( 1 ) HEARD the learned Advocate, Mr. H. S. Munshaw, appearing on behalf of petitioner. ( 2 ) IN the present petition, the petitioner has challenged the award passed by Labour Court, Baroda in Reference No. 107 of 1991 (old) and New No. 13 of 2000 dated 1. 3. 2006, whereby, the Labour Court has granted reinstatement with continuity of service and with 25% back wages w. e. f. 22. 6. 1995. ( 3 ) LEARNED Advocate, Mr. Munshaw, submitted that workman was appointed in special project assigned by Central Government through State Government in the National Rural Employment Programme and Javahar Rojgar Yojna. The workman was employed and provided work but, after some time, as funds are not available and scheme is over, therefore, along with other workmen, service of workman was terminated by petitioner on 9. 8. 1990. Said termination was challenged by workman before the Labour Court, Baroda. He submitted that petitioner has filed written statement and pointed out to the Labour Court that work is not available with the petitioner and after completion of the work, his service was terminated. He read over before this Court Page-13 and 14 of the award. He also submitted that workman has not produced any evidence before the Labour Court about completion of 240 days continuous service. He also submitted that it cannot be presumed that workman remained without work or unemployed after his termination. Therefore, according to him, Labour Court has committed gross error in passing such award which requires interference by this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. ( 4 ) I have considered the submissions made by learned Advocate, Mr. Munshaw and also perused the award passed by Labour Court, Baroda. The workman has filed statement of claim vide Exh. 6. The reference was made on 22. 2. 1991. The workman was working in Taluka Development Office w. e. f. 1. 10. 1987 as a daily wager Karkoon. His salary was Rs. 900/- per month. He remained continued in service w. e. f. 1. 10. 1987 to 9. 8. 1990. On 9. 8. 1990, his service was terminated by petitioner orally and no opportunity was given to the workman; no notice/ notice pay / retrenchment compensation was paid to the respondent workman. ( 5 ) ON behalf of the petitioner, written statement was filed vide Exh. 10. 1987 to 9. 8. 1990. On 9. 8. 1990, his service was terminated by petitioner orally and no opportunity was given to the workman; no notice/ notice pay / retrenchment compensation was paid to the respondent workman. ( 5 ) ON behalf of the petitioner, written statement was filed vide Exh. 19 raising certain contentions which have been raised by learned Advocate, Mr. Munshaw, before this Court. The contention raised in written statement that case of workman is covered by Section 2 (oo) (bb) of the I. D. Act,1947 and workman had not completed 240 days continuous service, therefore, the reference is required to be rejected. The workman was examined before the Labour Court vide Exh. 10. Thereafter, the petitioner remained absent and, therefore, ex-parte award was passed. Thereafter, petitioner has filed application for setting aside ex-parte award. The Labour Court has ultimately restored the reference by New No. 13 of 2000. The workman had filed affidavit vide Exh. 22 which was cross-examined by petitioner. Thereafter, on behalf of petitioner, one Shri Naranbhai Shantibhai vide Exh. 34 and one Shri Abdul Gani vide Exh. 43 was examined. Thereafter, Labour Court has heard the arguments of both the learned Advocates. The respondent workman had produced the record of presence marked by petitioner with Government Resolution vide Exh. 46. After considering the oral evidence and the submissions made by both the learned Advocates, the Labour Court has framed the issue and decided the merits between the parties. The Labour Court has come to conclusion that there is no dispute about the date of entry in the service 1. 10. 1987 and date of termination is 9. 8. 1990. The Labour Court has come to conclusion that petitioner has not produced any documentary evidence before the Court proving the fact that workman was appointed in particular project either in National Rural Employment Programme or Javahar Rojgar Yojna or any other project. It is necessary for the petitioner to justify that in which project the workman was appointed and whether that facts have been informed to the workman by giving appointment order to the workman or not. In this case, no appointment order has been issued in favour of respondent workman that he is appointed in particular project. No such documents produced by the petitioner before the Labour Court. In this case, no appointment order has been issued in favour of respondent workman that he is appointed in particular project. No such documents produced by the petitioner before the Labour Court. Therefore, in absence of the documentary evidence, the Labour Court has come to conclusion that it is not proved before the labour Court that workman is appointed in Javahar Rojgar Yojna or any project and, therefore, termination is not covered by Section 2 (oo) (bb) of the I. D. Act,1947. Therefore, such termination amounts to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2 (oo) of the I. D. Act,1947. The Labour Court has also appreciated the facts that it is a case in which no order of appointment and no order of termination issued by petitioner against the workman. Thereafter, the Labour Court has appreciated the oral evidence led by petitioner, as referred above, wherein, one Shri Naranbhai Shantibhai admitted in cross-examination, who was a witness of the petitioner, that workman was remained continued in service without any break from 1. 10. 1987 to 1. 10. 1990 but, he was working as daily wager. Therefore, in view of the admission made by witness of the petitioner, the workman was remained continued in service from 1. 10. 1987 to 1. 10. 1990. Meaning thereby the workman had completed 240 days continuous service on the basis of oral evidence of witness Naranbhai Shantibhai from the petitioner. This fact is enough to prove the completion of 240 days continuous service by the workman. It is also admitted by the said witness that daily rated muster roll was maintained by the Department and on that basis, salary was paid to the workman but, that muster was not produced by the petitioner before the Labour Court. Another witness of petitioner Shri Abdul Gani also admitted that he will produce the muster before the Labour Court, but not produced the same and, therefore, the Labour Court has rightly observed that in case if the muster roll was produced by the petitioner, this Court can examine it whether workman had completed 240 days continuous service or not. Therefore, when no documentary evidence given by petitioner to the workman during the period of service and to ask the workman to produce the documents, it is something unique on the part of petitioner. Therefore, when no documentary evidence given by petitioner to the workman during the period of service and to ask the workman to produce the documents, it is something unique on the part of petitioner. Therefore, the Labour Court has rightly appreciated unique theory of the petitioner demanding the documents from the workman. Undisputedly, no documents provided by the petitioner to the workman, therefore, Labour court has rightly come to conclusion that workman had completed 240 days continuous service within the meaning of 25b of the I. D. Act,1947 and at the time of termination, no notice/ notice pay/ retrenchment compensation were paid to the workman and, therefore, termination has been rightly set aside by the Labour Court. ( 6 ) THE contention which has been raised by petitioner that workman was appointed in particular project failed to prove such contention before the Labour Court by leading proper evidence. The Apex Court has considered this aspect in case of S. M. Nilajkar and others v. Telecom District Manager, Karnataka, 2003 AIR SCW 2196 that in such circumstances, employer should have to produce necessary documents before the Court that workman has been appointed in a particular project. Not only that, but it is a duty of the employer to inform the workman by giving written document of appointment order that he has been appointed in a particular project. In absence of such appointment order, the contention of petitioner cannot be accepted. Relevant observation of the Apex Court in the case of S. M. Nilajkar (supra) is in Para. 11 to 14, which is quoted as under :"11. It is common knowledge that the Government as a welfare State floats several schemes and projects generating employment opportunities, though they are short lived. The objective is to meet the need of the moment. The benefit of such schemes and projects is that for the duration they exist, they provide employment and livelihood to such persons as would not have been able to secure the same but for such schemes or projects. The objective is to meet the need of the moment. The benefit of such schemes and projects is that for the duration they exist, they provide employment and livelihood to such persons as would not have been able to secure the same but for such schemes or projects. If the workmen employed for fulfilling the need of such passing-phase-projects or schemes were to become a liability on the employer State by too liberally interpreting the labour laws in favour of the workmen, then the same may well act as a disincentive to the State for floating such schemes and the State may opt to keep away from initiating such schemes and projects even in times of dire need, because it may feel that by opening the gates of welfare it would be letting in onerous obligations entailed upon it by extended application of the labour laws. Sub-clause (bb) in the definition of retrenchment was introduced to take care of such like situations by Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1984 with effect from 18-8-1984. 12. "retrenchment" in its ordinary connotation is discharge of labour as surplus though the business or work itself is continued. It is well settled by a catena of decisions that labour laws being beneficial pieces of legislation are to be interpreted in favour of the beneficiaries in case of doubt or where it is possible to take two views of a provision. It is also well settled that the Parliament has employed the expression "the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever" while defining the term "retrenchment", which is suggestive of the legislative intent to assign the term retrenchment a meaning wider than what it is understood to have in common parlance. There are four exceptions carved out of the artificially extended meaning of the term retrenchment , and therefore, termination of service of a workman so long as it is attributable to the act of the employer would fall within the meaning of retrenchment dehors the reason for termination. To be excepted from within the meaning of retrenchment the termination of service must fall within one of the four excepted categories. A termination of service which does not fall within the categories (a), (b), (bb) and (c) would fall within the meaning of retrenchment . 13. To be excepted from within the meaning of retrenchment the termination of service must fall within one of the four excepted categories. A termination of service which does not fall within the categories (a), (b), (bb) and (c) would fall within the meaning of retrenchment . 13. The termination of service of a workman engaged in a scheme or project may not amount to retrenchment within the meaning of sub-clause (bb) subject to the following conditions being satisfied:-1. that the workman was employed in a project or scheme of temporary duration; 2. the employment was on a contract, and not as a daily wager simpliciter, which provided inter alia that the employment shall come to an end on the expiry of the scheme or project ; and 3. the employment came to an end simultaneously with the termination of the scheme or project and consistently with the terms of the contract. 4. the workman ought to have been apprised or made aware of the abovesaid terms by the employer at the commencement of employment. 14. The engagement of a workman as a daily wager does not by itself amount to putting the workman on notice that he was being engaged in a scheme or project which was to last only for a particular length of time or upto to the occurrence of some event, and therefore, the workman ought to know that his employment was short lived. The contract of employment consciously entered into by the workman with the employer would result in a notice to the workman on the date of the commencement of the employment itself that his employment was short lived and as per the terms of the contract the same was liable to termination on the expiry of the contract and the scheme or project coming to an end. The workman may not therefore, complain that by the act of employer his employment was coming to an abrupt termination. To exclude the termination of a scheme or project employee from the definition of retrenchment it is for the employer to prove the abovesaid ingredients so as to attract the applicability of sub clause (bb) abovesaid. In the case at hand, the respondent-employer has failed in alleging and proving the ingredients of sub-clause (bb), as stated hereinabove. All that has been proved is that the appellants were engaged as casual workers or daily wagers in a project. In the case at hand, the respondent-employer has failed in alleging and proving the ingredients of sub-clause (bb), as stated hereinabove. All that has been proved is that the appellants were engaged as casual workers or daily wagers in a project. For want of proof attracting applicability of sub-clause (bb), it has to be held that the termination of the services of the appellants amounted to retrenchment. ( 7 ) THE contention which has been raised by learned Advocate, Mr. Munshaw, that workman has not produced any documents before the Labour Court to prove completion of 240 days. The Apex Court has considered this aspect in the case of R. M. Yellatti v. Assistant Executive Engineer, reported in (JT 2005 (9) SC 340 ). The Apex Court has made following observations in Para. 17, 18 and 19 which are quoted as under :17. Analyzing the above decisions of this court, it is clear that the provisions of the Evidence Act in terms do not apply to the proceedings under section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act. However, applying general principles and on reading the aforestated judgments, we find that this court has repeatedly taken the view that the burden of proof is on the claimant to show that he had worked for 240 days in a given year. This burden is discharged only upon the workman stepping in the witness box. This burden is discharged upon the workman adducing cogent evidence, both oral and documentary. In cases of termination of services of daily waged earner, there will be no letter of appointment or termination. There will also be no receipt or proof of payment. Thus in most cases, the workman (claimant) can only call upon the employer to produce before the court the nominal muster roll for the given period, the letter of appointment or termination, if any, the wage register, the attendance register etc. Drawing of adverse inference ultimately would depend thereafter on facts of each case. The above decisions however make it clear that mere affidavits or self-serving statements made by the claimant/workman will not suffice in the matter of discharge of the burden placed by law on the workman to prove that he had worked for 240 days in a given year. Drawing of adverse inference ultimately would depend thereafter on facts of each case. The above decisions however make it clear that mere affidavits or self-serving statements made by the claimant/workman will not suffice in the matter of discharge of the burden placed by law on the workman to prove that he had worked for 240 days in a given year. The above judgments further lay down that mere non-production of muster rolls per se without any plea of suppression by the claimant workman will not be the ground for the tribunal to draw an adverse inference against the management. Lastly, the above judgments lay down the basic principle, namely, that the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution will not interfere with the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the labour court unless they are perverse. This exercise will depend upon facts of each case. 18. Now applying the above decision to the facts of the present case, we find that the workman herein had stepped in the witness box. He had called upon the management to produce the nominal muster rolls for the period commencing from 22. 11. 1988 to 20. 6. 1994. This period is the period borne out by the certificate (Ex. W1) issued by the former Asstt. Executive Engineer. The evidence in rebuttal from the side of the management needs to be noticed. The management produced five nominal muster rolls (NMRs), out of which 3 NMRs, Ex. M1, Ex. M2 and Ex. M3, did not even relate to the concerned period. The relevant NMRs produced by the management were Ex. M4 and Ex. M5, which indicated that the workmen had worked for 43 days during the period 21. 1. 1994 to 20. 2. 1994 and 21. 3. 1994 to 20. 4. 1994 respectively. There is no explanation from the side of the management as to why for the remaining period the nominal muster rolls were not produced. The labour court has rightly held that there is nothing to disbelieve the certificate (Ex. W1 ). The High Court in its impugned judgment has not given reasons for discarding the said certificate. In the circumstances, we are of the view that the division bench of the High Court ought not to have interfered with the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the labour court and confirmed by the learned single judge vide order dated 7. 6. The High Court in its impugned judgment has not given reasons for discarding the said certificate. In the circumstances, we are of the view that the division bench of the High Court ought not to have interfered with the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the labour court and confirmed by the learned single judge vide order dated 7. 6. 2000 in writ petition no. 17636 of 2000. This is not, therefore, a case where the allegations of the workman are founded merely on an affidavit. He has produced cogent evidence in support of his case. The workman was working in SD-1, Athani and Ex. W1 was issued by the former Asstt. Executive Engineer, Hipparagi Dam Construction Division No. 1, Athani-591304. In the present case, the defence of the management was that although Ex. W1 refers to the period 22. 11. 1988 to 20. 6. 1994, the workman had not worked as a daily wager on all days during that period. If so, the management was duty bound to produce before the labour court the nominal muster rolls for the relevant period, particularly when it was summoned to do so. We are not placing this judgment on the shifting of the burden. We are not placing this case on drawing of adverse inference. In the present case, we are of the view that the workman had stepped in the witness box and his case that he had worked for 240 days in a given year was supported by the certificate (Ex. W1 ). In the circumstances, the division bench of the High Court had erred in interfering with the concurrent findings of fact. 19. Before concluding, we would like to make an observation with regard to cases concerning retrenchment/termination of services of daily waged earners, particularly those who are appointed to work in Government departments. Daily waged earners are not regular employees. They are not given letters of appointments. They are not given letters of termination. They are not given any written document which they could produce as proof of receipt of wages. Their muster rolls are maintained in loose sheets. Even in cases, where registers are maintained by the Government departments, the officers/clerks making entries do not put their signatures. Even where signatures of clerks appear, the entries are not countersigned or certified by the appointing authorities. Their muster rolls are maintained in loose sheets. Even in cases, where registers are maintained by the Government departments, the officers/clerks making entries do not put their signatures. Even where signatures of clerks appear, the entries are not countersigned or certified by the appointing authorities. In such cases, we are of the view that the State Governments should take steps to maintain proper records of the services rendered by the daily wagers; that these records should be signed by the competent designated officers and that at the time of termination, the concerned designated officers should give certificates of the number of days which the labourer/daily wager has worked. This system will obviate litigations and pecuniary liability for the Government. " ( 8 ) THE Allahabad High Court has taken the similar view in case of U. P. Rajya Setu Nigam Sanyukta Karmachari Sangh v. U. P. State Bridge Corporation Ltd. and others, reported in 2003 Lab. I. C. 390. Relevant observations are in Para. 25 to 27 which are quoted as under :"25. It is not disputed that the Corporation is a State within the meaning of Art. 12 of the Constitution of India. It is supposed to act reasonable and not arbitrarily. The services of the respondents writ petitioners have been terminated without even given show cause notice or opportunity of hearing before passing the impugned orders of termination. Thus, the impugned orders have been passed in gross violation of principle of natural justice, fair play and equity and have rightly been quashed by the learned Single Judge. 26. These cannot be any dispute that every construction project is treated to be a separate work and the employees engaged but and working in a particular project cannot seek adjustment or absorption as a matter of right in another project on completion of that project in which they were working. 27. So far as the question that the respondent writ petitioners had been engaged for a particular project as concerned, there is no specific pleading by the corporation. General statement has been made that the workmen are generally employed at the project site and after completion of the project, the service of such employees automatically come to end on that particular project. General statement has been made that the workmen are generally employed at the project site and after completion of the project, the service of such employees automatically come to end on that particular project. But neither any details of project and employees engaged therein with reference to the respondent writ petitioners have been given nor their appointment letters have been placed before the Court. Hence, such contention cannot be accepted. ( 9 ) IN view of the above observations by the Apex Court as well as the Allahabad High Court as referred above, there is no documents produced by the petitioner to justify that workman has been appointed in particular project and workman has not produce any documents because no documents were given by petitioner to the workman. Therefore, the Labour Court has rightly considered the admission made by witness of petitioner that workman remained in continuous service from 1. 10. 1987 to 1. 10. 1990 without any break, which itself proved that workman had rendered 240 days continuous service. ( 10 ) THE Labour Court has considered the question of back wages independently on the basis of evidence led by workman before the Labour Court. The workman had admitted that he has earned Rs. 400/- by doing repairing work and except that he was not able to get any other amount. No oral evidence led by petitioner to prove gainful employment of the workman and no documents produced by the petitioner to prove gainful employment of respondent. The salary of the workman was Rs. 900/ -. Therefore, considering this aspect, the Labour Court has come to conclusion that workman is entitled 25% back wages of interim period not from the date of termination but, from the date of filing the statement of claim before the Labour Court on 22. 6. 1995. Therefore, termination of 1987 and for about 8 years period, the Labour Court has not given any amount of back wages to the workman but, w. e. f 22. 6. 1995, date of filing of statement of claim, the Labour Court has granted only 25% back wages of interim period. Therefore, according to my opinion, the Labour Court has rightly applied the mind and not granted 25% back wages from date of termination but, granted the same from date of filing the statement of claim. Therefore, the Labour Court has not committed any error while passing such award. Therefore, according to my opinion, the Labour Court has rightly applied the mind and not granted 25% back wages from date of termination but, granted the same from date of filing the statement of claim. Therefore, the Labour Court has not committed any error while passing such award. ( 11 ) AFTER considering this submission as well as perusing the award in question, the entire award is based upon the facts which considered to be fact finding. Therefore, this Court is having very limited jurisdiction to interfere with such award while exercising the power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Learned Advocate, Mr. Munshaw, is not able to point out any infirmity in the award. The Apex Court in case of Indian Overseas Bank v. Indian Overseas Bank Staff Canteen Workers Union and another, reported in AIR 2000 SC 1508 , in Para. 19, has observed as under :"19. The learned Single Judge seems to have undertaken an exercise, impermissible for him in exercising writ jurisdiction, by liberally reappreciating the evidence and drawing conclusions of his own on pure questions of fact, unmindful, though aware fully, that he is not exercising any appellate jurisdiction over the awards passed by a Tribunal, presided over by a Judicial Officer. The findings of fact recorded by a fact-finding authority duly constituted for the purpose and which ordinarily should be considered to have become final, cannot be disturbed for the mere reason of having been based on materials or evidence not sufficient or credible in the opinion of the writ Court to warrant those findings at any rate, as long as they are based upon some material which are relevant for the purpose or even on the ground that there is yet another view which can be reasonably and possibly one taken. The Division Bench was not only justified but well merited in its criticism of the order of the learned single Judge and in ordering restoration of the Award of the Tribunal. The Division Bench was not only justified but well merited in its criticism of the order of the learned single Judge and in ordering restoration of the Award of the Tribunal. On being taken through the findings of the Industrial Tribunal as well as the order of the learned single Judge and the judgment of the Division Bench, we are of the view that the Industrial Tribunal had overwhelming materials which constituted ample and sufficient basis for recording its findings, as it did , and the manner of consideration undertaken, the objectivity of approach adopted and reasonableness of findings recorded seem to be unexceptionable. The only course, therefore, open to the writ Judge was to find out the satisfaction or otherwise of the relevant criteria laid down by this Court, before sustaining the claim of the canteen workmen, on the facts found and recorded by the fact-finding authority and not embark upon an exercise of re-assessing the evidence and arriving at findings of ones own, altogether giving a complete go-bye even to the facts specifically found by the Tribunal below. " ( 12 ) IN view of the above, the Labour Court has not committed any error which requires any interference by this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Hence, there is no substance in the present petition. Present petition is dismissed.