ORDER R. Mothya Naik, the petitioner in the present criminal petition filed under Sec. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter to as 'Code' for the purpose of convenience) had questioned the order dt. 10-3-2003 made in M.P. No. 603/2003 in Cr. No. 134/2002 made by the XXI Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad. It is stated that the petitioner is A.I in Cr.No.134/2002 and in pursuance of F.I.R. lodged with C.C.S., Detective Department, Hyderabad, it was alleged that he had committed offences under Sections 420, 468, 471, 409, 120-B I.P.C. and under Sections 3 and 4 of Criminal Law (Amendment) Ordinance 1944. The Investigating Officer after completing the entire investigation filed the charge-sheet before the Court of learned XXI Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad and the same was returned on the ground that it was not filed in accordance with the provisions of Section 173 of the Code. While the matter stood thus, the Investigating Officer filed an application M.P. No. 609/2003 before the learned XXI Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad, praying for a direction from the learned Metropolitan Magistrate to direct the petitioner to give his specimen handwriting and specimen signatures. The learned Metropolitan Magistrate issued summons to the petitioner to be present on 4-3-2003 for giving his specimen signatures and the specimen handwriting. The main ground of objection raised by the petitioner is that the specimen signatures and specimen handwriting cannot be obtained from him for the purpose of investigation. Despite the objection raised by the petitioner, the application was allowed. It is also further stated that inasmuch as the investigation was completed, the Investigating Officer should have obtained permission under Section 178 (3) of the Code and in view of the same M.P. No. 609/03 itself is not maintainable. The learned Magistrate recorded reasons in detail and ultimately came to the conclusion that in the light of Sections 73 and 45 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, such directions can be issued and accordingly directed the petitioner to be present on 17-3-2003 before the Court and to give his specimen handwritings and signatures to send the same to Director, Forensic Science Laboratory for comparison and opinions of Experts. 2. It is not in serious controversy between the parties that the investigation in the crime was completed and the police had laid the charge-sheet before the Court. It is needless to say that investigation is something different from enquiry. 2. It is not in serious controversy between the parties that the investigation in the crime was completed and the police had laid the charge-sheet before the Court. It is needless to say that investigation is something different from enquiry. Section 173 of the Code deals with report of police officer on completion of investigation and Section 173 (8) of the code reads as hereunder:- "Nothing in this Section shall be deemed to preclude further investigation in respect of an offence after a report under sub-section (2) has been forwarded to the Magistrate and, where upon such investigation, the officer in charge of the police station obtains further evidence, oral and documentary, he shall forward to the Magistrate a further report or report regarding such evidence in the form prescribed; and the provisions of sub-sections (2) to (6) shall as far as may be, apply in relation to such report or reports as they apply in relation to a report forwarded under sub-section (2)." Section 2(g) of the Code defines "inquiry" as "inquiry" means every inquiry, other than a trial, conducted under this Code by a Magistrate or Court". Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India states that no person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. In M.P. Sharma and others v. Satish Chandra, District Magistrate, Delhi and others while dealing with the expressions who is "to be a witness" and not to "appear as a witness", it was held that the immunity extends to any kind of evidence likely to support the prosecution case. In State of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu AIR 1961 SC 1808 the principles specified in Sharma's case (1954) SCR 1077 were narrowed down as to how protection not be extended to any kind of evidence or to only to self-incriminating statements by accused, oral or written, relating to the charge brought against him. In the aforesaid decision Sinha C.J., at page No. 1814 observed. "To be a witness" may be equivalent to "furnishing evidence" in the sense of making oral or written statements, but not in the larger sense of the expression so as to include giving of thumb impression of palm or foot or fingers or specimen writing or exposing a pert of the body by an accused person for purpose of identification. "To be a witness" may be equivalent to "furnishing evidence" in the sense of making oral or written statements, but not in the larger sense of the expression so as to include giving of thumb impression of palm or foot or fingers or specimen writing or exposing a pert of the body by an accused person for purpose of identification. "furnishing evidence" in the latter sense could not have been within the contemplation of the Constitution makers for the simple reason that-though they have intended to protect an accused person from the hazards of self incrimination, in the light of the English Law on the subject-they could not have intended to put obstacles in the way of efficient an defective investigation into crime and of bringing criminals to justice. The taking of impressions of parts of the body of an accused persons very often becomes necessary to help the investigation of a crime. It is as much necessary to protect a accused person against being compelled to incriminate himself, as to arm the agents of law and the law Courts with legitimate powers to bring offenders to justice. Furthermore it must be assumed that the Constitution makers were aware of the existing law, for example, S. 73 of the Evidence Act or Sections 5 and 6 of the Identification of prisoners Act (33 of 1920). S. 5 authorises a Magistrate to direct any person to allow his measurements or photographs to be taken. If he is stratified that it is expedient for the purposes of any investigation or proceeding under the Code of Criminal Procedure to do so: 'measurements' include finger impressions and foot-print impressions. If any such person who is directed by Magistrate, under S.5 of the Act, to allow his Measurements or Photographs to be taken resists or refuses to allow the taking of the measurements or photographs, it has been declared lawful by S.6 to use all necessary means to secure the taking of the required measurements or photographs. Similarly S. 73 of the Evidence Act authorises the Court to permit the taking of finger impression or a specimen handwriting or signature of a person present in Court. If necessary for the purpose of comparison. The matter may be looked at from another point of view. Similarly S. 73 of the Evidence Act authorises the Court to permit the taking of finger impression or a specimen handwriting or signature of a person present in Court. If necessary for the purpose of comparison. The matter may be looked at from another point of view. The giving of finger impression or of specimen signature or of handwriting, strictly speaking is not "to be a witness." Means imparting knowledge in respect of relevant facts, by means of oral statements or statements in writing by a person who has personal knowledge of the facts to be communicated to a Court or to a person holding an enquiry or investigation. A person is said 'to be a witness' to a certain state of facts which has to be determined by a Court or authority authorised to come to a decision, by testifying to what he has seen, or something he has heard which is capable of being heard and is not hit by the rule excluding hearsay, or being heard and is not hit by the rule excluding hearsay, or giving his opinion, as an expert, in respect of matters in controversy. Evidence has been classified by text writers into three categories, namely (1) oral testimony: (2) evidence furnished by documents; and (3) material evidence. We have already indicated that we are in agreement with the Full Court decision is Sharma's case, 1954 SCR 107: ( AIR 1954 SC 300 ) that the prohibition in cl. (3) of Art. 20 covers not only oral testimony given by a person accused of an offence but also his written statements which may have a bearing on the controversy with reference to the charge against him. The accused may have documentary evidence in his possession which may throw light on the controversy. (3) of Art. 20 covers not only oral testimony given by a person accused of an offence but also his written statements which may have a bearing on the controversy with reference to the charge against him. The accused may have documentary evidence in his possession which may throw light on the controversy. If it is a document which is not his statement conveying his personal knowledge relating to the charge against him, he may be called upon by the Court to produce that document in accordance with the provisions of S. 139 of the Evidence Act, which in term, provides that a person may be summoned to produce a document in his possession or power and that he does not become a witness by the mere fact that he has produced it; and therefore, he cannot be cross-examined of course, he can be cross-examined if he is called as a witness who has made statements conveying his personal knowledge by reference to the contents of the documents or if he has given his statements in Court otherwise than by reference to the contents of the documents. In our opinion therefore; the observation of this Court in Sharma's case 1954 SCA 1077: ( AIR 1954 SC 300 ) that S. 139 of the Evidence Act has no bearing on the connotation of the word 'witness' is not entirely well-founded in law. It is well established that Cl. (3) of Art. 20 is directed against self-incrimination by an accused person. Self-incrimination must mean conveying information based upon the personal knowledge of the person giving the information and cannot include merely the mechanical process of producing documents in Court which may throw a light on any of the points in controversy, but which do not contain any statement of the accused based on his personal knowledge. For example, the accused person may be in possession of a document which is in his writing or which contains his signature or his thumb impression. For example, the accused person may be in possession of a document which is in his writing or which contains his signature or his thumb impression. The production of such a document, with a view to comparison of the writing or the signature or the impression, is not the statement of an accused person, which can be said to be of the nature of a personal testimony, When an accused person is called upon by the Court or any other authority holding an investigation to give his finger impression or signature or a specimen of his handwriting he is not giving any testimony of the nature of 'personal testimony' The giving of a 'personal testimony' must depend upon his volition. He can make any kind of statement or may refuse to make any statement. But his finger impressions or his handwriting inspite of efforts at concealing the true nature of it by dissimulation cannot change their intrinsic character. Thus, the giving of finger impressions or of specimen writing or of signatures by an accused person, though it may amount to furnishing evidence in the larger sense, is not included within the expression to be a witness. In order that a testimony by an accused person may be said to have been self incriminatory, the compulsion of which comes within the prohibition of the constitutional provision, it must be of such a character that by itself it should have the tendency of incriminating the accused, if not also of actually dong so. In other words, it should be a statement which makes the case against the accused person at least probable considered by itself. A specimen handwriting or signature or finger impression by themselves are no testimony at all being wholly innocuous because they are unchangeable except in rare cases where the ridges of the fingers or the style of writing have been tampered with. They are only materials for comparison in order to lend assurance to the Court that its inference based on their pieces of evidence is reliable. They are neither oral nor documentary evidence but belong to the third category of material evidence which is outside the limit of testimony’. They are only materials for comparison in order to lend assurance to the Court that its inference based on their pieces of evidence is reliable. They are neither oral nor documentary evidence but belong to the third category of material evidence which is outside the limit of testimony’. In State (Delhi Admn) v. Pali Ram AIR 1979 SC 14 in the context of Section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, after referring to the ratio in State of Bombay's Case (cited 2nd supra) held :- "Let us now compare it with Section 73 of the India Evidence Act, which runs as under: "In order to ascertain whether a signature, writing or seal is that of the person by whom it purports to have been written or made, any signature writing or seal admitted or proved to the satisfaction of the Court to have been written or made by that person may be compared with the one which is to be proved, although that signature writing or seal has not been produced or proved for any other purpose. The Court may direct any person present in Court to write any words or figures for the purpose of enabling the Court to compare the words of figures so written with any words or figures alleged to have been written by such person. It will be seen that the first paragraph of Section 73 is, in substance, a combined version of Section 48 of the English Act II of 1855 and Section 8 of the English Criminal Procedure Act, 1865. The Second paragraph of Section 73 in substantially the same as the English Law condensed by Taylor in the above-quoted portion of paragraph 1871. Just as in English Law, the Indian Evidence Act recognizes two direct methods of proving the handwriting of a person: (1) By an admission of the person who wrote it. (2) By the evidence of some witness who saw it written. These are the best methods of proof. These apart, there are three other modes of proof by opinion. They are: (I) By the evidence of a handwriting expert. (Sec. 45) (II) By the evidence of a witness acquainted with the handwriting of the person who is said to have written the writing in question. (Sec. 47) (III) Opinion formed by the Court on comparison made by itself. These apart, there are three other modes of proof by opinion. They are: (I) By the evidence of a handwriting expert. (Sec. 45) (II) By the evidence of a witness acquainted with the handwriting of the person who is said to have written the writing in question. (Sec. 47) (III) Opinion formed by the Court on comparison made by itself. (Sec. 73) All the three cognate modes of proof involve a process of comparison. In mode (i) the comparison is made by the expert of the disputed writing with the admitted or proved writing of the person who is said to have written the questioned document. In (ii), the comparison takes the form of a belief which the witness entertains upon comparing the writing in question, with an exemplar formed in his mind from some previous knowledge or repetitive observance of the handwriting of the person concerned. In the case of (iii), the comparison is made by the court with the sample writing or exemplar obtained by it from the person concerned. A Sample writing taken by the Court under the second paragraph of S. 73, is, in substance and reality the same thing as "admitted writing" within the purview of the first paragraph of S.73, also. The first paragraph of the Section, as already seen, provides for comparison of signature, writing, etc. purporting to have been written by a person with orders admitted or proved to the satisfaction of the Court to have been written by the same person. But it does not specifically say by whom such comparison may be made. Construed in the light of the English Law on the subject, which is the legislative source of this provision, it is clear that such comparison may be made by a handwriting expert (Section 45) or by one familiar with the handwriting of the person concerned (Section 47) or by the Court. The two mutually exclusive. They are complementary to each other. Section 73 is therefore to be read as a whole, in the light of Sec. 45. The two mutually exclusive. They are complementary to each other. Section 73 is therefore to be read as a whole, in the light of Sec. 45. Thus read, it is clear that a Court holding an inquiry under the code of Criminal Procedure in respect of an offence triable by itself or by the Court of Session, does not exceed its powers under Section 73 if, in the interests of justice, it directs an accused person appearing before it, to give his sample writing to enabling the same to be compared by a handwriting expert chosen or approved by the Court, irrespective of whether his name was suggested by the prosecution or the defence, because even in adopting this course, the purpose is to enable the Court before which he is ultimately put up for trial, to compare the disputed writing with his (accused's) admitted writing and to reach its own conclusion with the assistance of the expert. Since even where proof of handwriting which is in nature comparison exists a duty is cast on the Court to use its own eyes and mind to compare the admitted writing with the disputed one to verify and reach its own conclusion, it will not be wrong to say that when a Court seized of a case directs an accused person present before it to write-down a sample writing by such direction in the ultimate analysis, "is for the purpose of enabling the Court to compare" the writing so written with the writing alleged to have been written by such person, within the contemplation of Section 73. That is to say, the words "for the purpose of enabling the Court to compare" do not exclude the use of such 'admitted' or sample writing for comparison with the alleged writing of the accused by a handwriting expert cited as a witness by any of the parties. That is to say, the words "for the purpose of enabling the Court to compare" do not exclude the use of such 'admitted' or sample writing for comparison with the alleged writing of the accused by a handwriting expert cited as a witness by any of the parties. Even where no such expert witness is cited or examined by either party, the Court may, if it thinks necessary for the ends of justice, on its own motion, call an expert witness, allow him to compare the sample writing with the alleged writing and thus give his expert assistance to enable the Court to compare the two writings and arrive at a proper conclusion." The Apex Court in fact had referred to the views expressed in Hiralal Agarwal v. State (AIR 1958 Calcutta 123), State v. Punam Chand Gupta (AIR 1958 Bombay, 207), T. Subbiah v. S.K. Defendant Ramaswamy Nadar (AIR 1970 Madras 85) and Gulzar Khan v. State (AIR 1962 patna 255 (FBO and also B. Rami Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1971 Crl.L.J., 1591). In the light of the view expressed by the Apex Court referred to supra and in the light of the latter portion of Section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, this Court is of the considered opinion that order made by the learned Magistrate cannot be found fault inasmuch as the investigation was completed and the charge-sheet was filed and at that stage, the said direction was issued. Accordingly, the Crl.P. shall stand dismissed.