ASHOK B. HINCHIGERI, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner has prayed for a direction to the 1st respondent-Corporation to consider the case of the petitioner for promotion to the cadre of Senior Assistant with all the consequential benefits. ( 2 ) THE brief facts of the case are that the petitioner, respondents 2 and 3 were appointed as Junior assistants in the year 1984. A copy of the final seniority list, as on 31/12/1991, shows that the petitioner is above the respondents 2 and 3 in the seniority list. The petitioner is at Sl. No. 62, respondent No. 2 at Sl. No. 221 and respondent No. 3 at Sl. No. 253. The respondents 2 and 3 claimed to be belonging to Scheduled Tribe. As there was some dispute regarding the claim of the respondent No. 2, the respondent No. 3 was promoted. Thereafter it was found that the respondent No. 2 also belongs to Scheduled Tribe. On 14/9/1995, on giving the promotion to the respondent No. 2 in the vacancy earmarked for the Scheduled Tribe, the respondent No. 3 was not reverted to the cadre of the Junior Assistant, but was continued in the cadre of Senior assistant. ( 3 ) THE grievance of the petitioner is that he ought to have been promoted to the cadre of Senior assistant in the vacancy, which would have automatically arisen, if the respondent No. 3 were reverted to the cadre of Junior Assistant. The petitioner sought to ventilate his grievance by submitting a number of representations, which are produced as Annex. D-l to D-8. When they did not evoke any response from the respondent No. 1, he instituted this petition. ( 4 ) SRI Jayakumar S. Patil, the learned Senior Counsel for Smt. H. C. Kavitha appearing for the petitioner has made the following submissions: a) The petitioner had acquired the eligibility to be considered for promotion from the cadre of junior Assistant to the cadre of Senior Assistant as on the material date of 14/9/1995. It was on this day that the respondent No. 1 passed the order (Annex. B) promoting the respondent No. 2 to the cadre of Senior Assistant, which post was reserved for a candidate belonging to Scheduled tribe, but at the same time allowing the respondent: No. 3 to continue in the promotional cadre of Senior Assistant. It was on this day that the respondent No. 1 passed the order (Annex. B) promoting the respondent No. 2 to the cadre of Senior Assistant, which post was reserved for a candidate belonging to Scheduled tribe, but at the same time allowing the respondent: No. 3 to continue in the promotional cadre of Senior Assistant. The respondent No. 3 was continued in the promotional vacancy in the general (unreserved) category. b) There is no justification whatsoever for continuing the respondent No. 3 in the promotional cadre from 1995 till 1/4/2003. c) The learned Senior Counsel submits that the respondent No. 3, though technically promoted in 2003, was given all the benefits including the salary attached to the Senior Assistant from 1995 itself. d) It is the specific case of the petitioner that the respondent No. 3 who is admittedly junior to the petitioner was given the benefits of promotion for 8 years without any basis for the same. e) The representations at. Annexnre-D series were kept in the cold storage. The ants of the respondent. No. 1 only indicate that the respondent. No. 3 was given the bountiful benefits to which he was not entitled to. He submits that even the opinion, tendered by the 1st respondent's counsel vide his letter, dt. 4/5/1998, was also for the reversion of the respondent No. 3. f) Therefore Sri Patil prays for the grant of retrospective promotion from the date on which the respondent. No. 3 was given the benefits of promotion. He submits that, the petitioner's claim for promotion was not considered for no justifiable reason while operating the gradation list. In this regard, he relied on the short, note in the case of K. B. P. Control Board Officers Assn. v. K. S. P. Control Board reported in (2003) 3 KCCR SN 203. He has also relied on a judgment, of this Court in the case of Saikh Mehaboob v. Railway Board and Ors. reported in (1982) 1 slr 455. The relevant paragraph is extracted herein below: the last portion of the above circular states that even if a civil servant was denied promotion at proper time, he was not entitled to arrears of salary on the ground that he did not shoulder the duties and responsibilities of the higher post. In my view, the denial of arrears of salary to the petitioner cannot be supported. In my view, the denial of arrears of salary to the petitioner cannot be supported. The petitioner had a right to be considered far promotion on the dates when it was due in view of the right to equality guaranteed under Article 14 of the constitution and right to equal opportunity in matters relating to employment guaranteed under clause (1) of Article 16 of the Constitution. The said valuable rights guaranteed by the constitution cannot be denied in the first instance and thereby deny the civil servant the opportunity to render service in the higher post and subsequently make it a ground far justifying the arrears of salary even after according retrospective promotion, at some point of time later the giving effect to the circular as against the petitioner having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, would amount to the violation of the fundamental rights guaranteed to the petitioner under Article 14 read with Clause (1) of Article 16 of the Constitution. ( 5 ) PER contra, Sri Sawkar, the learned Counsel for the respondent No. l has made the following reply submissions: (a) (i) There is an, inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in approaching this Court. The acts done in 1995 are challenged after 6 long years. On the short ground of delay and latches only, this petition deserves to be thrown out. He draws support from a judgment of the Apex court in the case of P. S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of T. N. reported in (1978) 1 SCC 152, wherein it is held that a person aggrieved by an order of promoting a junior over his head should approach the Court within 6 months or at the most a year of such promotion. He has also cited a judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of (Gain Singh Maan v. High Court of P and h reported in (1980) 4 SCC 266 . He has also cited a judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of (Gain Singh Maan v. High Court of P and h reported in (1980) 4 SCC 266 . The relevant paragraph of the judgment is extracted herein below: 3 In regard to the to the petitioner's claim for promotion to the Selection Grade post in the punjab Civil Service (Judicial Branch) with effect from November 1, 1966, and to a post in the punjab Superior Judicial Service with effect from May 1, 1967 on the basis that a post had been reserved in each of the services for a member of the scheduled castes, it seems to us that the claim is grossly belated. The writ, petition was filed in this Court in 1978 about eleven years after the dates from which the promotions are claimed. There is no valid explanation for the delay, that the petitioner was making successive representations during this period can hardly justify our overlooking the inordinate delay. Relief must be refused on that ground. It is not necessary in the circumstances to consider the further submission of the respondents that the provision on which the petitioner relies as the basis of his claim is concerned with the appointment only of members of the scheduled castes to posts in the Punjab Superior Judicial service and not to recruitment by promotion to that service. (a) (ii) He also draws to my attention a recent judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Karnataka Power Corporation Ltd. v. K. Thangappan reported in AIR2006 SC 1581 , 2006 (2 )AWC2021 (SC ), JT2006 (4 )SC 312 , 2006 (3 )Karlj505 , (2006 )II LLJ421 SC , 2006 (4 )SCALE56 , (2006 )4 SCC322 , 2006 (3 )SLJ201 (SC ) wherein it is held inter alia, that submitting one after the other representation is no justification for approaching this Court belatedly. The relevant paragraphs are extracted herein below: 5. The factual position as noted above dearly shows that for nearly two decades Respondent 1 workman had remained silent. As rightly pointed out by learned Counsel for the appellants even in, the representations made in 1997 and 1998 there was no reference to the representations claimed to have been made in 1982 and/or 1989. Even if that would have been made, there was considerable delay even in making the representations. As rightly pointed out by learned Counsel for the appellants even in, the representations made in 1997 and 1998 there was no reference to the representations claimed to have been made in 1982 and/or 1989. Even if that would have been made, there was considerable delay even in making the representations. There is no dispute that mere making of representations cannot justify a belated approach. ( 6 ) DELAY or laches is one of the factors which is to be borne in mind by the High Court when they exercise their discretionary powers under Article 326 of the Constitution. In an appropriate case the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party. Even where fundamental right is involved the matter is still within the discretion of the Court as pointed out in Durga prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports. of course, the discretion has to be exercised judicially and reasonably. 9. It was stated in State of M. P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal that the High Court in exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in exercise of its writ Jurisdiction. It was stated that this rule is premised on a number of factors. The High court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring, in its train new-injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. It was pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third-party rights in the meantime is an important factor which also weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction. 10. It has been pointed out by this Court in a number of cases that representations would not be adequate explanation to take care of delay. 10. It has been pointed out by this Court in a number of cases that representations would not be adequate explanation to take care of delay. This was first stated in K. V. Rajalakshmiah Setty v. State of Mysore. This was reiterated in Rabindranath Bose case by stating that there is a limit to the time which can be considered reasonable for making representations and if the government had turned dawn one representation the making of another representation on similar lines will not explain the delay. In State of Orissa v. Pyarimohan Samantaray making of repeated representations was not regarded as satisfactory explanation of the delay. In that case the petition had been dismissed for delay alone. (See. State of Orissa v. Arun Kumar Patnaik also ). (a) (iii) Nextly, he has also relied on a judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of b. V. Sivaiah v. K. Addanki Basu reported in 1998 V AD (SC )533 , air1998 SC 2565 , JT1998 (5 )SC 96 , 1998 Lablc2749 , (1999 )I LLJ754 SC , 1998 (4 )SCALE182 , (1998 )6 SCC720 , [1998 ]3 SCR782 , 1999 (1 )SLJ257 (SC ), wherein the High court's refusal to consider the belated challenges to the promotions, was upheld. (b) (i) Shri Sawkar, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 fairly submits that it was wrong to have continued the respondent No. 3 in the cadre of Senior Assistant, But that by itself does not confer any right on the petitioner. In this regard, he cites a judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Union of India and Anr. v. International Trading Co. and Anr. reported in AIR2003 SC 3983 , 104 (2003 )DLT779 (SC ), JT2003 (4 )SC 549 , 2003 (4 )SCALE581 , (2003 )5 SCC437. The relevant portion of the judgment is extracted herein below: 13. What remains now to be considered, is the effect of permission granted to the thirty two vessels. As highlighted by learned Counsel for the appellants, even if it is accepted that there was any improper permission, that may render such permissions vulnerable so far as the thirty two vessels are concerned, but it cannot come to the aid of the respondents. It is not necessary to deal with that aspect because two wrongs do not mate one right. It is not necessary to deal with that aspect because two wrongs do not mate one right. A party cannot claim that since something wrong has been done in another case direction should be given for doing another wrong. It would not be setting a wrong right, but would be perpetuating another wrong. In such matters there is no discrimination involved. The concept of equal treatment on the logic of article 14 of the Constitution of India (in short "the Constitution cannot be pressed into service in such cases. What the concept of equal treatment presupposes is existence of similar legal foothold. It does not countenance repetition of a wrong action to bring both wrongs on a par. Even if hypothetically it is accepted that a wrong has been committed in same other cases by introducing a concept of negative equality the respondents cannot strengthen their case. They have to establish strengh of their case on some other basis and not by claming negative equality. (b) (ii) He also cites a judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Coromandel fertilisers Ltd. v. Union of India and Ors. reported in AIR1984 SC 1772 , (1984 )3 Complj289 (SC ), 1984 (3 )ECC98 (SC ), 1984 (17 )ELT607 (SC ), 1984 (2 )SCALE282 , 1984 Supp (1 ) SCC457 , [1985 ]1 SCR523 , 1985 (17 )UJ133 (SC ), wherein a wrong decision in favour of a particular party would not entitle any other party to claim the same benefit on the same basis. Based on these two judgments, Sri Sawkar submits that at the most the petitioner may be entitled to demand the withdrawal of benefits and consequently the recovery of amounts from the concerned official, but he cannot demand with any rate of success that based on a wrong thing committed by the first respondent, he also be given the same benefits; that really amounts to perpetuation of the mistakes. (c) No Junior Assistant, who is junior to the petitioner in the general category, is promoted prior to promoting the petitioner. 6. The respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 4, though served, have remained unrepresented. Their names are shown in the cause list. They are called out. But they are absent. (c) No Junior Assistant, who is junior to the petitioner in the general category, is promoted prior to promoting the petitioner. 6. The respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 4, though served, have remained unrepresented. Their names are shown in the cause list. They are called out. But they are absent. ( 7 ) CONSIDERING the rival submissions made at the bar, the decision-making process culminating in the continuation of the respondent No. 3 in the promotional cadre of Senior Assistant has to be reviewed, I have carefully gone through the averments made in the writ petition and the statement of objections of the respondent No. l. As the ground taken in paragraph 17 of the writ petition was not specifically met in the statement of objections, on 20-6-2006, I directed the respondent No. 1 to produce the original records and to file an affidavit throwing Light on the following aspects of the matter: (i) Why the R-3 was continued in the promotional cadre of Sr. Asst. , in anticipation of the scheduled Tribe vacancy arising in future. (ii) What follow up action was taken on the advice/legal opinion contained in the letter dt. 4-5-1998. (iii) For what reasons, the R-3's reversion was not given effect to. ( 8 ) THE first respondent has come on affidavit through its General Manager, Sr. Uday Shankar nejjur. The affidavit in paragraph 2 states that "simultaneously Sri Jogappa Naik, who had been promoted earlier, was continued as Senior Assistant and it was decided to grant him promotion as Senior Assistant in the subsequent vacancy for Scheduled Tribe in the 6th circle arising in future. " This stand is palpably erroneous and wholly unsustainable. No employee can be permitted to stay back in the promotional cadre and that too for a long period of eight years in anticipation of a vacancy arising in future. ( 9 ) THE said affidavit also discloses that the first respondent called for legal opinion in the matter. The Advocate/consultant, vide his reply, dated 4-5-1998 opined that it is not advisable to continue the respondent No. 3 in the higher cadre of Senior Assistant. Based on the said legal opinion, the then Managing Director passed an order withdrawing the promotion given to the respondent No. 3 and continuing him (SIC) as Junior Assistant with effect from 10-8-1994. The Advocate/consultant, vide his reply, dated 4-5-1998 opined that it is not advisable to continue the respondent No. 3 in the higher cadre of Senior Assistant. Based on the said legal opinion, the then Managing Director passed an order withdrawing the promotion given to the respondent No. 3 and continuing him (SIC) as Junior Assistant with effect from 10-8-1994. Inspite of the order being passed by the Chief Executive of the first respondent-Corporation, the respondent No. 3 was continued. I have perused the original records placed before me. I find the draft order for the reversion of the respondent No. 3. However, though the reasons are not forthcoming from the records, the respondent No. 3 was continued in the promotional cadre of senior Assistant. ( 10 ) THE petitioner submitted a number of representations for undoing the injustice done to him. However, they have not received any consideration from the decision-makers of the first respondent-Corporation. ( 11 ) AS a last resort, the petitioner filed this writ petition. On receiving the notice in the writ petition proceedings, the respondent No. 1 sought one more opinion from its consultant. He tendered his opinion vide his letter, dated 04-05-1998. The sum and substance of the legal opinion is that the first respondent must pass the necessary orders after putting the respondent no. 3 on notice and after considering his explanation thereto. It further states that the issue of reversion has to be brought to the notice of this Court for its orders. However, during the pendency of this writ petition proceedings, no reversion order is passed; nor an application for the leave of this Court is sought for reverting the respondent No. 3. On the other hand, they waited till 01-04-2003 to pass an order to promote the respondent No. 3 to the promotional vacancy arising in the category of Scheduled Tribes. No efforts are made to recover the monetary benefits from the concerned official for wrongfully giving them to the respondent No. 3. ( 12 ) THE records do not disclose why a promotional vacancy arising in the general category was not filled up by giving the same to the petitioner, who had acquired the eligibility to be promoted to the cadre in question. ( 12 ) THE records do not disclose why a promotional vacancy arising in the general category was not filled up by giving the same to the petitioner, who had acquired the eligibility to be promoted to the cadre in question. ( 13 ) SRI Sawkar's submission that the petitioner is not entitled to any benefits based on the mistakes committed in the case of the respondent No. 3 does not commend itself to me for two specific reasons: a) At the time of passing the order, dated 14-9-1995 at Annexure-B, continuing the respondent no. 3 in the promotional cadre of Senior Assistant, to which he was not entitled, as per the roster, was impermissible; the vacancy occupied by him was meant for candidates who belonged to general category. b) At the said material point of time, the petitioner had indeed acquired the eligibility for promotion for the post in question. Even on realising that a mistake is committed and even when their Advocate/consultant called for reversion, the authorities of the first respondent did not act at all. ( 14 ) THE three hold bar raised by Sri Sawkar, learned Counsel for the first respondent is also devoid of any merit. While it is convenient for the first respondent to accuse the petitioner of the delay in approaching this Court, it is in no position as to why it did not take cognizance of the representations at Annexure-D series. No doubt, the delay militates against the petitioner. But the first respondent's inaction, indifference, casualness and unresponsiveness to the plight of the petitioner can have no justification whatsoever. ( 15 ) THIS is a typical case of capriciousness on the part of the first respondent. Its officers do not address themselves to the legitimate grievances of a petitioning employee, do not act on the legal opinion and do not even implement the orders of the Managing Director. ( 16 ) IT is profitable to refer to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Mohd. Ahmed v. Nizam Sugar Factory and Ors. reported in 2005 SCC (Lands) 62, wherein a considered view is taken that if an employee is held hack from his work place for no fault of his, the monetary benefits cannot he denied to him. Ahmed v. Nizam Sugar Factory and Ors. reported in 2005 SCC (Lands) 62, wherein a considered view is taken that if an employee is held hack from his work place for no fault of his, the monetary benefits cannot he denied to him. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case of Sudha shrivastava (Smt) v. Comptroller and Auditor General of India reported in (1996 )1 CALLT66 (SC ), JT1995 (9 )SC 358 , 1995 (6 )SCALE449 , (1996 )1 SCC63 , [1995 ]supp4 SCR797 , is pleased to hold that, if a sealed cover procedure is followed, if it is found on the opening of the sealed cover that he was selected for promotion and if the prosecution has ended in his acquittal, the right to get the consequential benefits would devolve even on his heirs. ( 17 ) IT is also worthwhile to refer to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Union of India v. K. V. Jankiraman and Ors. reported in AIR1991 SC 2010 , [1991 (63 ) FLR767 ], JT1991 (3 )SC 527 , (1991 )II LLJ570 SC , 1991 (2 )SCALE423 , (1991 )4 scc109 , [1991 ]3 SCR790 , (1992 )1 UPLBEC445 , wherein it is held that the normal rule of 'no work no pay' is not applicable to cases where an employee, although is willing to work, is kept away from the work by the authorities for no fault of his. ( 18 ) IN the light of these judgments, I have no hesitation in rejecting the contention of Sri Sawkar, the learned Counsel for the respondent No. l that as the petitioner had not actually worked in the promotional cadre, he is not entitled to the monetary benefits attached to the cadre of Senior assistant. ( 19 ) THE Division Bench of this Court, while balancing the equities of an employee, who approached this Court belatedly, and the Management in the case of Karnataka Electricity board v. S. Bhaskar reported in , AIR1994 Kant 209 , AIR1994 KAR 209 , ILR1993 KAR 3103 , 1993 (4 )Karlj275 , has held as follows: 5. Having given our anxious consideration to the rival contentions we have reached a conclusion that the appellant/board has no case. Having given our anxious consideration to the rival contentions we have reached a conclusion that the appellant/board has no case. So far as the first contention urged by the learned Counsel for the Board touching the question of delay and laches on the part of the respondents in preferring the Writ Petition after some 11 years from the date of the office order is concerned this Court in W. A. 788/89 has brushed aside the very contention that the Writ Petitions preferred after such long lapse of time should have been rejected, by holding that the actual arrears payable to the petitioners in those cases having been limited to three years prior to the filing of the Writ Petitions by them, the question of delay and laches pales into Insignificance. It has to be kept in view that when an employee contends that he has been consistently discriminated against by being paid a lower salary than his Junior, it is a case of recurring cause of action especially in the light of Articles 14 and 16 (1) of the Constitution. It has to be also kept in view that by delaying the fifing of the Petitions the position of the Board has not been adversely affected. Nor has this delay deprived the appellant the opportunity of putting forward any defence to meet the case of the respondents. If at all it only benefited the appellant/board since it would not be required to pay the arrears for the whole period during which, the office orders had not been given effect to it is obvious that if petitioners had come earlier, they would have got arrears for a larger period. Therefore on the facts of this case it cannot be said that the delay on the part of the respondents/writ Petitioners is in any way fatal to the consideration of their case on merits. The first contention is, therefore rejected. 7. It is however, made dear that while granting two additional increments to the respondents the board shall fix nationally the respondents' pay-scale in the naming time scale of Asst. Engineers with effect from 26th June, 1979, the date of the office order, while limiting the actual arrears to be paid to three years immediately prior to the date of filing of the Writ Petitions. Engineers with effect from 26th June, 1979, the date of the office order, while limiting the actual arrears to be paid to three years immediately prior to the date of filing of the Writ Petitions. ( 20 ) IN the light of the aforesaid judgment, I have no hesitation in holding that the delay of six years in approaching the Court is not fatal to the consideration of this case on merits. However, I restrict, the monetary claims of the petitioner only to the period of three years, immediately preceding the institution of the writ petition and thereafter for the period from 7-6-2001 to 1-4-2003, the date on which the petitioner was promoted to the cadre of Senior Assistant. The petitioner is entitled to the increments, which he would have got if he had been promoted on 14-9-1995; the same shall be fixed notionally in his pay-scale of the Senior Assistant, hut the actual arrears to he paid to him are limited to the period from 7-6-1998 to 1-4-2003. ( 21 ) WHETHER the recovery proceedings are to he initiated against the third respondent or from the officer who had not given effect to the Managing Director's order for reverting the respondent no. 3, etc. , are the questions which fall within the province of administration. Therefore I do not propose to make any directions as far as these aspects of the matter are concerned. The first respondent may take such steps as it deems fit. ( 22 ) THE process of re-fixing the petitioner's salary in pay-scales of the Senior Assistant, shall be completed in an outer limit of four months from today. ( 23 ) IN the result, this writ petition is allowed. No order as to costs.