Judgment Rajive Bhalla, J. 1. This order shall dispose of four revision-petitions, namely, Crl. Rev. No. 232 of 2004, Crl. Revn. No. 2245 of 2004, Crl. Rev. No. 77 of 2006 and Crl. Rev. No. 78 of 2006. 2. In Crl. Rev. No. 232 of 2004 and Crl. Rev. No. 2245 of 2004, the petitioners impugn the orders, passed by the Sessions Judge, Sangrur, summoning them under Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the Code). In the two other revisions, the orders dated 3-12-2005, whereby charges have been framed, against the petitioners, are impugned. 3. FIR No. 226 dated 15-8-2003, registered under Sections 302/34. IPC and 25/54/59 of the Arms Act, at Police Station Dhuri, District Sangrur, complained of the murder of one Bhalinder Singh. The petitioners names figure in the FIR. Upon investigation, however, the investigating agency, found the petitioners innocent, and while filing a report under Section 173, placed the petitioners in Column No. 2. Gurdip Singh was cited as the sole accused. During the trial, P.W. 1, Hardev Singh s/o Jaswant Singh stepped into the witness-box and deposed, as regards the role played by the petitioners, in the murder. The prosecution, thereupon, filed an application under Section 319 of the Code praying therein, that the petitioners be summoned as additional accused to stand trial along with Gurdip Singh. The Sessions Judge. Sangrur vide order dated 3-1-2004, summoned the petitioners to stand trial. 4. In Crl. Rev. No. 232 of 2004, it was directed by this Court vide order dated 27-1-2004. that the trial Court would defer the date of hearing of the case to a date beyond the date fixed before this Court. This order was eventually vacated on 6-10-2005, but these petitions remained pending. 5. Thereafter, the trial Court framed charges against the petitioners. The order framing charges is the subject matter of challenge in Criminal Revisions Nos. 77 and 78 of 2006. During pendency of these petitions, the prosecution has, in addition to the witnesses already examined, examined five more witnesses. 6. Counsel for the petitioners contends that the order summoning the petitioners is devoid of any reasons. The Court failed to record its satisfaction as to why the petitioners should be summoned to stand trial, along with the other accused. During pendency of these petitions, the prosecution has, in addition to the witnesses already examined, examined five more witnesses. 6. Counsel for the petitioners contends that the order summoning the petitioners is devoid of any reasons. The Court failed to record its satisfaction as to why the petitioners should be summoned to stand trial, along with the other accused. The provisions of Section 319 of the Code can be invoked where, after a judicial consideration of the material on record, the Court records its reasonable satisfaction that the material placed before it discloses sufficient reasons to summon the petitioners, to stand trial along with the already arraigned accused. It is contended that while passing the impugned order under Section 319 of the Code, the trial Court lost sight of the principles of law enunciated in Michael Machado V/s. Central Bureau of Investigation . It is further contended that, if the order under Section 319 of the Code is set aside, then as a necessary corollary, the orders framing charges would have to be quashed. 7. Counsel for the complainant vehemently contends that P.W. ls, statement was sufficient to summon the petitioners. It is contended that the trial Court after examining the entire record, namely the report under Section 173 and the deposition of P.W. 1, recorded its satisfaction that the petitioners should be arraigned to stand trial along with the accused already facing trial. It is contended that, absence of the word "satisfaction," would not lead to a conclusion that the Court failed to apply its mind to the material on record or failed to pass an order in terms of Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It is contended that a perusal of the FIR, the statements under Section 161 and the statement of P.W. 1 on oath are sufficient to warrant the summoning of the petitioners and, therefore, the petition be dismissed 8. Counsel for the State of Punjab adopts the arguments raised by counsel for the complainant. 9. I have heard learned Counsel for the parties and perused the record. Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure reads as follows: 319. Power to proceed against other persons appearing to be guilty of offence. Counsel for the State of Punjab adopts the arguments raised by counsel for the complainant. 9. I have heard learned Counsel for the parties and perused the record. Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure reads as follows: 319. Power to proceed against other persons appearing to be guilty of offence. (1) Where, in the course of any inquiry into, or trial of, an offence, it appears from the evidence that any person not being the accused has committed any offence for which such person could be tried with the accused, the Court may proceed against such person for the offence which he appears to have committed. (2) Where such person is not attending the Court, he may be arrested or summoned, as the circumstances of the case may require, for the purpose aforesaid. (3) Any person attending the Court, although not under arrest or upon a summons, may be detained by such Court for the purpose of the inquiry into, or trial of, the offence, which he appears to have committed. (4) Where the Court proceeds against any person under Sub-section (1) then (a) the proceedings in respect of such person shall be commenced afresh, and the witness reheard: (b) subject to the provisions of Clause (a), the case may proceed as if such person had been an accused person when the Court took cognizance of the offence upon which the inquiry or trial was commenced. 10. The Hon ble Supreme Court while considering the parameters within which, powers under Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, are to be exercised held in Michael Machado 2000 Cri LJ 1706 as follows: 11. The basic requirements for invoking the above section is that it should appear to the Court from the evidence collected during trial or in the inquiry that some other person, who is not arraigned as an accused in that case, has committed an offence for which that person could be tried together with the accused already arraigned. It is not enough that the Court entertained some doubt, from the evidence, about the involvement of another person in the offence. In other words, the Court must have reasonable satisfaction from the evidence already collected regarding two aspects. First is that the other person has committed an offence. It is not enough that the Court entertained some doubt, from the evidence, about the involvement of another person in the offence. In other words, the Court must have reasonable satisfaction from the evidence already collected regarding two aspects. First is that the other person has committed an offence. Second is that for such offence that other person could as well as tried along with the already arraigned accused. 12. But even then, what is conferred on the Court is only a discretion as could be discerned from the words "the. Court may proceed against such person." The discretionary power so conferred should be exercised only to achieve criminal justice. It is not that the Court should turn against another person whenever it comes across evidence connecting that another person also with the offence. A judicial exercise is called for, keeping a conspectus of the case, including the stage at which the trial has proceeded already and the quantum of evidence collected till then, and also the amount of time which the Court had spent for collecting such evidence. It must be remembered that there is no compelling duty on the Court to proceed against other persons. 14. The Court while deciding whether to invoke the power under Section 319 of the Code, must address itself about the other constraints imposed by the first limb of subsection (4), that proceedings in respect of newly added persons shall be commenced afresh and the witnesses re-examined. The whole proceedings must be recommenced from the beginning of the trial, summon the witnesses once again and examine them and cross-examine them on order to reach the stage where it had reached earlier. If the witnesses already examined are quite large in number the Court must seriously consider whether the objects sought to be achieved by such exercise is worth wasting the whole labour already undertaken. Unless the Court is hopeful that there is reasonable prospect of the case as against the newly brought accused ending in conviction of the offence concerned we would say that the Court should refrain from adopting such a course of action. 11. In another judgment of the Hon ble Supreme Court after noticing the judgment in Michael Machados case 2000 Cri LJ 1706 (supra) and upon an appraisal of the provisions of Section 319, Cr. P.C. held as follows: 9. 11. In another judgment of the Hon ble Supreme Court after noticing the judgment in Michael Machados case 2000 Cri LJ 1706 (supra) and upon an appraisal of the provisions of Section 319, Cr. P.C. held as follows: 9. In Michael Machado V/s. Central Bureau of Investigation construing the words "the Court may proceed against such person" in Section 319, Cr. P.C., this Court held that the power is discretionary and should be exercised only to achieve criminal justice and that the Court should not turn against another person whenever it comes across evidence connecting that other person also with the offence. This Court further held that a judicial exercise is called for, keeping a conspectus of the case, including the stage at which the trial has proceeded already and the quantum of evidence collected till then, and also the amount of time which the Court had spent for collecting such evidence. The Court, while examining an application under Section 319, Cr. P.C. has also to bear in mind that there is no compelling duty on the Court to proceed against other persons. In nut shell, it means that for exercise of discretion under Section 319, Cr. P.C. all relevant factors, including the one noticed above, have to be kept in view and an order is not required to be made mechanically merely on the ground that some evidence had come on record implicating the person sought to be added as an accused. 12. A perusal of the statutory provisions of Section 319 of the Code as also the judgments referred to hereinabove, make it abundantly clear that while considering an application under Section 319 of the Code, a Court is required to record a "reasonable satisfaction" that the material on record whether in the shape of the statements under Section 161, which form a part of the report under Section 173 or other evidence produced before it, are sufficient to warrant a finding that the accused, sought to be summoned under Section 319 of the Code, must be arraigned along with the accused already facing trial. 13. The words "reasonable satisfaction" are not empty platitudes but are words that define the jurisdiction of a Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 319 of the Code. These words inhere in them, a duty, to record judicial satisfaction. 13. The words "reasonable satisfaction" are not empty platitudes but are words that define the jurisdiction of a Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 319 of the Code. These words inhere in them, a duty, to record judicial satisfaction. The order must disclose howsoever briefly, the reasons that led the Court to record a finding in terms of the powers conferred upon it under Section 319 of the Code. A Court is also required to examine the material, as held in Michael Machados case 2000 Cri LJ 1706 (supra), with a view to prima facie discern as to whether there is a reasonable prospect of the case, as against the persons sought to be summoned, ending in conviction. The powers under Section 319 of the Code are not to be exercised mechanically or on demand but on the principles of law referred to in the judgments noticed hereinbefore. 14. A perusal of the impugned order reveals that the trial Court has failed to exercise jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions of Section 319, Cr. P.C. of the Code. 15. The operative part of the impugned order reads as follows: I am of the opinion that on the basis of this statement and other material discussed above, Inderjit Singh alias Bhola and Surinder Kumar Changli should also be summoned to face trial with Gurdeep Singh accused for the murder of Bhalinder Singh. The process be issued against both of them for 20-1-2004. The present P.Ws. are discharged. 16. Apart from recording its opinion that the petitioners should be summoned to stand trial, no reasons whatsoever have been assigned for the opinion so formed. The impugned order does not set out any "reasonable satisfaction" judicial or otherwise as to why the petitioners should stand trial along with the other accused. The order in my considered opinion, does not meet the requirements of an order to be passed in exercise of powers under Section 319 of the Code. The order has been passed mechanically, without recording reasons and without considering the entire material on record. 17. The plea raised by the counsel for the complainant, that these petitions be dismissed, as charges have been framed against the petitioners and five witnesses examined, in my considered opinion, cannot be accepted. The order has been passed mechanically, without recording reasons and without considering the entire material on record. 17. The plea raised by the counsel for the complainant, that these petitions be dismissed, as charges have been framed against the petitioners and five witnesses examined, in my considered opinion, cannot be accepted. Setting aside of the order passed under Section 319 of the Code may result in some delay, in the conclusion of a trial, but this fact, is not a circumstance sufficient to warrant the upholding of an order which is contrary to law, the consequences whereof would condemn an individual to a criminal trial, that may lead to a conviction and sentence. 18. In view of what has been stated above, I am of the considered opinion that the order dated 3-1-2004 summoning the petitioners should be set aside. As a necessary corollary, the orders framing charges would also have to be set aside as the charges were framed during the pendency of these petitions. 19. In view of what has been stated above, the present petitions are allowed. The impugned order dated 3-1-2004 is set aside. The order framing charges dated 3-12-2005 is also set aside. The matter is remitted to the trial Court to decide the application under Section 319, Cr. P.C. afresh, in accordance with law within a period of one month of a receipt of a certified copy of this order.