Judgment Heard Sri B.K. Gupta, Advocate for the petitioner and Standing Counsel for the respondents. 2. By the present writ petition, the petitioner has prayed for a writ of certiorari quashing the order passed by the District Judge by which the appeal of the respondent no.2 has been allowed. 3. Briefly stated, the application was filed under Section 21 (1 )(a) of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 praying for the release of the accommodation belonging to Sitapur Eye Hospital, which is a registered public charitable trust known as Sitapur Eye Hospital, Ranikhet. The property in dispute is a part of the hospital. The premises known as Survey Plot No. 99/77/1 at Shiv Mandir Marg, Ranikhet, District Almora was let out to the respondent no. 2. The premises is required for looking after the patients and for their residence in the hospital area. If the accommodation is released, the patients will be benefited and therefore, the requirement of the landlord is bona fide looking to the public interest as well. 4. A written statement was filed by the respondent no. 2 denying the averments made in the application. In the additional pleas, it has been stated that in one of the portion, she is the tenant of the premises. It was admitted in paragraph 21 of the written statement that the patients are not being put to inconvenience by remaining in the accommodation. In paragraph 25, it has been stated that she is a teacher in the Government Inter College and she has no house to reside. In paragraph 26 of the written statement, further it has been admitted that the patients use to reside in the hospital for eight to ten days. Further in paragraph 28, it has been stated by the respondent no. 2 that she is making efforts to get an alternative accommodation. 5. In support of the application filed under section 21 (1)(a) of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 Dr. A. Mehrotra has filed an affidavit stating therein that the respondent no. 2 is a tenant at the rate of Rs. 60/- per month of two room accommodation along with other amenities and the premises is required for accommodating the patients, who use to come for the treatment and therefore, the requirement is bona fide. 6. A. Mehrotra has filed an affidavit stating therein that the respondent no. 2 is a tenant at the rate of Rs. 60/- per month of two room accommodation along with other amenities and the premises is required for accommodating the patients, who use to come for the treatment and therefore, the requirement is bona fide. 6. The certificate dated 6th April, 1976 was also filed, which was issued by the Cantonment Executive showing that the said premises Plot No. 99/77/1 has been leased out to the Eye Hospital for the purposes of running the Eye Hospital, but most of the rooms have been rented out to the own person, which is infringement of the condition 1 (b) of the lease deed. A show cause notice was sent to the petitioner. The said notice is quoted below: "The Medical Officer l/c Sitapur Eye Hospital Branch, Ranikhet Sub: USE OF THE HOSPITAL PREMISES FOR RESIDENCE Dear Sir, The Site comprising Sy. No. 99/7711 Ranikhet Cantonment along with buildings situated thereon were leased to Eye Hospital Trust for the purpose of Eye Hospital. It has been noticed that most of the rooms have been rented out for residential purposes to various individuals, which entails infringement of condition 1 (6) of the lease. You are, therefore, hereby required to show cause within 30 days from the date of receipt of this letter as to why action be not taken against you for breach of conditions of the lease. Yours faithfully, Cantonment Executive Officer, Ranikhet. " 7. The prescribed Authority vide his order dated 9th August, 1997 has relied upon the documents namely: "21 Kha/1 to 7 the copy of the lease-deed executed by the Cantonment Board, Ranikhet, 22 Kha, Plans in respect of Survey Plot No. 99/7711 Ranikhet 16 Ka/2 copy of Cantonment Board's Resolution No.6 dated 11-6-1977, 1613 Ka, copy of Board's letter no. 261/209-1/H/ADM dated 1-4-1976, 16/4 Ka copy of Cantt. Board's letter No. 165/H/ADM dated 27-2-1976, 7/1 to 2 Ka, copy of power's of attorney deed (Mukhtar-nama) dated 18-9-1976 and the affidavit of Sri BR. Rathor and Dr. A. Mehrotra lie Sitapur Eye Hospital Branch Ranikhet. " 8. Documents have also been relied upon by the respondent no. 2 in her own support to the following effect: "two affidavits i.e. Affidavit of Sri Rajendra Singh and the other of herself. A rent receipt 17/2 Ka." 9. Rathor and Dr. A. Mehrotra lie Sitapur Eye Hospital Branch Ranikhet. " 8. Documents have also been relied upon by the respondent no. 2 in her own support to the following effect: "two affidavits i.e. Affidavit of Sri Rajendra Singh and the other of herself. A rent receipt 17/2 Ka." 9. From the aforesaid documents, the finding was recorded that the premises is bona fide required for the purposes of accommodating the patients and as such the need of the petitioner has been held to be greater that the respondent no. 2. The respondent no. 2 went in Appeal. The appellate Court has come to the conclusion that since the respondent no. 2 is the teacher, therefore, the hardship shall lie in her favour. 10. The appellate Court has recorded a finding that rule 16 of the Act No. 13 of 1972 has not been taken into consideration by the prescribed authority while considering the bona fide need as well as comparative hardship and therefore, the appeal was allowed. 11 . A perusal of the order passed by the appellate Court shows that the appeal has been allowed on the ground that the comparative hardship has not been considered. Section 21 (1) (a) of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 provides as under :. "21. Proceedings for release of building under occupation of tenant.- (1) The prescribed authority may, on an application of the landlord in that behalf, order the eviction of a tenant from the building under tenancy or any specified part thereof if it is satisfied that any of the following grounds exist namely(a) that the building is bona fide required either in its existing form or after demolition and new construction by the landlord for occupation by himself or any member of his family, or any person for whose benefit, it is held by him, either for residential purposes or for purposes of any profession, trade or calling, or where the landlord is the trustee of a public charitable trust, for the objects of the trust;" 12. In Mst. Bega Begum V/s Abdul Ahmad Khan 1979 A.I.R. SC page 272, it has been held :- 'The connotation of the term 'requirement' should not be artificially extended nor its language so unduly stretched or strained as to make it impossible or extremely difficult for the landlord to get an order of release. In Mst. Bega Begum V/s Abdul Ahmad Khan 1979 A.I.R. SC page 272, it has been held :- 'The connotation of the term 'requirement' should not be artificially extended nor its language so unduly stretched or strained as to make it impossible or extremely difficult for the landlord to get an order of release. Such a course would defeat the very purpose of the Act, which affords the facility of eviction of the tenant to the landlord on certain specified grounds contemplated under section 21 of the Act. The provisions contained in the Act strike a just balance between the genuine need of the landlord on the one hand and the great inconvenience and troubles of the tenants on the other. Since section 21 of the Act is meant for the benefit of the landlord, therefore, it must be so construed as to advance the object behind the said provision. The tenant has to establish that if he is evicted he will suffer greater hardship as compared to the landlord and must lead clear evidence to show that in spite of the best efforts he was unable to get another alternative suitable accommodation in the absence whereof the scale of relative hardship may be tilted in favour of the landlord as the inconvenience, loss or trouble resulting from a denial of the order of release in favour of the landlord will for out weight the prejudice or the inconvenience which may likely be caused to the tenants. " 13. As will appear from the aforesaid Section 21 (1) (a) of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972, requirement being for consideration of objects of the trust, the requirement is fully covered under the aforesaid provision as held by the apex Court in Shanti Devi and another Vs. 1st Addl. District Judge, Haridwar 2000(2) ARC Page 386. In the aforesaid case, it has been observed as under :- "9. Respondent No.2 is admittedly a 'sanyasi' and his object in life to preach religion, performance religious rites and to establish' dharm' according to his own sect. If a man can utilize the accommodation for the purpose of any profession, trade or calling, there is no reasons that a 'sanyasi' cannot be permitted to utilize his own property to achieve his own objects in regard to religious purposes. " 14. In Shanti Devi Vs. If a man can utilize the accommodation for the purpose of any profession, trade or calling, there is no reasons that a 'sanyasi' cannot be permitted to utilize his own property to achieve his own objects in regard to religious purposes. " 14. In Shanti Devi Vs. 1st Upper District Judge (supra) reliance has been placed on Kapnath Pandey v. XIth Additional District Judge, Luc know and others, 1993 (2) ARC 657 and Yogendra Nath Jain v. IIIrd Additional District Judge, Meerut and others, 1998 (1) ARC 444, relevant observations are quoted below:- "Admittedly Sheel Chand was tenant. He died during the pendency of the case leaving behind him Smt. Shanti Devi, his widow and two sons, Pramod Kumar and Rakesh Kumar. Pramod Kumar son of petitioner No. 1 was allotted EWS flat and his family is residing therein. Respondent No.1 took the views that as one of the family members of the deceased tenant has acquired an accommodation in the same city, explanation referred to above is applicable in this case. Learned Counsel for the petitioners contended that the explanation referred to above will be applicable only when two conditions are satisfied, namely, (1) that the member of the family who has acquired the accommodation was residing with the tenant and (2) was wholly dependent upon him but both these conditions have not been satisfied. He has placed reliance upon the decision Kapnath Pandey v. IXIth Additional District Judge, Luc know and others, 1993 (2) ARC 67 and Yogendra Nath Jain v. IIIrd Additional District Judge, Meerut and others, 1998 (1) ARC 444. Pramod Kumar was admittedly living with his father but it is alleged that he because (sic) dependent since the year 1970 and thereafter he was not residing with his father and he was not dependent upon him at the time when he acquired the land. It is not necessary to examine the controversy as regards to the applicability of the explanation under the facts and circumstances of the present case as the Appellate Authority has examined the hardship, which the parties may suffer on account of the application being allowed or rejected by it. The petitioner No.2 is an earning member of the family. The application was filed in the year, 1992 and almost 8 years have passed, they have not shown that they made any sincere effort to find out any alternative accommodation. The petitioner No.2 is an earning member of the family. The application was filed in the year, 1992 and almost 8 years have passed, they have not shown that they made any sincere effort to find out any alternative accommodation. Petitioner No. 1 is alleged to be living with his son. The application was filed against four sets of tenants. The two tenants have already vacated and the third tenant has not filed any writ petition in this Court. The disputed accommodation cannot be raised (sic) unless the disputed accommodation is also released in favour of respondent No. 2 and in these circumstances, the respondent No. 1 was justified in holding that respondent NO.2 would suffer a greater hardship in case the application is rejected." "9. Respondent No.2 is admittedly a 'sanyasi' and his object in life is to preach reli"gion, performance religious rites and to establish 'dharm' according to his own sect./f a man can utilize the accommodation for the purpose of any profession, trade or calling, there is no reason that a 'sanyasi' cannot be permitted to utilize his own property to achieve his own object in regard to religious purposes. " 15. The judgment of Shanti Devi (supra) went up to the Apex Court and the Apex Court in 2003 SC and Full Bench Rent Cases, P. 133 after confirming the judgment of the High Court has held as under :- "4. The singular submission of the learned counsel for the appellant-tenants has been that the purpose for which the premises are sought to be got vacated does not fall within the purview of the above said provision. We do riot agree. Clause (a) above said is 'very widely worded. Demolition and reconstruction for occupation by the landlord himself either for residential purpose or for purposes of any profession trade or calling is permissible. The word 'profession, trade or calling' are very wide and include therein all activities wherein a person may usefully and/or gainfully engage himself./t cannot be doubted that the respondent-landlord is a sanyasi and his calling is performance or religious activities including propagation of religion by delivering sermons and attracting devotees. Though the respondent does not appear to be carrying on such activities like a commercial activity, the fact remains that the respondent depends on such activities also to cater to his livelihood there from." 16. Though the respondent does not appear to be carrying on such activities like a commercial activity, the fact remains that the respondent depends on such activities also to cater to his livelihood there from." 16. So far as the rule 16 (1) (a) is concerned, the same provides as under: "16. Application for release on the ground of personal requirement [Sections 21 (1)(a) and 34(8)].-(1) In considering the requirements of personal occupation for purposes of residence by the landlord or any member of his family, the prescribed authority shall, also have regard to such factors as the following(a) where the landlord already has adequate and reasonably suitable accommodation having regard to the number of members of his family and their respective ages and his means and social status, his claim for additional requirements shall be construed strictly." 17. In Sushila Vs. IInd A.D.J. Banda reported in 2003 SCFBRC 109, Rule 16 of the UP. Act No. 13 of 1972 has been interpreted. It has been held as under: "As observed earlier it is clear that the length of period of tenancy as provided under clause (a) of sub-rule 2 of Rule 16 of Rules, 1972 is only one of the factors to be taken into account in context with other facts and circumstances of the case. It cannot be a sole criterion or deciding factor to order or not the eviction of the tenant. " 18. Taking into consideration the aforesaid, I find merit in the arguments of the petitioner and therefore, the writ petition is allowed. However, respondent no. 2 has prayed for some time to vacate the accommodation. The prayer is accepted. 19. In view of that, the respondent no. 2 is allowed time to vacate the premises by or before 6th March, 2007 provided he follows the given conditions: .(a) undertaking to vacate the premises by or before 6th March, 2007 is furnished by or before 30th September, 2006. (b) the arrears of rent and damages is given by or before 30th September, 2006. (c) the current rent or damages is paid in the first week of every month. On failure of the aforesaid conditions, no more relief will be available with the respondent no. 2 and the petitioner shall proceed to evict the respondent no. 2. 20. Writ petition is allowed. No order as to costs.