JUDGMENT A.B. Pal, J. 1. The Petitioner herein while serving as Panchayat Secretary in Teliamura Rural Development Block under the Govt. of Tripura faced a criminal proceeding registered as 15 (WT/K)88 in connection with which he was arrested and detained for more than 48 hours in police custody leading to his suspension under Rule 10 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 w.e.f. 19.4.1989. The period of his suspension continued till it was revoked by an order dated 6.2.1995 following which he resumed duties on 15.2.1995. In the trial, he along with eight others were charged under Sections 147, 302 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code on the allegation that they had conspired and done to death the father of the informant Ranjit Das and then hanged the body on a tree in order to show that it was a case of suicide by hanging. On conclusion of the trial during which 13 witnesses were examined, the learned Additional Sessions Judge, West Tripura, Agartala held that the prosecution had failed to prove the charge against the accused persons. The observation contained in para 12 of the judgment is quoted below: In the light of the discussion made above, I lead to conclude that the prosecution side failed to prove the charge Under Section 302 of the IPC against the accused persons to the effect that after killing Rabindra Das the accused persons set his dead body in hanging condition in a Banak tree in the jungle of Durgapur village under Kalyanapur P.S. beyond all reasonable doubt and as such I find that all the accused persons are entitled to get the benefit of doubt. After the acquittal by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, the Director of Panchayats (first Respondent herein) passed an order on 5.4.1999 (Annexure-6) that the Petitioner herein, who submitted a representation for regularisation of his service by granting him all financial benefits for the period of his suspension, shall be entitled to get counted the entire period of suspension for the purpose of pension, increment and other service benefits, but no financial benefit other than the amount already paid as subsistence allowance would be admissible for the period of suspension. This order has been assailed in the present writ petition. 2. I have Mr. Somik Deb, learned Counsel for the Petitioner and Mr. T.D. Majumder, learned Counsel for the State Respondents. 3. This order has been assailed in the present writ petition. 2. I have Mr. Somik Deb, learned Counsel for the Petitioner and Mr. T.D. Majumder, learned Counsel for the State Respondents. 3. The only question that falls for consideration in this writ petition is whether an employee, who has been acquitted on benefit of doubt, is entitled to the full pay and allowances during the suspension period. The Petitioner has also made the allegation of discrimination by citing the example of another employee, Shri Pradip Biswas of the Agriculture Department, who was also involved along with him and others in the said criminal case, but after acquittal he was given all the financial benefits for the period of suspension by an order dated 21.4.1997, issued by the Director of Agriculture. The order, which has been enclosed as Annexure-7 with the writ petition reads in the concluding part as follows: The period of suspension of Sri Biswas, A.A. with effect from 19.4.1989 to the date of his joining in duties shall be treated as on duties. He shall be allowed and paid full pay and admissible allowances for the period of suspension after deduction of the amount already drawn by him earlier for the aforesaid period as subsistence allowance. 4. The State Respondents contested the writ petition contending, inter alia, that acquittal on benefit of doubt is not a positive finding about innocence of the Petitioner and, therefore, as his services could not be utilized during the period of suspension, it was within the competence of the authority to pass necessary order as to his entitlement of pay and allowances. 5. The legal position is required to be noted first before placing on its anvil the factual position of the case on hand. In LINK Chhotelal v. Union of India and Ors., reported in (1989)1 GLR 307, it has been held that acquittal on benefit of doubt is a complete acquittal on merit. The discussion and observation made in para 3 of the judgment and order are gainfully quoted below: 3. We have perused the acquittal order passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, Kailashahar (Tripura) and we find that it took the view that the prosecution had failed to prove the charges beyond all reasonable doubt. The discussion and observation made in para 3 of the judgment and order are gainfully quoted below: 3. We have perused the acquittal order passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, Kailashahar (Tripura) and we find that it took the view that the prosecution had failed to prove the charges beyond all reasonable doubt. Because of this observation, it cannot, first, be held that the Petitioner was acquitted by giving him any benefit of doubt inasmuch as a criminal case has to fail on merit if the prosecution fails to prove the charge beyond reasonable doubt. Secondly, even if the acquittal can be said to be on the ground of giving benefit of doubt to the Petitioner, we cannot hold that such an acquittal is, in any way, less than acquittal due on full merits. Shri Das has, in this connection, referred us to Mohan Lal v. Union of India and Ors. 1981 (2) SLJ 489, in which it was held that even where a person is acquitted on benefit of doubt, it cannot be said that he is acquitted due to non-compliance with the technical rules of procedure. The further observation in this case is that in criminal law an acquittal on benefit of doubt is a complete acquittal on merits. We are in respectful agreement with this view expressed by the learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court. We have also been referred in this connection to Balwant Singh v. The Inspector General of Police and Ors. 1983(1) SLJ 176(Petitioners and H) in which the acquittal on the ground that the prosecution had failed to produce witnesses despite being given 6/7 opportunities was not held to be an acquittal on technical ground. We are not expressing any opinion as to such acquittals, but would say that when the accused is acquitted on the ground of benefit of doubt, the same cannot be regarded as acquittal on technical ground. As to when an acquittal would be on technical ground, we may mention about acquittal due to lack of sanction in those cases where sanction is required. In the present case, however, the acquittal order was passed by the learned Magistrate after going through the evidence led in the case which did not satisfy the mind of the learned trial court, because of which it was stated that the prosecution had failed to prove the case beyond all reasonable doubt. In the present case, however, the acquittal order was passed by the learned Magistrate after going through the evidence led in the case which did not satisfy the mind of the learned trial court, because of which it was stated that the prosecution had failed to prove the case beyond all reasonable doubt. In another case between Shri Krishna Mohan Dutta v. The State of Tripura, reported in (1988)2 GLR 332, a Division Bench of this Court held that if an employee is put under suspension because of any criminal proceeding and no separate departmental proceeding has been drawn up and thereafter, he is reinstated on being acquitted by the criminal court, he is entitled to get full salary for the period of suspension even if the acquittal is on the basis of benefit of doubt. Para 5 of the said judgment is reproduced below: 5. In Duttatrava Vasudeo Kulkarni v. Director of Agriculture 1984 (3) SLR 83, a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court held that an employee is entitled to full pay and allowances as if he had not been suspended-the concept of benefit of doubt is irrelevant. According to their Lordships acquittal by giving benefit of doubt means acquittal for all purposes and amounts to "acquitted of blame". We respectfully agree with the law laid down by the Bombay High Court and hold that if an employee is put under suspension because of any criminal proceeding and no separate departmental proceeding has been drawn up and thereafter he is reinstated on being acquitted by the criminal court is entitled to get full salary for the period of suspension even if the acquittal is on the basis of benefit of doubt. However, in Hukmi Chand v. Jhabua Co-operative Central Bank Ltd., reported in (1998)2 SCC 291 , the Supreme Court dealt with a situation where the service of the Appellant was terminated following his conviction and sentence in a criminal case. This appeal against the conviction and sentence was dismissed, but in revision he was acquitted by the High Court. The question whether he was entitled to full pay and allowances during the period of his dismissal was considered and the Apex Court came to a decision that the right to reinstatement on acquittal does not carry with it by necessary implication a right to back wages under Rule 49(ii). The question whether he was entitled to full pay and allowances during the period of his dismissal was considered and the Apex Court came to a decision that the right to reinstatement on acquittal does not carry with it by necessary implication a right to back wages under Rule 49(ii). The relevant part of the said judgment appearing in para 6 is quoted below: There is no such fetter in Rule 49(ii) as contended by the Appellant. All that Rule 49(ii) provides is that the order must state that such back wages are being granted. In absence of an order specifying the grant of back wages, the reinstatement will not automatically entitle an employee to back wages. The right to reinstatement on acquittal, therefore, does not carry with it, by necessary implication, a right to back wages under Rule 49(ii). But the employer has the discretion to grant back wages. Such a "fetter" if at all it is a fetter, cannot be considered as arbitrary in view of the fact that the termination of services under Rule 49(I) is on conviction. During the pendency of an appeal, the conviction is not obliterated. However, on acquittal, Rule 49(ii) provides for reinstatement. The grant of back wages, in these circumstance, will obviously depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case, especially because in the interregnum, the employee does not work with the employer on account of a valid termination of service. While the above case dealt with the question of entitlement of an employee of full pay and allowances during the period he was out of service because of his dismissal severing the employer and employee relationship, the question whether full pay and allowances are admissible to an employee on acquittal based on insufficient evidence in a criminal case has been addressed in Krishnakant Raghunath Bibhavnekar v. State of Maharashtra and Ors., reported in (1997)3 SCC 636 . It has been held by the Apex Court that the disciplinary authority has option to enquire into the misconduct, which was the subject matter of the criminal charge against the employee concerned. If the alleged misconduct is the foundation for prosecution, grant of consequential benefits with all back wages etc. cannot be as a matter or right. The relevant part containing the above observation is quoted below: Legal evidence may be insufficient to bring home the guilt beyond doubt. If the alleged misconduct is the foundation for prosecution, grant of consequential benefits with all back wages etc. cannot be as a matter or right. The relevant part containing the above observation is quoted below: Legal evidence may be insufficient to bring home the guilt beyond doubt. The act of reinstatement sends ripples among the people in the office/locality and shows wrong signals for degeneration of morality, integrity and rightful conduct and efficient performance of public duty. The constitutional animation of public faith and credit given to public acts would be undermined. Every act or the conduct of a public servant should be to effectuate the public purpose and constitutional objective. Public servant renders himself accountable to the public. If the alleged conduct is the foundation for prosecution, grant of consequential benefits with all back wages etc. cannot be as a matter of course, even if the employee may have been acquitted on appreciation or lack of sufficient evidence. It would be deleterious to the maintenance of discipline if a person who was suspended on valid considerations is given full back wages as a matter of course, on his acquittal. The disciplinary authority has option either to enquire into the misconduct unless the selfsame conduct was subject-matter of the charge and on trial the acquittal was not based on benefit of doubt but on a positive finding that the accused did not commit the offence at all. The authority may also, on reinstatement, pass appropriate order including treating suspension period as not spent on duty, after following the principles of natural justice. 6. The above decisions of this Court and the Apex Court would make it clear that even after acquittal on benefit of doubt, it is open to the disciplinary authority to make an inquiry into the alleged misconduct, which was the foundation of the criminal proceeding against the accused employee inasmuch as the standard of proof in a criminal proceeding and a departmental proceeding cannot be same. While in a criminal proceeding the prosecution has to prove the charge against the accused beyond all reasonable shadow of doubt, in a disciplinary proceeding it would suffice if it can be proved that preponderance of probability is in favour of a misconduct committed by the Govt. Servant. While in a criminal proceeding the prosecution has to prove the charge against the accused beyond all reasonable shadow of doubt, in a disciplinary proceeding it would suffice if it can be proved that preponderance of probability is in favour of a misconduct committed by the Govt. Servant. Because of this reason, the inquiry on acquittal is legally sustainable, but the same has to be done in accordance with the principles of natural justice after affording opportunities to the incumbent concerned to represent his case. In the case on hand, the order impugned herein passed by the Director of Panchayats on 5.4.1999 does not show that an inquiry was initiated by the disciplinary authority after the order of acquittal in the sessions trial in order to ascertain whether the materials and evidence on record about alleged misconduct of the Petitioner stood the test of preponderance of probability. That has not been done and, therefore, it cannot be said that the Petitioner herein was guilty of any misconduct for which he is not entitled to full pay and allowances for the period of his suspension during which the employer-employee relationship did not obliterate. 7. I have carefully gone through the judgment rendered by the learned Additional Sessions Judge in the sessions trial noted above. In that case the dead body was found hanging on a tree and none of the witnesses paraded by the prosecution was eyewitness. The entire case was sought to be built and proved on circumstantial evidence, which, however, miserably failed leading to acquittal of the accused-Petitioner herein as well as other accused persons. One of the other accused, Pradip Biswas was also a Govt. employee in the office of the Director of Agriculture and as noted above after his acquittal, he was given full pay and allowances for the period of suspension. That being so, it would be an apparent discrimination between the two Govt. employees under the same Govt., who had faced same criminal proceeding and were acquitted under same circumstances. Thus, they being similarly situated cannot be discriminated against by two different orders. 8. Placing the factual position on hand on the anvils of law laid down by the Apex Court and this Court as noticed above, there is no difficulty to take view that in the present case, the Petitioner is entitled to the full pay and allowances for the period of his suspension. 8. Placing the factual position on hand on the anvils of law laid down by the Apex Court and this Court as noticed above, there is no difficulty to take view that in the present case, the Petitioner is entitled to the full pay and allowances for the period of his suspension. 9. Accordingly, this writ petition is allowed to the extent noted above leaving the parties to bear their own costs. Petition allowed