Judgment :- The defendants in the suit are the appellants in the second appeal. The respondent filed a suit for partition claiming a preliminary decree for 1/4th share in the suit properties. According to the plaintiff, he is the eldest son of the first defendant/Ramasamy Pillai and defendants 2 and 3 are the other sons of the first defendant and defendants 4 to 6 are the subsequent purchasers from the first defendant. One Subramaniyam Pillai, the father of the first defendant, in and by a gift deed dated 26.12.1920 marked as Ex.A-1, has given the property for charitable purposes. Since the charity was not effected, the said property was partitioned between the first defendant and his brothers by a partition deed dated 23.11.1924 marked as Ex.A-2. The said partition' deed included the property earmarked for the charitable purposes by Subramaniyam Pillai. According to the plaintiff, even though the said property was earmarked for charitable purposes, for the purpose of the partition deed Ex.A-2, the same cannot be partitioned. However, the said property obtained by way of partition had been enjoyed as joint family property by the plaintiff and defendants 1 to 3. Taking advantage of the fact that the plaintiff was living away, defendants I to 3 have sold some of the properties after entering into a partition among themselves by a partition deed dated 11.6.1987 marked as Ex.A-4 and according to the plain­ tiff, the said partition deed is not valid in law. The sale effected by defendants 1 to 3 in favour of defendants 4 to 6 are invalid and in these circumstances, after giving notice to the, defendants, the plaintiff has filed the present suit claiming a partition of 1/4th share in the suit properties. The trial Court, after elaborate trial, framed a specific issue about the non-inclu­sion of certain items of properties, viz., whether the non-inclusion of the properties mentioned as items 1, 3 and 4 in the A Schedule­ We allotted as the plaintiff's share in the parti­tion dated 11.6.1987, in the plaint Schedule will amount to partial partition and fatal to the suit for partition. Another issue was framed as to whether the plaintiff has accepted the parti­tion deed dated 11.6.1987 and is living in the property allotted to him and if so, whether he is estopped from filing the present suit for par­tition. Another issue was framed as to whether the plaintiff has accepted the parti­tion deed dated 11.6.1987 and is living in the property allotted to him and if so, whether he is estopped from filing the present suit for par­tition. The trial Court, having found that as per Ex.A4, the plaintiff is living in the house allot­ted to him as admitted by his oral evidence and also on the basis that some of the items of the properties allotted to the plaintiff under the partition deed have not been added in the Schedule to the-suit, has dismissed the suit on the basis of partial partition. On appeal by the plaintiff, the first appellate Court has granted a decree for partition in favour of the plaintiff by setting aside the judgment of the trial Court. The first appellate Court has rejected the con­tention of the defendant that on 26.10.2000, a sale was effected by the first defendant in view of the fact that it is for the necessity of the family and the partial partition is not binding on the plaintiff and also finding that the partition effected on 11.6.1987 under Ex.A-4 is not valid. It is as against that said judgment of the first appellate Court; the defendants have filed the present second appeal. The, substantial question of law that was framed by this Court was relating to the principle of estoppel. 2. I have heard the learned counsel for the appellant as also the respondent. 3. The learned counsel for the appellant would urge that since. It is found by the trial Court that three items of properties allotted to the plain­ tiff under the partition deed Ex.A-4 have been omitted to be included in, the Schedule to the suit and in fact, the trial Court has raised this issue as issue No.7 and has given a finding that the suit for partial partition is bad - for non­ inclusion of, certain items of properties. There­ fore, the learned counsel for the appellant would urge that the judgment of the first appellate Court has to, be set aside on the ground of non­ maintainability of the suit for partition due to the reason of partial partition. 4. There­ fore, the learned counsel for the appellant would urge that the judgment of the first appellate Court has to, be set aside on the ground of non­ maintainability of the suit for partition due to the reason of partial partition. 4. In this regard, it is relevant to point out that even though the trial Court has found that the suit for partition is bad for non-inclusion of some of the properties, the lower appellate Court has not considered the said issue at all. In fact from the grounds of appeal filed by the plaintiff in the first appeal, it is found that, a specific ground has been raised as follows: "The lower Court grossly erred in thinking that the suit for partition is bad for non-inclusion of items 1, 3 and 4 of plaint A Schedule; the lower Court failed to note that items 1, 3 and 4 of plaint A Schedule have been brought into the suit and that the appellant had claimed partition and separate possession in respect of this item also." 5. In spite of a specific ground raised in the appeal, the first appellate Court has chosen to set aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court and granted a decree for partition. Nevertheless, while filing the second Appeal, the appellants, who are the defendants in the suit, have also not chosen to raise the said point of partial partition as a substantial question of law, apart from the fact that such point has also not been argued in the second appeal. Ultimately, this Court, while admitting the second appeal, has permitted the substantial question of law only in respect of the question of estoppel and not on the question of partial partition. 6. The learned counsel for the appellant relies upon the judgment of the Supreme Court rendered in Sabitri Chatterjee v. Debi Das Boy, (2004) 5 CTC 683. In that case, while laying down the law in respect of Sec. 100, the Supreme Court has held that the High Court can also dispose of the second appeal on any other substantial question of law not formulated by it, but it has to record the reasons for framing such question of law. In that case, while laying down the law in respect of Sec. 100, the Supreme Court has held that the High Court can also dispose of the second appeal on any other substantial question of law not formulated by it, but it has to record the reasons for framing such question of law. The Supreme Court in that case, having found that the High Court has not formulated a substantial question of law on that basis in accordance with Sec.100(4) of the C.P.C., has remitted the matter back, directing the High Court to dispose of the second appeal in accordance with law after complying with Sub-sec.(4) to Sec.100. The Supreme Court has laid down the law in the following words: "The submission urged on behalf of the appellant before us is that there was really no question of law which arose for consideration of the High Court. The finding of fact recorded by the appellate Court as regards the bonafide personal need of the Appellant was supported by evidence on record and therefore, there was no justification for the High Court to set aside that finding. In any event, it was submitted, there was no justification for an amendment of the pleadings And recording of further evidence in view of the fact that the matters sought to be brought on record by way of amendment and additional evidence were already before the Court and what was described as future developments were facts within the knowledge of the parties. We need not refer to the merit of the submissions urged before us by learned counsel for the appellant. However, we notice that the High Court before disposing of the second appeal did not frame the substantial question of law as required by Sec. 100, C.P.C. Sub-sec.(4) of Sec. 100, C.P.C., mandates that where the High Court is satisfied that a substantial question of law is involved in any case it shall formulate that question. The appeal shall then be heard on the question so formulated leaving it open to the respondent to argue that the case does not involve such question. No doubt the proviso to Sec. 100, C.P.C., does not take away the power of the Court to hear, for reasons to be recorded, the appeal on any other substantial question of law not formulated by it, if it is satisfied that the case involves such question. No doubt the proviso to Sec. 100, C.P.C., does not take away the power of the Court to hear, for reasons to be recorded, the appeal on any other substantial question of law not formulated by it, if it is satisfied that the case involves such question. In the instant case the learned Judge has not formulated any question of law which requires determination under Sec. 100, C.P.C. This Court in a series of decisions has insisted upon compliance with the mandatory requirement of Sub-sec.(4) of Sec. 100, C.P.C." "In these circumstances, we set aside the judgment and order of the High Court and remit the matter to the High Court to dispose of the second appeal in accordance with law after complying with the requirement of Sub-sec.(4) of Sec. 100." 7. It is based on the said judgment, the learned counsel for the appellant insists for remitting the matter to the first appellate Court for a proper decision regarding the issue of partial partition. 8. It is an admitted fact that the judgment of the first appellate Court has not dealt with the issue of partial partition at all, which is very relevant for the purpose of deciding a suit for partition. 9. Considering the overall situation in this case and finding that a decision has to be rendered with regard to the issue of partial partition, which is specifically raised by the plaintiff himself as a ground in the first appeal and which ii very relevant for the decision of the issue involved, this Court frames the following question of law: "Whether the first appellate Court is right in not deciding the claim of partial partition in respect of items 1, 3 and 4 of the properties mentioned in Ex.A4?" 10. The learned counsel for the respondent cannot have any objection for the said proposition. In these circumstances, this Court is of e considered view that the matter must be remitted back to the first appellate Court for giving its findings on the issue of partial partition. The learned counsel for the respondent cannot have any objection for the said proposition. In these circumstances, this Court is of e considered view that the matter must be remitted back to the first appellate Court for giving its findings on the issue of partial partition. With these observations, the second appeal is allowed to the following limited extent viz.,: (1) The matter is remitted to the first appellate Court, viz., the Sub-Court, Nagapattinam, to decide about the claim of partial partition in A.S.No.277 of 1997, giving reasons therefore, in addition to the reason already adduced, within a period of 8 weeks from the date of receipt of copy of this judgment. (2) The judgment decree of the first appellate Court in A.S.No.277 of 1997 is set aside. No Costs.