DESHEEYA VIDYA SHALA SAMITHI (REGD. ), SHIMOGA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA
2006-06-22
N.K.PATIL
body2006
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER In the instant case, petitioners herein, questioning the legality and the validity of the Government Order dated 6th June, 2006 in proceedings No. KumE.17 MuNoSo.2006 vide Annexure-G, have presented the instant writ petition. 2. The first petitioner is a registered Vidya Shala Samithi and petitioners 2 and 3 are the Honorary Secretary and Honorary Joint Secretary of first petitioner-Shala Samithi respectively. The grievance of petitioners in the instant writ petition is that, first petitioner-Shala Samithi was registered under the provisions of the Mysore Societies Registration Act, 1904 for the purpose of imparting Education in Shimoga city. The present Managing Committee is the duly elected Committee. However, it is the case of petitioners that, some of the permanent teachers who are interested in taking ever the Management into their hands started interfering with the Management of the said Shala Samithi and have also decided to participate in the election of the Managing Committee. The first petitioner-Shala Samithi has rejected the request of the said teachers. Aggrieved by the said rejection by first petitioner-Shala Samithi, the aggrieved persons have approached the Trial Court and filed a suit in O.S. No. 682 of 1986 seeking declaration, that they are all the members of the Shala Samithi. The said suit was decreed against the petitioners. Being aggrieved by the said decree, the first petitioner has filed the appeal on the same and the same is pending adjudication. Be that as it may. 3. Some of the teachers and members of the first petitioner-Desheeya Vidya Shala Samithi (Registered), Shimoga ('Shala Samithi' for short) have given a representation to the District Registrar as well as the Government, requesting the I Competent Authority to initiate appropriate proceedings and take over the Management of the said Shala Samithi from petitioners 2 and 3 and appoint an Administrator for managing the affairs of the Shala Samithi. It is case of petitioners that, on the basis of the representation given by some of the teachers of the Shala Samithi in collusion with some other members of the Shala Samithi to the District Registrar, the said authority has forwarded the proposal to the Competent Authority, regarding appointment of an Administrator to take over the affairs of the said Shala Samithi in utter violation of Sections 11 and 13 of the Karnataka Societies Registration Act, 1960 ('Act' for short).
The Competent Authority after issuing notice to the Shala Samithi, after considering the reply filed by it and the proposal forwarded by the Competent Authority of the Department, by invoking Section 27-A of the said Act, has appointed the Administrator under Section 27-A(1) for a period of six months with a direction to the Administrator to conduct election and hand over the management to the newly elected members of the Managing Committee. Being aggrieved by the impugned order passed by first respondent herein dated 6th June, 2006 vide Annexure-G, appointing the Administrator, as referred above, petitioners herein felt necessitated to present the instant writ petition. 4. Sri G.S. Visveshwara, learned Senior Counsel appearing for petitioners submitted at the outset that, the impugned order passed by first respondent is liable to be set aside in view of non-conduct of proper enquiry and for not affording personal oral hearing as envisaged under Section 27 -A of the Act. Further, he vehemently submitted that, the impugned order passed by first respondent is liable to be set aside at the threshold itself in view of sheer non-compliance of principles of natural justice. To substantiate his submission, he placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in Peoples' Education Society, Belgaum v State of Karnataka and Others1, another judgment in Renukacharya v State of Karnataka2 and another judgment in V. Narayanaswamy and Another v State of Karnataka and Others3. Relying upon the said judgments, he submitted that, as per Section 27-A of the Act, before appointment of an Administrator, it is mandatory on the part of the Competent Authority to conduct proper enquiry and give a personal hearing to the aggrieved party. In the instant case, no personal hearing as such has been given to petitioners and therefore, in view of the well-settled law laid down by this Court, in the judgments referred above, the impugned order passed by first respondent at Annexure-G is liable to be set aside.
In the instant case, no personal hearing as such has been given to petitioners and therefore, in view of the well-settled law laid down by this Court, in the judgments referred above, the impugned order passed by first respondent at Annexure-G is liable to be set aside. Further, to substantiate his case on the ground of non-compliance of the principles of natural justice, he placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Union Carbide Corporation v Union of India4 and drew my attention to headnote J-1, paragraph 79 and submitted that, if the ratio of law laid down by this Court and the Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgments are considered, the impugned order passed by first respondent vide Annexure-G is liable to vitiate. 5. Per contra, learned Counsel for respondents, inter alia, contended and substantiated that, the impugned order passed by the Competent Authority is in accordance with law. To substantiate the said submission, he placed reliance on the proposal submitted by the second respondent dated 18th February, 2006 and submitted that, earlier, a notice has been issued to the first petitioner herein and after considering their reply dated 17th April, 2006, the Competent Authority has passed the impugned order and the same is in strict compliance of Section 27-A(1)(a) and (1)(b) of the Act. In view of gross violation of Sections 11 and 13 of the Act, the Competent Authority has rightly appointed the Administrator for a period of six months to administer and manage the affairs of the Shala Samithi and the same is in strict compliance of the mandatory provisions of the Act. Learned Counsel for respondents further vehemently submitted that, this is one of the classic case, where petitioners 2 and 3 have continued to function as if they are the elected representatives under the guise that, the suit is pending adjudication before the Trial Court. Since the academic year 1986-87, till the date of passing the impugned order by the Competent Authority, petitioners 2 and 3 herein have continued to function in the Shala Samithi and at no point of time, they have called for general body meeting as per the requirement of Sections 11 and 13 of the Act. To substantiate the said submission, Sri Ashok Haranahalli, learned Counsel appearing for one of the respondents and learned Government.
To substantiate the said submission, Sri Ashok Haranahalli, learned Counsel appearing for one of the respondents and learned Government. Pleader appearing for respondents 1 and 2 vehemently submitted that, the second petitioner himself claiming to be honorary Secretary of the Shala Samithi has admitted in the reply filed by him dated 17th September, 2005 vide Annexure-R8 filed along with the statement of objections. "l1.s has stated in unequivocal terms that, petitioners have not got the accounts audited through the auditor due to non-conduct of general body meeting and some time may be granted for the same. In view of the admission made by second petitioner in his reply dated 17th September, 2005 vide Annexure-R8 produced along with the objections, they submitted that, petitioners are not entitled for personal hearing nor Rule 8 of the Karnataka Societies Registration Ru18s, 1961, is applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. 6. To further substantiate his submission, learned Counsel for respondents placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in Aligarh Muslim University and Others v Mansoor Ali Khanl and has taken me through paragraph 20 of the said judgment which is at page 2787. The said paragraph reads thus: "Para 20. As pointed recently in M.C. Mehta v Union of India, AIR 1999 SC 2583 : (1999)6 SCC 237 , there can be certain situations in which an order passed in violation of natural justice need not be set aside under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. For example where no prejudice is caused to the person concerned, interference under Article 226 is not necessary. Similarly, if the quashing of the order which is in breach of natural justice is likely to result in revival of another order which is in itself illegal as in Gadde Venkateswara Rao v Government of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1966 SC 828 : (965)2 SCR 172, it is not necessary to quash the order merely because of violation of principles of natural justice". 7.
7. Further, he placed reliance on S.L. Kapoor v Jagmohan and Others2 Canara Bank and Others v Debasis Das and Others3 and Ganesh Santa Ram Sirur v State Bank of India and Another4, and submitted that, the Apex Court has observed in one of the aforesaid judgments that, unless failure of justice is occasioned or that it would not be in public interest to dismiss a petition on the fact situation of a case, this Court may refuse to exercise the said jurisdiction. Further, he submitted that, the Apex Court in one of the aforesaid judgments has observed that, the principles of natural justice cannot be reduced to any hard and fast formulae· and these principles cannot be put in a straitjacket. Their applicability depends upon the context and the facts and circumstances of each case. Therefore, he submitted that, in the instant case, petitioners have not called for general body meeting for the past more than two decades in gross violation of Sections 11 and 13 of the Act. Therefore, the Competent Authority has rightly exercised the power conferred under Section 27-A(1)(a) and (l)(b) of the Act and passed the impugned order. Therefore, the judgments of this Court as well as the Apex Court relied upon by learned Counsel for petitioners do not have any bearing on the facts and circumstances of the case on hand. Therefore, he submitted that, the reliance placed by learned Senior Counsel for petitioners are not of any assistance to him in the instant case. 8. Sri S.V. Prakash, another Counsel appearing for one of the respondent's, placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Baldev Singh and Others v State of Himachal Pradesh and Others1 and submitted that, the Apex Court has clarified that, hearing contemplated is not required to be oral and can be by inviting objections and disposing them of in a fair way. He also placed reliance on Saij Gram Panchayat v State of Gujarat and Others2, and submitted that, the Apex Court has observed that, an opportunity of being heard should have been given to the people of the areas concerned. In that case, action having already been taken without giving an opportunity of hearing, in view of the urgency, post-decisional hearing was considered as sufficient compliance with the principle of audi alteram partem Therefore, petitioners cannot complain of any violation of the principles of natural justice.
In that case, action having already been taken without giving an opportunity of hearing, in view of the urgency, post-decisional hearing was considered as sufficient compliance with the principle of audi alteram partem Therefore, petitioners cannot complain of any violation of the principles of natural justice. 9. Sri S.P. Kulkarni, learned Counsel appearing for some of the respondents, in addition to the stand taken on behalf of other respondents, drew my attention to Annexures-Rland R2 produced along with the statement of objections filed by respondents 4 to 6. He submitted that, a notice was issued to the Shala Samithi for noncompliance with the provisions of Sections 11, 12 and 13 of the Act since the year 1971-72 and further, another communication has been sent by the authority, directing them to comply with the provision of Sections 12 and 13 of the Act and to send the compliance report. Therefore, he submitted that, from the date of establishment of the Shala Samithi in the year 1953-54 the said institution has not been functioning in strict adherence to the relevant provisions .of the Act and Rules. Further, he submitted that, petitioners were given several opportunities to substantiate their case, but except filing a reply, they have not produce any authenticated document in support of their case. They have even failed to produce any substantive material in support of their case that, they have complied with the mandatory provisions of Sections 11 and 13 of the Act. Therefore, he submitted that, the writ petition filed by petitioners is liable to be dismissed as misconceived. 10. After hearing learned Counsel for petitioners, learned Counsel for respondents, considering the rival contentions urged by them and after careful perusal of the impugned order passed by first respondent vide Annexure-G the only question that arises for consideration in the instant writ petition is as to: "Whether the impugned order passed by the Competent Authority is in consonance with the mandatory provisions of the Act?" After careful perusal of the impugned order vide Annexure-G, it is manifest on the face of the said order that, there is no error or illegality as such committed by the Competent Authority in passing the impugned order.
The Competent Authority after receipt of the proposal, forwarded by second respondent dated 18th February, 2006, had issued a show-cause notice to the Shala Samithi on 28th February, 2006 and in pursuance of the said notice, the second petitioner herein filed the reply dated 17th April, 2006. The first respondent, after considering the proposal forwarded by second respondent dated 18th February, 2006 and reply given by second petitioner dated 17th April, 2006, has specifically referred that, since the academic year 1953-54, the Shala Samithi has consistently violated Sections 11 and 13 of the Act. The stand of petitioners is that, the Competent Authority ought to have safeguarded the interest of the employees of the institution, the career of the students. They have stated that, the general body meeting could not be called for, for the reason that, the matter was pending adjudication before the Civil Court and in their reply stated that, appropriate decision will be taken for calling the general body meeting. All these aspects cannot be accepted having regard to the paramount consideration of providing basic education at the grass root level particularly in rural areas, considering the interest of public in general and career of students in particular. Therefore, the Competent Authority, keeping all these relevant factors in mind, has passed the impugned order, by invoking Section 27-A(1)(a) of the Act and appointed the Administrator for a period- of six months, with a direction to him to conduct and complete the election and hand over the administration to the newly elected body, by giving cogent reasons with reference to relevant material available on record. Therefore, I am of the considered view that, the order passed by first respondent is in strict compliance of the mandatory provisions of Section 27-ACl)(a) and (l)(b) of the Act. 11. After evaluation of the entire material available on record, the grounds urged by petitioners in the instant writ petition and the stand taken by respondents, it is astonishing to note the manner in which the Shala Samithi has been functioning at the instance of petitioners 2 and 3, who are unknown to law, for consistently more than two decades. In these matters, there should be pragmatic approach and matter should be gone into in detail having regard to the actual ground reality of the matter. Therefore, the order passed by the Competent Authority is just and reasonable.
In these matters, there should be pragmatic approach and matter should be gone into in detail having regard to the actual ground reality of the matter. Therefore, the order passed by the Competent Authority is just and reasonable. I do not find any unjust or arbitrary decision as such taken by first respondent in passing the impugned order. Therefore, interference by this Court in the impugned order passed by first respondent is not justifiable. 12. So far as the reliance placed by learned Counsel for petitioners on the judgments of this Court and Apex Court regarding non-conduct of proper enquiry resulting in violation of Rule 8 of the Rules, not affording personal hearing to petitioners and violating principles of natural justice etc. are concerned, I am of the view that, there is no quarrel, second opinion or dispute regarding the well-settled principles of law laid down by this Court as well as the Apex Court. But, the proposition of law in the judgments relied upon by petitioners are not applicable to the facts of the case on hand and hence, the same are not of any assistance to petitioners in the instant case. After thorough evaluation of the entire records threadbare, it emerges that, petitioners themselves have categorically admitted in unequivocal terms that, they have not conducted the general body meeting and have failed to produce any authenticated documents to substantiate their stand that, they have conducted the general body meetings. When they have failed to call for general body meeting for more than two decades, it is no( now open for them to take hyper-technical ground that, the authority ought to have given a personal hearing to petitioners and conducted proper enquiry before passing the impugned order. The said stand of petitioners is neither justifiable nor the same is appreciable, having regard to the conduct of the petitioners, as rightly pointed out by learned Counsel for respondents. 13. It is significant.
The said stand of petitioners is neither justifiable nor the same is appreciable, having regard to the conduct of the petitioners, as rightly pointed out by learned Counsel for respondents. 13. It is significant. to note, the well-settled proposition of law laid down by the Apex Court in series of matters, particularly in the decision in Ganesh Santa Ram Sirur's case, that, the Apex Court has held that, the decision in S. L. Kapoor's case make one thing clear, namely, the principles of natural justice cannot be reduced to any hard and fast formulae and as said in Russell v Duke of Norfolk1, these principles cannot be put in a straitjacket and their applicability depends upon the context and the facts and circumstances of each case. The objective is to ensure a fair hearing, a fair deal to a person ·whose rights are going to be affected. The Apex Court further opined that, the approach and test adopted in Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad v B. Karunakar'2., should govern an cases where the complaint is not that there was no hearing, no notice, no opportunity and no hearing but one of not affording a proper hearing that is adequate or a full hearing or violation of a procedural rule or requirement governing the enquiry. In the instant case, two proposals were submitted by the Competent Authority. The first proposal was submitted by the 2nd respondent on 24th October, 2005 and based on the said proposal, a notice was issued by first respondent to petitioners to have their say in the matter on 19th December, 2005 and thereafter, another reminder was sent. In pursuance of the said notice and reminder, petitioners have filed the reply. Thereafter, on the basis of the second proposal sent by second respondent on 18th February, 2006, in order to afford one more opportunity to petitioners, the first respondent has issued another notice dated 28th March, 2006. The petitioners have given reply to the said notice on 17th April, 2006. After careful perusal of the reply filed by petitioners vide Annexure-F produced along with the writ petition, it can be seen that, petitioners except repeating the history and background of the institution, have not given any reasons whatsoever as to why the annual general body meeting was not called for.
After careful perusal of the reply filed by petitioners vide Annexure-F produced along with the writ petition, it can be seen that, petitioners except repeating the history and background of the institution, have not given any reasons whatsoever as to why the annual general body meeting was not called for. But, they have proceeded to say that, the proposal forwarded by second respondent is imaginary and the same is on the basis of assumption and presumption and based on vested interest and that, the said decision taken by second respondent is based on false representation given by some permanent teachers. But, from the reply given by petitioners to the second notice issued by the Competent Authority dated 28th March, 2006, it can be seen that, petitioners have taken the stand that, they may be afforded reasonable opportunity, but, cleverly, intentionally and deliberately have suppressed· the admission made by them in their communication dated 17th September, 2005 vide Annexure-R8 produced along with the. statement of objections filed by the some of the respondents, wherein petitioners have stated in unequivocal terms that, in view of pendency of the suit before the Civil Court, general body meeting could not be convened. It is further specifically stated at item No. 7 of their communication that, books of accounts for the year 2004-05 would be produced within 14 days from the date of conducting the general body meeting and prayed for some time for the same. It can further be seen that, petitioners have been gone to the extent of saying at item No.6 of the said communication that, there is an oral settlement between the members of the Shala Samithi and the permanent teachers on 30th September, 2005 and a general body meeting has been called, as per the enclosure 6. But, the said statements are made by petitioners only to mislead the authority. 14. Further, it is pertinent to note, as rightly pointed out by learned Counsel appearing for respondents that, the Apex Court in Baldev Singh's case, has clarified that, hearing contemplated is not required to be oral and can be by inviting objections and disposing them of in a fair way. Further, the Apex Court in Saij Gam Panchayat's case, has observed that, an opportunity of being heard should have been given to the people of the areas concerned.
Further, the Apex Court in Saij Gam Panchayat's case, has observed that, an opportunity of being heard should have been given to the people of the areas concerned. In that case, action having already been taken without giving an opportunity of hearing, in view of the urgency, post-decisional hearing was considered as sufficient compliance with the principle of audi alteram partem. Therefore, if the ratio of law laid down in the aforesaid judgments are applied to the facts of the case on hand, it can be seen that, petitioners have been given ample opportunity to put forth their case before passing the impugned order. But, they have failed to make use of the said opportunities given to them. 15. Sri Ashok Haranahalli, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent, submitted that, it is undisputed fact that, since two decades, petitioners have not conducted general body meeting and it is an admitted fact that, consistently petitioners have violated the mandatory provision of Sections 11 and 13 of the Act. To substantiate his submission, he placed heavy reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Canara Bank and drew my attention to pargraph 23 of the said judgment, wherein it is held thus: "Para 23. As was observed by this Court we need not go into "useless formality theory" in detail; in view of the fact that no prejudice has been shown. As is rightly pointed out by learned Counsel for the appellants, unless failure of justice is occasioned or that it would not be in public interest to dismiss a petition on the fact situation of a case, this Court may refuse to excise the said jurisdiction (see Gadde Venkateswara Rao v Government of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1966 SC 828 : (1965)2 SCR 172). It is to be noted that legal formulations, cannot be divorced from the fact situation of the case. Personal hearing was granted by the Appellate Authority, though not statutorily prescribed. In a given case post-decisional hearing can obliterate the procedural deficiency of a pre-decisional hearing (See Charan Lal Sahu v Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 1480 : (1990)1 SCC 613 )". Further, he submitted that, the post-decisional hearing cannot be a substitute for pre-decisional hearing, in the case at hand the position is different.
In a given case post-decisional hearing can obliterate the procedural deficiency of a pre-decisional hearing (See Charan Lal Sahu v Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 1480 : (1990)1 SCC 613 )". Further, he submitted that, the post-decisional hearing cannot be a substitute for pre-decisional hearing, in the case at hand the position is different. Therefore, he submitted that, the reliance placed by learned Counsel for petitioners on this aspect cannot be considered as a radar . and applied to the facts and circumstances of the case. Under Section 27 -A( 1)(a) and (1 )(b) of the Act, nowhere, it is stipulated that, a personal hearing should be given to the parties. The reliance placed by learned Counsel for petitioners in support of his case that, Rule 8 of the Rules has not been complied with, is also not at all applicable to the facts of the case. In the instant case, proceedings were initiated for, non-compliance of Sections 11 and 13 of the Act and not Section 25 of the said Act. Learned Counsel for respondents submitted that, there is no report as such submitted in the instant case, but what is submitted is a proposal for consideration by the Competent Authority. After careful perusal of the same, there is some substance in the submission made by learned Counsel for respondents. It emerges from the proposal forwarded by the second respondent dated 18th February, 2006 that, it is not a report but a proposal for consideration by the Competent Authority, highlighting the ground reality and the manner in which the Shala Samithi has been functioning since decades in clear violation of Sections 11 and 13 of the Act. Therefore, I am of the considered view that, at any stretch of imagination, interference by this Court in the impugned order passed by first respondent vide Annexure-G is not justifiable. 16. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, as stated above, taking into consideration the totality of the case on hand and the factual legal aspects of the matter, interference by this Court in exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India is uncalled for. Hence, I do not find any good grounds as such made by petitioners. Accordingly, the writ petition filed by petitioners is dismissed as devoid of any merits.