JUDGMENT By the Court—This special appeal arises out of judgment dated 4th October, 2005, passed by the Hon’ble Single Judge in Writ Petition No. 52958 of 2004, dismissing the writ petition of the petitioner appellant against the dismissal order passed by the Disciplinary Authority as a result of Departmental Enquiry. 2. The relevant facts in brief are that the appellant was appointed as Driver on 5th December, 1978, at Narora Atomic Power Station, Narora, District Bulandshahr, and was promoted as Driver Grade-II, a Class-Ill post, in the year 1997. One Sri R.K. Thawait, Assistant Manager Recruitment made a complaint to the disciplinary authority that the petitioner appellant attempted to assault him on 11th December, 1998 in the evening hours at a lonely place near Community Center causing bleeding from mouth and nose and swelling on the face of Sri Thawait. He was also medically examined on 12th December, 1998, by the Medical Officer, Primary Health Centre, Narora. He also lodged a complaint/FIR at Narora Police Station. Ultimately a charge-sheet was issued to the appellant on 10th March, 1999 containing two charges and after holding a regular Departmental Enquiry the inquiry report dated 15th December, 1999 was submitted holding both the charges proved against the appellant. The copy of the enquiry report supplied to the petitioner appellant vide letter dated 10th January, 2000, whereafter the appellant submitted his reply dated 1st February, 2000. After considering the entire material, the Disciplinary Authority issued a show cause notice dated 9th March, 2000 against the proposed punishment of dismissal. Ultimately, the order of dismissal dated 20th September 2000 was passed by the Disciplinary Authority. The appellant filed an appeal which was rejected by the Appellate Authority, vide order dated 5th January, 2001. Thereafter Writ Petition No. 9928 of 2001, was filed by the appellant before this Court, challenging the dismissal as well as the Appellate Order. The aforesaid writ petition was allowed vide judgment dated 11th August, 2004, holding that the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer as approved by the Disciplinary and Appellant Authority cannot be said to be based on substantial evidence to sustain the extreme penalty of dismissal from service and, accordingly, the dismissal order as well as the Appellate orders are quashed. The aforesaid writ petition was allowed vide judgment dated 11th August, 2004, holding that the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer as approved by the Disciplinary and Appellant Authority cannot be said to be based on substantial evidence to sustain the extreme penalty of dismissal from service and, accordingly, the dismissal order as well as the Appellate orders are quashed. However, the Hon’ble Court remitted the matter back with the following directions : “Accordingly it will be safe to refer the matter to the punishing authority to look into the matter in the light of the evidence as exist on record and taking into account the observation as has been made in this judgment. Needless to say that decision as has been cited in respect to the argument that punishment should not be shockingly disproportionate will also be taken note of. Thus, the punishing authority is to take into account the totality of circumstances, existence of substantial evidence to sustain the charges and then to form opinion about proof of charges and quantum of punishment if any is to be given. The authority is not to be influenced by the earlier decision taken against the petitioner and fresh consideration is to be made strictly in accordance with the consideration and observation as has been made in this judgment. As the matter as already prolonged it is to be observed that the fresh decision is to be taken by the disciplinary authority within a period of three months from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order." 3. The Disciplinary Authority reconsidered the matter and vide its order dated 11th November, 2004, held both the charges proved agreeing with the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer as well as referring to other material available on record, and again imposed the punishment of dismissal from service. The appellant, challenging the dismissal order dated 11.11.2004, filed the writ petition, which has been dismissed by judgment under appeal. 4. We have heard Sri Manish Goel, learned Counsel for the appellant and Sri V.K.S. Chaudhary, Senior Advocate assisted by Sri C.S. Singh for the respondents. 5. The appellant, challenging the dismissal order dated 11.11.2004, filed the writ petition, which has been dismissed by judgment under appeal. 4. We have heard Sri Manish Goel, learned Counsel for the appellant and Sri V.K.S. Chaudhary, Senior Advocate assisted by Sri C.S. Singh for the respondents. 5. Sri Goel vehemently contended that once the order of dismissal was held to be illegal on the basis of the evidence available on record in the earlier writ petition, it was not permissible for the disciplinary authority again to impose punishment of dismissal and this amounts to upsetting the findings recorded by this Court. This attempt on the part of the disciplinary authority is contemptuous and, therefore, vitiates the order of dismissal. He further contended that before passing the order of dismissal after holding the charges proved, it was obligatory on the part of the disciplinary authority to afford a fresh opportunity to the appellant even though, no such direction was issued by this Court vide judgment dated 11th August, 2004. He also submitted that there was no independent witness and evidence except complainant and this did not fulfil the requirement of sufficient evidence to prove charge against him. Hence the view taken by the disciplinary authority that the charges are proved against the appellant is perverse, based on no evidence and is liable to be set aside. Lastly he contended that the charge as levelled against the appellant is not so grave as to justify the extreme penalty of dismissal, hence the impugned order of punishment is arbitrary and disproportionate to the charges levelled against the appellant. 6. However, Sri Chaudhary, appearing for the respondents submitted that this Court will not reappreciate the evidence like an appellate authority in judicial review of the orders passed as a result of disciplinary proceedings. He submitted that on the basis of the evidence and material on record, the disciplinary authority has agreed with the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer and the same cannot be reappreciated as a Court of appeal. He also submitted that as per the ultimate directions of this Court, the entire matter was open to be considered by the respondents and, in compliance thereof the disciplinary authority has reconsidered the matter and passed fresh order of dismissal which cannot be said to be erroneous or contrary to law or to any order of this Court. He also submitted that as per the ultimate directions of this Court, the entire matter was open to be considered by the respondents and, in compliance thereof the disciplinary authority has reconsidered the matter and passed fresh order of dismissal which cannot be said to be erroneous or contrary to law or to any order of this Court. He further submits that the Hon’ble Single Judge has considered all the aspects of the matter and the arguments raised on behalf of appellant, therefore, the appeal deserves to be dismissed. 7. In order to appreciate the rival submissions advanced on behalf of the parties it would be necessary to consider the issue which was raised in the earlier writ petition and decided by this Court, vide judgment dated 11th August, 2004, which has attained finality between the parties. A perusal of the aforesaid judgment shows that the Court took the view that the charge of assault by an employee, if proved, the penalty of dismissal can be and should be imposed to maintain discipline in the institution. However, it further held that the finding of guilt can be recorded only when the evidence is of a conclusive nature and is supported with independent evidence and attending circumstances. After perusing the dismissal order as well as the appellate order, this Court in the earlier writ petition, held that the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer and approved by the disciplinary and appellate authority as such cannot be said to be based on substantial evidence to sustain the extreme penalty of dismissal from service and thereafter it remitted the matter back to the punishing authority with the direction to reconsider the matter, taking into account the totality of the circumstances, existence of substantial evidence to sustain the charges and then to form opinion about prove of charges and quantum of punishment if any is to be given. 8. Therefore, it is clear that this Court directed the punishing authority to consider the matter in its entirety and thereafter to find out as to whether the charges are proved and if so what would be the punishment to be imposed upon the appellant. The disciplinary authority in pursuance to the aforesaid directions, by means of the order dated 11th August, 2004, has held the charges proved referring to the following evidence besides others : 1. The disciplinary authority in pursuance to the aforesaid directions, by means of the order dated 11th August, 2004, has held the charges proved referring to the following evidence besides others : 1. The statement of the complainant Officer who was assaulted by the appellant. 2. The First Information Report lodged by him. 3. The enquiry report, which obviously has not been set aside or quashed by this Court. 9. In order to decide the quantum of punishment besides the proof of charge the disciplinary authority has further taken into consideration the past conduct of the appellant which was already put to his notice having been mentioned in the charge-sheet. In the past also the appellant showed similar conduct of abusing his senior Officers, misbehaving with them and refusing to carry out the lawful orders of the superior Officers which resulted in various punishments imposed from time to time. 10. Considering the first submission, that it was incumbent upon the disciplinary authority to afford a fresh opportunity to the appellant, we are of the view that there was no occasion to afford any fresh opportunity to the appellant. While remitting the matter back this Court did not allow the authorities to admit or entertain any fresh evidence or material. The appellant was already afforded adequate opportunity of defence during the course of the enquiry and in the earlier writ petition it was not found that the disciplinary proceedings were conducted denying adequate opportunity of defence to the appellant. Once opportunity at every stage of the disciplinary enquiry was afforded to the delinquent employee, it was neither required under any principal of law nor otherwise to give another opportunity to the delinquent employee merely because the matter has been remitted back by the order of the Court directing disciplinary authority to consider it afresh. We, therefore, reject this contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant. 11. Next submission of the learned Counsel for the appellant that there was no sufficient evidence to prove charges already held by the Hon’ble Court, hence the disciplinary authority could not have proceeded to reconsider the prove of charges and it was required to consider only the quantum of punishment other than dismissal also has no force. 12. 11. Next submission of the learned Counsel for the appellant that there was no sufficient evidence to prove charges already held by the Hon’ble Court, hence the disciplinary authority could not have proceeded to reconsider the prove of charges and it was required to consider only the quantum of punishment other than dismissal also has no force. 12. In our view this contention is untenable since the directions contained in the judgment on 11th August, 2004 specifically require the punishing authority to take into account the totality of the circumstances, existence of circumstantial evidence to sustain the charges and then to form opinion about proof of charges and quantum of punishment. This Court directed the disciplinary authority to reconsider both the aspects afresh and the hands of the disciplinary authority were not tightened in any particular direction or manner. It is also not disputed that the entire disciplinary proceedings upto the stage of enquiry report was not held to be vitiated in law or set aside by the Court. 13. Thus, the disciplinary authority was well within its rights to consider the enquiry report and other evidence collected during the course of the enquiry to record its findings regarding prove of charge. The learned Counsel for the appellant took great pains by reading the impugned order of dismissal passed by the disciplinary authority on 11th November, 2004 after remand repeatedly in his attempt to show that the order is not in consonance with the directions issued by this Court and cannot be said that independent evidence has been considered by the disciplinary authority. However, we fail to persuade ourselves to agree with such submission. 14. The Disciplinary authority, in the order dated 11.8.2004, after referring to the procedural steps has considered the material on record and held the charges proved against the appellant observing as under : "The report submitted by the Inquiry officer, and the written brief submitted by the presenting officer, the relevant documents were taken on records during the course of Inquiry and the witnesses examined have been carefully gone through and satisfied that the procedure as laid down under the Model Standing Order has been followed during the inquiry proceedings. I also find that adequate and enough opportunities had been extended to the Charged Official to defend his case before the Inquiry Officer, and there has been no violation of any Constitutional provisions. I also find that adequate and enough opportunities had been extended to the Charged Official to defend his case before the Inquiry Officer, and there has been no violation of any Constitutional provisions. The contention of Sharma that there was no eye-witness to the alleged incidence was examined in detail during the inquiry and the Inquiry Officer had, after proper appreciation of the entire evidence before him, observed that the evidence of the complainant who was cross-examined by the defence assistant of Shri Sharma was enough evidence to prove the occurrence of the incident. Assaulting an officer is a very serious misconduct under the conduct rules and the penalty imposed is commensurate with the misconduct committed and proved in the proceedings. The contention of Shri S.K. Sharma that the First Information Report No. 49 lodged by Shri R.K. Thawait was not registered and it is recorded as Non-Crime Report and also the case is not lodged by the police authorities and hence the disciplinary authority could not proceed against him, has been examined. This plea cannot be accepted.” 15. On page 61 of the paper book the disciplinary authority thereafter has held the charges proved observing as under : “AND WHEREAS the undersigned after careful consideration of the inquiry report, and other relevant records of the case agrees with the findings of the Inquiry Authority and holds the charges framed against the said Sharma as proved.” 16. Further in order to consider what punishment should be imposed, the Disciplinary authority has considered the seriousness of allegations, past conduct of the petitioner and the discipline required different kind of installations, namely the Nuclear Power installation which is a sensitive Units. 17. In the aforesaid facts and the material on record, the question arises regarding ambit of judicial review in such matters. 18. The judicial review in the matter of disciplinary proceedings proceed in a narrow sphere and is confined to the extent of decision making process and not to appreciate the decision itself unless it is found to be vitiated in law on account of malafide, bias or based on no evidence at all. The authorities exercising quasi judicial functions are not Courts and hence not bound by strict rules of evidence. 19. The authorities exercising quasi judicial functions are not Courts and hence not bound by strict rules of evidence. 19. A Constitution Bench in the case of State of Mysore v. Shivabasappa, AIR 1963 SC 375 , in para 3 of the judgment held as under : “Tribunals exercising quasi judicial functions are not Courts and that therefore they are not bound to follow the procedure prescribed for trial of actions in Courts nor are they bound by strict rules of evidence. They can, unlike Courts, obtain all information material for the points under enquiry from all sources, and through all channels, without being fettered by rules and procedure which govern proceedings in Court. The only obligation which the law casts on them is that they should not act on any information which they may receive unless they put it to the party against whom it is to be used and give him a fair opportunity to explain it.” 20. In the matter of departmental enquiry, what is the scope of judicial review, has been considered by the Apex Court in the case of State of Andhra Pradesh v. Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1723 , and in para 7 it has held as under : “There is no warrant for the view expressed by the High Court that in considering whether a public officer is guilty of the misconduct charged against him, the rule followed in criminal trials that an offence is not established unless proved by evidence beyond reasonable doubt to the satisfaction of the Court, must be applied, and if that rule be not applied, the High Court in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is competent to declare the order of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry invalid. The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution is competent to declare the order of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry invalid. The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution a Court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant: it is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Where there is some evidence, which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. The High Court may undoubtedly interfere where the departmental authorities have held the proceedings against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion on the very fact of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion, or on similar grounds, But the departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts and if there be some legal evidence on which their findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution." (para 7) 21. In Bareilly Electricity Supply Company Ltd. v. Workmen and Ors., 1971 (2) SCC 617 , the Apex Court held that the procedure prescribed in the Evidence Act is not applicable in the departmental proceedings and the only requirement is that the evidence should be collected by giving due opportunity to the delinquent employee as well. Something, which is not a legal evidence may not be acted upon unless it is admitted in the departmental proceedings by the person competent to spoke about them and are subjected to cross-examination. The relevant observations are as under : “But the application of principles of natural justice does not imply that what is not evidence can be acted upon. Something, which is not a legal evidence may not be acted upon unless it is admitted in the departmental proceedings by the person competent to spoke about them and are subjected to cross-examination. The relevant observations are as under : “But the application of principles of natural justice does not imply that what is not evidence can be acted upon. On the other hand what it means is that no material can be relied upon to establish a contested fact which are not spoken to by persons who are competent to speak about them and are subjected to cross-examination by the party against whom they are sought to be used.” (para 14) 22. In the case of State of Haryana v. Rattan Singh, AIR 1977 SC 1512 , certain passengers were found to have travelled alighted the bus without tickets as a result whereof the employee, who was the Conductor of the bus, was charge sheeted. The employer on the basis of the statements of the Flying Squad held the charge proved. The employee challenged the order of punishment on the ground that the passengers are said to have travelled without ticket were not examined and in the absence thereof the entire evidence is hearsay. The Apex Court rejecting such contention held as under : “It is well settled that in a domestic enquiry the strict and sophisticated rules of evidence under the Indian Evidence Act may not apply. All materials which are logically probative for a prudent mind and are permissible. There is no allergy to hearsay evidence provided it has reasonable nexus and credibility. It is true that departmental authorities and administrative tribunals must be careful in evaluating such material and should not glibly swallow what is strictly speaking not relevant under the Indian Evidence Act. For this proposition it is not necessary to cite decisions nor text books, although we have been taken through case law and other authorities by Counsel on both sides. The essence of a judicial approach is objectivity, exclusion of extraneous materials or considerations and observance of rules of natural justice. Of course, fairplay is the basis and if perversity or arbitrariness, bias or surrender of independence of judgment vitiate the conclusions reached, such finding, even though of a domestic tribunal, cannot be held good. The essence of a judicial approach is objectivity, exclusion of extraneous materials or considerations and observance of rules of natural justice. Of course, fairplay is the basis and if perversity or arbitrariness, bias or surrender of independence of judgment vitiate the conclusions reached, such finding, even though of a domestic tribunal, cannot be held good. However, the Courts below misdirected themselves, perhaps in insisting that passengers who had come in and gone out should be chased and brought before the tribunal before a valid finding could be recorded. The ‘residuum’ rule to which Counsel for the respondent referred, based upon certain passages from American Jurisprudence does not go to that extent nor does the passage from Halsbury insist on such rigid requirement. The simple point is, was there some evidence or was there no evidence-not in the sense of the technical rules governing regular Court proceedings but in a fair commonsense way as men of understanding and worldly wisdom will accept. Viewed in this way, sufficiency of evidence in proof of the finding by a domestic tribunal is beyond scrutiny. Absence of any evidence in support of a finding is certainly available for the Court to look into because it amounts to an error of law apparent on the record.“ (para 4). 23. In B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, 1995(6) SCC 749 , reiterating the principles of judicial review in disciplinary proceedings, the Apex Court held in para 12 as under : “Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the Court. When an inquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act, nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined” therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act, nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined” therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. When the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case." (para 12) 24. In R.S. Saini v. State of Punjab, 1999 (8) SCC 90 , the Apex Court held that the standard of proof required in disciplinary proceedings is that of preponderance of probability where there are some relevant material which the authority has accepted and which material may reasonably support the conclusion that the officer is guilty. It is not the function of the High Court to review the material and to arrive at its own independent finding. It also held if the enquiry has been properly held, the question of adequacy or reliability of the evidence cannot be canvassed before the Court. This is followed in Lalit Popli v. Canara Bank and others, 2003(3) SCC 583 (Para 16-19). 25. It also held if the enquiry has been properly held, the question of adequacy or reliability of the evidence cannot be canvassed before the Court. This is followed in Lalit Popli v. Canara Bank and others, 2003(3) SCC 583 (Para 16-19). 25. The same view has been followed by the Apex Court in the case of High Court of Judicature at Bombay v. Shashikant S. Patil, AIR 2000 SC 22 , wherein it has been held as under : “Interference with the decision of departmental authorities can be permitted, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution if such authority had held proceedings in violation of the principles of natural justice or in violation of statutory regulations prescribing the mode of such inquiry or if the decision of the authority is vitiated by considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case, or if the conclusion made by the authority, on the very face of it, is wholly arbitrary or capricious that no reasonable person could have arrived at such a conclusion, or grounds very similar to the above. But we cannot overlook that the departmental authority, (in this case the Disciplinary Committee of the High Court) is the sole judge of the facts, if the inquiry has been properly conducted. The settled legal position is that if there is some legal evidence on which the findings can be based, then adequacy or even reliability of that evidence is not a matter for canvassing before the High Court in a writ petition filed before Article 226 of the Constitution." (para 16) 26. The Apex Court in the above case also held that the disciplinary authority while considering the report of the enquiry officer is neither an appellate nor a revisional body and, therefore, its order cannot be drafted like a judgment. Even where it differs from the finding of the enquiry officer, it need not to discuss and contest in detail the conclusion of the enquiry officer but it is sufficient if it refers to its disagreement with some reason. Even where it differs from the finding of the enquiry officer, it need not to discuss and contest in detail the conclusion of the enquiry officer but it is sufficient if it refers to its disagreement with some reason. The relevant observations are reproduced as under : “The findings of the Inquiry Officer are only his opinion on the materials, but such findings are not binding on the disciplinary authority as the decision making authority is the punishing authority and, therefore, that authority can come to its own conclusion, of course bearing in mind the views expressed by the Inquiry Officer. But it is not necessary that the disciplinary authority should “discuss materials in detail and contest the conclusions of the Inquiry Officer." (para 19) 27. In Syed Rahimuddin v. Director General, CSIR, 2001 (9) SCC 575 , the Apex Court observed as under : “It is well settled that a conclusion or a finding of fact arrived at in a disciplinary enquiry can be interfered with by the Court only when there are no materials for the said conclusion, or that on the materials, the conclusion cannot be that of a reasonable man." (para 5) 28. In Sher Bahadur v. Union of India, 2002 (7) SCC 142 , the orders of punishment were challenging on the ground of lack of sufficiency of the evidence. The Apex Court explained that the expression sufficiency of evidence postulates existence of some evidence which links the charged officer with the misconduct alleged against him and it is not the adequacy of the evidence. 29. Recently, in the case of Government of Andhra Pradesh v. Mohd. Nasrullah Khan, JT 2006 (2) SC 82, the Apex Court has reiterated the scope of judicial review as confined to correct the errors of law or procedural error if resulting in manifest miscarriage and justice or violation of principles of natural justice. In para 7, the Hon’ble Court held as under : “By now it is a well established principle of law that the High Court exercising power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution does not act as an Appellate Authority. Its jurisdiction is circumscribed and confined to correct errors of law or procedural error if any resulting in manifest miscarriage of justice or violation of principles of natural justice. Its jurisdiction is circumscribed and confined to correct errors of law or procedural error if any resulting in manifest miscarriage of justice or violation of principles of natural justice. Judicial review is not akin to adjudication on merit by appreciating the evidence as an Appellate Authority." (Para 7) 30. Some of the general principles emerge from the aforesaid law, may be summarized as under : (1) The Tribunal exercising quasi judicial functions neither bound to follow the procedure prescribed for trial of actions in Courts nor bound by the strict rules of evidence. (2) They may obtain all information material for the points under enquiry and act upon the same provided it is brought to the notice of the party and fair opportunity is afforded to explain. (3) The judicial enquiry is to determine whether the authority holding enquiry is competent, and whether the procedure prescribed is in accordance with the principles of natural justice. (4) There should exist some evidence accepted by the competent authority which may reasonably support the contention about the guilt of the officer. Adequacy or reliability of the evidence cannot be looked into by the Court. (5) The departmental authorities are the sole judges of facts and if there be some legal evidence on which their findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the Court. (6) There is no allergy to hear-se evidence provided it has reasonable nexus and credibility. All materials which are logically probative for a prudent mind are permissible. (7) The essence of a judicial approach is objectivity, exclusion of extraneous materials or considerations and observance of rules of natural justice. (8) It is not necessary that the Disciplinary authority should discuss material in detail and contest the conclusions of the Inquiry Officer. (9) The judicial review is extended only when there is no evidence or the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached on the basis of the material available. 31. In the light of the aforesaid settled principles of law it is clear that the disciplinary authorities are master of appreciation of facts. Once, the evidence has been collected after giving due opportunity of defence to the concerned employee, the appreciation of evidence is within the realm of the departmental authorities. 31. In the light of the aforesaid settled principles of law it is clear that the disciplinary authorities are master of appreciation of facts. Once, the evidence has been collected after giving due opportunity of defence to the concerned employee, the appreciation of evidence is within the realm of the departmental authorities. If there is some evidence having nexus with the misconduct of the employee concerned, the sufficiency of the same would not be examined. It also cannot be examined as to whether such evidence ought to be believed by the departmental authorities or not. The disciplinary authority in the present case in order to hold the appellant guilty of the charges levelled against him, has relied upon the statement of the complainant recorded during the course of the enquiry and opportunity of cross-examination was afforded to the appellant. Further it has considered the First Information Report lodged by the complainant on the same day with Police, which was recorded as non-crime report by the appellant’s authorities and the contents thereof. It has also considered and agreed with the conclusions of the Enquiry Officer who has also relied upon, besides other, the injury report of the complainant showing that he sustained minor injuries as a result of the incident of assault on 11th December, 1998. The Enquiry Officer has also considered the facts that incident of assault occurred at a lonely place cannot be disbelieved merely because there is no other witness except the victim particularly when the said victim was put to cross-examine by the delinquent employee who could not bring forth anything to discredit to his (victims) statement. The difference in the earlier order passed by the disciplinary authority and the one which has been passed after the remand of this Court is writ large from the fact that in earlier order without discussing anything, the disciplinary authority referring to the various procedural steps of the enquiry proceedings, and agreeing to the report of the Enquiry Officer, imposed the punishment of dismissal upon the delinquent employee. There is no discussion of the evidence at all, or the independent decision regarding proof of charge by the disciplinary authority. However, in the order dated 11th November, 2004, the disciplinary authority has discussed the question of proof of charge and has recorded finding of guilt against the appellant. There is no discussion of the evidence at all, or the independent decision regarding proof of charge by the disciplinary authority. However, in the order dated 11th November, 2004, the disciplinary authority has discussed the question of proof of charge and has recorded finding of guilt against the appellant. Obviously, this Court cannot expect the disciplinary authority to write a judgment, discussing all the evidence and material on record, like a Judicial Officer. The order in question however, contain sufficient discussion with respect to the assessment of evidence and guilt of the appellant. It cannot be said, therefore, that the disciplinary authority after remand has not passed the order complying with the directions issued by this Court vide judgment dated 11th August, 2004. 32. The learned Counsel for the appellant, however, urged that for imposing extreme penalty of dismissal, the standard of proof is much higher and is not confined to the balance of probabilities. To fortify the above submission he for reliance on the following : 1. Bhandari v. Advocates Committee, 1956(3) All ER 742. 2. Kumaon Mandal Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Girja Shankar Pant and Ors., 2001 (1) SCC 182 . 3. L.D. Jai Singhani v. Naraindas M. Punjabi, AIR 1976 SC 373 LD. 4. Administrative Law by H.W.R. Wade and C.F. Forsyth Eighth Edition, Page 297. 33. In our view none of the aforesaid authorities advance and support the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant. 34. In the case of Bhandari (supra) the appellant was an Advocate practicing in the Supreme Court of Kenia. On the charges of professional misconduct, the Advocates Committee ordered that he should be admonished. Considering the question of onus of proof the Privy Council agreed with the following observation of the Court of appeal : “We agree that in every allegation of professional misconduct involving an element of deceit or moral turpitude a high standard of proof is called for, and we cannot envisage any body of professional men sitting in judgment on a colleague who would be content to condemn on a mere balance of probabilities.” 35. The observations apparently are applicable in respect to the case of professional misconduct involving element of deceit or moral turpitude, since an advocate carries the trust and confidence of the litigant whom he represents and also being an officer of the Court enjoins a different status in a Court of law than an employee. As observed above the individual professional and body of professionals may treated to considering the case of colleagues but in the case of employer and employees the status is different. The said judgment, therefore, nowhere detracts the authoritative pronouncements of the Apex Court of this country that in the disciplinary proceedings, the standard of proof is the balance of probabilities and the employer is the sole Judge of the appreciation of facts and evidence. 36. Similar is the position in the case of L.D. Jai Singhani (supra), which was also a case of professional misconduct under the Advocates Act, where the Apex Court held that in a case of the nature brought before it which involves possible debarring of the advocate concern, evidence should be of a character which should leave no reasonable doubt about guilt. The aforesaid observations are not of general application having extension to the cases of disciplinary proceedings against an employee held by the employer. 37. In Kumaon Mandal Vikas Nigam Ltd. (Supra), the Apex Court has reiterated the legal position as laid down and discussed hereinabove by us. In para 19 of the Judgment the Apex Court observed, as under : “Judicial review of administrative action is feasible and the same has its application to its fullest extent in even departmental proceedings where it is found that the recorded findings are based on no evidence or the findings are totally perverse or legally untenable. The adequacy or inadequacy of evidence is not permitted but in the event of there being a finding which otherwise shocks the judicial conscience of the Court, it is a well-nigh impossibility to decry availability of judicial review at the instance of an affected person." (para 19) 38. The facts of the Kumaon Mandal case (Supra) also shows that a show cause notice containing 3 allegations was served upon the employee without supplying the documents relied in support of the charges. The facts of the Kumaon Mandal case (Supra) also shows that a show cause notice containing 3 allegations was served upon the employee without supplying the documents relied in support of the charges. In spite of repeated demand some of them were supplied but not all the employee in the absence of the documents relied in support of the charges could answer to show cause notice effectively except by giving a short reply. The enquiry officer submitted his report on the basis of examination of record without giving any notice and without fixing any date or venue for the oral enquiry or for cross-examination or examine any witness. No presenting officer was appointed. In short no oral enquiry was conducted and the enquiry officer submitted his report on the basis of only the charge-sheet and the reply of the employee. In this factual background, the matter was examined by the Court considering as to whether the proceedings can be said to be consistent with the principles of natural justice. The High Court allowed the writ petition of the employee and the judgment was upheld by the Apex Court. The aforesaid judgment also does not help the petitioner and on the other hand, as we have already discussed, supports the case of the employer. 39. The passage relied upon from Wade’s Administrative Law, (supra) also does not show any different standard of proof in the case of departmental inquiry as has been laid down consistently in India by the Apex Court. The relevant passage on page 297 of Wades Administrative Law (supra) may be reproduced as under: “Nearly all the cases which concern administrative law are civil, as opposed to criminal proceedings. The standard of proof of facts, accordingly, is the civil standard, based on the balance of probabilities, as contrasted with the criminal standard which requires proof beyond reasonable doubt. Even where, as sometimes in disciplinary proceedings, the language of the Act or regulations has a criminal flavour, speaking of ‘offences’, ‘charges’ and ‘punishments’, the standard of proof remains the civil standard. But the civil standard is flexible, so that the degree of probability required is proportionate to the nature and gravity of the issue. Even where, as sometimes in disciplinary proceedings, the language of the Act or regulations has a criminal flavour, speaking of ‘offences’, ‘charges’ and ‘punishments’, the standard of proof remains the civil standard. But the civil standard is flexible, so that the degree of probability required is proportionate to the nature and gravity of the issue. Where personal liberty is at stake, for example, the Court will require a high degree of probability before it will be satisfied as to the facts justifying detention; and the requirement will not be much lower in matters affecting livelihood and professional reputation, or where there is a charge of fraud or moral turpitude. Lord Scarman has indeed said that the choice between the two standards is largely a matter of words, asking how, if a Court has to be satisfied of some crucial, it can entertain a reasonable doubt. Disciplinary offences in prisons are evidently treated as criminal, so that the criminal standard applies." 40. Now coming to the question as to whether the extreme penalty of dismissal could have been imposed against the appellant or not, in view of the nature of charges found proved against him, we have no manner of doubt that in order to maintain discipline in the institution no penalty other than dismissal could have been awarded in such a case. It can never be expected that a subordinate employee misbehave or assault his superior authorities or officers of the employer and yet be allowed to be retained in service, since this would sub-serve the discipline and smooth functioning of the institution. 41. The Apex Court in U.P. State Textile Corporation Spinning Mills Jhansi v. State of U.P. and others, 1997 (75) FLR 45, has observed as under : “In the present case, the respondent No. 3 has not only given abuses and threats but he has actually gone further and committed acts of violence. In my opinion, the industry cannot run if a person like the respondent No. 3 is its employee, and hence the only punishment called for was dismissal. The tribunal, in my opinion, acted arbitrarily in interfering with the punishment of dismissal on the sentimental ground that such dismissal would mean economic death. A person like the respondent No. 3 who behaves like a hooligan has to be dismissed, otherwise the industry cannot run.” 42. The tribunal, in my opinion, acted arbitrarily in interfering with the punishment of dismissal on the sentimental ground that such dismissal would mean economic death. A person like the respondent No. 3 who behaves like a hooligan has to be dismissed, otherwise the industry cannot run.” 42. The Apex Court recently in a catena of cases has upheld the punishment of dismissal for using abusive language. In the case of Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. v. N. B. Narawade, JT 2005 (2) SC 583, the workmen abused the superior officers twice using filthy apology language, the Apex Court upholding the punishment of dismissal observed as under : “We too are of the opinion that the language used by the workman is such that it cannot be tolerated by any civilized society. Use of such abusive language against a superior officer, that too not once but twice, in the presence of his subordinates cannot be termed to be an indiscipline calling for lesser punishment in the absence of any extenuating factor referred to hereinabove." (para 14) 43. In Muriadih Colliery of Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. v. Bihar Colliery Kamgar Union through workmen, 2005 (3) SCC 331 , held that kind of violence justify the stringent punishment and upheld the punishment of dismissal by further observing that substituting the order of dismissal by another minor punishment would be wholly disproportionate to the gravity of misconduct and cannot be upheld. 44. In Hombe Gowda Educational Trust and another v. State of Karnataka and others, JT 2005(10) SC 606, the Apex Court has held that in view of change of economic policy of the country the earlier trend has undergone a major change and the Court seek to strike a balance between the interest of the workmen as well as employer. It has further held as under : “This Court has come a long way from its earlier view points. The recent trend in the decisions of this Court seek to strike a balance between the earlier approach of the industrial relation wherein only the interest of the workmen was sought to be protected with the avowed object of fast industrial growth of the country. In several decisions of this Court it has been noticed that how discipline at the workplaces/industrial undertaking received a set back. In several decisions of this Court it has been noticed that how discipline at the workplaces/industrial undertaking received a set back. In view of the change in economic policy of the country, it may not now be proper to allow the employees to break the discipline with impunity." (para 30) 45. The said view has been referred and followed in the case of L.K. Verma v. H.M.T. Ltd., JT 2006 (2) SC 99, wherein it has held as under : “So far as the contention as regard quantum of punishment of concerned, suffice it to say that verbal abuse has been held to be sufficient for inflicting a punishment of dismissal.” (para 22) 46. In view of the aforesaid settled law, it is extremely difficult to accept the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant that the punishment imposed upon the appellant is disproportionate to the gravity of the charge proved against him and the said punishment could not have been imposed upon him. 47. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the judgment under appeal does not warrant any interference in this appeal. In the result, the special appeal being devoid of merit, is accordingly, dismissed. 48. No order as to cost. Appeal Dismissed. ———