ORDER This revision is filed under Section 46(1) of the Karnataka Rent Act, 1999 being aggrieved by the order dated 4-8-2003 passed by the XII Additional Small Causes Judge, Bangalore in H.R.C. No. 1771 of 1997. 2. A petition was filed by the landlady under Section 27(1)(a) and (h) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 and later under the amended Act, 1999, the petition was maintained under Section 27(2)(a) and (r). The petition premises is non-residential on a monthly rental of Rs. 720/and the respondent/tenant is running a printing press in the premises. Stating that since January 1996 the rent has not been paid and that the petitioner is having three sons and two daughters and two sons have been accommodated and that the third son intends to start a electrical motor rewinding business in the petition premises and at present he is working elsewhere in West of Chord Road and as such, she has filed the eviction petition. 3. The petition was contested by the tenant stating that there is alternate accommodation available to the landlady and the rate of rent is Rs. 400/- and not Rs. 720/-. It was also contended that the rent was paid upto 17-6-1997 and the requirement of the petitioner is not there and further the petition premises is not for her requirement. 4. After enquiry, the Trial Court has held that the tenant is in arrears of rent though not as claimed by the petitioner and that the petition premises is very much required for her third son for establishing a electrical motor rewinding business and accordingly, ordered for eviction. Being aggrieved by the same, the tenant is before this Court. 5. Heard the Counsel for the petitioner and the respondent. 6. It is the argument of the Counsel representing the tenant that as per Section 27(2)(r), the definition of 'family' does not include an independent person and as per the definition 'family' consists of wife or husband or his or her dependents. Accordingly, he submitted that the requirement of the son who is residing separately and who is a major and earning, is not the requirement of the petitioner.
Accordingly, he submitted that the requirement of the son who is residing separately and who is a major and earning, is not the requirement of the petitioner. Further there are two more shops which became vacant during the pendency of the matter and that has not been taken note of by the Trial Court even though photos have been taken in this regard and inspite of alternate accommodation available, the Trial Court ignoring this aspect, has passed an order of eviction. 7. Per contra, Counsel representing the respondent/landlady submitted that the requirement of the son is the requirement of the mother who is the landlady and as per the new enactment the words 'for any member of his family' refers to 'children' as well although they are not dependent and accordingly submitted that even a reading of Section 27(2)(r) makes it clear that it is for the benefit of the family members or for any person for whose benefit the premises are held and submitted that the Trial Court has not committed any error in passing the impugned order. 8. In the light of the arguments advanced, let me consider whether any error has been committed by the Trial Court in passing the impugned order. 9. At the outset, it is the argument of the revision petitioner, relying upon the decision in the case of Ram Dass v Ishwar Chander and Others, that the requirement of the landlord must be either bona fide requirement or reasonable requirement but, if it is the landlord's desire to seek for possession, it must have an objective element of a need and it must be genuine and honest. Of course the enactment of the amended Act, 1999 has shifted the burden on the respondent to rebut the presumption of requirement which initially is in favour of the landlord. Admittedly, there are premises available to the landlady out of which two premises are occupied by her two sons and they are carrying on their business independently. The Trial Court having noted the evidence of the landlady and other documents and also referring to the photos submitted by the tenant has held that there is requirement of the petition premises for her third son for running an electric motor rewinding business and that he is carrying on a similar business in a rented premises elsewhere.
The Trial Court having noted the evidence of the landlady and other documents and also referring to the photos submitted by the tenant has held that there is requirement of the petition premises for her third son for running an electric motor rewinding business and that he is carrying on a similar business in a rented premises elsewhere. It has also held that there is no other alternate accommodation available and that the tenant has also not placed any cogent and acceptable evidence to show that the landlady has got alternative accommodation, and accordingly, has passed an order of eviction. 10. Insofar as payment of arrears of rent is concerned, after determining the arrears of rent it is the submission of the revision petitioner that the entire rent has been paid and from time to time, he has been paying the rent. In that view of the matter, the ground under Section 27(2)(a) may not arise for further consideration. 11. Having heard the arguments of the revision petitioner, the explanation provided under the definition of 'family' in relation to a person (Section 3(d)) means wife or husband of such person and his or her dependents. A reading of Section 27(2)(1') makes it clear that the requirement of the premises by the landlord is for occupation for himself or for any member of his family if he is owner thereof, or for any person for whose benefit the premises are held and that the landlord or such person has no other suitable accommodation. 12. Here in the instant case, although it is submitted by the petitioner's Counsel that there were two more vacant premises available during pendency of the matter and that were not occupied and photos of the shops were also submitted in that regard, the Trial Court, noting that there is no cogent evidence in this regard, has passed an order of eviction. Further, the definition of 'family' though refers to 'dependants of the landlord' or in relation to a person, 'dependency' refers not necessarily to economic dependency of a minor. Even a son or daughter who is grown up and if he has no alternative accommodation of his/her own, then for the purpose of residence he/she has to be treated as a dependent.
Even a son or daughter who is grown up and if he has no alternative accommodation of his/her own, then for the purpose of residence he/she has to be treated as a dependent. In the circumstances, the argument of the Counsel for the tenant that the son has grown up and is having independent business, does not hold water. The very purpose of the legislation under which the definition of 'family' is mentioned is regarding dependency. When the son of the landlord is residing elsewhere in a rented premises and having found that the accommodation available is not sufficient and also that he is carrying on his business in a tenanted premises, in such circumstance, the requirement and need of the petition premises by the landlady is definitely there as her son is dependent on her for his residence. Dependency has to be read in this context and not in the ordinary connotation that he is dependent for everything as it is being considered for the purpose of financial dependency or dependent as a minor. Even for economically independent persons benefit who is a son or daughter, parents can seek eviction when the son or daughter or other dependent has no accommodation of his/her own. 13. Although some photos of the petition premises are produced by the tenants to show that the shops have been vacant, the same has been denied by the landlady and also by the persons who have given evidence on behalf of the landlady. Further, there is no other cogent evidence placed by the tenant to show that there are other premises available which could be occupied by them for carrying on the business. I do not find any illegality or error in the order passed by the Trial Court. 14. For the foregoing reasons, the petition is dismissed. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, six months time has been granted to the tenant to vacate and hand over vacant possession of the petition premises. No costs.