( 1 ) SPECIAL Civil Application No. 3134 of 2001 when came up for final hearing, since Special Civil Application No. 13380 of 2006 was also arising on the same subject matter, both are heard finally by this Court. ( 2 ) THE short facts are as under: the petitioners of Special Civil Application No. 3134 of 2001 (hereinafter referred to as "the original owner/seller" for the sake of convenience) were holding the agricultural land at village Shela, Taluka Sanand, Dist. Ahmedabad. It appears that all the lands held by Joitaram Patel was given one block and the total block comprised of 78,914 sq. mtrs. out of the total area of the block. It appears that the land ad-measuring 18,004 sq. mtrs. was sold by the seller to one Ibrahimbhai vide Registered Sale Deed dated 10. 04. 1980. No permission was obtained of the authority under the Bombay Prevention of Fragmentation Act,1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act ). Thereafter, on 06. 07. 1981, the remaining land admeasuring 60910 sq. mtrs. was sold by Registered Sale Deed on 06. 07. 1981 by the seller to respondent Nos. 1 and 3 of Special Civil Application 3134 of 2001 (hereinafter referred as the purchaser of the land in question ). Even for the sale dated 06. 07. 1981, no permission was obtained of the competent authority under the Act. It appears that the entry came to be recorded of both the aforesaid Sale Deeds dated 10. 04. 1980 and 06. 07. 1981 based on the said Registered Sale Deed in the revenue record. However thereafter, it appears that in the year 1983, the Deputy Collector initiated the proceedings qua the Sale Deed dated 06. 07. 1981 by seller to the purchaser under the provisions of the Act on the ground that the permission of the competent authority was not obtained for the transfer of the land. It appears that in the meantime, on 03. 08. 1982, the purchaser of the land applied for converting the land for non-agricultural use and such permission came to be granted by Taluka Development Officer, Sanand. Thereafter, on 26. 09. 1983, in the proceedings under the Act, the Deputy Collector cancelled the Entry No. 1018 dated 11. 08. 1982 based on the Registered Sale Deed and declared the sale as void and further directed imposition of fine to the seller of Rs. Thereafter, on 26. 09. 1983, in the proceedings under the Act, the Deputy Collector cancelled the Entry No. 1018 dated 11. 08. 1982 based on the Registered Sale Deed and declared the sale as void and further directed imposition of fine to the seller of Rs. 250/- failing which, the amount of fine to be recovered as arrears of the land revenue and also declared for restoration of the original status of the land. It appears that the order of the Deputy Collector was challenged by the purchaser by preferring appeal before the State Government and the State Government vide order dated 23. 04. 1984, directed for remand of the matter by setting aside the order of the Deputy Collector. The matter was thereafter, further considered by the Deputy Collector and on 30. 09. 1986, the order came to be passed by the Deputy Collector, whereby the transfer was set aside and the fine of Rs. 100/- was imposed upon the seller failing which, the amount to be recovered as arrears of the land revenue and it was also declared that the possession of the purchaser over the disputed land is illegal and therefore, the summary eviction was ordered against the purchaser. It was also directed to intimate the copy of the order to the parties and Talati was directed to keep on record the copy of the order. It deserves to be recorded that the copy of the order was forwarded to the Mamlatdar, Sanand, with the direction that after the expiry of the period of appeal, the fine be recovered from the seller and the possession be taken back from the purchaser and the record be restored to the original position. It appears that the purchaser challenged the order of the Deputy Collector under the Act before the State Government by preferring revision and the State Government passed the order on 20. 04. 1990, whereby, the revision was dismissed and so far as the restoration of the original status of the land is concerned, it was ordered that the land be forfeited to the State Government. ( 3 ) IT appears that the order dated 03. 08. 1982 for grant of permission to use the land for non-agricultural purpose came to be taken in Suo Motu revision by the State Government and ultimately, on 30. 08. ( 3 ) IT appears that the order dated 03. 08. 1982 for grant of permission to use the land for non-agricultural purpose came to be taken in Suo Motu revision by the State Government and ultimately, on 30. 08. 1990, the State Government passed the order, whereby, the order of the Taluka Development Officer granting permission for non-agricultural purpose was set aside. ( 4 ) THREE Special Civil Applications came to be filed; one being Special Civil Application No. 7011 of 1990 preferred by the purchaser for challenging the order dated 30. 08. 1990 passed by the State Government for cancellation of non-agricultural permission dated 03. 08. 1982; the another being Special Civil Application No. 5183 of 1990 preferred by the seller for challenging the order of the State Government dated 20. 04. 1990, so far as it related to the confiscation of the land to the State Government; the third being Special Civil Application No. 5767 of 1990 preferred by the purchaser of the land for challenging the order passed by the State Government as well as the Deputy Collector dated 20. 04. 1990 and 30. 09. 1986 for dismissal of the revision and for declaration of the sale and for setting aside of the sale etc. It deserves to be recorded that during the course of hearing, the original record of all three petitions were called for and it appears that in Special Civil Application No. 7011 of 1990, preferred by the purchaser, on 19. 09. 1990, following order was passed: "rule. Parties are directed to maintain status quo as of today". ( 5 ) THE aforesaid order came to be continued until final disposal. ( 6 ) IN Special Civil Application No. 5183 of 1990 preferred by the seller, on 08. 07. 1990, the following order was passed: "rule. Ad interim stay of that part of the order whereby the land has been assumed by the Government acting under Section 9 (3) of the Act". ( 7 ) THE aforesaid order also came to be continued until final disposal. In Special Civil Application No. 5676 of 1990, preferred by the purchaser, on 09. 08. 1990, the following order was passed: "rule. ( 7 ) THE aforesaid order also came to be continued until final disposal. In Special Civil Application No. 5676 of 1990, preferred by the purchaser, on 09. 08. 1990, the following order was passed: "rule. Ad interim relief against enforcement of the order Annexure-D" ( 8 ) IT deserves to be recorded that the order Annexure-D was the order of the State Government in revisional jurisdiction under the Act, whereby, the revision was dismissed and the land was ordered to be forfeited to the Government. In the said Special Civil Application, sellers were impleaded as party respondent Nos. 2/1 to 2/5. The aforesaid order also came to be continued until final disposal. That thereafter, all the three Special Civil Applications came to be finally heard by this Court (Coram: P. K. Sarkar, J. , as he then was) on 25. 04. 2000 and this Court in the Common Judgment observed that the order of the learned Additional Chief Secretary, suffers from some infirmities, which requires to re-examination and accordingly, it is required to be quashed. The Court thereafter, quashed the order passed by the State Government in both the Revision Case Nos. 3/1987 and 23/1987. The Court further directed the State Government to issue notice to all the parties and to allow them to adduce both oral as well as documentary evidence and after hearing both the sides, it was directed that the revision applications be decided within stipulated time limit. ( 9 ) IT may incidentally be mentioned that so far as the transaction of sale of the land dated 10. 04. 1980 by the seller with Ibrahimbhai for the land admeasuring 18,004 sq. mtrs. , which was in chronology prior to the sale by the seller in favour of the purchaser, no proceedings were initiated under the Act for a long time but in the year 1996, the proceedings came to be initiated in respect to the said transaction with Ibrahimbhai and on 30. 07. 1996, the order came to be passed by the Deputy Collector, whereby, post facto permission was granted to the sale in question. It appears that the seller, who is also the seller in the present case, challenged the order of the Deputy Collector before the State Government in revision granting post facto permission under the Act to the sale and on 10. 04. It appears that the seller, who is also the seller in the present case, challenged the order of the Deputy Collector before the State Government in revision granting post facto permission under the Act to the sale and on 10. 04. 1998, the State Government passed the order for dismissal of the said revision and confirmed the order of the Deputy Collector. The said order of the State Government was challenged by the seller by preferring Special Civil Application No. 4741 of 1998 before this Court and this Court (Coram:m. S. Shah, J.), as per the order dated 22. 09. 1999, dismissed the petition by observing inter alia that the breach of the provisions of Section 31 of the Act does not render a transaction void as all that is required to be done before execution of the Sale Deed is to obtain permission of the competent authority. It was observed inter alia at para 40 of the order as under:"even otherwise, the breach of the provisions of Section 31 of the Act does not render a transaction void as all that is required to be done before the execution of the Sale Deed is to obtain permission of the competent authority and the competent authority while passing the impugned order dated 30. 07. 1996, has granted ex post facto permission, which cannot be said to be arbitrary or unreasonable. " ( 10 ) IT appears that the aforesaid decision of the Single Bench of this Court came to be challenged by the seller by preferring Letters Patent Appeal No. 1086 of 1999 and the said Letters Patent Appeal came to be decided by the Division Bench of this Court on 23. 01. 2000, reported at 2003 (1) GLR 562 . It is not in dispute that the order of the Division Bench of this Court is carried before the Higher Forum by the seller or the Higher Forum has reversed the view of the Division Bench. ( 11 ) IT appears that in the meantime, the State Government heard the revision in pursuance of the Judgment of this Court dated 25. 04. 2000 in Special Civil Application Nos. ( 11 ) IT appears that in the meantime, the State Government heard the revision in pursuance of the Judgment of this Court dated 25. 04. 2000 in Special Civil Application Nos. 5183 of 1990, 5767 of 1990 and 7011 of 1990 and thereafter, the State Government has allowed the revision against the order passed by the Deputy Collector under the Act and the transaction of sale between the seller and the purchaser is approved and the revenue entry based on the sale is confirmed. The State Government also confirmed the order of the Taluka Development Officer dated 03. 08. 1982 for grant of permission for non-agricultural use and withdrew the notice of revision for Suo Motu exercise of revisional power dated 24. 10. 1989. It is under these circumstances, the seller has approached to this Court by preferring Special Civil Application No. 3138 of 2001 for the relief inter alia to quash and set aside the order of the State Government in both the revisions. The petitioner herein has also prayed to hold that in view of the order passed by the competent authority under the Act, the transaction in question was a void transaction and in view of the expressed statutory voidity, this Court may confirm the order of the competent authority dated 30. 09. 1986 passed by the Deputy Collector, whereby the sale was declared void. ( 12 ) SPECIAL Civil Application No. 13380 of 2006 is preferred by one Gafurbhai Vasibhai Desai as Karta of Vasibhai Haribhai Desai HUF as well as heirs of deceased Vasibhai Haribhai Desai for challenging the very order of the State Government dated 07. 12. 2000 in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction contending inter alia that in the year 1993, the original land owner-seller had entered an Agreement to Sale dated 01. 06. 1993 and thereafter on 13. 03. 1993, a Registered Sale Deed is also executed in their favour by the original owner-seller and they were required to be heard by the State Government while exercising the revisional power and as they were not heard, the present petition. The aforesaid petitioners of Special Civil Application No. 13380 of 2006 shall be referred to as the so-called purchaser/second purchaser for the sake of convenience . The aforesaid petitioners of Special Civil Application No. 13380 of 2006 shall be referred to as the so-called purchaser/second purchaser for the sake of convenience . ( 13 ) IT deserves to be recorded that it is the contention of the petitioners of both the petitions in their petition that as per the panchnama drawn in presence of the Talati-cum-Mantri of Gram Panchayat, Sela, the possession of the land which was purchased by the petitioner is given to the seller and as per the purchaser, on the very day, i. e. on 15. 12. 1986, the statement was also recorded by Talati-cum-Mantri of the purchaser that the possession is received. It deserves to be recorded that in the said panchnama, there is no signature of the purchaser for returning th possession to the seller. It is the further case of the seller that the State Government when passed the order on 30. 08. 1990, has also recorded that there is another panchnama dated 30. 04. 1988, whereby the land sold to the purchaser of the Block No. 335 is entrusted to the seller through Talati-cum-Mantri of Shela Gram Panchayat. The said panchnama is not on record, whereas, the case of the respondent purchaser is that for asserting the possession of the land in question, the seller had preferred Regular Civil Suit No. 6/86 and in the said Suit, the application for temporary injunction was also prayed and there is finding of the Civil Court that the plaintiffs have not proved the prima facie case for establishing the possession and therefore, the application for temporary injunction is required. It is also the case of the respondent purchaser that the appeal was preferred by the seller against the order of the Civil Court dated 30. 04. 1986 of rejecting the application for temporary injunction by preferring Misc. Civil Appeal No. 98/86 before the District Court and as per the order dated 11. 09. 1987 of the District Court, the appeal is dismissed and it is further the case of the respondent purchaser that the Suit for protecting the ownership and possession is also dismissed for want of prosecution by the learned Civil Judge on 26. 09. Civil Appeal No. 98/86 before the District Court and as per the order dated 11. 09. 1987 of the District Court, the appeal is dismissed and it is further the case of the respondent purchaser that the Suit for protecting the ownership and possession is also dismissed for want of prosecution by the learned Civil Judge on 26. 09. 1989 and thereafter, the said order of the learned Civil Judge, is not challenged by the seller before any Higher Forum and therefore, accordingly, so far as establishing the possession of the land and for protection of the possession of the land, the seller has lost before the Civil Court and the Suit is also abandoned and now is barred. ( 14 ) IT deserves to be recorded that during the course of the hearing, the abstract of the computer record of this Court is produced by Mr. Patel together with the copy of the contempt application being Misc. Civil Application 798 of 1995 in Special Civil Application No. 5767 of 1990 preferred by the purchaser against the State Government as well as the seller and so-called purchaser/second purchaser, whose interest is sought to be represented in the second petition being Special Civil Application No. 13380 of 2006. The copy of the application shows that the contempt application is filed on the ground that inspite of the operation of the interim relief in Special Civil Application No. 5760 of 1990, the Agreement to Sale is entered into by the seller with the second purchaser in collusion with one another and in violation with the order of this Court passed in Special Civil Application No. 5767 of 1990 and therefore, this Court may initiate appropriate proceedings and punish in accordance with law. It may be recorded that the computer extract record of this Court of the aforesaid Misc. Civil Application for contempt shows that notice has been issued and is also served upon respondent No. 2, namely Maganbhai Joitram Patel, Vasibhai Haribhai Desai (Karta of H. U. F.) 2/10, Mithiben W/o. Vasibhai Haribhai 2/12, Garufbhai Vasibhai Desai 2/13, Bhanuben D/o. Vasibhai Haribhai 2/14, Kantaben D/o. Vasibhai Haribhai 2/15, Shantaben D/o. Vasibhai Haribhai 2/16, Shantaben D/o. Vasibhai Haribhai 2/17, Geetaben D/o. Vasibhai Haribhai 2/18, Jasiben W/o. Gafurbhai Vasibhai. It appears that Raghuveer Vasibhai Desai is minor and there is no reference to the Notice to that minor or service thereof in the computer record. So far as the other parties are concerned, namely Dasrathbhai Maganlal Patel and other legal heirs of Maganlal Joitaram Patel,. respondent Nos. 2/1 to 2/9, namely Kunverben wd/o Maganlal Joitaram Patel, Dasrathlal Maganlal Patel, Ratilal Maganlal Patel, Jasubhai Maganlal Patel, Jayantibhai Maganlal Patel, Rajeshbhai Ratilal Patel, Mukesh Ratilal Patel, Sardaben d/o. Maganlal Patel and Kokilaben d/o. Maganlal Joitaram as well as for resp. No. 2/11 namely Vasibhai Haribhai Desai (Karta of H. U. F.), appearance is also filed in the contempt proceedings through advocate Mr. G. A. Pandit and the computer record further shows that the said contempt petition is pending before the Division Bench of this Court. It may be recorded that the interim order came to be passed in Special Civil Application No. 5767 of 1990 was ad-interim relief against enforcement of the order, Annexure-D, which is passed by the State Government dated 20. 04. 1990 for confirming the order of the Deputy Collector under the Act and for forfeiture of the land to the State Government. ( 15 ) I have heard the learned advocates appearing for the petitioner Mr. Shelat as well as Mr. Gandhi in their respective petitions and Mr. Patel for the private respondents at length and also the learned Asst. Government Pleader. ( 16 ) IN my view, the following questions arouse for the consideration of this Court. The legality and validity of the impugned order passed by the State Government. The conduct on the part of the of the purchaser. The status or locus of the so-called purchaser/second purchaser, who allegedly purchased the property pending the litigation of Special Civil Application Nos. 5183 of 1990, 5767 of 1990 and 7011 of 1990. ( 17 ) THE consequential order. The perusal of the order passed by the State Government shows that it has proceeded on the basis that, in case of the transaction of sale with Ibrahimbhai, the post facto permission is granted and the remaining land of the entire block is sold to the purchaser by way of Registered Sale Deed. ( 17 ) THE consequential order. The perusal of the order passed by the State Government shows that it has proceeded on the basis that, in case of the transaction of sale with Ibrahimbhai, the post facto permission is granted and the remaining land of the entire block is sold to the purchaser by way of Registered Sale Deed. It is also recorded by the State Government that the transaction of sale in favour of Ibrahimbhai was approved and when there was no division of the block for sale of the remaining land, there is no breach of the provisions of the Act. Section 9 of the Act, reads as under:"9. Penalty for transfer or partition contrary to the provisions of the Act. The transfer or partition of any land contrary to the provisions of this Act shall be void. The owner of any land so transferred or partitioned shall be liabile to pay such fine not exceeding Rs. 250 as the Collector may, subject to the general orders of the [state] Government, direct. [such fine shall be recoverable as an arrear of land revenue]. Any person unauthorisedly occupying or wrongfully in possession of, any land, the transfer or partition of which, either by the act of parties or by the operation of law, is void under the provisions of this Act, may be summarily evicted by the Collector. " ( 18 ) SECTION 31, which is also relevant reads as under:"31. Restriction on alienation and sub-division of consolidated holdings.- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, no holding allotted under this Act, nor any part thereof shall be- (a) transferred, whether by way of sale (including sale in execution of a decree of a Civil Court or for recovery of arrears of land revenue or for sums recoverable as arrears of land revenue or by way of gift exchange, or lease, otherwise, except in accordance with such conditions as may be prescribed: (b) sub-divided (including sub-division by a decree or order of a Civil Court or any other competent authority) except with the permission in writing of the [collector]. [ (2) Nothing in sub-section (1)- (a) shall apply to a transfer of a holding allotted under this Act Guj. [ (2) Nothing in sub-section (1)- (a) shall apply to a transfer of a holding allotted under this Act Guj. of 1978, where the transfer is of the entire holding, not involving any sub-division thereof or to a sub-division of a holding allotted under this Act where such sub-division is made to provide for the shares of persons entitled thereto on the death of the owner, and does not create any fragment; or (b) shall be deemed ever to have applied t a transfer of a holding allotted under this Act, made after the 19th February, 1969, but before the date of the commencement of the Bombay Prevention of Fragmentation and Consolidation of Holdings, (Gujarat Amendment) Act, 1978 (hereinafter referred to as "the said date" whee such transfer was of an entire holding not involving and sub-division thereof and the transferee or his successor-in-interest was occupying or was in possession of the holdings so transferred immediately before the said date and had not been entitled from such holding before the said date in pursuance of an order of eviction passed by the Collector under sub-section (3) of section 9, and such transfer shall not be, and shall be deemed never to have been, void on the ground that it was contrary to the provisions of this section. (3) Where in respect of any holding to which clause (b) of sub-section (2) applies an order for payment of fine by the owner transferring such holding was made by the Collector under sub-section (2) of section 9, or an order for eviction was made under sub-section (3) of section 9 but such order was not given effect to such order shall be deemed to have become ineffective on the said date and the fine, if paid by the owner, shall be refunded to him. Any revision proceedings pending against any such order which becomes ineffective under this sub-section shall abate. "] ( 19 ) RULE 27 has the reference to the applicability of Section 31, which is also relevant reads as under:"27. Any revision proceedings pending against any such order which becomes ineffective under this sub-section shall abate. "] ( 19 ) RULE 27 has the reference to the applicability of Section 31, which is also relevant reads as under:"27. Application for permission for transfer of consolidated holding and the conditions for such transfer.- (1) No consolidated holding shall be transferred as provided by clause (a) of section 31 (Such transfer not being a mortgage in favour of a co-operative land mortgage bank a primary land mortgage bank or a primary co-operative society) except with the permission of the Collector after making an application to him in that behalf; (2) The transfer of a consolidated holding may be permitted by the Collector subject to the condition that the owner shall, subject to the provisions contained in the relevant tenancy law relating to restrictions on transfers of agricultural lands, and acquisition of holdings and lands, first offer it in succession and at the price fixed by the Collector to (i) the tenant of the holding or his heirs, (ii) the owner of the adjoining holding provided he cultivates it personally or to the tenant of the adjoining holding provided he cultivates it personally or to the tenant of the adjoining holdings; and (iii) such bona fide cultivators in the village as have sufficient land of their own for their maintenance: provided that notwithstanding anything contained in this sub-rule, mutual exchange of holdings allotted under the scheme, other than by sale, may, subject to the provisions contained in the relevant tenancy law relating to the restrictions on transfers of agricultural lands and acquisitions of holdings and lands, be permitted by the Collector, if the holdings are cultivated personally by the parties to the exchange. (3) Where a consolidated holding has been mortgaged in favour of a co-operative land mortgage bank, a primary land mortgage bank or a primary co-operative society, such mortgage shall be subject to the condition that the whole of the consolidated holding shall be deemed to have been mortgaged and in case of default in payment of the loan to the bank or as the case may be the society, the whole consolidated holding shall be liable to be sold for recovery of the arrears of loan. " ( 20 ) IF the aforesaid provisions are considered, it appears that Section 9 of the Act provides that the transfer or partition contrary to the provisions of the Act shall be void. Sub-section (2) of the Act provides for enabling power with the Collector to impose fine not exceeding Rs. 250/ -. Sub-section (3) of Section 9 provides the power of summary eviction by the Collector. Section 31 of the Act provides for prohibition of transfer, except, in accordance with such conditions, as may be prescribed and it also provides for sub-division, except with the permission of the Collector. Sub-section (2) of Section 31 provides that nothing in sub-section (1) shall apply where the transfer is of the entire holding, not involving any sub-division thereof or to a sub-division of holding alloted under the Act. ( 21 ) THE contention raised on behalf of the petitioner by Mr. Shelat was that since under Section 31 (1), the transfer otherwise than provided in accordance with the conditions as may be prescribed is prohibited, even in respect of the entire holding or the remaining portion thereof, the permission is required to be obtained because in his submission, Rule 27 provides in express language that no consolidated holding shall be transferred as provided by clause (a) of Section 31 of the Act except with the permission of the Collector, after making the application to him on that behalf. Therefore, it was submitted that if the permission is not obtained even for the remaining portion of the block, the transfer would be hit by the prohibitory language and the same would be void. The said contention is ex-facie misconceived inasmuch as the condition precedent for applicability of Rule 27 is to the transfer prohibited as per clause (a) of sub-section (1)of Section 31, whereas sub-section (2) of Section 31, carves out an exception to transfer of the holding allotted under the Act where the transfer is of the entire holding and not involving of any sub-division thereof. Section 31 (1) and both clauses thereof, i. e. clause (a) and (b) would apply to the cases of transfer other than the exception carved out by sub-section (2) of Section 31. Therefore, it is not possible to agree with the contention of Mr. Section 31 (1) and both clauses thereof, i. e. clause (a) and (b) would apply to the cases of transfer other than the exception carved out by sub-section (2) of Section 31. Therefore, it is not possible to agree with the contention of Mr. Shelat that even if the entire block is to be transferred or the remaining portion of the land is to be transferred, permission is required to be obtained as per Rule 27 of the Rules. In my view, sub-section (2) of Section 31 of the Act is expressly clear that if the transfer is to be made of the entire holding not involving any sub-division thereof and if the entire holding is to be transferred, neither it is hit by Section 31 (1) nor Rule 27 will have any applicability to such cases. ( 22 ) IT is true that in the present case, the entire block comprised of the land admeasuring 78,914 sq. mtrs. , however, as observed earlier, and for which there is no dispute that initially the land admeasuring 18,004 sq. mtrs. was sold by the seller to Ibrahimbhai, as per the Registered Sale Deed dated 10. 04. 1980, and for the transfer of such Sale Deed, post facto permission came to be granted by the Deputy Collector in the year 1996 and the decision of such post facto permission under the Act is not only upheld by the State Government under revisional jurisdiction but, is upheld by the Single Bench of this Court as well as the Division Bench of this Court as referred to hereianbove and therefore, once the permission is granted on 10. 04. 1980 for the transfer of the land admeasuring 18,004 sq. mtrs. , comprising of a portion of the land of the whole block, the remaining block resulting thereto, is of the land admeasuring 60,910 sq. mtrs. , with the seller after the transfer to Ibrahimbhai and in any case, on the date when the transfer was made by the seller to the purchaser as per Registered Sale Deed dated 06. 07. 1981. mtrs. , with the seller after the transfer to Ibrahimbhai and in any case, on the date when the transfer was made by the seller to the purchaser as per Registered Sale Deed dated 06. 07. 1981. Therefore, when the remaining land of the block as a whole was transferred to the purchaser by the seller by Registered Sale Deed, it was not a case of resulting into a situation of sub-division of the block or a division of the block and such cases would be covered by sub-section (2) of Section 31 and not under sub-section (1) of Section 31. Therefore, it is not possible to accept the contention raised by Mr. Shelat that any error is committed on the face of the record by the State Government while exercising the revisional jurisdiction. It is hardly required to be stated that the scope of judicial scrutiny by this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution is even otherwise also restricted to the errors committed on the face of it, which may result into a jurisdictional error or the exercise of the discretion is so perverse, which may warrant the interference. Even if two views are possible, it is not an error of jurisdiction and if the discretion is properly exercised, and there is no perversity in exercising the discretion, normally, this Court would not interfere with the orders of the revisional authority in exercise of powers under Article 227 of the Constitution. ( 23 ) THE learned counsel appearing for the petitioners have not addressed the Court on the aspects of challenge to the impugned order passed by the State Government, so far as it relates to grant of permission for Non Agricultural use is concerned. The only grievance raised was that, if the sale was void, no title would stand transferred to the purchaser and consequently the purchaser would not be entitled to seek permission for use of the land for Non Agricultural purpose. As such, the said contention shall stand covered by the observations and conclusion of this Court on the aspects that whether the sale is void or is not declared void in view of the order of the State Government allowing the revision. As such, the said contention shall stand covered by the observations and conclusion of this Court on the aspects that whether the sale is void or is not declared void in view of the order of the State Government allowing the revision. It is further observed that after the sale transaction in favour of the purchaser, the entry is mutated in the revenue record, the possession was handed over and thereafter, the land is converted for Non Agricultural purpose and over the said land, room, pillar, road etc. are constructed and therefore, the State Government has also recorded that even if the purchaser was to be evicted from the land, summary procedure was required to be followed, which has not been followed. It is observed by the State Government that the panchnama which is produced is having no importance/existence in the eye of law and thereafter, ultimately, the State Government has withdrawn the notice for Suo Motu exercise of the power under Section 211 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code (hereinafter referred to as the code ) issued against the order of the Taluka Development Officer, granting permission for Non Agricultural use. Even otherwise also, to that extent, so far as the matter relates to withdrawal of the notice for Suo Motu exercise of power of revision against the order dated 03. 08. 1982, passed by the Taluka Development Officer for Non Agricultural use, it cannot be said that any jurisdictional error is committed by the State Government while passing the impugned order nor can it be said that the exercise of discretion is so perverse, which deserve to be interfered with by this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. ( 24 ) THEREFORE, if the merit of the case is examined on the question of law as sought to be canvassed on behalf of the petitioner, it cannot be said that the State Government has committed any error of jurisdiction nor can it b said that the exercise of the discretion by the State Government on the basis of the aforesaid legal position is so perverse, which deserves interfered with by this Court in exercise of powers under Article 227 of the Constitution. ( 25 ) MUCH grievance is raised by the so-called purchaser/second purchaser for contending that no opportunity of hearing has been given by the State Government before exercising of the power under revisional jurisdiction and it was further contended that it did come on record before the State Government that the second Sale Deed is executed and the land is allegedly transferred to the alleged purchaser/second purchaser and inspite of the same, no opportunity of hearing is given and therefore, the order is in breach of principles of natural justice and hence, the order of the State Government deserves to be quashed by this Court at the instance of the so-called purchaser/second purchaser. ( 26 ) THE aforesaid contention raised by Mr. Gandhi, prima facie is attractive, but on close scrutiny, holds no water. Even in the matter of observance of principles of natural justice, so far as the exercise of the power of this Court in a petition under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution, the law has developed further to the extent that unless the prejudice is demonstrated to the satisfaction of the Court, this Court may decline to interfere with the orders passed by the lower authority, even if it is passed by not hearing the persons complaining the breach of principles of natural justice. The reference may be made to that to the decision of this Court in case of Hindu Finstock Ltd. Vs. Securities and Exchange Board of India reported at 2002 (3) GLR 2565 , where the view taken by the Court as observed at para 11 and 13 based on the decision of the Apex Court in case of Aligarh Muslim University Vs. Mansoor Ali Khan reported at AIR 2000 SC 2783 , is that unless the prejudice is satisfactorily demonstrated before this Court, the Court may decline to exercise the power and decline to interfere with the orders passed by the lower authority. ( 27 ) IF the matter is examined in light of the aforesaid legal position, it appears that as observed earlier, seller preferred Special Civil Application No. 5183 of 1990 before this Court for challenging the order of the State Government dated 24. 04. 1990, so far as it related to the confiscation of the land to the State Government. ( 27 ) IF the matter is examined in light of the aforesaid legal position, it appears that as observed earlier, seller preferred Special Civil Application No. 5183 of 1990 before this Court for challenging the order of the State Government dated 24. 04. 1990, so far as it related to the confiscation of the land to the State Government. The record of the said memo of the Special Civil Application shows that there is no statement whatsoever made for the so-called entrustment of the possession of the land by Talati-cum-Mantri to the seller nor there is any statement made by the petitioner/seller that the possession of the land pending the proceedings before the Deputy Collector and/or before the State Government is transferred or is of the seller/petitioner therein. As it is the land which was ordered to be confiscated to the State Government by the order of the State Government, which was challenged by the seller/petitioner in the said petition. It is true that this Court in the said petition on 18. 07. 1990, admitted the petition and granted ad-interim stay against the resumption of the land to the Government under Section 9 (3) of the Act and therefore, the legal position at the most can be said as suspending the order of the State Government for forfeiture of the land which was challenged by the seller in the said petition, but thereby, the effect of the order is not totally abolished but is rather, stayed and suspended. The seller who was petitioner of Special Civil Application No. 5183 of 1990 was aware about the pendency of the said petition. Further another two Special Civil Applications i. e. Special Civil Application No. 5183 of 1990, preferred by the purchaser against the order of the State Government confirming the order of the Deputy Collector under the Act and further confiscation of the land and Special Civil Application No. 7011 of 1990, preferred by the purchaser against the order of the State Government cancelling the non-agricultural use permission granted by the Taluka Development Officer were pending. It cannot be disputed that the seller was not aware about the interim orders passed by this Court in Special Civil Application No. 5183 of 1990 as well as Special Civil Application No. 5767 of 1990 since Special Civil Application No. 5183 of 1990 was preferred by the seller themselves and Special Civil Application No. 5767 of 1990 was party to the proceedings as respondent Nos. 2/1 to 2/5. Even in the Special civil Application No. 7011 of 1990, which was preferred against the order in connection with the non-agricultural use is concerned, as observed earlier, on 19. 09. 1990. this Court had ordered for maintenance of the status quo as on that day. It is true that in Special Civil Application No. 7011 of 1990, the seller was not impleaded as party, however, when all the Special Civil Applications were heard together by this Court on 25. 04. 2000, at that stage also, the seller who was petitioner of Special Civil Application No. 5183 of 1990 had chosen not to disclose the factum regarding the alleged possession or the alleged registered Agreement to Sale, or alleged Sale Deed with second purchaser. ( 28 ) NO parties to the proceedings can be allowed to overreach the judicial process by his own conduct either independently or in collusion with any third party. No any party to the proceedings can be allowed to frustrate the proceedings of this Court by one-sided action without any express permission of the Court or without making full disclosure to the Court at the time when the matter is heard by the Court on 25. 04. 2000, when the petitioners of Special Civil Application No. 5183 of 1990 invoked the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. It was required for such petitioners to see that no situation is created by them, which results into frustrating the rights of the parties, more particularly, when not only the jurisdiction was invoked, but the benefit of the interim order was also being enjoyed by the petitioners therein/seller. It was required for such petitioners to see that no situation is created by them, which results into frustrating the rights of the parties, more particularly, when not only the jurisdiction was invoked, but the benefit of the interim order was also being enjoyed by the petitioners therein/seller. As such, with a view to see that the rights of the parties to the proceedings are not allowed to frustrate and the Court is in a position to give an effective relief, the principles of lis pendence have role to play and such principles are not only statutorily recognised as per the provisions of Transfer of Properties Act, but the same is also in furtherance to full and complete justice to the parties at the end results. The reference may be made to the decision of the Apex Court in case of Surjit Singh and ors. etc. etc. Vs. Harbans Singh and Ors. reported at AIR 1996 SC 135 , wherein, the Apex Court while considering th question of the effect of the transfer taking place in defiance to the restraint order and the status of the assignee for being impleaded as party on the basis of such assignment, observed inter alia at para 4 as under:"it is per se property, for it relates to the immovable property involved in the suit. It clearly and squarely fell within the ambit of the restraint order. In sum, it did not make any appreciable difference whether property per se had been alienated or a decree pertaining to that property. In defiance of the restraint order, the alienation/assignment was made. If we were to let it go as such, it would defeat the ends of justice and the prevalent public policy. When the Court intends a particular state of affairs to exist while it is in seisin of a lis, that state of affairs is not only required to be maintained, but it is presumed to exist till the Court orders otherwise. The Court in these circumstances has the duty, as also the right, to treat the alienation/assignment as having not taken place at all for its purposes" ( 29 ) ULTIMATELY it was observed by the Apex Court that as subsequently, assignee is not required to be impleaded as the party to the proceedings. The Court in these circumstances has the duty, as also the right, to treat the alienation/assignment as having not taken place at all for its purposes" ( 29 ) ULTIMATELY it was observed by the Apex Court that as subsequently, assignee is not required to be impleaded as the party to the proceedings. ( 30 ) IT is true that in the present case, there was no expressed prohibitory order against the transfer by the seller. However in Special Civil Application No. 7011 of 1990, which was against the order of the State Government for cancellation of non-agricultural permission granted by the Taluka Development Officer, this Court had directed the parties to maintain status quo as on that day. Further, in Special Civil Application No. 5183 of 1990, which was preferred by the seller at the instance of the seller, the Court by interim order suspended the resumption of the land by the Government which otherwise was forfeited to the Government. The petitioner/seller was conscious and fully aware that the land is forfeited to the Government and he has challenged the order by preferring Special Civil Application No. 5183 of 1990 and the Court has granted protection to them against resumption of the land by the Government and therefore, it would have expected for the petitioner in any case, not to create a situation, which may result into frustrating the rights of the Government in the event, the petitioner fails in the petition or in alternative, the petitioner could not transferred better title than they were holding and the outcome, if any, of the litigation was even otherwise also to bind the second purchaser on the principles of lis pendens. The reference may be made to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of M/s. Shree Chamundi Mopeds Ltd. V. Churh of South India Trust Association, Madras reported at AIR 1992 SC 1439 . The further important circumstance is that, based on the interim order passed in the petition preferred by the purchaser, being Special Civil Application No. 5767 of 1990, vide order dated 09. 08. The further important circumstance is that, based on the interim order passed in the petition preferred by the purchaser, being Special Civil Application No. 5767 of 1990, vide order dated 09. 08. 1990, the contempt application was preferred being MCACP No. 798 of 1995 in Special Civil Application No. 5767 of 1990 and the Division Bench of this Court even when considered the matter for entering of the Agreement to Sale for the land in question, found prima facie case for initiation of the proceedings of contempt not only against the purchaser but also against the so-called persons, who agreed to purchase the land who are second purchasers in the present case and those persons, i. e. the seller as well as the second purchasers were served with the notice for initiation of contempt proceedings by this Court and they have appeared through the advocate. Therefore, it can be said that they were and are fully aware about the contempt proceedings and those proceedings are uptil now, not terminated and are pending. ( 31 ) EVEN otherwise also, apart from the aforesaid, in view of the principles of lis pendens, any decision of the Court is to bind the subsequent transferee, pending the litigation as per the provisions of Section 52 of the Transfer of Properties Act. Therefore, as such, there is no independent cause to be agitated by the transferee pending the litigation and any transfer entered into pending the litigation cannot be allowed to create a situation for adversely affecting the rights of either parties to the proceedings for the main dispute, which is subject matter of the petition. The reference may be made to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Sarvinder Singh V. Dalip Singh and Ors. reported at (1996) 5 SCC 539 in which the observations made by the Apex Court, more particularly at para 6 is reproduced as under :"during the pendency in any court having authority within the limits of India. . . reported at (1996) 5 SCC 539 in which the observations made by the Apex Court, more particularly at para 6 is reproduced as under :"during the pendency in any court having authority within the limits of India. . . of any suit or proceeding which is not collusive and in which any right to immovable property is directly and specifically in question, the property cannot be transferred or otherwise dealt with by any party to the suit or proceeding so as to affect the rights of any other party thereto under the decree or order which may be made therein, except under the authority of the court and on such terms as it may impose. " ( 32 ) REFERENCE may be made to another decision of the Apex Court in the case of Dhurandhar Prasad Singh V. Jai Prakash University and Ors, reported at AIR 2001 SC 2553. At para 7, it was inter alia observed that :"if a party does not ask for leave, he takes the obvious risk that the suit may not be properly conducted by the plaintiff on record, and yet, he will be bound by the result of the litigation even though he is not represented at the hearing unless it is shown that the litigation was not properly conducted by the original party or he colluded with the the adversary. " ( 33 ) THE aforesaid both the decisions once again came to be considered by the Apex Court in case of Bibi Zubeida Khatooo V. Nabi Hassan Saheb and Anr. reported at AIR 2004 SC 173 in a matter of transferee purchasing the property during the pendency of the suit without leave of the Court and the rejection of the application for being impleaded as party. The Apex Court found that though in normal circumstances, the transferee is allowed to be joined as party to protect his interest, but as the Trial Court had assigned cogent reasons for rejecting such joinder on the observations that the suit is old and prima facie, the action of alienation does not appear to be bonafide, the order of the Trial Court not allowing the party to be impleaded and non-interference thereof by the High Court was justified. ( 34 ) THEREFORE, in view of the aforesaid position, as such when the second purchaser was aware about the litigation being initiated by the purchaser, in view of the notice for initiation of the contempt proceedings before this Court having been served, it is not possible to agree with the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner by Mr. Gandhi that the second purchaser were not at all aware about the proceedings of the litigation through out and they acted upon the revenue record showing the names of the seller as the owner of the land. Such statement made in the memo of the petition are falsified by the record of this Court, more particularly, of the contempt proceedings and it can rather be said that such petitioners who are second purchasers have suppressed the aforesaid material fact. It can be said that both, the seller as well as the second purchaser, have suppressed the aforesaid material fact before this Court in the petitions. ( 35 ) IN any event, when the sellers were fully aware about the litigation and the second purchasers, as observed earlier were aware about the litigation of Special Civil Application No. 5767 of 1990, no attempts have been mad by the second purchasers to get themselves impleaded as parties in the proceedings of Special Civil Application No. 5767 of 1990, nor the said factum is, as observed earlier, stated by the petitioner/seller in Special Civil Application No. 5183 of 1990, at the time, when this Court finally heard the matter on 25. 04. 2000. It appears that the seller had an audacity to suppress the aforesaid factum of so-called execution of second Sale Deed to the second purchaser and the so-called purchaser, inspite of the contempt proceedings having been served, acted as a silent spectator to the litigation and allowed the order to be passed. Therefore, under these circumstances, it is not possible to accept the contention of Mr. Gandhi on behalf of the second purchaser that any orders passed by this Court or the orders passed by the State Government thereafter, could not have been passed without hearing the second purchaser or cannot be said as binding to the second purchaser. In any event, the Judgment dated 25. 04. Gandhi on behalf of the second purchaser that any orders passed by this Court or the orders passed by the State Government thereafter, could not have been passed without hearing the second purchaser or cannot be said as binding to the second purchaser. In any event, the Judgment dated 25. 04. 2000 is binding to the seller who was party to the proceedings as well as to the second purchasers who were consciously aware about the pendency of the aforesaid litigation before this Court. ( 36 ) CONCERNING to the merits of the order passed by the State Government, which is impugned in these petitions, as observed earlier, it cannot be said that there is a case for interference by this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. The second purchaser initially did not challenge the order of the State Government, simultaneously or even thereafter for some period, though as observed earlier, the seller as well as the second purchaser were fully aware about the proceedings and the litigation. It is only at the time when the petitions of the seller were listed for final hearing, the another petition after a period of about more than 5 years being Special Civil Application No. 13380 of 2006 is preferred by the second purchaser challenging the very order of the Government. As observed earlier, on merits, it is found by this Court that when there was transfer of remaining portion of the block, it cannot be said that any permission was required of the competent authority under the Act and therefore, the transfer is not hit by the provisions of the Act and the Government has rightly allowed the revision. Mr. Gandhi, learned counsel appearing for the second purchaser, during the course of hearing, has adopted the arguments raised on behalf of the seller by Mr. Shelat, learned counsel, for challenging the order of the State Government on merits. Mr. Gandhi, learned counsel appearing for the second purchaser, during the course of hearing, has adopted the arguments raised on behalf of the seller by Mr. Shelat, learned counsel, for challenging the order of the State Government on merits. Therefore, this Court, as per the reasons recorded hereinabove, has not accepted the contention raised on behalf of the seller for upsetting the order of the State Government exercising the revisional power for so-called breach of the provisions of the Act and therefore, it cannot be said that any prejudice is caused on merits to the second purchaser by the impugned order of the State Government even if the contention of the second purchaser is considered and examined on merits for assailing of the order of the State Government in revisional jurisdiction. ( 37 ) IT deserves to be recorded that the case of the seller is that, even for the remaining land of the block, the permission is required to be obtained of the competent authority under the Act for transfer to any person by the holder of the block. Even for transfer by the seller to the second purchaser, no permission is obtained of the competent authority, either by the seller or by the second purchaser, nor such is even pleaded in the petition. The case of the second purchaser is that as the second purchaser as well as the seller both are agriculturist, and as the seller and the second purchaser were cultivating the land, the transfer is effected. Under the provisions of the Act, the transfer was not set aside by the Deputy Collector who was the first authority on the ground that the purchaser of the land is not an agriculturist. Further, such alleged breach would be outside the scope of the present Act and would relate to the provisions of Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act. Therefore, if the permission is not obtained under the Act, and if the contention of the seller as well as the purchaser on merits for assailing the order of the State Government is to be accepted, the consequence would be that the sale effected in favour of second purchaser by the seller would also be hit by the provisions of the Act. Of course, the said contention is not accepted by the Court for the reasons stated hereinabove, but it can rather be said that the petitioners of both the petitions, i. e. seller and the second purchaser on the one hand are complaining the breach of the statutory provisions of the Act and on the other hand themselves have not followed the provisions of the Act, which is required to be followed as per their contention so far as the law relates to the transaction in favour of the second purchaser. The aforesaid can be said as not only abrogating and reprobating at the same time but shows no bonafide conduct on the part of both the petitioners. i. e. the seller and the second purchaser. ( 38 ) AS observed earlier, if the order of the State Government in revisional jurisdiction so far as it relates to the exercise of the power under the Act is not upset or is found legal and valid by this Court, the transaction of transfer of property in favour of the purchaser would be legal and valid. There is no challenge by the seller or by the second purchaser before any Civil Court for the declaration to set aside such Sale Deed executed in favour of the purchaser, more particularly, after the abandonment of the right by dismissal of the Civil Suit No. 6/86 in the Court of the Civil Judge, Sanand, for want of prosecution on 26. 09. 1989. Therefore, once the rights of the seller of the property/land in question having duly conveyed by the Sale Deed dated 06. 07. 1981 in favour of the purchaser, the seller ceases to have any interest whatsoever in the land admeasuring 60910 sq. mtrs. and consequently, the second sale in favour of the second purchaser by the seller even otherwise also as per the law would result into a sale executed by the persons having no title or right over the property and consequently, the second purchaser would get no lawful right over the property by the alleged second Sale Deed. The aforesaid is coupled with the circumstance that the sale is pending the litigation in favour of the second purchaser and with conscious knowledge of the litigation as observed earlier by the seller as well as by the second purchaser. The aforesaid is coupled with the circumstance that the sale is pending the litigation in favour of the second purchaser and with conscious knowledge of the litigation as observed earlier by the seller as well as by the second purchaser. Therefore, when the second purchaser has acquired no lawful interest over the property by the alleged Sale Deed, it cannot be said that there was any lawful right of the second purchaser in the property in question and consequently, if the second purchaser is not heard, there is no breach of the principles of natural justice by not giving hearing to the lawfully affected parties. ( 39 ) IN view of the above, as on merits, this Court has not accepted the contention for assailing the order of the State Government and as the second purchaser has not lawfully acquired any right or interest whatsoever in the property, it cannot be said that any prejudice caused is demonstrated before this Court, which can be said as a valid ground to interfere with the order of the State Government on the alleged complaint of the breach of principles of natural justice. Therefore, in view of the aforesaid, the contention raised on behalf of the second purchaser by Mr. Gandhi that the impugned order of the State Government be quashed and set aside on the ground of breach of principles of natural justice, is not accepted and hereby rejected. ( 40 ) THE aforesaid takes me to examine the conduct and bonafide on the part of the petitioners who have approached to this Court invoking the powers of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. There is no dispute on the point that the petitioner/seller executed the Sale Deed in favour of the purchaser of having received the consideration as mentioned in the Sale Deed and the Sale Deed came to be executed as back as in the year 1981. Therefore, the seller/petitioner are the persons who have pocketed the consideration and have transferred the land by executing the Sale Deed with open eyes. Therefore, the seller/petitioner are the persons who have pocketed the consideration and have transferred the land by executing the Sale Deed with open eyes. More or less, similar question arose before this Court in case of Prahladbhai Monahbhai Patel V. Vithalbhai Mohanbhai Patel in Special Civil Application No. 4647 of 2005, when the seller of the land approached this Court challenging the order of the State Government of certifying the entry and validating the transaction of sale as no fragment as per the provisions of the Act. This Court in its decision dated 18. 03. 2005 in the said matter, observed inter alia as under :"#. Having considered the above, it appears that it is an admitted position that the father of the petitioner, by accepting consideration, has executed sale deed in favour of the respondent no. 1. Therefore, father of the petitioner, whose interest is being represented by the petitioner, is a party to the transaction, which is found to be in breach of the statutory provisions by the Prant Officer. The State Government, in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction has found that the action is taken after unreasonable delay, inasmuch as the transaction is of 1963 and even if it is considered that the action was taken immediately after entry was mutated in the revenue record, then also, the effect of the delay cannot be said as wiped out. In any case, the State has not preferred petition before this Court and the petitioner s father who was party to the transaction, as such, cannot be said to be aggrieved by the decision of the State Government. So will be the case, in the event, the petitioners are representing the interest as legal heirs of the party to the transaction. One who is a beneficiary of the transaction, once having taken benefit, cannot be allowed to contend that the transaction is illegal or is in contravention to statutory provision and, therefore, even though he has enjoyed the benefit of transaction, the property, which is already sold, should be given back to him or should be taken away by the statutory authority. (Emphasis supplied At this stage, it would be worthwhile to refer to certain observations of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Patel Ratilal Maganbhai and others Vs. State of Gujarat, 2003 (1) GLR 562 . (Emphasis supplied At this stage, it would be worthwhile to refer to certain observations of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Patel Ratilal Maganbhai and others Vs. State of Gujarat, 2003 (1) GLR 562 . This Court had, in the said decision, while considering the challenge made by one of the parties to the transaction of sale against the decision of the authority, observed inter alia at para-13 as under:-". . . Seller of the transaction in case of voluntary sale is required to file a suit before the appropriate court for declaration that the sale is void, even if he is seeking a declaration that the transaction of sale is void on account of non-availability of permission of the competent authority. Since it is a question of voluntary sale, seeking declaration of such voluntary sale as void at the instance of the seller of the land, taking into consideration the decision of the Full Bench in the case of Jadav Prabhatbhai Jethabhai, 2001 (1) GLR 16 , such seller much approach the Court within the period of limitation for declaration that the sale is invalid or void and the period of limitation as provided under law is of three years from the date of such sale. "" ( 41 ) ULTIMATELY, it was found by this Court that the petitioner cannot be allowed to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court and it was further observed that as there is no prejudice caused to the petitioner on account of the order passed by the State Government, which was under challenge, no useful purpose would be served in considering the issue as to whether the advocate who represented the case was given intimation or not. ( 42 ) IT deserves to be recorded that the present petitioners/seller themselves were parties to the proceedings to the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in case of Patel Ratilal Maganbhai (Supra ). The observations thereof are extracted hereinabove by this Court in the Special Civil Application No. 4647 of 2005 in the case of Prahladbhai Monahbhai Patel (Supra ). As such, as recorded hereinabove, in the earlier paragraph, the matter was pertaining to the transaction of sale entered into by the seller who is petitioner herein in favour of Ibrahimbhai. The observations thereof are extracted hereinabove by this Court in the Special Civil Application No. 4647 of 2005 in the case of Prahladbhai Monahbhai Patel (Supra ). As such, as recorded hereinabove, in the earlier paragraph, the matter was pertaining to the transaction of sale entered into by the seller who is petitioner herein in favour of Ibrahimbhai. As such, for the remedy available to a seller who is party to the transaction, which is allegedly in breach of the provisions of the Act, the observations of Division Bench as abstracted from para 13, 18 and 19 inter alia were as under :". . . Seller of the transaction in case of voluntary sale is required to file a suit before the appropriate court for declaration that the sale is void, even if he is seeking a declaration that the transaction of sale is void on account of non-availability of permission of the competent authority. Since it is a question of voluntary sale, seeking declaration of such voluntary sale as void at the instance of the seller of the land, taking into consideration the decision of the Full Bench in the case of Jadav Prabhatbhai Jethabhai, 2001 (1) GLR 16 , such seller much approach the Court within the period of limitation for declaration that the sale is invalid or void and the period of limitation as provided under law is of three years from the date of such sale. " ( 43 ) IT was also observed at the same para, relevant portion of which is as under:-"in case, where permission to sell is required to be obtained of any competent authority, it is obligatory on the part of the seller to disclose to the purchaser that the permission of the competent authority is required to be obtained and thereafter, sale should be effected. When such informations are withheld by the seller from the purchase and subsequently on account of non-availability of permission, the sale is declared or void and the purchaser is visited with the consequences of depriving the property or otherwise, the purchaser can legitimately sue seller for recovery of the damages permissible under law. When such informations are withheld by the seller from the purchase and subsequently on account of non-availability of permission, the sale is declared or void and the purchaser is visited with the consequences of depriving the property or otherwise, the purchaser can legitimately sue seller for recovery of the damages permissible under law. Therefore, in such circumstances, when any voluntary sale is required to be declared void, on account of breach of any of the provisions of law, the Court will have to examine as to whether seller had disclosed all the material facts before the purchaser regarding requirement of obtaining permission of the competent authority or not. " ( 44 ) IN the very decision, at para-18, it was observed, inter alia, as under:-"but this shows the conduct of the appellants who are trying to invoke extraordinary equitable jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is well settled principle of law that the powers under Article 226 of the Constitution are discretionary and if this Court finds that the equitable considerations are against the person who tries to invoke the jurisdiction, the Court may decline to entertain the petition because the powers vested are not to encourage wrong actions, who themselves are party to the litigation. " ( 45 ) FURTHER, at para-19, it was, inter alia, observed as under:-"a Court of equity when exercising its equitable jurisdiction under Art. 226 must so act as to prevent perpetration of a legal fraud and the Courts are obliged to do justice by promotion of good faith, as far as it lies within their power. Equity is always known to defend the law from crafty evasions and new subtleties invented to evade law. " ( 46 ) THIS Court in its decision in case of Prahladbhai (Supra) further observed thus :"in the present case also, the facts are more or less common and, therefore, in view of the decision of the Division Bench of this Court, it cannot be said that the order passed by the State Government deserves to be interfered with at the instance of the petitioners. #. Mr. #. Mr. Jani, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner made an attempt to submit that in the said matter before the Division Bench, initiation of the first proceeding before the authority was at the instance of the person who was party to the transaction of the sale, whereas in the present case, authority suo motu initiated proceedings and, therefore, he submitted that the said decision may not be made applicable to the facts of the present case. I am afraid such a contention can be accepted from the mouth of the person who is a party to the transaction of sale and who has pocketed the consideration and thereafter, has approached to this Court for invoking the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution on the ground that the transaction was invalid. No such distinction as sought to be canvassed by Mr. Jani would make out settled principle of law for the purpose of exercising discretionary and equitable jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. In any event, statutory period of limitation for declaring the sale as void at the instance of the petitioner is over in view of the decision of the Division Bench of this Court and further, when the petitioner has received consideration and has enjoyed the benefit thereto of the transaction, it cannot be said that the petitioner is prejudiced by the order passed by the State Government in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction whereby the proceedings for cancellation of the sale are set aside. " ( 47 ) MR. Shelat, learned counsel appearing for the seller/purchaser attempted to distinguish the judgment of the Division Bench of this Hon ble Court by contending inter alia that in the present case, the action is taken by the authority immediately and not at a belated stage of 16 years as it was in case of the sale transaction with Ibrahimbhai. He further submitted that in case of sale with Ibrahimbhai, the competent authority itself had withdrawn the notice by granting post facto permission and the possession was found to have been given in case of Ibrahimbhai prior to the consolidation of the block and further submitted that the additional distinguishing feature in the present case is that the transaction is declared void by the authority under the Act on 23. 09. 09. 1986 and the possession is also restored to the seller and therefore, it was submitted by Mr. Shelat that the issue cannot be said as concluded as it was in case of Ibrahimbhai nor the observations made by the Division Bench of this Hon ble Court qua the invoking of the power by the seller under Article 226 or the observations for filing of the Suit would apply in the present case. ( 48 ) MR. Shelat additionally submitted that in view of the subsequent decision of the Apex Court in case of Madhegowda Vs. Ankegowda and Ors. reported at 2002 (1) SCC 178 , when the alienation is per se invalid and void ab initio, no suit is required to be filed and therefore, he submitted that the decision of the full bench of this Court, which has been relied upon by the Division Bench in case of Patel Ratilal (Supra) is no more a good law nor the principles laid down based on the said decision of the full bench would apply to the facts of the present case. ( 49 ) MR. Shelat, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner relied upon the various decisions of this Court as well as of the Apex Court for contending that if the transaction is per se void, no suit is required to be filed and if it is a nullity in the eye of law and therefore, when the transaction is a nullity in the eye of law, there is no question of applicability of the principles of the Limitation Act, nor such declaration is required for the transaction as null or void. ( 50 ) EVEN if the contention of Mr. Shelat is accepted for the sake of consideration that in view of the subsequent decision of the Hon ble Apex Court in case of Madhegowda (Supra) that when the agreement is void qua the alienation of the minor s property by de facto manager/guardian, no limitation period would be applicable, then also this Court is not required to examine the voidity of the transaction entered into by de facto guardian on behalf of the minor, but is required to examine the voidity of the transaction of the sale entered by the seller, who was major with full consciousness. The position of the minor and the transaction entered into by the de facto guardian on behalf of the minor cannot be equated with the transaction entered into by major person for disposal of the property. It may be that if for minor, the limitation is applicable in view of the full bench decision of this Court in case of Jadav Prabhatbhai Jethabhai (Supra), for which subsequently, as observed by the Apex Court in case of Madhegowda (Supra), the limitation may not be applicable but, even if such aspects of requirement of filing Suit by the minor is excluded, then also the question of requirement of filing of Suit within the period of limitation would remain so far as it relates to the transaction entered into by a person competent to enter contract and not only competent, but a person who with full consciousness, entered into contract, enjoyed benefit, pocketed the consideration and slept over the so-called right concerning to alleged illegal transaction for indefinite period. As recorded earlier, Civil Suit being being Regular Civil Suit No. 6/86 was filed by the seller against the purchaser for the permanent injunction against the purchaser on the basis that the land is of absolute ownership and possession of the seller. The said Suit is dismissed on 26. 09. 1989, and therefore, the seller plaintiff has abandoned the right, if any, including that of ownership over the land by not pursuing the proceedings of the suit thereafter. Therefore, when the transaction is entered into by the seller, who was competent to contract and when the suit was also filed for asserting the right of ownership and of possession, and the said suit is dismissed for want of prosecution and subsequent suit therefore would stand barred as per the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, it is not possible to accept the contention of Mr. Shelat that it was not required for the seller to file Civil Suit within the period of limitation for the relief inter alia that the transaction is void or that there was a mistake of law when the transaction was entered into. Therefore, it is not possible to accept the contention of Mr. Shelat that it was not required for the seller to file Civil Suit within the period of limitation for the relief inter alia that the transaction is void or that there was a mistake of law when the transaction was entered into. Therefore, it is not possible to accept the contention of Mr. Shelat that the subsequent observations made by the Division Bench of this Court in case of Patel Ratilal Maganbhai (Supra) at paragraph 13, would not apply to the facts of the present case, nor it is possible to accept the contention of Mr. Shelat that even for the relief of declaration that the sale is illegal or void, the Suit is not required to be filed within the period of limitation by such seller. ( 51 ) THERE is one additional aspect, which deserves to be required to be considered and the same is that the question of requirement to file the suit would arise only if the transaction is held as void ab initio by any authority or Court. The State Government has in the impugned order found that the transaction is not illegal and the revision is allowed, so is the conclusion of this Court as recorded hereinabove, for the validity of the transaction to the extent that the transaction is not hit by the provisions of the Act. Therefore, if the transaction is not a void transaction, even as declared by the State Government and this Court has also not found the transaction as void, the other decisions relied upon by Mr. Shelat to show the effect, if the transaction is a void transaction, are of no relevance for the present case. ( 52 ) IN my view, even if the transaction is as per the seller, void due to any statutory provision or otherwise, once a seller with full consciousness has entered into the transaction and has enjoyed the benefit of such transaction by having received the consideration and having parted with the possession of the land in question, such seller cannot be allowed to contend that the transaction is illegal or void due to any statutory provisions and therefore, even though he has enjoyed the benefit of the transaction, the property, which is already sold, should be given back to him by intervention of the Court of justice including this Court exercising power under Article 227 of the Constitution. It hardly requires to be stated that the power of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution is equitable discretionary jurisdiction and if the conduct of the present petitioner who approaches before the Court is found by this Court as not bonafide or if this Court finds that here is a litigant, who is invoking the jurisdiction of this Court with any oblique motive or against the settled principles of equity, justice and good conscience, even if the illegality is demonstrated, the Court may not permit such litigant to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution or the Court may decline the relief to such litigant. It may be stated that the Courts are not only to uphold the law but to render justice to the parties to the proceedings. Law may be a basis, but justice is the end result. Therefore, to embody such outcome of the end results of rendering justice, if any scrupulous litigation is allowed to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution, it would not only be against the settled principles of equity, justice and good conscience, but would also defeat the real ends of justice for which there is existence of Courts in the society. Therefore, in my view, when the seller himself in the present case has enjoyed the benefit of the transaction and having pocketed the consideration, now he should not be allowed to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution and since the petitioner is at the final hearing stage, no writ can be entrusted to such seller, who have preferred the petition with no bonafide purpose at all but, to explore undue benefit of the alleged transaction, which as per the seller is illegal, though the seller themselves are party to such transaction. ( 53 ) MR Shelat, learned counsel on behalf of the petitioner/seller made a lame excuse by contending that the petitioners have stated in the petition that they are ready to return the consideration on any terms, which may be so ordered by this Court and in the submission of Mr. Shelat, the said averment made in the petition shows bonafide on the part of the petitioner/seller. Shelat, the said averment made in the petition shows bonafide on the part of the petitioner/seller. ( 54 ) I am afraid afraid, such a plea can be accepted from the mouth of a seller of a immovable property, who entered into the transaction and received consideration and parted with the property as back as in the year 1981, i. e. about 25 years time has passed after the transaction. Such plea is never raised earlier before any forum, neither before the Assistant Collector nor before the State Government in earlier litigations. Further, the question may also arise to be examined as to whether seller disclosed a material facts before the purchaser regarding requirement of obtaining permission of the competent authority or not or whether the purchaser purchased the property inspite of such disclosure or not" As observed by the Division Bench of this Court in case of Patel Ratilal Maganbhai (Supra), if the purchaser establishes that the seller of the property has withheld the said information from the purchaser and the seller has made the purchaser to believe that on account of the sale transaction, the rights and title of the seller are fully conveyed and he would become absolute owner of the property, the Court may decline the relief to the seller. Further, even in the matter of restoration of the possession, the Court may be required to examine not only to repay of the sale consideration, but also the compensation which would include the difference of the valuation, the development over the land, etc. As such, in view of the aforesaid judgment of the Division Bench, it was required for the petitioner seller to file the Civil Suit which in any case is barred by the Code of Civil Procedure and Limitation Act. Further, such plea is not raised at any earlier point of time, nor there is sufficient material available on record to accept such plea and it appears that the same is made with a view to attract undue sympathy of the Court without there being genuine intention for such purpose. Had the seller interested to refund the money, he could hat done so long back when the proceedings were initiated for the first time for declaring the transaction as void and even thereafter. Had the seller interested to refund the money, he could hat done so long back when the proceedings were initiated for the first time for declaring the transaction as void and even thereafter. Therefore, it appears that such plea is not only lacking bonafide, but is just an eyewash and to support the contention that the transaction is void for invoking discretionary equitable jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. ( 55 ) MUCH grievance is raised on the ground that the possession is transferred in favour of the seller by the Talati-cum-Mantri and thereafter, the seller has transferred the land in question in favour of the second purchaser and therefore, they are justified in pursuing the litigation for asserting their right in the property and therefore, the conduct on the part of the petitioner/seller as well as the second purchaser is bonafide. ( 56 ) THE State Government in the impugned order has rightly observed that even if the summary eviction was to take place of the purchaser from the land in question, the opportunity of hearing was required to be given. Apart from the said aspects, the power of summary eviction is with the Collector and even in the order passed by the first authority, the papers are forwarded to the Mamlatdar for getting back the possession and to restore the position. The Talati-cum-Mantri has no authority under law to entrust the possession to the seller who was party to the proceedings. No proceedings for summary eviction are initiated by the Mamlatdar nor the possession is handed over by the purchaser to the seller in pursuance to the order passed by the Deputy Collector. The land was converted for the purpose of Non Agricultural use as back as in the year 1982 and therefore, the land had ceased to be an agricultural land, if the matter is considered strictly as per the provisions of the Bombay Land Revenue Code. If some panchnama is drawn by Talati-cum-Mantri, having no authority for such purpose, and under the guise of so-called panchnama, the seller have assumed the possession, such possession can be said as illegal entry in the property of the purchaser. It creates no right whatsoever in the eye of law in favour of the so called seller. If some panchnama is drawn by Talati-cum-Mantri, having no authority for such purpose, and under the guise of so-called panchnama, the seller have assumed the possession, such possession can be said as illegal entry in the property of the purchaser. It creates no right whatsoever in the eye of law in favour of the so called seller. Even in the proceedings of the Civil Suit, when Application Exh-5 for interim injunction was decided by the learned Civil Judge, it was observed by the learned Civil Judge that the possession of the plaintiff seller is not established and the plaintiff seller by making trespass over the suit land, stated to have received possession, but such possession is not received by due process of law and therefore, the Civil Court had observed that there is no prima facie case for protecting the possession and for injunction and the Application Exh-5 was dismissed. Such finding of the Civil Court was confirmed by the District Court in the proceedings of the Appeal being Civil Misc. Appeal No. 98/86 against the order of the Civil Court and the District Court while confirming the order also observed that there are two contrary panchnamas for showing the so-called possession. The said order of the District Court is accepted and is subsequently not reversed by any higher forum. A suit for permanent injunction on the contention of title and possession of the property is dismissed for want of prosecution. Therefore, when the Civil Court has also not believed the lawful possession of the seller, any attempt to contend that as the possession was entrusted to the petitioner seller and therefore, their conduct is bonafide cannot be accepted and the same is misconceived. As observed earlier, no title to the property was with the seller on the date when the transaction of second sale was entered into by the seller in favour of the second purchaser. If the alleged status of the seller over the land is not as that of any lawful possession, it can be said that the seller by manipulating the record, illegally entered the land in question and when the Civil Court also had not accepted the possession nor did it grant any injunction in favour of the seller, it conveys no lawful right whatsoever even for receiving and enjoying the possession of the land in question in favour of the second purchaser. The aforesaid is coupled with the circumstance as recorded hereinabove that by suppressing the material fact before this Court, the alleged transaction in favour of second purchaser is entered into and the petitioner seller as well as the second purchaser both had full knowledge about the proceedings and inspite of the initiation of the contempt proceedings by this Court and the notice of contempt proceedings having been served upon them, the petitioner as well as the second purchaser had an audacity to enter the transaction for overreaching the judicial process with a view to frustrate the proceedings or to create a hurdle in the smooth course of justice. Therefore, neither the conduct of the petitioner/seller nor the conduct of the second purchaser can be said as bonafide and it appears to be with a view to frustrate the Court proceedings and if both such litigants have approached to this Court for invoking the powers of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution, the judicial discretion demands that no writ should be entrusted such litigant/s who have played not only foul play with the purchaser but have played foul play with the proceedings of the Civil Court, District Court, the proceedings of this Court in writ jurisdiction earlier as well as the proceedings thereafter. In my view, if such litigant/s are entrusted with the writ of this Court, it may result into travesty of justice. ( 57 ) UNDER the aforesaid circumstances, the conduct of both the petitioners are such that no relief should be granted by entrustment of the writ in exercise of the power under Article 227 of the Constitution by this Court. ( 58 ) THE aforesaid takes me to the last aspect of passing consequential order. In view of the aforesaid observations and the discussion, both the petitions are thoroughly misconceived and are with a view to abstract and explore undue benefit by abusing the process of Court. The litigation can be said as vexatious and misuse and abuse of process of law. In view of the aforesaid observations and the discussion, both the petitions are thoroughly misconceived and are with a view to abstract and explore undue benefit by abusing the process of Court. The litigation can be said as vexatious and misuse and abuse of process of law. If the petitions are dismissed simplicitor, such type of litigants would attempt to undertake such practices again and again, which may result into not only multiplicity of proceedings but, it would generate the situation against the ends of justice to be achieved by the Courts and more particularly, this Court while exercising its power under Article 227 of the Constitution exercising supervisory discretionary and equitable and plenary jurisdiction under the Constitution of India. Therefore, I find that it is a fit case where exemplary cost deserves to be awarded in addition to the cost of the present litigation in both the petitions. ( 59 ) THEREFORE, Rule discharged. Interim relief vacated. However, it is directed that the petitioners of Special Civil Application No. 3134 of 2001 shall pay the cost of Rs. 15,000/- towards the cost of the respondent Nos. 1 and 4 and exemplary cost. Out of the said amount of Rs. 7,500/- shall be the cost receivable by the State Government towards the cost of litigation and the exemplary cost, whereas Rs. 7,500/- shall be receivable as cost by respondent Nos. 2 and 5. ( 60 ) SPECIAL Civil Application No. 13380 of 2006 is dismissed with the cost of Rs. 10,000/ -. However, such cost shall not be receivable by respondent Nos. 1 to 12, who are seller/petitioners of Special Civil Application No. 3134 of 2001, but shall be receivable by respondent Nos. 13 to 16 and out of the said amount of Rs. 10,000/-, Rs. 5,000/- shall be received as cost of litigation and exemplary cost by respondent Nos. 13 and 14, whereas the remaining Rs. 5,000/- shall be receivable as cost of litigation and exemplary cost by respondent Nos. 15 and 16. The concerned petitioner shall pay the cost to the concerned respondents within a period of one month from today. 10,000/-, Rs. 5,000/- shall be received as cost of litigation and exemplary cost by respondent Nos. 13 and 14, whereas the remaining Rs. 5,000/- shall be receivable as cost of litigation and exemplary cost by respondent Nos. 15 and 16. The concerned petitioner shall pay the cost to the concerned respondents within a period of one month from today. ( 61 ) IT is clarified that any observations made by this Court in the present Judgment shall not influence or prejudice the rights of the either parties in the other proceedings of contempt jurisdiction and both the side shall be at the liberty to raise all contentions as may be available in law in the said proceedings.