JUDGMENT A. K. GANGULY, J. — This writ petition has been filed chal¬lenging the order dated 6.2.2006 passed by the Bhubaneswar Devel¬opment Authority, opposite party No.1 (hereinafter called “B.D.A.”). By the said order the Planning Member of B.D.A. informed one Tapan Kumar Mohanty, who claims to be the Managing Director of M/s. Z. Engineers Construction (P) Ltd., the petitioner-company that its application filed on 19.10.2005 for construction of a residential/commercial S+8 storied building cannot be considered for certain reason mentioned in the said order. The reasons for non-consideration of the petitioner’s application is that the plot is located in the green belt/Commercial zone as per the C.D.P. of Bhubaneswar. The other reasons is that the building plan is not in conformity with Rule 70(8) of Bhubaneswar Develop¬ment Authority (Planning & Building Standards) Regulations, 2001 (hereinafter referred to as “Regulations, 2001”). 2. The material facts of the case are that for construc¬tion of a S+8 residential building over plot No.264(P), 265 in Mouza Chandrasekharpur in Bhubaneswar, a plan is stated to have been submitted on 4.7.2002 by the petitioner in the prescribed form under Section 16(1) of Orissa Development Authorities Act (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”). It was alleged that the said plan was submitted in conformity with Clause 70(2) read with Table 17(2)(b) Column 3, Serial No.9 of the Regulation. The further case of the petitioner-company is that by its letter dated 11.2.2003 sent to the Vice-Chairman, BDA, it was brought to the notice of the Vice-Chairman that permission from the BDA to undertake development with respect to the plot in question was filed on 4.7.2002 and its application was registered on 4.7.2002. More than two months had elapsed since the submission of the application by the petitioner-company but till date it had not been either approved or rejected. It was made clear in the said letter that if within a further period of one month from the date of receipt of the notice no communication of either granting or refusing permission or for requisitioning of any relevant infor¬mation was received by the petitioner-company, then the petition¬er-company would presume the permission as applied for has been deemed to have been granted. In answer to the said letter, the B.D.A. sent on 26.2.2003 its letter to the Chief Architect, Government of Orissa, Bhubaneswar enclosing therein a set of revised plan containing three numbers of drawing and copy of clarification letter submit¬ted by the Chief Architect in response to the observations made by the Chief Architect. The Chief Architect was also requested by the Planning Member, Bhubaneswar to take appropriate action in the matter and his considered view was also requested to be communicated to the Planning Member of B.D.A. to be placed in the next Development Plan and Building Permission Committee. A copy of the said letter was sent to the Managing Director of the petitioner-company for necessary information and interaction with the Chief Architect and it was also made clear that the said letter was issued in response to the statutory notice received by the B.D.A. 13.2.2003. 3. The Chief Architect in response to the same sent its reply to the Vice-Chairman, BDA by a communication dated 8.4.2003, the text of which is set out below :- “GOVERNMENT OF ORISSA OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ARCHITECT NIRMAN SOUDHA : BHUBANESWAR No. C.P.H. & UD-1/98(pt) 926 / Dated the 8th April, 2003. From Shri S. C. Swain, Chief Architect, Govt. of Orissa, Bhubaneswar. To The Vice-Chairman, Bhubaneswar Development Authority, Bhubaneswar. Sub : Submission of first revision drawings of item No.BPC-17/37- Apartment complex of High Land residency over Plot No.264/2511, 264/4299 and 265 in Mz-Chandrasekharpur. Sir With reference to the letter No.1626/BP/BDA dated 26.02.2003, the revised drawings of the above mentioned projects submitted by B.D.A. were scrutinized by our Design Committee on 7.4.2003. On principle the Committee has accepted the proposal. However BDA should examine the parking norms as per Regulations. One set of revised drawings (five nos.) of this project is re¬quired to be retained in this office for future reference and record and another set of drawing is enclosed herewith for fur¬ther necessary action by BDA. Yours faithfully, Sd/- Chief Architect, Orissa. Memo No.927 /Dated the 8th April, 2003 Copy forwarded to the Planning Member, Bhubaneswar Develop¬ment Authority, Bhubaneswar for information and necessary action. Sd/- Chief Architect, Orissa” 4. Thereafter several letters were exchanged between the parties and ultimately the stand of BDA is reflected in its letter dated 6.2.2006, as noted in the beginning of this judg¬ment, which is marked as Annexure-12. Sd/- Chief Architect, Orissa” 4. Thereafter several letters were exchanged between the parties and ultimately the stand of BDA is reflected in its letter dated 6.2.2006, as noted in the beginning of this judg¬ment, which is marked as Annexure-12. Therefore as on date the plan has not been sanctioned, as according to BDA certain technical requirements have not been complied with by the petitioner-company. 5. It is normally not within the domain of a Writ Court to decide whether the technical requirements are to be fulfilled by the petitioner or whether insistence on those technical require¬ments by the BDA is at all necessary or not. The sanction of a building plan, especially like the present one, which is for construction of a building of considerable height, namely S+8 bristles with various technical considerations and the Court normally does not have the expertise to decide whether those considerations are germane or not, unless of course the authori¬ties insistence on compliance with the technicalities is palpably perverse. Here no such patent perversity has been alleged nor is it manifest. 6. The case has been argued on a different point, namely that having regard to the facts of the case and the provisions of the Act, there has been a deemed sanction of the petitioner’s plan by BDA and therefore BDA cannot now withhold it on the pretext of any technical objection. 7. It has been argued that admittedly on 4.7.2002, the application for sanction filed by the petitioner was received by the BDA, but it has not communicated its decision within two months. Therefore, Section 16(7) of the said Act comes into play. Section 16(7) of the said Act is set out below : “16. Application for permission- (7) If the Authority does not communicate its decision either granting or refusing permission to the applicant within two months from the date of receipt of the application by the authority, the applicant shall in the form prescribed by regula¬tions draw the attention of the Vice-Chairman of the Authority with regard to his application, by registered post.” It has also been urged that in terms of Section 16(7), the petitioner had drawn the attention of the Vice-Chairman with regard to its application dated 4.7.2002 by its letter dated 11.2.2003. According to the petitioner, thereafter Section 16(8) would come into play and this provides for grant of deemed sanc¬tion. According to the petitioner, thereafter Section 16(8) would come into play and this provides for grant of deemed sanc¬tion. Section 16(8) is set out below :- “16(8) If, within a further period of one month from the date of receipt of the application drawing such attention, as mentioned in Sub-section (7), the Authority does not communicate its decision, either granting or refusing permission, such per¬mission shall be deemed to have been granted to the applicant on the date immediately following the date of expiry of the three months' period : Provided that in computing the period of two months under Sub-section (7) and further one month under Sub-section (8) the period in between the date of requisitioning any further information or documents from the applicant and the date of receipt of such information or document from the applicant shall be excluded.” 8. Relying on a decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Manindra Kumar Ray and others versus Bhubaneswar Development Authority and another reported in AIR 1998 Orissa 141, the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that in the facts of this case this Court should issue a declaration that in view of the provision of Section 16(8) of the Act the petitioner-company's plan has been deemed to have been sanctioned. The decision in the case of Manindra Kumar Ray (supra) considered the effect of a deeming clause in Section 16(8) of the Act and the time limit prescribed under Sections 16(7) and 16(8) of the Act. In construing the effect of the deeming clause in a statutory provision learned Judges referred to the decision of the House of Lords in East End Dwellion Co. versus Finsbury Co. reported in (1952) AC 109 and the decision of St. Aubyn v. A.S. reported in (1951) 2 ALL ER 473. Referring to the principles decided in those two cases, the learned Judges in Paragraph-6 of Manindra Kumar Ray’s case (supra) laid down the rule of interpre¬tation which is to be followed in construing a proviso and also for construing the effect of deeming provision. There cannot be any dispute with those principles laid down by the Division Bench and this Court respectfully agrees with those said propositions. There cannot be any dispute with those principles laid down by the Division Bench and this Court respectfully agrees with those said propositions. Even after laying down those principles and even after holding that the time limit prescribed in Sub-sections (7) and (8) of Section 16 clearly apply to the facts of the case, in Manindra Kumar Ray, the learned Judges in the concluding direc¬tions of the said judgment did not hold that the plan is deemed to have been sanctioned in view of the delay on the part of the sanctioning authority (See Para 11). On the other hand, the learned Judges gave the following directions to the petitioners :- “To avoid unnecessary delay, the petitioners are directed to appear before the Vice-Chairman on 17.6.1998. Let the final decision be taken within three months from today.” This shows that even after the deeming provision was held to be applicable the same was not pressed into service in concluding the controversy between the parties. 9. In my judgment the deeming provision in Sub-section (8) and the time limit in Sub-section (7) has been introduced with the dominant purpose to see that the applications which are filed for grant of sanction by the applicants do not remain pending with the authorities for an unreasonably long period. On the other hand the legislative intention is that such an application should receive immediate attention of the sanctioning authority. So the deeming provision introduced in Sub-section (8) of Section 16 is meant to expedite the entire process of sanction under the threat of a deemed sanction. A deemed provision is a legal fiction created by a statute and in interpreting a legal fiction the Court is to first ascer¬tain the purpose for which the fiction is created. (See State of Travancore Cochin and others v. Shanmugha Vilas Cashewnut Facto¬ry, Quilon reported in AIR 1953 SC 333 at paragraph-38 pages 342 and 343 and also the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Bombay v. Pandurang Vinayak and others reported in AIR 1953 SC 244 at paragraph-5 page 246). After ascertaining this purpose the Court is to assume all facts and consequences which are the inevitable corollaries for giving effect to the fiction. After ascertaining this purpose the Court is to assume all facts and consequences which are the inevitable corollaries for giving effect to the fiction. At the same time it is also well settled that in construing the fiction its effect is not to be extended beyond the purpose for which it is created. (See the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar and others reported in AIR 1955 SC 661 at paragraph-31 page 680). Therefore, a reasonable view of the facts situation has to be taken by the Court having regard to the purpose for which the legal fiction is created. Considering all these principles and also considering the reply given by BDA dated 26.2.2003 which is within one month from 11.2.2003, this Court cannot hold that the deeming provision under Section 16(8) can be applied in the facts of the case. This Court further holds that when any person insists on the application of a deeming provision he must strictly comply with the conditions for invoking the deeming provision. In other words, if any person wants to enjoy a benefit granted under a deeming provision he must adhere to the conditions which are to be followed in order to bring him under the beneficial provision of the deeming clause. 10. As already indicated, the main purpose of the deeming clause is to introduce the element of the speed in the matter of grant of sanction, that is why designedly the application under Section 16(7) has been directed to be addressed to the Vice-Chairman of BDA under certain conditions. The first condition is that it has to be in the form prescribed by the Regulation and the second condition is that the application has to be sent under registered post. In the instant case the application which has been sent by the petitioner dated 11.2.2003 was neither sent by a registered post nor was it sent in the prescribed form. Such form has been prescribed under Rule 10(2) which has been framed under the said Act. In the instant case the application which has been sent by the petitioner dated 11.2.2003 was neither sent by a registered post nor was it sent in the prescribed form. Such form has been prescribed under Rule 10(2) which has been framed under the said Act. The said Rule 10(2) is set out below:- “10(2) If the Authority, does not communicate its decision either granting or refusing permission to the applicant within two months from the date of receipt of the application by the Authority, the applicant shall draw the attention of the Vice-Chairman of the Authority with regard to his application, by registered post in Form-III.” The relevant form is Form-III and the same is a statutory form. Though learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that there is not much difference between the petitioner’s letter dated 11.2.2003 and the statutory form but nonetheless the appli¬cation was not sent under the statutory form. At the same time the said application was not sent under registered post but it was possibly sent by hand delivery and appears to have been received by some one in the office of BDA. The requirement of sending the notice under statutory form by registered post with A.D. is part of conditions under Section 16(7) and it is only on a strict fulfilment of these conditions the benefit of deeming sanction under Section 16(8) can be availed of by an applicant. The prescription of those conditions namely sending the notice under a statutory form and under regis¬tered post also has a specific purpose. The obvious purpose is after it is sent in that form and in that manner it will immedi¬ately draw the attention of the Vice-Chairman. Hundreds of let¬ters not in any prescribed forms are sent under ordinary post or through personal service. But those letters do not carry the stamp of urgency which is attributable to a statutory notice sent under registered post. Therefore, the ordinary letter of an applicant sent not in the form and otherwise than by registered post may not be placed before the Vice-Chairman to draw his attention. That is why the conditions have been prescribed. Therefore these conditions are to be mandatorily followed by anyone who seeks to invoke the benefit under Section 16(8). This has not been done in this case. Therefore without compliance with these statutory requirements, the petitioner cannot claim the benefit of Section 16(8). 11. That is why the conditions have been prescribed. Therefore these conditions are to be mandatorily followed by anyone who seeks to invoke the benefit under Section 16(8). This has not been done in this case. Therefore without compliance with these statutory requirements, the petitioner cannot claim the benefit of Section 16(8). 11. There is another part of Section 16(8) also. Section 16(8) makes it clear that entire process from the date of appli¬cation for sanction and the date of grant of deemed sanction is to be completed within a period of three months after of course deducting the period which is to be taken by the authorities in requisitioning any further information or documents from the applicant. In the instant case the petitioner applied under Sec¬tion 16(7) much beyond the initial period of two months. The application for grant of sanction was filed on 4.7.2002 and the letter was purported to have been sent on 11.2.2003. Therefore, from the very conduct of the petitioner it was clear that it was not invoking the deeming provision for the purpose of urgency. If any applicant invokes the deeming provision after considerable delay on his part, the same may not be strictly maintainable in view of the clear prescription of three months’ period minus the period mentioned in the proviso of Section 16(8). 12. For these reasons this Court is unable to accept the contention of the petitioner that in view of the provision of Section 16(8) of the said Act the plan of the petitioner-company should be deemed to have been sanctioned. Apart from that the reply which has been given by the BDA in response to the notice which was purported to have been sent under Section 16(7) would also show that the BDA was not sitting tight over the application of the petitioner-company but was responding to the same. 13. The learned counsel for the petitioner-company, howev¬er, argued that in response to the BDA’s letter dated 26.2.2003 the Chief Architect, Orissa after sanctioning the plan virtually accepted the proposal. Therefore, the BDA should now grant the same. 13. The learned counsel for the petitioner-company, howev¬er, argued that in response to the BDA’s letter dated 26.2.2003 the Chief Architect, Orissa after sanctioning the plan virtually accepted the proposal. Therefore, the BDA should now grant the same. This is a question of grant of proposal on merits and as already noted, normally a Writ Court does not interfere by di¬recting the appropriate sanctioning authority to exercise its discretion in the matter of grant of sanction in any particular way namely whether it must grant the sanction or not unless of course it appears that the conduct of the authorities is mani¬festly mala fide or perverse. As noted above that is not the case here. This Court finds that the application for grant of sanction has not yet been disposed of and is pending at the stage of the communication of BDA dated 6.2.2006. Since the matter is pending with BDA for a considerable period of time, this Court directs the petitioner-company to approach the BDA by fulfilling its reply to BDA’s letter and the same should be done within a period of 15 days from today if not already done. Thereafter BDA should hear the petitioner or its representatives in person and will finalize the question of grant of sanction either way within a period of three months from the date the petitioner approaches the BDA. This time limit is peremptory in nature considering the fact that the matter is pending for a long time. This Court, therefore, disposes of this Writ petition with the aforesaid observations. There is no order as to cost. CHIEF JUSTICE I agree. Petition disposed of.