JUDGMENT S.A. Naqvi, J. Rajat Vidyarthi preferred this Second appeal u/s 100 of the CPC aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 2-7-2001 passed by Ninth Addl. Distt. Judge, Gwalior, in Civil Appeal No. 86A of 1999 setting aside finding of trial Court on issue No. 1 but confirming judgment and decree dated 1-11-1999 passed by Ninth Civil Judge, Class II, Gwalior, in Civil suit No. 203A of 1996 whereby, Civil suit filed by appellant/plaintiff has been rejected by trial Court. Plaintiff/appellant's case, in short, is that on 30-12-1965 forefather of both the parties Bisan Sahai/Vidyarthi purchased house No. 3/280 (new No. 276/40) situated at Taksal Road, Chhatri Bazar, Lashker, Gwalior, from Smt. Laxmibai Kelkar. Harvansh Sahai, Raghuvansh Sahai and deceased Krishna Sahai are sons of late Bisan Sahai. Disputed house is un-partitioned. Rameshwar Sahai and Rajeshwar Sahai were also sons of Bisan Sahai. Bisan Sahai was father of five abovesaid sons. Plaintiff was residing with his uncle Rajeshwar Sahai and his family after death of his father. All the five sons of Bisan Sahai have 1/5th share each in the disputed house. Respondent/defendant tried to dispose of whole disputed house while he is entitled to dispose of only 1/5th share of the disputed house. Defendant's mother Smt. Chandramukhi on 19-12-1965 got mutated his name in Municipal Corporation, Gwalior on disputed house. The defendant/respondent brought two to three persons on house to deal with them for sell. Consequently, appellant/plaintiff filed civil suit for permanent injunction to restrain defendant to sell whole of the disputed house. Respondent/defendant denied allegations of plaint. He pleaded that disputed house is worth Rs. 15,00,000/(Rs. fifteen lacs) and therefore, the suit is undervalued. The suit also suffers from non-joinder of necessary parties. Smt. Chandramukhi is owner of disputed house and she is in possession of the house since 22 to 25 years. House is in the name of Chandramukhi. Plaintiff/appellant and his predecessor made admissions regarding ownership of Chandramukhi on disputed house while, she filed application in property tax case. After death of Chandramukhi, defendant/respondent became sole owner of the disputed house. Plaintiffs father is alive so, plaintiff/appellant has no right to file this suit. Suit is frivolous and prayed for dismissal of the suit with costs. On the basis of pleadings, learned trial Court framed four issues. After death of Chandramukhi, defendant/respondent became sole owner of the disputed house. Plaintiffs father is alive so, plaintiff/appellant has no right to file this suit. Suit is frivolous and prayed for dismissal of the suit with costs. On the basis of pleadings, learned trial Court framed four issues. After completion of trial, learned trial Court dismissed plaintiffs suit holding that the disputed house is joint properly of parties. Aggrieved by the impugned judgment and decree dated 1-11-1999, defendant preferred first appeal before Ninth ADJ, Gwalior. On hearing both the parties, learned First Appellate Court passed impugned judgment dated 2-7-2001 allowed appeal and set-aside finding of trial Court arrived at pertaining to issue No. 1 and held that the defendant is sole owner of the disputed house and dismissed the suit of plaintiff/appellant. Aggrieved by impugned judgment and decree, appellant/plaintiff filed this appeal on following grounds : (i). Impugned judgment is based on purely conjecture and surmises, contrary to the facts and circumstances of the case and evidence on record. Learned trial Court erred in illegally entertaining the appeal by the defendant whereas, no appeal lies against finding on one issue only when the suit itself had been dismissed by trial Court. Learned lower appellate Court has not properly interpreted the Will Ex. P/3 and overlooked documentary evidence produced by appellant/plaintiff. Learned lower appellate Court overlooked the fact that a trust was created for the welfare and the benefit of Smt. Chandramukhi during her life time and of her minor son defendant/respondent till attaining majority and becomes settled in life, both these objects have been achieved long back and the trust stands fully discharged. Learned trial Court has erred in holding that defendant/respondent is sole owner of the disputed house appellant/defendant prays to allow appeal and set-aside judgment and decree passed by learned lower appellate Court. Learned Counsel for the respondent supported the impugned judgment and decree and prayed for dismissal of the appeal with costs. On the basis of pleadings and judgment and decree passed by both the Courts below, following substantial questions of law have been framed : (1) Whether, after dismissal of the suit, defendant has right to file appeal? (2) Whether, the property in dispute is Joint Hindu Family Property? On the basis of pleadings and judgment and decree passed by both the Courts below, following substantial questions of law have been framed : (1) Whether, after dismissal of the suit, defendant has right to file appeal? (2) Whether, the property in dispute is Joint Hindu Family Property? Heard Learned Counsel for both the parties at length, perused impugned judgment and decree, judgment and decree passed by learned trial Court and record of both the Courts below. First substantial question of law is that whether, "after dismissal of the suit, defendant has right to file appeal". Section 96 of CPC provides First Appeal which reads as under : Appeal from original decree. - (1) Save where otherwise, expressly provided in the body of this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, an appeal shall lie from every decree passed by any Court exercising original jurisdiction to the Court authorized to hear appeals from the decisions of such Court. (2) An appeal may lie from an original decree passed ex parte : (3) No appeal shall lie from a decree passed by the Court with the consent of parties; (4) No appeal shall lie, except on a question of law, from a decree in any suit of the nature cognizable by Courts of Small Causes, when the amount or value of the subject-matter of the original suit does not exceed. Section 96 of the Code, does not enumerate person who can file appeal u/s 96 of Civil Procedure Code. It is however, found that in order to entitle to file appeal, the person must be aggrieved against judgment and decree. A party which would benefit from the change in judgment is said to have appealable interest. However, interest should not be contingent, speculative or futerative. It must be substantial, immediate and pecuniary. In order to be entitled to file appeal as an aggrieved person, he must have a legal grievance which might have deprived him of the benefit, in the case the judgment and decree had gone the other way and he may be a party to the suit or a legal representative and it may have interest in the subject-matter of the suit and should have been prejudicially affected by the decree. Placing reliance on (2002) 6 SCC 468, Banarsi and Others Vs. Placing reliance on (2002) 6 SCC 468, Banarsi and Others Vs. Ram Phal, , Banarsi and Others v. Ram Phal, it has been argued by Learned Counsel for appellant that no appeal is maintainable against a finding alone where ultimate decision is in favour of the person aggrieved by the finding. It has also been argued by Learned Counsel for the appellant that learned trial Court dismissed appellant/plaintiffs suit and no decree has been passed in his favour against respondent/defendant so he is not an aggrieved person and not entitled to file an appeal against judgment and decree of the trial Court. Consequently, learned lower appellate Court committed illegality in admitting defendant/respondent's appeal and setting aside the finding arrived at by learned trial Court on issue No. 1. In Nalakath Sainuddin (supra), it has been held by Hon. Supreme Court as under: 17 (i) * * * * (ii) * * * * (iii) 'Any aggrieved party', the expression employed in section 20(1), means a person feeling aggrieved by the ultimate decision, that is, the operative part of the order. A party to the proceedings, who has succeeded in securing the relief prayed for, is not a party aggrieved through the order contains a finding or two adverse to him. The respondent can support the order and pray for the ultimate decision being sustained, without filing a revision of his own, and for achieving such end he may seek reversal of any findings recorded against him. However, if the non-petitioning party feels entitled to a more beneficial or larger order in his favour but was allowed a lesser or smaller relief than to the extent of claiming the more beneficial or larger relief he should have filed a revision petition of his own as he was "an aggrieved party" to that extent. In the case of Banarasi and others (supra), it has been held by Hon. Supreme Court as under: Sections 96 and 100, CPC make provision for an appeal being preferred from every original decree or from every decree passed in appeal respectively; none of the provisions enumerate the person who can file an appeal. However, it is settled by a long catena of decisions that to be entitled to file an appeal the person be one aggrieved by the decree. However, it is settled by a long catena of decisions that to be entitled to file an appeal the person be one aggrieved by the decree. Unless a person is prejudicially or adversely affected by the decree he is not entitled to file an appeal. (See Phoolchand v. Gopal Lal; Jatan Kumar, Golcha v. Golcha Properties (P) Ltd. and Ganga Bai v. Vijay Kumar). No appeal lies against a mere finding. It is significant to note that both sections 96 and 100, CPC provide for an appeal against decree and not against judgment. Any respondent though he may not have filed an appeal from any part of the decree may still support the decree to the extent to which it is already in his favour by laying challenge to a finding recorded in the impugned judgment against him. Where a plaintiff seeks a decree against the defendant on grounds (A) and (B), any one of the two grounds being enough to entitle the plaintiff to a decree and the Court has passed a decree on ground (A) deciding it for the plaintiff while ground (B) has been deciding against the plaintiff, in an appeal preferred by the defendant, in spite of the finding on ground (a) being reversed the plaintiff as a respondent can still seek to support the decree by challenging the finding on ground (B) and persuade the appellate Court to form an opinion that in spite of the finding on ground (A) being reversed to the benefit of the defendant/appellant the decree could still be sustained by reversing the finding on ground (B) though the plaintiff-respondent has neither preferred an appeal of his own nor taken any cross-objection. A right to file cross-objection is the exercise of right to appeal though in a different form. It was observed in Sahadu Gangaram Bhagade v. Special Dy. Collector, Ahmednagar that the right given to a respondent in an appeal to file cross-objection is a right given to the same extent as is a right of appeal to lay challenge to the impugned decree if he can be said to be aggrieved thereby. Taking any cross-objection is the exercise of right of appeal and takes the place of cross-appeal though the form differs. Taking any cross-objection is the exercise of right of appeal and takes the place of cross-appeal though the form differs. Thus, it is clear that just as an appeal is preferred by a person aggrieved by the decree so also a cross-objection is preferred by one who can be said to be aggrieved by the decree. A party who has fully succeeded in the suit can and needs to neither prefer an appeal nor take any cross-objection though certain finding may be against him. Appeal and cross-objection both are filed against decree and not against judgment and certainly not against any finding recorded in a. judgment. This was the well-settled position of law under the un-amended Civil Procedure Code. The CPC amendment of 1976 has not materially or substantially altered the law except for a marginal difference. Even under the amended Order 41 Rule 22 sub-rule (1) a party in whose favour the decree stands in its entirety is neither entitled nor obliged to prefer any cross-object' on. However, the insertion made in the text of sub-rule (1) makes it permissible to file a cross-objection against a finding. The difference which has resulted we will shortly state. A respondent may defend himself without filing any cross-objection to the extent to which decree is in his favour; however, if he proposes to attack any part of the decree he must take cross-objection. The amendment inserted by the 1976 amendment is clarificatory and also enabling and this may be made precise by analysing the provision. There may be three situations : (i). The impugned decree is partly in favour of the appellant and partly in favour of the respondent; (ii). The decree is entirely in favour of the respondent though an issue has been decided against the respondent; (iii). The decree is entirely in favour of the respondent and all the issues have also been answered in favour of the respondent but there is a finding in the judgment which goes against the respondent. 11. In the type of case (i) it was necessary for the respondent to file an appeal or take cross-objection against that part of the decree which is against him if he seeks to get rid of the same though that part of the decree which is in his favour he is entitled to support without taking any cross-objection. The law remains so post-amendment too. The law remains so post-amendment too. In the type of cases (ii) and (iii) pre-amendment CPC did not entitle nor permit the respondent to take any cross-objection as he was not the person aggrieved by the decree. Under the amended Civil Procedure Code, read in the light of the explanation, though it is still not necessary for the respondent to take any cross-objection laying challenge to any finding adverse to him as the decree is entirely in his favour and he may support the decree without cross-objection; the amendment made in the text of sub-rule (1), read with the explanation newly inserted, gives him a right to take cross-objection to a finding recorded against him either while answering an issue or while dealing with an issue. The advantage of preferring such cross-objection is spelled out by Sub-rule (4). In spite of the original appeal having been withdrawn or dismissed for default the cross-objection taken to any finding by the respondent shall still be available to be adjudicated upon on merits which remedy was not available to the respondent under the un-amended Civil Procedure Code. In the pre-amendment era, the withdrawal or dismissal for default of the original appeal disabled the respondent to question the correctness or otherwise of any finding recorded against the respondent. On going through section 96 of the CPC and abovementioned citations of the Apex Court, it is settled principle of law that only aggrieved person can file appeal against operating part of the decree. No appeal shall lie only against any finding arrived at by the trial Court on any issue against any person. Keeping into mind this principle of law, I am examining question whether in the present case after dismissal of suit, present defendant has a right to file appeal or not. It is clear from the allegations of plaint that plaintiff/appellant claimed 1/5th share in the disputed house and on the basis of sale deed executed in favour of his predecessor Bisan Sahai and stating that Bisan Sahai was sole owner of the disputed house and after his death, plaintiffs father who was original plaintiff in the suit, entitled to 1/5th share of disputed house. Plaintiff also pleaded that disputed house has not been partitioned between co-owner i.e. five sons of Bisan Sahai and his successors. Plaintiff also pleaded that disputed house has not been partitioned between co-owner i.e. five sons of Bisan Sahai and his successors. After completion of trial though learned trial Court dismissed the suit of the plaintiff, but decided issue No. 1 against defendant and held that disputed house is unpartitioned and joint property of the plaintiff/appellant and defendant and other successors of Bisan Sahai. It means learned trial Court held that plaintiff/appellant has 1/5th joint share in the disputed property. It has been argued by Learned Counsel for the appellant that appeal can be filed only against operative part of the decree and appeal cannot be filed against a finding arrived at by learned trial Court while it does not part of the decree. It is true that no appeal can be filed only against any finding arrived at by learned trial Court but if any finding is operative part of the decree, then person aggrieved can file appeal against that decree. In the present case, learned trial Court held that disputed house is joint property of both the parties with other successors of Bisan Sahai and decided issue No. 1 in favour of appellant/plaintiff but learned trial Court also incorporated this finding of fact in decree also which reads that as per finding on issue No. 1, disputed house is of co ownership of the parties but suit for permanent injunction has not been proved by the plaintiff. Consequently, his suit is hereby dismissed. It is clear from para 16 of the impugned judgment of the trial Court that the finding on issue No. 1 is operative part of the decree, so against this operative part of the decree, defendant has a right to file appeal as an aggrieved person. Consequently, arguments advanced by Learned Counsel for the appellant have no force and deserve to be rejected, and hereby rejected. As per above discussion, I hold that respondent/defendant is an aggrieved person pertaining to decree passed by learned trial Court and after dismissal of the suit, defendant has a right to file appeal and learned lower appellate Court has not erred in admitting appeal filed by present respondent/defendant (as appellant in Civil Appeal No. 86 of 1999) for final hearing. As per above discussion, I hold that respondent/defendant is an aggrieved person pertaining to decree passed by learned trial Court and after dismissal of the suit, defendant has a right to file appeal and learned lower appellate Court has not erred in admitting appeal filed by present respondent/defendant (as appellant in Civil Appeal No. 86 of 1999) for final hearing. Consequently, substantial question of law No. 1 deserves to be decided against appellant and hereby decided against appellant/plaintiff and in favour of respondent and I hold that after dismissal of the suit by the trial Court, defendant/respondent has a right to file appeal against decree passed by trial Court as an aggrieved person. Substantial question of law No. 2 is "whether the property in dispute is Joint Hindu Family Property". To decide this substantial question of law, I will have to go through the record of the trial Court, judgment and decree passed by trial Court and lower appellate Court. It is also necessary to peruse the evidence adduced by both the parties and if it reveals that learned First appellate Courts finding pertaining to sole ownership of defendant/respondents to disputed house is perverse, against evidence, misreading of evidence or overlooking of any evidence then, it would be necessary to re-appreciate the evidence adduced by both the parties. On going through the judgment of learned trial Court, it is revealed that learned trial Court appreciated the evidence adduced by both the parties (oral or documentary) and arrived at the conclusion that both the parties are co-owner of the disputed house. While on going through the impugned judgment of lower appellate Court, it is revealed that by misreading of Will of Bisan Sahai Ex. P/3 and oral evidence adduced by both the parties in trial Court, it is held that defendant/respondent is sole owner of disputed house. In para 22 of the judgment, it has been held by First Appellate Court that disputed house was purchased by Bisan Sahai by Rs. 30,000/- (Rs. thirty thousand only) which was mentioned in the Will Ex. P/3 and that amount was given to defendant's mother Chandramukhi. In para 22 of the judgment, it has been held by First Appellate Court that disputed house was purchased by Bisan Sahai by Rs. 30,000/- (Rs. thirty thousand only) which was mentioned in the Will Ex. P/3 and that amount was given to defendant's mother Chandramukhi. Evidence led by both the parties on these facts, have been considered and in paras 19 to 21 of impugned judgment which show that learned First appellate Court has not considered evidence and circumstances of the case in right perspective and abruptly in para 22 of judgment has held that disputed house has been purchased by amount which has been mentioned in the Will Ex. P/3. But learned First appellate Court did not consider in impugned judgment effect of Will Ex. P/3 whether this will evolve sole ownership of Rs. 30,000/- (Rs. thirty thousand only) or any house purchased by that amount in favour of mother of defendant/respondent Smt. Chandramukhi. Without giving any finding on the basis of Will Ex. P/3 regarding sole ownership of disputed house in favour of Chandramukhi, finding arrived at by First appellate Court is certainly by overlooking material evidence on record and this finding is perverse. Certainly, construction of the document i.e. Will Ex. P/3, under which, claim to property is made, is a substantial question of law and interpretation of document involving title, the High Court can go into the said question in Second appeal. Learned First appellate Court only cursorily mentioned the Will Ex. P/3 in its judgment and decided factum of ownership in favour of respondent/defendant. It has not been considered by learned First Appellate Court whether the Will Ex. P/3 confers sole ownership or limited ownership in favour of Chandramukhi, mother of respondent. In this scenario, it is necessary to look into the Will Ex. P/3 in its right perspective and to interpret all documents involving disputed house's title. Section 74 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, provides that it is not necessary that any technical words or terms of art be used in a Will, but only that the wording be such that the intentions of the testator can be known therefrom. P/3 in its right perspective and to interpret all documents involving disputed house's title. Section 74 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, provides that it is not necessary that any technical words or terms of art be used in a Will, but only that the wording be such that the intentions of the testator can be known therefrom. As per section 82 of the Act, meaning of any clause in a Will is to be collected from the entire instrument, and all its parts are to be construed with reference to each other and from section 88 of the Act, it is clear that where two clauses of gifts in a Will are irreconcilable, so that they cannot possibly stand together, the last shall prevail. Raj Bajrang Bahadur Singh Vs. Thakurain Bakhtraj Kuer, , Radha Sundar Dutta Vs. Mohd. Jahadur Rahim and Others, , Raghunath Keshava Kharkar Vs. Ganesh and Others, , Mauleshwar Mani and Others Vs. Jagdish Prasad and Others, , AIR 2003 2528 (SC) and AIR 2002 SC 1908, Balwant Kaur v. Chanda Singh are citations with regard to construction of a Will and interpretation of Will. On going through these citations, it is clear that Will should be read as a whole and intention of testator to be given prime importance which should be gathered from the recital in the Will, surrounding circumstances disclosed from the Will, underlying scheme of the disposition made under the Will as also the reason for making favors therein. Will must be construed objectively and conclusion must be adduced by reasonable process of reasoning. In present case, to arrive at any conclusion about ownership of the disputed house, construction of Will has to be scrutinised objectively from the recital in the Will and to gather intention of Bisan Sahai about the ownership of the disputed house. It is admitted fact that Bisan Sahai purchased disputed house vide sale deed Ex. P/1 worth Rs. 32,000/- (Rs. thirty two thousand). It is immaterial whether the trusted amount Rs. 30,000/- (Rs. thirty thousand) has been spent on purchasing house or Bisan Sahai purchased this house from his own income. If it is assumed that Bisan Sahai purchased disputed house by his own income then, it becomes jointly owned house by the successors of Bisan Sahai. 32,000/- (Rs. thirty two thousand). It is immaterial whether the trusted amount Rs. 30,000/- (Rs. thirty thousand) has been spent on purchasing house or Bisan Sahai purchased this house from his own income. If it is assumed that Bisan Sahai purchased disputed house by his own income then, it becomes jointly owned house by the successors of Bisan Sahai. I am considering that if this disputed house has been purchased by trusted amount, then this house is a joint property of the successors of the Bisan Sahai or respondent and his mother are sole owners of the disputed house. It is admitted fact that Bisan Sahai executed Will Ex. P/3 on 21-11-1965 and constituted private trust for the benefit of respondent Narendra Gopal and her mother Chandramukhi by depositing Rs. 30,000/- (Rs. thirty thousand) in a bank for use of interest accrued on said amount or rent of house purchased by Rs. 30,000/- (Rs. thirty thousand) shall be spent for maintenance of respondent and his mother. On going through the Will Ex. P/3 and recitation, it reveals that Bisan Sahai was very intelligent person and worried for future of Chandramukhi and her son Narendra Gopal. He was well versed of Urdu language. Will Ex. P/3 is very well worded and it clearly indicates intention of testator. There is no ambiguity in language of Will and every clause is clear. Will Ex. P/3 has been proved by legal evidence and both the parties are relying on Will Ex. P/3. At the time of execution of Will respondent was minor and her mother Chandramukhi was widow and they were dependent on Bisan Sahai and his other sons. With abandoned caution, Bisan Sahai appointed his son Raghuwansh Sahai, Rameshwar Sahai, Rajeshwar Sahai and Krishna Sahai as trustees and executor of Will including father of appellant. He also made provision if any trustee dies or retires for continuance of trust. Bisan Sahai appears to be religious person and family caring person. Will Ex. P/3 reveals that Bisan Sahai always prays to God for welfare and unity of his family. In his life time, he wants to make such family arrangements to avoid future disputes among his sons and their families. Bisan Sahai distributed ornaments among his daughter in-laws. Bisan Sahai was wormed for future of minor Narendra Gopal and widowed daughter in law Chandramukhi to secure their future. Bisan Sahai executed Will Ex. In his life time, he wants to make such family arrangements to avoid future disputes among his sons and their families. Bisan Sahai distributed ornaments among his daughter in-laws. Bisan Sahai was wormed for future of minor Narendra Gopal and widowed daughter in law Chandramukhi to secure their future. Bisan Sahai executed Will Ex. P/3 and constituted a trust depositing Rs. 30,000/- (Rs. thirty thousand) in a bank and made provision that interest accruing on this amount shall be used for maintenance of respondent Narendra Gopal and his mother. Alternatively, Bisan Sahai made provision that a house be purchased from Rs. 30,000/- (Rs. thirty thousand) and rent income of the said house be used for maintaining Narendra Gopal and his mother. It is admitted by both the parties that after execution of Will, Bisan Sahai deposited Rs. 30,000/- (Rs. thirty thousand) in a bank and trustees or executor of Will started maintaining Narendra Gopal and his mother Chandramukhi by interest amount accrued on deposited amount. Even before execution of Will Ex. P/3, Bisan Sahai was in search of purchasing a house for benefit of respondent and his mother but not succeeded in purchasing a suitable house. Consequently, he desired to purchase a house if available from trusted/deposited amount in the bank. It has been mentioned in Will Ex. P/3 that "TEES HAZAR (30,000) RUPYA JO MAINE REHAN VYAY NA HO SAKE". It has been further provided in the Will that "AGAR JAYDA GAIR MANKULA_____MANJURI LAJAM HAI". If we read Will Ex. P/3 as a whole with above mentioned clauses, intention of testator is very clear. These clauses with reference to other clauses of Will clearly establish that Bisan Sahai never intended to create absolute ownership in favour of respondent Narendra Gopal and his mother Chandramukhi, but created limited interest in their favour looking Narendra Gopal's minority and age of Chandramukhi. It has been clearly mentioned in Will that house purchased by Rs. 30,000/- (Rs. thirty thousand) shall remained family property i.e. to say that it Will be joint property of successors of Bisan Sahai. It is clear from the Will that Bisan Sahai never intended to create absolute ownership in favour of Narendra Gopal and her mother and deposited Rs. 30,000/- (Rs. thirty thousand) as a house purchased a house by said amount. thirty thousand) shall remained family property i.e. to say that it Will be joint property of successors of Bisan Sahai. It is clear from the Will that Bisan Sahai never intended to create absolute ownership in favour of Narendra Gopal and her mother and deposited Rs. 30,000/- (Rs. thirty thousand) as a house purchased a house by said amount. It has been argued by Learned Counsel for respondent that proceeding started by Municipal Corporation Gwalior for fixation of property tax on purchased house, proceedings were started on application of Chandramukhi and in application, she was shown as owner of purchased house. It is also urged by Learned Counsel for respondent that other successors of Bisan Sahai never objected these proceedings but some of them presented applications on behalf of Chandramukhi for exemption of property tax, consequently, they including appellant are estopped from challenging ownership of Chandramukhi in disputed house and she became sole owner of disputed house. It is also argued that after the death of Chandramukhi, respondent became sole owner of disputed house. It is true and proved by documents Ex. D/1, D/3 to D/6 that Chandramukhi applied for exemption from payment of property tax to competent authority and this act was never objected to by other successors of Bisan Sahai rather they supported action taken by Chandramukhi to avoid payment of property tax on disputed house. Their conduct is against the intention and right created by Will Ex. P/3 pertaining to disputed house. Bisan Sahai never intended to give authority to any executor of Will or trustee to change intention of Will and right created by Will about disputed house i.e. to say house purchased by trusted amount. Successors of Bisan Sahai have no authority to change rights and liabilities created by Will Ex. P/3 whatsoever, it may be including joint ownership of the disputed house. Successors of Bisan Sahai did not object in proceeding of property tax exemption for their vested interest i.e. to avoid payment of property tax on disputed house. Their conduct do not override intention and right created by Will pertaining to disputed house. It is not case of the respondent that appellant or other successors of Bisan Sahai relinquished their right and title in disputed house in favour of Chandramukhi and his son Narendra Gopal. Their conduct do not override intention and right created by Will pertaining to disputed house. It is not case of the respondent that appellant or other successors of Bisan Sahai relinquished their right and title in disputed house in favour of Chandramukhi and his son Narendra Gopal. By any stretch of imagination looking to the intention of creator of Will, it cannot be presumed that by the abovesaid conduct of successors of Bisan Sahai, Chandramukhi and his son respondent Narendra Gopal became sole owner of the disputed house, because, Bisan Sahai never intended to give right to their sons to change the ownership of disputed house which was purchased by him for the benefit of Chandramukhi and his son Narendra Gopal. Chandramukhi had joint title in disputed house during her life time and after his death, Narendra Gopal succeeded limited ownership of disputed house. Citation AIR 2005 SCW 972 , Christopher Barla v. Basudev Naik (d) by LRs. and AIR 2005 SCW 381 Commissioner Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowment v. Shanrougama and Others has no relevance in present case looking to the facts and circumstances of the case. Arguments advanced by Learned Counsel for respondent has no force, consequently, rejected. As discussed above, it has been proved by Will Ex. P/3 that house purchased by Bisan Sahai (disputed house) was for the benefit of Chandramukhi in her lifetime and her son Narendra Gopal till he attains majority and stands on his foot. It is also proved that Chandramukhi and Narendra Gopal were not sole owners of disputed house but all successors of Bisan Sahai were joint owner of disputed house. It is also proved that Bisan Sahai was sole owner of disputed house during his life time and accrued rent used to spent for maintenance of Chandramukhi and Narendra Gopal. After the death of Bisan Sahai, his sons and Grandson Narendra Gopal got equal share in disputed house and they became joint owner i.e. to say co-owners of the disputed house. Learned first appellate Court misread the evidence and intention of testator of Will Ex. P/3 and perversely came to conclusion that Chandramukhi and Narendra Gopal were sole owners of the disputed house after the death of Bisan Sahai on the basis of Will Ex. P/3. Finding recorded by learned first appellate Court is not sustainable in view of above discussions. Learned first appellate Court misread the evidence and intention of testator of Will Ex. P/3 and perversely came to conclusion that Chandramukhi and Narendra Gopal were sole owners of the disputed house after the death of Bisan Sahai on the basis of Will Ex. P/3. Finding recorded by learned first appellate Court is not sustainable in view of above discussions. However, in view of the case reported as 1982 MPWN SN 27, Pyarelal v. Nandlal, 1997 RN 19, Sushil Kumar and Anr Vs. Ram Prakash and Ors, , Sunil Kumar and Others v. Ramprakash and Others only suit for permanent injunction is not maintainable without seeking relief of partition. Learned Court below does not commit any error in dismissing suit on that count. As per above discussion, I am of the view that learned First Appellate Court committed illegality and perversity in reversing finding of trial Court regarding jointness of the disputed house of both the parties, consequently, appeal deserves to be allowed and judgment and decree passed by learned First appellate Court is liable to be set-aside. Consequently, appeal is allowed. Judgment and decree dated 2-7-2001 is set-aside and judgment and decree passed by learned trial Court dated 1-11-1999 is hereby restored. Respondent shall bear appellant's cost of this appeal. Advocate fee as per schedule if certified. Decree be drawn accordingly. Final Result : Allowed