JUDGMENT PRADIP MOHANTY, J. — The appellant has preferred this appeal against the judgment and order of acquittal dated 11.07.1988 passed by the J.M.F.C., Berhampur in 3 (a) C.C.No. 191 of 1985 (T.R.No. 310 of 1987). 2. The case of the prosecution, in short, is that on 18.03.1985 it was found that the accused-respondent had constructed a new pucca building on the back side of her existing building without obtaining prior permission of the appellant. As such, the accused-respondent contravened Sections 264 and 266 of the Orissa Municipal Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’). A prosecution report against the accused-respondent was filed before the S.D.J.M., Berhampur which was registered as 3 (a) C.C.No. 191 of 1985. 3. The defence plea was one of stout denial. 4. To substantiate the accusation, prosecution examined four witnesses and exhibited five documents. P.W.1 is the Amin, P.W.2 is the Surveyor, P.W.3 is a Peon and P.W.4 is the Tax Daroga of Berhampur Municipality. Defence examined none. The J.M.F.C., Berhampur, who tried the case, by her judgment dated 10.07.1987 acquitted the accused-respondent of the offences with a finding that the prosecution has failed to prove the ingredi¬ents of the above offences. 5. Mr. Choudhury, learned counsel for the appellant, submits that the trial Court grossly fell into error in disbe¬lieving the prosecution evidence as regards unauthorised con¬struction and the ownership of the building in question. 6. Now, let us notice some of the provisions of the Act, which are relevant for the present purpose. 5. Mr. Choudhury, learned counsel for the appellant, submits that the trial Court grossly fell into error in disbe¬lieving the prosecution evidence as regards unauthorised con¬struction and the ownership of the building in question. 6. Now, let us notice some of the provisions of the Act, which are relevant for the present purpose. Section 273A runs thus : “273-A. Demolition or alteration of building work unlawfully commenced, carried on or completed - (1) If the Execu¬tive Officer is satisfied - (i) that the construction or reconstruction of any building or well - (a) has been commenced without obtaining the permission of the Executive Officer or where an appeal has been preferred to the Municipality in contravention of any order passed by the Munici¬pality in appeal; or (b) is being carried on, or has been completed otherwise than in accordance with the plans or particulars on which such permission or order was based; or (c) is being carried on, or has been completed in breach of any of the provisions of this Act or of any rule or bye-law made under this Act or of any direction or requisition lawfully given or made under this Act or such rules or bye-laws; or (ii) that any alteration required by any notice issued under Section 271 have not been duly made; or (iii) that any alteration of or addition to any building or any other work made or done for any purposes in, to or upon any building, has been commenced or is being carried on or has been completed in breach of Section 273, he may make a provisional order requiring the owner or the builder to demolish the work done, or so much of it as, in the opinion of the Executive Offi¬cer, has been lawfully executed or to make such alteration may in the opinion of the Executive Officer be necessary to bring the work into conformity with the Act, bye-laws, rules, direction or requisition as aforesaid, or with the plans and particulars on which such permission or order was based, and may also direct that until the said order is complied with the owner or builder shall refrain from proceeding with the building or well. (2) The Executive Officer shall serve a copy of the provi¬sional order made under Sub-section (1) on the owner of the building or well together with a notice requiring him to show cause within a reasonable time to be mentioned in such notice why the order shall not be confirmed. (3) If the owner fails to show cause to the satisfaction of the Executive Officer, the Executive Officer may confirm the order with any modification he may think fit to make, and such order shall then be binding on the owner.” As per the above provision, notice should be served on the owner of the building. Section 347 of the Act provides as follows : “347. Persons empowered to prosecute - Save as other¬wise expressly provided in this Act, no person shall be tried for any offence against the provisions of this Act, or of any rule, regulation or bye-law made under it, unless a complaint is made by the police or the Executive Officer of a Municipality or by a person expressly authorized in this behalf by the Municipality or its Executive Officer, within three months of the commission of the offence. But nothing herein shall affect the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Act 5 of 1898) in regard to the power of certain Magistrate to take cognizance of offences upon information received or upon their own knowledge or suspi¬cion. The above provision speaks of filing of prosecution report within three months from the date of construction. In the instant case, there is no material before this Court to show that the notice as required by Section 273A of the Act was served on the owner of the building. Therefore, it can be inferred that no notice has been served on the owner of the building, and as such, there has been non-compliance of Section 273A of the Act. It is not open to the prosecution to file a case under Section 385A of the Act without complying with the provisions of Section 273A. Perusal of the Amin’s report shows that there is no mention about the date of construction of the building. Therefore, it cannot be inferred that the prosecution report was filed within three months from the date of construction. Moreover, no independent witness has been examined by the prosecution to support its case. 8. Perusal of the Amin’s report shows that there is no mention about the date of construction of the building. Therefore, it cannot be inferred that the prosecution report was filed within three months from the date of construction. Moreover, no independent witness has been examined by the prosecution to support its case. 8. In view of the above, there is no infirmity in the impugned judgment and order of acquittal. Therefore, the appeal stands dismissed. Appeal dismissed.