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2006 DIGILAW 509 (CAL)

TEA BOARD v. LMJ INTERNATIONAL LTD.

2006-08-14

ASHIM KUMAR BANERJEE, TAPAN MUKHERJEE

body2006
ASHIM KUMAR BANERJEE, J. ( 1 ) TEA Board was set up under the tea Act, 1953 (hereinafter referred to as the "said Act" of 1953) by the central Government, inter alia, controlling export of tea. By the said Act, tea Board was entitled to issue licence for tea export under Tea (Distribution tor Export) Control Order, 1957 issued under the said Act of 1953. ( 2 ) LMJ International Limited (hereinafter referred to as the "lmj") was a company mainly dealing with export of various items abroad. On september 11. 1991 Tea Board granted them licence for export of tea. According to LMJ they discovered tea market in Libya and they became pioneer in export of tea in that country. On July 7, 1999 National Supply corporation (hereinafter referred to as "nasco") a Government organization in the said country entered into an agreement with LMJ for export of 3000 MT of black tea as per specification. The goods were accordingly shipped in April, 2000 after proper inspection of the quality and quantity by the approved agency of the parties. According to LMJ, the shipment was properly done and they received payment from NASCO in respect of such supply. Their performance guarantee was also released. ( 3 ) IN August 30, 2000 Tea Board received a communication from Indian embassy at Libya through the Ministry of Commerce, Government of India that there had been a dispute with regard to the supply made to NASCO by LMJ which resulted to strange commercial relation between the two countries. The communication of the Ambassador of India in Libya is appearing at page 94-96 of the Paper Book. Tea Board forwarded a copy of the said complaint to LMJ vide tetter dated August 30. 2000 and requested them to offer their comments on the same. Immediately LMJ by their letter dated September 1, 2000 gave a detailed reply to the Tea board appearing at page 97 104 of the Paper Book with a copy to all concerned including the Ambassador of India in Libya as well as other dignitaries of the Central Government. On perusal of the said reply it appears that the goods were inspected before shipment by a Cypress based inspection agency and after being satisfied about the quality of the goods the consignment was shipped. On perusal of the said reply it appears that the goods were inspected before shipment by a Cypress based inspection agency and after being satisfied about the quality of the goods the consignment was shipped. It was also contended that the blending and packaging of tea was done in presence of the representative of the inspecting agency. The sample was also tested in a laboratory abroad at the instance of the inspection agency. However when the goods arrived at Tripoli, Libya the Health Authorities of the Libya Government took sample and raised objection as according to them the consignment was not fit for human consumption. According to LMJ, it might have been caused due to internal disputes between two departments of Libya government being the Health Authorities on the one hand and NASCO on the other hand. It also appears that there had been dispute with regard to supply of rice also. ( 4 ) CORRESPONDENCE were exchanged thereafter between Tea Board, nasco and LMJ. At one stage LMJ asked for copy of the complaint if any made by NASCO against them Tea Board wrote back to NASCO. NASCO replied to the effect that they already at the instance of the central Government communicated to the joint Director, Foreign Trade. Copy of their letter addressed to Joint Director. Foreign Trade was also supplied to LMJ for their perusal. Ultimately notice to show cause was issued to LMJ by Tea Board to the effect why proceeding, would, not be initiated against them for cancellation of their export licence in terms of Clause 12 of the Control Order of 1957. The said notice was issued on December 22, 2000. By that time the Tea Board was informed that according to Health Authority of Libya Government tea exported by LMJ was unfit far human consumption and was withdrawn from the market the entire commercial activities between the two countries came to a standstill because of the subject dispute. LMJ replied reiterating their stand earlier taken by them. Second show cause notice was issued on june 8, 2001. LMJ also replied reiterating their stand. Tea Board advised lmj to resolve the controversy. The Tea Board authorized LMJ to represent the country in a commercial delegation to Libya. Discussions were held. LMJ replied reiterating their stand earlier taken by them. Second show cause notice was issued on june 8, 2001. LMJ also replied reiterating their stand. Tea Board advised lmj to resolve the controversy. The Tea Board authorized LMJ to represent the country in a commercial delegation to Libya. Discussions were held. Ultimately, LMJ and MASCO on principle agreed to resolve the controversy and an agreement was arrived at between LMJ and nasco subject to the approval of the higher authorities of the Libya government. The Libya Government did not approve such settlement. Personal hearing was given to the Director of LMJ by the Chairman, Tea board after issuance ,of notice of hearing dated December 11, 2001. Adjpumment was asked for by LMJ which was refused by Tea,board. Ultimately, Chairman, Tea Board by a reasoned order dated December 19, 2001 cancelled the export licence issued by the Tea Board under the control Order of 1957. ( 5 ) PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THIS COURT: On December 20, 2001 LMJ filed the above writ petition before this court. Initially there was an interim order staying the order of cancellation with a corresponding direction upon LMJ not to export any tea until further order. The writ petition was heard by Learned Single judge and was disposed of by judgment and order dated June 25, 2002 appearing at page 357-432 of the Paper Book allowing the writ petition by quashing the order impugned dated December 1), 2001 passed by the Chairman, Tea Board. An appeal was filed on August 31, 2002. The appeal came up for hearing before the bench presided over by the then Hon'ble Chief Justice and one of us (Ashim Kumar Banerjee, J ). The Division Bench dismissed the appeal as infructuous by an order dated June 30, 2003 as it was represented before the Division Bench that the Libya Government already withdrew the complaint lodged against LMJ and LMJ already started exporting goods to libya through NASCO. An application for recall was made by Tea Board on may 7, 2004, The said application was heard and disposed of by another division Bench presided over by one of us (Ashim Kumar Banerjee, J.)sitting with R. N. Sinha, J (as His Lordship then was) whereby the appeal was restored after recall of the order dated June 30, 2003 imposing a cost of Rs. 20,000. 00 against Tea Board to be paid to LMJ. 20,000. 00 against Tea Board to be paid to LMJ. After the appeal was restored it came up before us when identical submission was made by LMJ to the effect that the appeal became infructuous because of the subsequent event. We, however, decided to hear the appeal on merits. The appeal was heard on the above mentioned dates. ( 6 ) SUBSEQUENT EVENTS: During the pendency of the writ petition before the learned Single judge and during the pendency of the appeal before the Division Bench attempts were made by the parties to have resolution of disputes. On a disclosure being made by both the parties before us it appears to us that ultimately the dispute was resolved between the parties and an agreement was, in fact, entered into on April 28, 2005 between NASCO and LMJ. As per Article 12 of the said agreement it was agreed upon by and between the parties that the parties would have no claim against each other under any contract or shipment concluded upto the date of execution of the said agreement. Under Article 13 of the said agreement it was agreed upon by and between the parties that the parties would withdraw all court cases against each other in Libyan Courts as well as Indian Courts or pending anywhere else. According to Tea Board this agreement was entered into due to intervention by the Central government and Tea Bpard was instrumental in such settlement so that tea export in such country could be resumed after resolution of the controversy. It was further contended on behalf of the Tea Board that there was further breach on the part of LMJ of the settlement agreement dated April 28, 2005. Such allegation was, however, strongly disputed by the learned counsel appearing for LMJ before us. LMJ on the contrary through an application being GA No. 2140 of 2006 as well as by way of further disclosure brought documents on record to show that they started export of various consignments including tea to Libya through NASCO, latest date of such disclosure is of July 5, 2006. ( 7 ) OUR REACTION TO THE SUBSEQUENT EVENT : There had been some development during pendency of the writ petition before the learned Single Judge. ( 7 ) OUR REACTION TO THE SUBSEQUENT EVENT : There had been some development during pendency of the writ petition before the learned Single Judge. Learned Single judge did not place any reliance on the same and in our view rightly as nothing much turned up which could help the court to take a different stand other than the stand to be taken on the basis of the sequence of events as on the date of the presentation of the petition. There was not much improvement at the appellate stage. Before the first Division Bench opportunities were given to Tea Board to react to the submission made on behalf of LMJ. Despite opportunities being given. Tea Board could not come with a definite assertion. As a result the Division Bench dismissed the appeal as infmctuous relying on the submission of LMJ. When the application for recall was made the other Division Bench get the opportunity to examine the documents disclosed by Tea Board and ultimately observed that the Tea Board was earlier given ample opportunity to disclose further documents which they did not avail and the appellant was extremely callous tn pursuing their appeal. The Division Bench, however, was, of the opinion that whether the ban still existed or not was a question on merits and should be gone into at the time of hearing the appeal on merits. Hence, the appeal was restored. The appeal was heard by us on the above mentioned dates. ( 8 ) WE now find ; that there was an agreement between the parties subsequent to passing of the orders of the learned Single judge as well as two Division Benches referred to above. Mr. Mitra appearing for the appellant, contended that the Division Bench in this appeal was invited to decide whether the learned judge was right in allowing the writ petition by quashing the order of the Chairman, Tea Board passed on December 19, 2001. Hence, the Division Bench should consider the sequence of events as on the date of delivery of judgment by the learned Single judge or the date when the impugned order was passed by the Chairman, Tea board and not the facts subsequent thereto. Mr. Hence, the Division Bench should consider the sequence of events as on the date of delivery of judgment by the learned Single judge or the date when the impugned order was passed by the Chairman, Tea board and not the facts subsequent thereto. Mr. Kapoor on the other hand appearing for LMJ contended that on perusal of the sequence of events subsequent to the passing of the order by the learned Single Judge the issue became academic and there was nothing for the Division Bench to go into the controversy by entertaining the appeal of the appellant. ( 9 ) BOTH the submissions, in our view, sound logical. If we approach the problem giving emphasis to technicality we find, Mr. Mitra was right. On the other hand we cannot bursh aside the reality as of date by rejecting the contention of Mr. Kapoor. We. however, feel that once the parties argued before us on merits and we were invited to decide the controversy we should give our views on the controversy. We also intend to deal with subsequent events and thereafter mould the relief considering the events subsequent to the filing of the writ petition. ( 10 ) WE, therefore, intend to give bur views on the issues and aspects raised by the parties. It might be academic to some extent, however, it might be of help to the parties to resolve similar controversy if arises in future. ( 11 ) THE ORDER IMPUGNED: The order dated December 19, 2001 passed by the Chairman, Tea board was impugned in the above writ petition by LMJ. The said order is appearing at page 238-247 of the Paper Book. ( 12 ) ANALYSIS of the Order of the Tea Board: (i) Tea Board initiated proceeding on receipt of the letter dated 25th August, 2000 from the Ministry of Commerce enclosing a letter of the Ambassador of India in Libya dated August 6, 2000. According to Ambassador complaint was lodged by NASCO relating to import of tea from In'dia through LMJ. According to complaint the consignment received by NASCO was not according to the sample provided by LMJ. (ii) Representative of LMJ was called for discussion. They were informed about the complaint. LMJ offered their explanation through their letter dated September 1, 2000 which was conveyed to Indian ambassador at Libya. According to complaint the consignment received by NASCO was not according to the sample provided by LMJ. (ii) Representative of LMJ was called for discussion. They were informed about the complaint. LMJ offered their explanation through their letter dated September 1, 2000 which was conveyed to Indian ambassador at Libya. Subsequent communication came to the effect that tea was withdrawn from the Libyan market. Foreign Ministry in Libya gave a written complaint to Ambassador with regard to the quality of tea and threatened that unless such issue was resolved no other Indian tea consignment would be permitted for shipment to Libya. (iii) Show cause notice was given in terms of Clause 12 which was replied to by LMJ. NASCO was also written for raising a formal complaint. To that they replied to Tea Board asking them to contact the joint Director, Foreign Trade. Accordingly, joint Director, Foreign Trade was contacted and the complaint was received which was sent to LMJ for their comments. (iv)As per the complaint to Joint Director the entire consignment was of inferior quality and the Health Authority rejected such consignment by observing that it was unfit for human consumption. It was also pointed out that 500 MT was shipped and payment was received by LMJ by negotiating "forged" and "false" documents. (v) On perusal of the formal complaint of NASCO a fresh show cause notice was issued and reply was received from LMJ. Informal meeting was arranged to resolve the controversy. (vi) Ultimately hearing was held on December 18, 2001 where it was contended by LMJ that no claim was made by NASCO for such export of alleged inferior quality. There was no. claim made by NASCO on any account. Hence, there was no occasion for Tea Board to issue notice for cancellation of the licence under Clause 12. (vii) Entire export was stopped after April, 2000 and India was losing export market for about 19 months in Libya. (viii) LMJ was asked to sort out the problem way back in August, 2000. They could not do so. The settlement arrived at between the parties was not approved by the higher authority. India lost the tea market in Libya. (vii) Entire export was stopped after April, 2000 and India was losing export market for about 19 months in Libya. (viii) LMJ was asked to sort out the problem way back in August, 2000. They could not do so. The settlement arrived at between the parties was not approved by the higher authority. India lost the tea market in Libya. (ix) Chairman observed that the licencee failed to perform their contractual obligation, to the satisfaction of the foreign buyer and as such in exercise of the power conferred under sub-section 3 and 5 of the said Act of 1953, licence was cancelled. ( 13 ) JUDGMENT AND ORDER OF THE LEARNED SINGLE JUDGE IMPUGNED IN THE APPEAL: Learned Single Judge in his well versed judgment dated June 25 2002 allowed the writ petition. The judgment is appearing at page 3c6-437 of the Paper Book. ( 14 ) ANALYSIS OF THE JUDGMENT OF THE LEARNED SINGLE JUDGE : (i) The show cause notices issued purportedly under Clause 12 of the Control Order were not proper and those notices were not show cause notices contemplated under Clause 12. (ii) There had been violation of natural justice and fair play as the cancellation of licence proceeded on an unfair basis. (in) There had been lack of fair play as the appellant procured complaint from the foreign buyer. (iv) The Chairman of the appellant should have detached himself from the controversy being the adjudicating authority. The facts would depict that there was no detachment. (v) Letter dated April 11, 2002 weakened the case of the appellant and the said letter was not disclosed until the Affidavit-in-Opposition was filed in the writ proceeding. (vi) There was no cross examination which was necessary to adjudicate the controversy. (vii) The proceeding was vitiated in absence of the foreign buyer as foreign buyer was a necessary party in the proceeding. (viii) There was no social impact on the controversy as the controversy involved herein was commercial and contractual in nature and no public interest was involved in the dispute. (ix) The plea of alternative remedy was not available to the appellant as the court felt that there had been a dear violation of principles of natural justice. ( 15 ) CONTENTION OF THE APPELLANT Mr. (ix) The plea of alternative remedy was not available to the appellant as the court felt that there had been a dear violation of principles of natural justice. ( 15 ) CONTENTION OF THE APPELLANT Mr. Aninda Mitra, Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant contended as follows: (1) Adequate opportunity was given to the respondent No. 1 to offer their explanation as to the complaint raised against them. Hence, there was no violation of principles of natural justice. (ii) The formal complaint was obtained as the respondent No. 1 demanded the same while replying to the notice of show-cause. Hence, there was no question of procuring any complaint as observed by the Learned Single Judge. (iii) The notice issued under Clause 12 was to give opportunity to the respondent No. 1 to offer their explanation and upon receipt of their reply appropriate opportunity was given to the respondent No. 1 of being heard. (iv) There was no lack of fair play as observed by the Learned single Judge. (v) The written submission filed by the respondent No. 1 did not raise any plea with regard to the validity of the show-cause notice and such belated plea should not have been entertained by the Learned Single Judge. (vi) The principles of Evidence Act could not apply in case of proceeding contemplated under Clause 12 as such the observation of the Learned Single judge that no cross-examination was done was not liable to be sustained. (vii) The process under Clause 12 was initiated by the Tea Board in view of a complaint received by them from the governmental level and issue involved public importance and national importance as the entire export market in Libya came to a stand still because of the subject dispute. (viii) The Learned judge did not consider the national importance involved in the matter. (ix) Under the Control Order of 1957 the Central Government was the appellate authority and the Learned Single Judge should not have sat on appeal over the order passed under Clause 12 by the Chairman Tea Board in an application under Article 226 of the Constitution, which was not permissible in law. (x) Scope of judicial review was very much limited and unless the. (x) Scope of judicial review was very much limited and unless the. order impugned was shown to be perverse or there was error apparent on the face of it the order impugned in the writ petition was not liable to be quashed and or set aside. (xi) The Learned Single Judge should have dismissed the writ petition by relegating the parties to the appellate authority. ( 16 ) CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENT NO. 1 AND 2. Mr. S. K. Kapur, Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent No. 1 and 2 contended as follows: (i) The order impugned in the writ petition was perverse as there was no finding of the concerned authority to the extent that there had been breach committed on the part of the respondent no. 1 in performing their obligation under the export contract. (ii) There was no formal complaint lodged by the foreign buyer and the complaint was procured by the appellant. (iii) The authority did not exercise its jurisdiction conferred upon it under Clause 12 in a proper manner. (iv) There was no finding to the extent that there had been non performance of the contractual obligations to the foreign buyer by the respondent No. 1 as contemplated under-sub-rule 1 (aa)of Clause 12 of the Control Order. (v) The cancellation of licence could only be done on the grounds mentioned in sub-clause 1 of Clause 12. The concerned authority did not come to any positive finding as to whether any of the grounds mentioned in sub-rule 1 of Clause 12 was involved in the instant matter warranting cancellation of the licence. (vi) The Learned Single judge in his painstaking judgment dealt with each and every aspect raised before him and there was no scope for the Division Bench to interfere with the same. (vii) Assuming that there had been an occasion for cancellation of the licence, events subsequent to the filing of the writ petition would show that the. present appeal became infructuous as the respondent No. 1 already started export to libya and that too through NASCO the purported complainant. (viii) Because of the events subsequent to the filing of the writ petition the present appeal became infructuous and was liable to be dismissed as infructuous. present appeal became infructuous as the respondent No. 1 already started export to libya and that too through NASCO the purported complainant. (viii) Because of the events subsequent to the filing of the writ petition the present appeal became infructuous and was liable to be dismissed as infructuous. ( 17 ) UNION OF INDIA : Hearing of the appeal was time to time adjourned by us to ensure presence of the learned advocate appearing for the Central Government. However, we could not achieve any success till the hearing was concluded. At the time of conclusion of the hearing Mr. Pallav Benarjee, learned counsel, appeared for the Central Government, however immediately after recording his appearance left the court and we did not get any opportunity to have the views of the Central Government in this matter. ( 18 ) CASES CITED: Mr. Anindya Mitra, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, cited the following decisions: (i) 1972, Volume - III, Supreme Court Cases, Page 324 (The Deputy assistant Iron and Steel Controller and Anr. vs. L. Manickchand, proprietor, Kafrella Metal Corp oration, Madras) (ii) All India Reporter, 1973. Supreme Court, Page 2711 (M/s daruka and Co. vs. The Onion of India and Ors.) (iii) All India Reporter, 1984, Supreme Court, Page 898 (Bishnu ram Borah and Anr. vs. Parag Saikia and Ors) (iv) 1994, Volume -II, Supreme Court Cases, Page 481 (State of maharashtra and Ors. vs. Prabhu) (v) 1995, Volume- I, Supreme Court Cases, Page 652 (State of orissa and Anr. vs. Radhay shyam Mehar and Ors.) (vi) All India Reporter, 1997, Supreme Court, Page 1541 (Danda rajeshwari vs. Bodawula. Hanumayamma and Ors (vii) All India Reporter, 1997; Supreme Court, Page 2286 (High court of Judicature at Bombay through its Registrar us. Udaysingh S/o Ganpatrao Naik Nimbalkar and Ors.) (viii) All India Reporter, 2000, Patna, Page 43 (M/s Kavita Pigments and Chemicals (Pvt.) Ltd. 81 Ors. us. Allahabad Bank andors.)Mr. S. K. Kapoor, learned counsel appearing for the respondent, however, did not cite any authority. ( 19 ) OUR VIEWS ON THE ISSUE AS ON THE DATE OF PRESENTATION OF THE WRIT PETITION. Let us deal with the order of the Learned Single judge on the issues raised before His Lordship and decided by His Lordship. (i) SHOW-CAUSE NOTICE: on the issue of show-cause notice His Lordship observed that the notices purportedly issued under Clause 12 were not valid notices. Let us deal with the order of the Learned Single judge on the issues raised before His Lordship and decided by His Lordship. (i) SHOW-CAUSE NOTICE: on the issue of show-cause notice His Lordship observed that the notices purportedly issued under Clause 12 were not valid notices. To appreciate h ,is Lordship's judgment the interpretation of Clause 12 is necessary. Under Clause 12 the licensing authority being the appellant after giving the licence holder being the respondent No. 1 herein an opportunity of being heard was entitled to cancel the licence on the following grounds: a) Licence was obtained by misrepresentation. This ground is not germane herein. b) Licensee did not observe or perform their contractual obligation. In the instant case, the licensee exported goods after a thorough inspection. There had been payment made by NASCO. It was observed by the order impugned that they procured payment by negotiating false document. Such plea was however, not pressed before us. We also did not find any such assertion before the Learned single Judge. The appellant proceeded on a complaint being, received from the appropriate department of Central Government and after receipt of the complaint the authority asked for explanation from the respondent No. 1. The respondent No. 1 asked for at copy of the complaint from the foreign buyer. Since there was no formal complaint from the foreign buyer the appellant wrote to the concerned foreign buyer who asked the appellant to contact the Joint director of Foreign Trade. Tea Board obtained a copy of the formal complaint received by the Joint Director from the foreign buyer which was in turn forwarded to the respondent No. 1 for their comments. c) Any of the conditions under licence had been contravened. There was no definite assertion on the part of the appellant on that score, at least we do not find the same in the order impugned. Hence, we do not deliberate on same, ( 20 ) ON receipt of the complaint the notice under Clause 12 was issued by the appellant. We do not find any irregularity therein. Lot of emphasis was put on behalf of the respondent No. 1 as well as by the Learned Single judge as to the wordings of the notices. In the notice the respondent no. 1 was asked to show-cause why the proceeding would not be initiated under Clause 12 for cancellation of the licence. We do not find any irregularity therein. Lot of emphasis was put on behalf of the respondent No. 1 as well as by the Learned Single judge as to the wordings of the notices. In the notice the respondent no. 1 was asked to show-cause why the proceeding would not be initiated under Clause 12 for cancellation of the licence. We have carefully examined the Control Order. The Control Order did not suggest any two tier proceeding before the licensing authority. Hence, such notice should be construed as a notice under Clause 12. We also wish to view this issue from a different angle. We have to examine how the parties understood the purport of the notice. From the correspondence exchanged between the parties as well as from the written submission filed before the licensing authorities we find that the respondent No. 1 understood the show-cause notice as a notice under Clause 12. Hence, this plea of the respondent, No. 1 cannot be sustained and consequently the finding of the Learned Single judge on this score is, erroneous. ( 21 ) (ii) NATURAL JUSTICE - LACK OF FAIR PLAY: The Learned judge observed that the principles of natural justice was violated and on that ground the order impugned was liable to be set aside. To elaborate this issue the Learned Judge found that the entire proceeding proceeded on an unfair basis and there had been lack of fair play on the part of the licensing authority. His Lordship also observed that the licensing authority while hearing a proceeding under Clause 12. should have detached itself from the controversy to maintain transparency and independent approach, which was lacking in the matter. The Learned Judge also observed that the letter dated April 1. 1, 2002 should have been disclosed at the appropriate stage. On a close examination of the chronological events referred to hereinbefore we find that at each and every stage the respondent No. 1 was informed by the licensing authority about the complaint. At every stage they were given opportunity to offer their explanation. At the request of the respondent no. 1 Tea Board arranged for a foreign delegation involving them so that the controversy could be resolved at the appropriate place. However, despite such attempt being made the issue could not be resolved contemporaneously. At every stage they were given opportunity to offer their explanation. At the request of the respondent no. 1 Tea Board arranged for a foreign delegation involving them so that the controversy could be resolved at the appropriate place. However, despite such attempt being made the issue could not be resolved contemporaneously. Hence, we do not find any lack of fair play or any unfair basis adopted by the licensing authority in deciding the issue and the observation of the Learned Single judge in our view on that score cannot be sustained. ( 22 ) (iii) CROSS-EXAMINATION: The Learned judge proceeded on the basis that there should have been cross-examination and the issue should have been resolved in presence of the foreign buyer. In this type of proceeding before a quasi judicial authority rigid provisions of the Evidence Act, in our view, are not strictly applicable. What is required, is compliance of the principles of natural justice. As we find and have observed hereinbefore, there was no violation of principles of natural justice. Hence, the observation of the learned Single Judge that there was no cross-examination of the relevant parties conducted by the licensing authority before passing of the order impugned cannot be sustained. ( 23 ) (IV) SOCIAL IMPACT AND/or PUBLIC IMPORTANCE: we also, with due respect to His Lordship, are unable to agree with His lordship on the issue of social impact and/or public importance. From the chronological events we find that the entire export market in Libya came to a standstill because of the subject controversy. The respondent no. 1 might have been responsible for this. However, the prestige of our country was at take and specially when the entire consignment was rejected by (the Health Authority of the Libya Government on the ground that the consignment was not fit for human consumption. If this issue was not of public Importance or did not have any social impact, we are unable to find out what more it coduld be. ( 24 ) (v) ALTERNATIVE REMEDY: Plea of alternative remedy was dealt with by His Lordship. His lordship rejected such plea. If this issue was not of public Importance or did not have any social impact, we are unable to find out what more it coduld be. ( 24 ) (v) ALTERNATIVE REMEDY: Plea of alternative remedy was dealt with by His Lordship. His lordship rejected such plea. When the writ petition was initially entertained by His Lordship, His Lordship could have given the interim protection as had been done as and by way of stop gap arrangement and thereafter relegated the respondent No. 1 to the appellate authority being the Central Government under the Control Order of 1957. It was not done. Parties were asked to exchange their affidavits and the matter was finally heard and disposed of by the judgment impugned herein. ( 25 ) IN our view, the Learned Judge considering the event as on the date of the filing of the writ petition should not have interfered with the order impugned in the writ petition considering the national importance involved in the issue. It was contended before us that because of cancellation of the licence the entire business of the respondent No. 1 was hindered and immense prejudice was caused to the respondent No. 1. That could have been taken care of in an appeal before the appellate authority being the Central Government. This Court sitting in writ jurisdiction should not have gone into in detailed examination as to the veracity of the order impugned when there was specific provision for appeal. It was contended before us on behalf of the appellant that the central Government being the appellate authority was the appropriate body to examine not only the issue of deprivation of the business of the respondent No. 1 as well as the issue of national importance. The Central government did have the machinery to take up the issue with the government of Libya and could have resolved the controversy preserving the respective rights of the parties. Sitting in Writ Court such venture, in our view, should not have been attempted to by His Lordship. ( 26 ) OUR VIEWS IN THE PRESENT SCENARIO CONSIDERING THE SUBSEQUENTS: EVENTS: The entire dimension of the controversy took a different shape after execution of the settlement agreement entered into between the respondent No. 1 and the foreign buyer NASCO on April 28, 2005. It was not available with the Learned Single Judge. ( 26 ) OUR VIEWS IN THE PRESENT SCENARIO CONSIDERING THE SUBSEQUENTS: EVENTS: The entire dimension of the controversy took a different shape after execution of the settlement agreement entered into between the respondent No. 1 and the foreign buyer NASCO on April 28, 2005. It was not available with the Learned Single Judge. It was not also available before the Division Bench when the appeal was dismissed on the basis of the submission made by the respondent No. 1. It was also not available before the other Division Bench which recalled the earlier order and restored appeal to be heard on merits. However, before us, this document was disclosed by the appellant itself. On perusal of this document, it appears to us that the issue has now become academic. The parties agreed therein to withdraw respective cases against each other pending before Indian Courts as well as Libyan Court or anywhere else. The document disclosed by the respondent No. 1 would show that there had been export of consignments by the respondent No. 1 to Libya through the same foreign buyer NASCO: We cannot overlook the fact that. NASCO is also a Governmental. organization being a part of the Libyan government. In such view of the matter we feel that the issue has now become academic. Mr. Mitra appearing for the appellant contended that we should restrict ourselves to the facts available to the Learned Single judge as in the appeal we are only to examine the order of, the Learned single Judge and nothing else. We are unable to accept such contention. The Court of appeal is entitled to examine the subsequent events and that is permitted in law. Mr. Mitra also tried to contend that there was further breach committed by the respondent No. 1 of the agreement dated april 28, 2005 which could be entered into with the active assistance of the Central Government as well as Tea Board. If Tea Board feels that there are violations of the terms of the licence or there are complaints 'received by them from the foreign buyer after September, 2005 they can initiate fresh proceeding under Clause 12 of the Control Order of 1957. No such occasion has arisen as yet. It was not the case of the appellant that they received any subsequent complaint from NASCO. No such occasion has arisen as yet. It was not the case of the appellant that they received any subsequent complaint from NASCO. It was not the case of the appellant that there was subsequent breach of the condition of the licence and hence contention of the appellant on that score, in our view, is totally misconceived and as such is rejected. ( 27 ) CONCLUSION: Although we have held that the Learned Judge was wrong in interfering with the order impugned in the writ petition for the reasons stated above we do not find any scope to interfere in this appeal at this stage because of the events subsequent to passing of the order by the learned Single, Judge. RESULT: appeal fails and its hereby (dismissed without, however, any order as to cost. Appeal dismissed.