Judgment :- R. Regupathi, J. The plaintiff in O.S.No.1/96 on the file of Family Court, Madurai, is the appellant herein and he has filed the said suit under Sec.307 of the Muslim Act for dissolution of his marriage with the first respondent herein. The second respondent is the President of the Jamadh in whose presence the marriage was performed. 2. As per the averments in the plaint, the appellant married the first respondent on 2.6.1983 and gave birth to a female and a male children on 12.6.1984 and 1.12.1986, respectively. The appellant has made several allegations against the first respondent in the plaint for seeking dissolution of marriage which could be categorised as follows: (a) Though a coconut thope to an extent of six acres belonged to the first respondent, her father and brother by coercion obtained a deed of settlement in their favour. (b) The first respondent was already married, suppressing her earlier marriage, the marriage with the appellant was performed. (c) The family members of the first respondent deviate from the muslim culture, adapting western culture. (d) The first respondent indulged in unwarranted activities and when questioned she denied the same. (e) The first respondent did not look after the children properly. (f) The family members of made arrangements for another marriage her and the first respondent was misdirected. (g) In view of the frequent quarrels between the appellant and the first respond there was several panchayats and litigation in previous occasions. (h) Finally a separate residence was arranged and the first respondent lived till 5.6.1995, during that period they were leading a happy life. But suddenly the first respondent deserted him, the reason being, she was having personal affairs, she went to Ramnad and leading a wayward life contrary to Islamic culture. 3. The first respondent filed her written statement as follows: (a) The children were entrusted with her custody by order in G.W.O.P.No.7/90 of the file of the learned District Judge, Ramanathapuram at Madurai, and the children were with her. In that case, the respondent has filed a letter dated 28.10.1986 wrote by the appellant pronouncing triple talak. (b) Further on 13.9.1993 he appellant, through his lawyer, had also sent a notice pronouncing talak, which was also said to have been filed before the lower Court. In that case, the respondent has filed a letter dated 28.10.1986 wrote by the appellant pronouncing triple talak. (b) Further on 13.9.1993 he appellant, through his lawyer, had also sent a notice pronouncing talak, which was also said to have been filed before the lower Court. (c) In view of the aforesaid circumstances, the first respondent was already divorced, as per Muslim Law, once the wife was divorced the husband cannot remarry her unless the following conditions are fulfilled: "(i) the wife should observe iddat. (ii) After observing iddat, the wife, should be lawfully married to another person. (iii) Such intervening marriage must be actually consummated. (iv) the second husband must pronounce triple talak. (v) the wife should observe iddat after the said talak.” (e) False allegation had been purposely made in the plaint to create a cause of action. (f) At any rate, she had no objection for divorce, though her case was that she had already been divorced. 4. The plaint was filed on 4.1.1996 and the written statement on 25.6.1996. On 10.4.1997 the respondent filed a memo as follows: “Without prejudice to the contentions of this defendant in her written statement, it is submitted that the suit may he decreed for divorce and thus render justice” On 16.4.1997, the appellant filed a memo in which he has stated as follows: “The divorce petition has been filed by mistake. Instead of praying restitution of conjugal right, he has prayed for divorce. There was no proper legal assistance at that time. The plaintiff therefore prays that the plaint need not be acted upon and prayed for dismissal of the petition to facilitate to file a fresh petition for restitution of conjugal right.” 5. On consideration of the rival contentions and in view of the memo filed by both the parties and further in view of the reason that no witness were produced before the Court, the learned Judge Family Court, has passed the judgment decree. The learned Trial judge relied on the provisions of Sec. 307 of the Mulsim Law, which reads as follows:­ “307. The learned Trial judge relied on the provisions of Sec. 307 of the Mulsim Law, which reads as follows:­ “307. Different forms of divorce.–The contract of marriage under the Mahamedan law may dissolved in any one of the following ways: (1)­ by the husband at his will, without the intervention of a Court; (2) by mutual consent of the husband and wife, without the intervention of a Court of a Court; (3) by a Judicial decree at the suit of the husband or wife. The wife cannot divorce herself from her husband without his consent, except under a contract whether made before or after marriage, but she may, in some cases, obtain divorce by judicial decree”. 6. After filing of the suit, on various occasion, both the appellant and the first respondent were Present in the Court. On enquiry by the trial Judge, the appellant has clearly expressed his intention of talak of his wife. It is claimed by the first respondent that, the appellant had already divorced her. It is seen from the judge of the trial Court, both the parties have been directed to place relevant materials on their side and the case was adjoined on several dates, but the parties neither placed any materials. It is also pointed out by the trial Court that the appellant herein unnecessarily dragged on the case by seeking adjournments under the pretext of compromise, but the first respondent not expressed her consent for compromise. 7. The trial Court relied upon a judgment reported in Ajmerylussan v. Moin Ahmad 1983 All LJ 1332 wherein it has been stated as follows: “Suit by a Mohamedan husband for a declaration that he had divorced his wife cannot be dismissed for want of evidence. For the wife must be treated as divorced the moment the plaint is filed….” 8. The learned judge on consideration of the fats and circumstances of the case decreed the, Suit thereby granted talak. The appellant, aggrieved by the judgment and decree preferred the above Civil Miscellaneous Apple on the ground that the object of constitution of family Court is to unite the parties and not to give divorce; that the appellant has not been given sufficient opportunity to join the first respondent; that the trial Court could have examined the parties in this regard, but the judgment has been passed hastily, which is misconceived and wrong. 9. 9. The counsel for the appellant advanced arguments by reiterating the grounds made in the appeal. He further submitted that the appellant-being the father of two children, have affection, towards respondent No.1 and the children and this being a matrimonial matter a chance must have been given to the appellant to meet the first respondent and to persuade her in reunion, but the trial Court failed to do so; that there is no evidence to substantiate that the appellant has already given talak: that the memo dated 16.4.1997, which was filed due to change of circumstances, was not at all take into consideration, and there is no mention at all about the same in the judgment; that though the appellant had, expressed his willingness to join together, no opportunity was given by the trial judge and it erroneously observed as if the appellant has given talak. 10. Per contra, learned counsel for: the first respondent contended that this battle between the appellant and respondent No.1 is going on for about 12 years; that several allegations have being made against the first respondent and several litigation went on at various level. Counsel for the first respondent filed a typed set wherein he has enclosed a letter, dated 28.10.1986 written by the appellant expressing his talak, in which he has stated in detail the reason for doing so, besides that by an­ other letter dated 19.1.1990, the appellant has pronounced triple talak and informed the first respondent that itself was final one. Thereafter on 5.7.1990 the appellant has issued a no­tice, wherein he has canvassed the dispute between them and further claimed that he is going to initiate several other proceedings against the first respondent and her family members. In the said notice the appellant has admitted for having sent the above letters and further stated that the first respondent is a lady with mental disorder and concluded by saying that he has escaped and regret himself for hav­ing lived with a criminal like first respondent. Counsel for the first respondent. Contended that in view of the facts and circumstances of the case, it was clear that the first respondent was already divorced, besides that he sought for a decree, of dissolution of marriage based on the earlier pronouncement of talak. 11. Counsel for the first respondent. Contended that in view of the facts and circumstances of the case, it was clear that the first respondent was already divorced, besides that he sought for a decree, of dissolution of marriage based on the earlier pronouncement of talak. 11. Counsel for the respondent further submit that under the provisions of Muslim Law when once talak is pronounced she must be construed as a divorced lady and the husband cannot remarry unless the conditions mentioned above are fulfilled. In the present case such conditions are not fulfilled and therefore it must be construed that the dissolution reached finality. Even in the suit, the appellant had sought for a divorce and the first respondent had filed a written statement mentioning the facts and also filed a memo submitting decree. The learned counsel for the first respondent submits that several cases were filed by the appellant against the first respondent and the same are listed below: - 1. GWOP No.4 of 1987 For appointment of Guardian for Minor Children-District Court, Ramnad. Dismissed on 7.12.1988. 2. O. S. No. 22 of 1987 Suit for specific performance on a forged document filed in Sub-Court, Ramnad, dismissed on 11.11.1998. 3. O.P. No. 15 of 1987 Restitution of conjugal rights-Sub Court, Ramnad dismissed. 4. GWOP No. 1 of 1987 Appointment of Guardian for minor children, Family Court, dismissed. 5. W.P.No. 8364 of 1996 HCP in High Court for producing minor children, dismissed. 6. Criminal Case No.1835/1990 Prl. Sessions Court Ramnad closed. 7. Petition under Sec. 97 of the Cr.P.C., children are wrongfully confined, judicial Magistrate, Sivagangai, closed as mistake of fact. 12. Both the counsel submitted that the parties are to be summoned before this court so that this Court can ascertain their views, accordingly both the parties were summoned and they appeared before this Court on 31.1.2006. Both the parties have been given opportunity to express their views with regard to reunion. The appellant expressed his view it take her back and requested first respondent to go along with him. The first respondent exponents expressed her agony and the bad language uttered by the appellant and made it clear that it is impossible for her to live any more with him. Thereafter we have heard the learned counsel of both the parties. 13. The first respondent exponents expressed her agony and the bad language uttered by the appellant and made it clear that it is impossible for her to live any more with him. Thereafter we have heard the learned counsel of both the parties. 13. The learned counsel for the first respondent cited the judgment reported in Durga Prasanna Tripahty v. Arundhati Tripathy 2006-1-LW162, wherein it has been observed by the Honourable Supreme Court as follows: “16…the parties have been living sepa­rately for almost 14 years which means that there is an irretrievable breakdown of marriage in that because of such breakdown of marriage the marriage between the parties has been rendered a complete deadwood. Learned counsel for the appellant argued that no useful purpose will be served by keeping such a marriage alive on paper, which, would only aggravate agony of the parties. Therefore he would pray that in the fitness of things and in the interest of justice, the marriage between the parties is forthwith termi­nated by a decree of divorce…” “22…..Under the circumstances, the ap­pellant had proved before the Family Court both the factum of separation as well as animus deserendi which are the essential elements of desertion.” Finally their Lordships observed as follows: "30. .... Marriages are made in heaven. Both parties have crossed the point of no return. A workable solution is certainly not possible. Parties cannot at this stage reconcile themselves and live, together forgetting their past as a bad dream.....” 14. In the present case, even according to the appellant the parties were living separately from 1995 onwards for more than 10 years. The appellant was repeatedly throwing abusive language. By using the facilities available in the personal law, even before approaching the Court he has given talak. The letters expressing talak filed in the typed set and the notice given by the appellant are not denied. Under such circumstances, there will be any useful purpose in putting the parties together. 15. By letter dated 28.10.1986, at the time when the respondent was pregnant, the appellant has pronounced a single talak, which allegedly have effect of triple talak after delivery of child and completion of iddat period. Subsequently, by letter dated 19.1.1990, again he pronounced triple talak. At the time when G.W.O.P.7/1990 was pending before the learned District Judge, Ramnad at Madurai, the appellant has filed the letter dated 19.1.1990 before the said Court. Subsequently, by letter dated 19.1.1990, again he pronounced triple talak. At the time when G.W.O.P.7/1990 was pending before the learned District Judge, Ramnad at Madurai, the appellant has filed the letter dated 19.1.1990 before the said Court. Before filing the present O.S.No.1/1996 the appellant has filed several cases namely for restitution of conjugal rights, for production of the minor children by way. of filing HCP, for appointment of guardian for minor children and suit for specific performance etc. 16. In this context it is also useful to refer Mulla on Principles of Mahomedan Law (Nineteenth Edition, 1990) states vide Para 310: "310. Talak may be oral or in writing: A talak may be effected (1) orally (by spoken words) or (2) by a written document called a talaknama (d). (1) Oral Talak.-- No particular form of words is prescribed for effecting a talak. If the words are express (saheeh) or well understood as implying divorce no proof of intention is required. If the words are ambiguous (kinayat), the intention must be proved (e). It is not necessary that the talak should be pronounced in the presence of the wife or even addressed to her (f). In a Calcutta caw the husband merely pronounced the word "talak" before a family council and this was held to be invalid as the wife was not named (g). This case was cited with approval by the Judicial Committee in a case where the, talak was valid though pronounced, in wife''''s absence, as the wife was named (h). The Madras High Court has also held that the words should refer to the wife (i). The talak pronounced in the absence of the wife take effect though not communicated her, but for purposes of dower it is not necessary that it should come to her knowledge (j) and her alimony may continue till she is informed of the divorce (k). Words of divorce: - The words of divorce must indicate an intention to dissolve the marriage. If they are express (saheeh), e.g., “Thou are divorced”, "I have divorced thee”, or “I divorce my wife for ever and render her harem from me" Rashid Admad v. Anisa Khatun, 1932 (59) I.A.21, they clearly indicate an intention to dissolve the marriage and no proof of intention is necessary. If they are express (saheeh), e.g., “Thou are divorced”, "I have divorced thee”, or “I divorce my wife for ever and render her harem from me" Rashid Admad v. Anisa Khatun, 1932 (59) I.A.21, they clearly indicate an intention to dissolve the marriage and no proof of intention is necessary. But if they are ambiguous (kinayat), e.g., "Thou art my cousin, the daughter of my uncle, if thou goest" "Hamid Ali v. Imtiazan 1878 (2) All. 71 or "I give up all relations and would have no connection of any sort with you" Wajid Ali v. Jafar Husain, 1932 (7) Luck 430, 136 I.C. 209, (32) A.O.34, the intention must be proved ..... 17. In Dr. Tahir Mahmood''''s "The Muslim Law of India" (Second Edition, at PP. 113-119), the basic rule stated is that a Muslim husband under all schools of Muslim Law can divorce his wife by his unilateral action and without the intervention of the Court. This power is known as the power to pronounce a talak. In Pathayi. v. Moideen, 1968, KLT 763, it has been held that: "The only condition necessary for the valid exercise of the right of divorce by a husband is that he must be a major and of sound mind at that time. He can effect divorce whenever he desires. Even if he divorces his wife under compulsion, or in jest, or in anger that is considered perfectly valid. No special form is necessary for effecting divorce under Hanafi law... The husband can effect if by conveying to the wife that he is repudiating the alliance. It need not even he addressed to her. It takes effect the moment it comes to her knowledge. 18. The talak to be effective has to be pronounced. The Term ''''pronounce'''' means to proclaim, to utter formally, to utter rhetori­cally, to declare to, utter, to articulate (Cham­bers 20th Century Dictionary, New Edition, p. 1030). In so far as the present case is con­ corned, on more than one occasion the appellant has pronounced in unequivocal term ''''talak''''. The pronouncement of earlier talak by the appellant, even at the time when the matter was taken up for hearing in the trial Court and at the time when the appellant personally ap­pear before this Court was not denied. The pronouncement of earlier talak by the appellant, even at the time when the matter was taken up for hearing in the trial Court and at the time when the appellant personally ap­pear before this Court was not denied. The appellant not satisfied with the pronouncement of talak by written communications men­tioned above, for the reasons best known to him also filed the present suit. In the present suit he has narrated so many reasons for socking decree of divorce. Therefore, the commu­nications of the appellant were clear all through that he wanted to terminate the marital relationship. It is also noted that when both the parties, appeared before the Trial Court at­ tempts were made for reunion and it is ob­ served as follows: "At the time of filing of the suit and during the various dates, when the case was taken and when the plaintiff and defendant were present in Court, the plaintiff his clearly expressed his intention of talak of his Wife. 19. Even in the written statement filed by the first respondent on 25.6.1996, while denying the allegations, she consented for a decree bench passed. In addition to that she also filed a memo dated 10.4.1997. To forestall the trial Court from passing the decree, the appellant filed memo dated 16.4.1997, which is untenable in law. 20. The appellant by filing just a memo, that too, belatedly sought for an amendment before the trial Court to change the nature of the caw from dissolution of marriage into one of restitution of conjugal rights. The said prayer changes the very foundation of the case, distinct, separate and independent of the original relief aside for. It is to be remembered that the averment in the plaint imputing the reputation and assassinating the character of the respondent is unaltered. Hence the trial Court rightly ignored the said memo filed by the appellant. The memo filed by the respondent submitting decree was also ignored by the trial Court since the same plea was raised by her in written statement. The trial Court passed judgment and decree in merits, which is perfectly based on proper consideration of law and facts. 21. Hence the trial Court rightly ignored the said memo filed by the appellant. The memo filed by the respondent submitting decree was also ignored by the trial Court since the same plea was raised by her in written statement. The trial Court passed judgment and decree in merits, which is perfectly based on proper consideration of law and facts. 21. On meaningful reading of the pleadings of the pleadings of the parties, the averments contained therein, dislike for each other is apparent the talak pronounced by the appellant even prior to the filing of the suit, Proceeded by failed attempts the parties living separately from 1995 onwards and the assertion of the respondent at the time of hearing undoubtedly impractical for reunion. 22. In the result, the judgment and decree passed by the Court below is confirmed. The Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is dismissed. No costs.