JUDGMENT Amitava Roy, J. 1. Being unsuccessful in eliciting a decisive judicial verdict on their challenge to the vires of the retrospective amendments to the Gauhati High Court Services (Appointment, Condition of Services and Conduct) Rules, 1967 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Rules'), upgrading the post of Secretary to the Hon'ble the Chief Justice from Class II (D) to Class II (A), the Appellants have carried the assailment in this appeal. The learned Single Judge for the reasons recorded in the decision impugned before us, directed the issue to be placed before the Hon'ble Chief Justice on the administrative side. Though by the judgment and order two writ petitions being W.R (C) No. 7509/02 by the Appellants and W.P. (C) No. 6522/02 by the Respondent No. 4, had been disposed of, no appeal has arisen against the determination in W.P. (C) No. 6522/02. The Appellant No. 1 is an association of employees of the Principal Seat of the Gauhati High Court. 2. We have heard Mr. G.K. Bhattacharjee, Senior Advocate for the Appellants, Mr. B.C. Das Senior Advocate, Standing Counsel for the Gauhati High Court and Mr. A.K. Goswami, Senior Advocate for the Respondent No. 4. 3. Before adverting to the rival assertions, some admitted facts would be handy. The conditions of service and the conduct of the persons borne on the establishment of the Gauhati High Court hereinafter also referred to as the 'High Court'), are governed by the Rules. Thereunder, the post of Deputy Registrar is included in Class II of the Service and that of the Assistant Registrar in Class II(A). Before the impugned amendment in the year 2001, precisely, on 30.05.2001, the post of Secretary to the Hon'ble the Chief Justice was included in Class II(D). The pay scale of the Assistant Registrar was higher than that of the Secretary to the Hon'ble Chief Justice. By a notification No. JDJ. 199/98/8, dated 07.11.1998, issued by the Govt. of Assam in the Judicial Department, revision of pay scales of the officers and staff of the Registry of this High Court, was effected from 01.01.1998. Whereas, the revised pay scale of the post of the Assistant Registrar in Class II(A) was sanctioned to be Rs. 8100-13,025/-, plus special pay of Rs. 3000/- per month that of the Secretary to the Hon'ble Chief Justice in Class II(D) became Rs. 4390-11,425.00. 4. Whereas, the revised pay scale of the post of the Assistant Registrar in Class II(A) was sanctioned to be Rs. 8100-13,025/-, plus special pay of Rs. 3000/- per month that of the Secretary to the Hon'ble Chief Justice in Class II(D) became Rs. 4390-11,425.00. 4. The Respondent No. 4, was initially appointed as a Lower Division Clerk in the Mizoram Bench of this High Court on 01.09.1990 and was thereafter promoted temporarily to the post of Upper Division Clerk on 03.03.1992 in the Aizawl Bench of this High Court. He on 25.01.1992 submitted a representation to be transferred to the Principal Seat at Guwahati, whereafter, by order dated 23.06.1992 of the Registrar (Judicial), he was brought as the junior most Lower Division Assistant in the Principal Seat at Guwahati with the stipulation that he would not be entitled to seniority and other benefits over the existing LD Assistants in the Registry at Guwahati. He accordingly, joined at the Principal Seat as a Lower Division Assistant on 09.07.1992. While, serving as such in this Registry, he applied for and was eventually appointed as Secretary to the Hon'ble Chief Justice in the then pay scale of Rs. 1835-4325/- per month by notification No. HCV/42/47/2522/ Est. dated 16.12.1997. His pay scale at that point of time, was lower than that of the Superintendent in Class II(C) i.e. Rs. 2215-4075. After the revision of pay with effect from 01.01.1996, noticed hereinabove, the Respondent No. 4 on 06.04.1999 submitted a representation before the Registrar General of this Court at Gauhati, claiming the pay scale of Rs. 8100-13,025/-, as that of the Librarian-cum-Research Officer, as well as upgradation of the status of the post of Secretary to the Hon'ble Chief Justice appropriately. The Registrar General of this Court having taken up the issue with the Judicial Department of the State, by a notification dated 05.06.1999 of the Deputy Secretary of the said department, the sanction of upgradation of the pay scale of the Secretary to the Hon'ble Chief Justice from Rs. 4390-11425/- to Rs. 8100-13,025/- was conveyed and the existing incumbent was permitted to be fitted in that scale without any fixation benefit. 4390-11425/- to Rs. 8100-13,025/- was conveyed and the existing incumbent was permitted to be fitted in that scale without any fixation benefit. It was thereafter, that acting on the representation dated 06.04.1999 that the Registrar General of this Court placed the matter before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice for consideration for amendment of the Rules for upgradation of the post of Secretary to the Hon'ble Chief Justice as requested. This was followed by the impugned notification dated 30.05.2001 issued by the Registrar General of the High Court notifying the amendment of the Rules, thereby, inter alia deleting the post of Secretary to the Hon'ble Chief Justice from Class II(D) of the Service and incorporating it at SI. No. 2 after the post of Assistant Registrar in Class II(A) in Schedule I of the Rules. It was thus upgraded to be a feeder post for promotion to the post of Deputy Registrar. Subsequent thereto, by the notification dated 26.02.2002 also under challenge, the amendment in the Rules vis-a-vis the post of Secretary to the Hon'ble Chief Justice was provided a retrospective effect from 05.09.1999. In other words, by the amendments as above, the post of Secretary to the Hon'ble Chief Justice was treated to be one in Class II(A) of the Services on and from 05.09.1999. The Appellant-association, submitted a representation before the Hon'ble Chief Justice on 18.03.2002, pointing out that the amendments would result in granting undue benefit to the Respondent No. 4 to the prejudice of many senior incumbents in service. Two posts of Deputy Registrar at or about sometime having fallen vacant, the departmental Promotion Committee comprised of two Hon'ble Judges of this Court, in its meeting held on 17.06.2002, after considering the cases of the eligible candidates recommended Smti. Pankaj Baruah and Dinesh Ch. Goswami for promotion. Accordingly, by notification dated 12.02.2002 assailed in W.P.(C) No. 6522/2002 by the present Respondent No. 4, promotions as recommended were effected. 5. The rival cases of the parties in the above factual backdrop, now deserve attention. According to the Appellants, the avenue of promotion for the general staff in the service of the High Court from the post of Lower Division Assistant to that of Deputy Registrar, is enroute Upper Division Assistant, Superintendent and Assistant Registrar. 5. The rival cases of the parties in the above factual backdrop, now deserve attention. According to the Appellants, the avenue of promotion for the general staff in the service of the High Court from the post of Lower Division Assistant to that of Deputy Registrar, is enroute Upper Division Assistant, Superintendent and Assistant Registrar. They have asserted that persons appointed as Lower Division Assistant as far back on 05.08.1988, are still serving as such and that only two who had been appointed in the said post in 1968 and 1969 have succeeded in reaching the level of Deputy Registrar through the normal channel of promotion. They have pleaded that though the Respondent No. 4 had joined the service as a Lower Division Assistant only on 04.07.92, they bore no reservation on his appointment as the Secretary to the Hon'ble Chief Justice and upgradation of his pay scale to that of Rs. 8100-13025/, as that post was an Ex-cadre post and by such appointment, the members of the association were not likely to be affected in the matter of timely consideration of their cases for promotion and other prospects of cadre advancement. While contending that the Respondent No. 4 had not held the post of Upper Division Assistant or Superintendent at any point of time, they have complained that the impugned amendments of the Rules with retrospective effect, pave the way for his accelerated promotion to the post of Deputy Registrar by superseding many senior Lower Division Assistants in service. 6. Citing some instances of the past, the Appellants have asserted that the promotions of the earlier incumbents of the post of Secretary to the Hon'ble Chief Justice, were guided by their seniority in service following the normal channel and not by precipitating supersession in service. They also referred to the rules regarding appointment to the post of Court Master by selection from Upper Division Assistant/Lower Division Assistant at the Principal Seat working in the High Court, having 8 years experience. Under the said rules, a Court Master is to be considered for promotion in terms of his own seniority in the rank of Upper Division Assistant/Lower Division Assistant as the case may be. Under the said rules, a Court Master is to be considered for promotion in terms of his own seniority in the rank of Upper Division Assistant/Lower Division Assistant as the case may be. Considering the limited scope of promotion to the higher ranks, the impugned amendments were thus assailed to be violative of the right of the senior members in service for promotion to higher posts and thus illegal and unconstitutional. The retrospective amendments were impeached being annihilative of the vested right of the senior members in service for consideration of their cases for promotion. The recommendation and promotion of Smti. Pankaj Baruah and Shri Dinesh Ch. Goswami has however been endorsed by the Appellant-association. The Respondent No. 4's reply to the above, is that the post of Secretary to the Hon'ble Chief Justice having fallen vacant at the relevant time options were called from the willing candidates vide memorandum No. HCV/907/1501, dated 03.06.97 and he being fully eligible for the post exercised his option as sought for. He was thereafter called for interview and was eventually appointed by the notification dated 16.12.97. The Registry of the High Court having moved the Govt. of Assam in the Judicial Department for raising the pay scale of the said post it was upgraded to Rs. 8100-13025/-. The said pay scale being at par with that of the Assistant Registrar, the post of Secretary to the Hon'ble Chief Justice was therefore included in Class II(A) of the High Court service. According to him, following the amendment of the Rules on 30.05.2001 followed by the grant of retrospectivity thereto with effect from 05.09.1999, he became eligible to be considered for promotion to the post of Deputy Registrar and that therefore the promotion of Smti. Pankaj Baruah and Shri Dinesh Ch. Goswami by overlooking his superior claim both on the ground of seniority and merit was illegal. He maintained that the Hon'ble Chief Justice had rejected the representation (s) submitted by the Appellant-association against the amendments and that therefore he had been denied timely promotion to the post of Deputy Registrar. He therefore prayed that the promotion of Smti. Pankaj Baruah and Shri Dinesh Ch. Goswami be quashed and he be directed to be promoted as the Deputy Registrar. 7. Shri Dinesh Ch. He therefore prayed that the promotion of Smti. Pankaj Baruah and Shri Dinesh Ch. Goswami be quashed and he be directed to be promoted as the Deputy Registrar. 7. Shri Dinesh Ch. Goswami impleaded as Respondent No. 4 in W.P. (C) No. 6522/2002, generally affirmed the stand taken by the Appellant-association and contended that the Respondent No. 4 was not eligible to be promoted to the post of Deputy Registrar. 8. The learned Single Judge, while noticing the rule making power of the Chief Justice of the High Court conferred by Article 229 of the Constitution of India and his primacy in the matter of prescribing the conditions of service of the officers and staff of the High Court, in the contextual facts entertained the Appellant-association's contention that a person appointed as Secretary to the Hon'ble the Chief Justice enjoyed the status thereof and other benefits incidental thereto wholly at the pleasure of the Chief Justice and therefore such appointment could not be deemed to have allowed him to steal a march over others, who had neither opted for nor selected for the said post. It was observed that the post of the Secretary to the Hon'ble Chief Justice was a special one and the holder thereof, was required to look after and co-ordinate the various works of the Chief Justice. Referring to the absolute discretion of the Chief Justice in the matter, the learned Single Judge expressed the view that as the issue whether the appointment of any one to the said post would be permanent or temporary had not been brought to the notice of the Chief Justice at the time of the upgradation thereof from Class II(D), the question ought not to be decided on the judicial side and that it needed to be placed before the Chief Justice on the administrative side for consideration and appropriate decision for necessary guidelines etc. The learned Single Judge further marked that the Rules were silent in this regard. The challenge to the promotion of Smti. Pankaj Baruah and Dinesh Goswami, however was negatived. 9. Mr. Bhattacharjee has argued that the impugned amendment of the Rules evidenced by the notification dated 30.05.01, having been made by the Acting Chief Justice of the High Court, it is per se, null and void. The challenge to the promotion of Smti. Pankaj Baruah and Dinesh Goswami, however was negatived. 9. Mr. Bhattacharjee has argued that the impugned amendment of the Rules evidenced by the notification dated 30.05.01, having been made by the Acting Chief Justice of the High Court, it is per se, null and void. Article 229(2) of the Constitution of India having empowered only the Chief Justice of a High Court or some other Judge or Officer of the Court authorized by the Chief Justice to make rules prescribing the conditions of service of officers and servants of the said institution, the Acting Chief Justice thereof, had no competence or authority in undertaking such a legislative act. The Acting Chief Justice of a High Court thus being not constitutionally empowered to discharge any legislative function as comprehended in Article 229(2), the impugned amendment is ab initio, invalid, he urged. The learned Senior counsel has, argued that resultantly the notification dated 26.02.2002 providing retrospectivity to the said amendment, though seemingly sanctioned by the Chief Justice of the High Court, is also nonest in law. The impugned amendment affected by the notification dated 30.05.2001 being still born, the retrospectivity thereto though authorized by the Chief Justice of the High Court would not validate the same. Even, otherwise, as the impugned notification dated 26.02.2002 has the effect of denuding the senior members of the service of their vested right of consideration for promotion to the higher posts, it is ineffectual and invalid, he urged. He submitted on instructions that the Respondent No. 4, in the meantime, had been granted retrospective promotion to the post of Deputy Registrar and that the same had been assailed afresh in a different writ proceeding. Mr. Bhattacharjee placed reliance on the following decisions : Supreme Court Employees Welfare Association v. Union of India and Ors. AIR 1990 SC 334 , Chairman, Railway Board and Ors. v. C.R. Rangadhamalah and Ors. (1997) 6SCC 623, K. Narayanan and Ors. v. State of Karnataka and Ors. AIR 1994 SC 55 , High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan v. Ramesh Chand Paliwal and Anr. (1998) 3 SCC 72 , Union of India v. Syad Sarwar Ali and Ors. (1998) 9 SCC 426 . Mr. v. C.R. Rangadhamalah and Ors. (1997) 6SCC 623, K. Narayanan and Ors. v. State of Karnataka and Ors. AIR 1994 SC 55 , High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan v. Ramesh Chand Paliwal and Anr. (1998) 3 SCC 72 , Union of India v. Syad Sarwar Ali and Ors. (1998) 9 SCC 426 . Mr. Das, in reply has argued that having regard to the scheme envisaged in Article 216, 223, 224 and 229 of the Constitution of India, the expressions "duties of the office" appearing in Article 223 would comprehend all functions relatable to the office of the Chief Justice including legislative acts under Article 229(2). As the Acting Chief Justice appointed under Article 223 in the discharge of the duties of the said office would be required to exercise all powers essential therefor, no differentiation in the nature of such functions administrative, judicial or legislative is conceivable. In that view of the matter acceptance of the contention that an Acting Chief Justice is not the Chief Justice of a High Court would be doing violence of the aforementioned constitutional scheme, more particularly, Article 216, which enjoins that every High Court shall consist of a Chief Justice besides such other Judges as the President many time to time deem it necessary to appoint. The learned Senior counsel to backup his argument also referred to Clause II(a) under Part D of the Second Schedule of the Constitution of India defining "Chief Justice" to include an "Acting Chief Justice". According to Mr. Das, a constitutional provision is to be understood and interpreted bearing in mind the object thereof and the purpose sought to be achieved thereby. There being no restriction or limitation imposed on the performance of duties or the exercise of power therefore by the Acting Chief Justice of a High Court, he is competent to perform all the functions of the Chief Justice including one, to frame Rules under Article229(2) of the Constitution of India. As the Rules framed under the aforesaid constitutional sanction is a yield of a legislative act, the same can be permissibly given a retrospective effect as those framed under Article 309 of the Constitution of India. Mr. Das for buttressing his arguments placed reliance on the following decisions: Supreme Court Advocates on Record Association and Ors. v. Union of India (1993) 4 SCC 441 , Ashok Kumar Gupta and Anr. Mr. Das for buttressing his arguments placed reliance on the following decisions: Supreme Court Advocates on Record Association and Ors. v. Union of India (1993) 4 SCC 441 , Ashok Kumar Gupta and Anr. v. State of U.P. and Ors.: (1997) 5 SCC 201 , S.R. Chaudhury, v. State of Punjab and Ors. (2001) 7 SCC 126 , Ms. Aruna Roy and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. (2002) 7 SCC 368 , B.S. Vadera v. Union of India and Ors. AIR 1969 SC118, Raj Kumar v. Union of India and Ors. AIR 1975 SC 1116 , Bhakta Ramegowda and Ors. v. State of Karnataka and Ors. (1997) 2 SCC 661 , Ashok Tanwar and Anr. v. State of H.P. and Ors. (2005) 2 SCC 104 , High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan v. Ramesh Chand Paliwal and Anr. (1998) 3 SCC 72 . 10. Mr. Goswami, while endorsing the submission on behalf of the High Court, has submitted that the constitutional framework of Chapter V titled "High Courts in the State" under Part VI of the Constitution of India, clearly propounds that a Chief Justice of a High Court includes an Acting Chief Justice. According to him, the word "duties" employed in Article 223 of the Constitution is only a concept, which cannot be limited by compartmentalizing the said constitutional provision from the rest of the scheme. As a constitutional provision has to be provided a purposive connotation; any limitation on the power of the Acting Chief Justice as suggested would be opposed to the above principle of interpretation. Mr. Goswami has maintained that the impugned amendments do not suffer from the vice of lack of competence and having been occasioned in the exercise of the powers constitutionally conferred, the impugnment thereof on the grounds set out in the writ petition is misconceived. The Respondent No. 4 as the Secretary to the Hon'ble the Chief Justice having been upgraded two Clause II(A) of the service with effect from 05.09.1999, he had a right to be considered for promotion in terms of the Rules and thai all contentions to the contrary are misplaced. Mr. Goswami sought to reinforce his arguments by resting on the following decisions : R.C. Poudyal v. Union of India 1994 Supp (1) SCC 324, Ajit Singh and Ors. (II) v. Union of India and Ors. Mr. Goswami sought to reinforce his arguments by resting on the following decisions : R.C. Poudyal v. Union of India 1994 Supp (1) SCC 324, Ajit Singh and Ors. (II) v. Union of India and Ors. (1999) 7 SCC 209 , S.R. Choudhury, v. State of Punjab and Ors. (2001) 7 SCC 126 , Ashok Tanwar and Anr. v. State of H.P. and Ors. (2005) 2 SCC 104 . 11. We have extended our anxious consideration to the competing arguments. As the plea of lack of legislative competence to occasion the impugned amendments in the Rules if upheld, would have a decisive bearing on the adjudicative exercise undertaken, it would be expedient to deal with the same at the threshold. We propose to refer to the authorities cited at the Bar before evaluating the rival arguments. 12. The Apex Court in R.C. Poudyal (Supra) while dealing with the approach to be adopted to construe the provisions of the Constitution held that in the interpretation of a Constitutional document, "words are but the framework of concepts and concepts may challenge more than words themselves". It held that the significance of the change of the concepts themselves is vital and the constitutional issues are not solved by a mere appeal to the meaning of the words without an acceptance of the line of their growth. It quoted with approval the axiom that "intention of a Constitution is rather to outline principles than to engrave details." 13. The above view was noticed in S.C. Advocates on record Association (Supra). The Apex Court observed that it is the primary institutional task of that Court, first, to clearly understand the true message that the constitution intends to convey and to pronounce the law in harmony with the meaningful purpose, original intent and true sprit of the Constitution. For this, it held that to deal with the controversies, issues and problems which arise for general interpretation, the courts have to undertake an onerous mission in exploring the 'real intention' and 'Original meaning' of the constitution beyond all obscurities and to expound the principles underlying the philosophy of the Constitution and declare what it speaks about and mandates. 14. The same view echoed in Ashok Kumar Gupta and Anr. 14. The same view echoed in Ashok Kumar Gupta and Anr. (supra) where the Apex Court ruled that the Constitution unlike other Acts is, intended to provide an enduring paramount law and a basic design of the structure and power of the State and rights and duties of the citizens to serve the society through a long lapse of ages and that it was not only devised to meet the needs of the day when it is enacted, but also the needs of the altering conditions of the future. It recorded that in the interpretation of the Constitution, words of width are both a framework of concepts and means to achieve the goals in the Preamble. The intention of the Constitution is, rather, to outline principles than to engrave details, it reiterated. 15. In somewhat more expressive terms, the Apex Court in S.R. Choudhury (Supra) illustrated the proposition stating that the Constitutional provisions are required to be understood and interpreted with an object-oriented approach. A Constitution must not be construed in a narrow and pedantic sense. It denounced that the words used may be in general terms, but their full import and true meaning has to be appreciated considering the true context in which the same are used and the purpose which they seek to achieve. In interpreting the constitutional provisions, it is the function of the court to ascertain the intention of the framers of the Constitution, it remarked. 16. The Apex Court in Ms. Aruna Roy and Ors. (Supra), while considering that the words and expressions used in the Constitution have no fixed meaning and should receive interpretation based on the experience of the people in the course of its working, recalled the words of Chief Justice Holmes on the topic as extracted herein-below: The immortal words of Chief Justice Holmes should guide us in interpreting words and expressions used in our Constitution. He said, "spirit of law is not logic but it has been experience". His words apply with greater force to constitutional law. 17. The fundamental precepts in interpreting the provisions of the Constitution are laid down in the following two passages quoted with approval in Ajit Singh and Ors. (II) (Supra): Our Constitution is not a straitjacket. It is a living organism. As such it is capable of growth, of expansion and of adaptation to new conditions. 17. The fundamental precepts in interpreting the provisions of the Constitution are laid down in the following two passages quoted with approval in Ajit Singh and Ors. (II) (Supra): Our Constitution is not a straitjacket. It is a living organism. As such it is capable of growth, of expansion and of adaptation to new conditions. Growth implies changes, political, economic and social moral conceptions of material things.... (Brandeis' Papers, Harvard Law School) The Constitution is neither, on the one hand, a Gibraltar rock, which wholly resists the ceaseless washing of time and circumstances, nor is it, on the other hand, a sandy beach, which is slowly destroyed by erosion of the waves. It is rather to be likened to a floating dock which, while firmly attached to its moorings, and not therefore at the caprice of the waves, yet rises and falls with the tide of time and circumstances. (Constitution of the United States, Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow (1924) Oxford University Press.) 17. A. In this regard, we advantageously notice the following extract from the judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada in Hunter v. Southam Inc. (1984) 2 SCR 145 (CAN SC) quoted with approval in Ashok Tanwar (Supra): The constitutional provisions cannot be cut down by technical construction rather it has to be given liberal and meaningful interpretation. The ordinary rules and presumptions, brought in aid to interpret the statutes, cannot be made applicable while interpreting the provisions of the Constitution. In Minister of Home Affairs v. Fisher dealing with Bermudian Constitution, Lord Wilberforce reiterated that a Constitution is a document 'sui generic, calling for principles of interpretation of its own, suitable to its character. (emphasis suplied). 18. In Ashok Tanwar (Supra), the Apex Court on a survey of the decisions on the issue had summed up its views stating that the interpretation of a provision of the Constitution having regard to the various aspects serving the purpose and mandate thereof stands on a separate footing. It held that the Constitution unlike other statutes is meant to be a durable instrument to serve through a longer number of years without frequent revision. It is intended to serve the needs of the day when it was enacted and also to meet the needs of the changing conditions of the future, it observed. 19. It held that the Constitution unlike other statutes is meant to be a durable instrument to serve through a longer number of years without frequent revision. It is intended to serve the needs of the day when it was enacted and also to meet the needs of the changing conditions of the future, it observed. 19. What follows from the summary of the judicial opinion hereinabove, is that a Constitution is not merely a conglomeration of 'words' expressed, but a living and workable instrument to serve the necessities of time. It provides the outline of the makers vision incorporating fundamental concepts to be fashioned and groomed with the vicissitudes of times. A rational, realistic and purposive interpretation of the provisions of the Constitution is thus understandably essential to elicit the correct meaning of its edicts and a literal and pedantic approach thereto is to be eschewed. A reasonable, meaningful and logical construction of the provisions which effectuates the constitutional precepts is therefore the demand of the interpreting principles. Any construction that would not subserve the object of a constitutional tenet but reduce it to a dead letter ought to be discarded. 20. With the above beacon light to lead the way, the schematic lay out of chapter v. of Part VI of the Constitution devoted to the High Courts in the States may be examined. For our limited purpose, we would obviously restrict our attention to Articles 216, 223 and 229 only. Article 216 provides that every High Court shall consist of a Chief Justice and such other Judges as the President may from time to time deem it necessary to appoint. Article 223 provides that when the office of the Chief Justice of a High Court is vacant or when any such Chief Justice is by reason of absence or otherwise, unable to perform the duties of his office, the same shall be performed by such one of the other Judges of the Court as the President may appoint for the purpose. The power of making appointments of officers and servants of High Court has also been conferred on the Chief Justice of the Court or such other Judge and/or officer of the Court as he may direct under Article 229 of the Constitution subject to the proviso thereunder. The power of making appointments of officers and servants of High Court has also been conferred on the Chief Justice of the Court or such other Judge and/or officer of the Court as he may direct under Article 229 of the Constitution subject to the proviso thereunder. Article 229(2) lays down that subject to the provisions of any law made by the Legislature of the State, the conditions of service of officers and servants of a High Court shall be such as may be prescribed by rules made by the Chief Justice of the Court or by some other Judge or officer of the Court authorized by the Chief Justice in that regard. The rules so made so as far as they relate to salary, allowance, leave or pension would require the approval of the Governor of the State. 21. Article 229 of the Constitution therefore in categorical terms authorizes the Chief Justice of the Court or any other Judge or Officer of the Court as he may direct, subject to the proviso to Sub-clause (1) thereof, to make appointment of officers and servants of a High Court. Similarly, the Chief Justice of the Court or some other Judge or officer of the Court authorized by him is empowered to make rules laying down the conditions of service of officers or servants of the High Court subject to the provision of law, if any, made by the Legislature of the State. The question that confronts us is whether any other Judge of the High Court appointed under Article 223 of the Constitution of India performing the duties of the office of the Chief Justice in the eventualities envisaged therein can perform the legislative act of framing rules under Article 229(2) prescribing the conditions of service of the officers and servants of the said High Court. The Appellants have asserted that the rule making powers having been conferred on the Chief Justice of the High Court or such other Judge or Officer of the court as he may direct, the impugned amendment to the Rules vide notification dated 30.5.2001 are non est for want of legislative competence having been caused by the then Acting Chief Justice of this Court. 22. 22. Article 223 manifests, the compliance of the mandate of Article 216 that, every High Court has to consist of a Chief Justice along with such other Judges as the President may appoint from time to time. The said constitutional provision prescribes a make up of a High Court which mandatorily has to have a Chief Justice. It is, therefore when the office of the Chief Justice of a High Court is vacant or by reason of absence or otherwise the Chief Justice is unable to perform the duties of his office, that any other Judge of the court is appointed by the President to perform the duties of the said office. The arrangement is understandably a temporary one till a regular Chief Justice assumes office. Till then, however, bearing the prescription of Article 216, the duties of his office have to be unavoidably performed by the Acting Chief Justice. Noticeably, the makers of the Constitution in their wisdom refrained from specifying the duties which could be permissibly performed by the Acting Chief Justice during the interregnum. No limitation, restraint or restriction is discernible in the said constitutional provision qua, the Acting Chief Justice in the discharge of the duties of the office of the Chief Justice during his incumbency. No interdiction on the exercise of powers of the Acting Chief Justice in executing his functions is also decipherable. Logically, the Acting Chief Justice as the surrogate of the Chief Justice would be requiring to discharge the multifaceted functions rentable to the office. Being the head of the judicial institution of the State, he would be expected to perform all the essential duties for the efficient and smooth working of the High Court. For the same, the Acting Chief Justice would be essentially required to take day to day decisions on all matters pertaining to the functioning of the High Court. For all intents and purposes therefore, he would function as the regular Chief Justice of the Court. To hold otherwise, would introduce uncertainty and unpredictability in the administration of the High Court, an eventuality inconceivable in the present scheme of things. 23. For all intents and purposes therefore, he would function as the regular Chief Justice of the Court. To hold otherwise, would introduce uncertainty and unpredictability in the administration of the High Court, an eventuality inconceivable in the present scheme of things. 23. It being a practical experience that at times, the Acting Chief Justice continues in office for quite some time, denial inter alia of the power to prescribe and/or alter the conditions of service of the officers and servants of the High Court may result in a stalemate in a given fact situation thus leading to an anomalous and incomprehensible situation. A cumulative reading of Article 223 and Article 229also does not evince any embargo on the execution of the legislative act by the Acting Chief Justice meant normally for the Chief Justice or some other Judge or officer of the Court authorized by him. In absence of any indication delineating the duties and/or powers to be restrictively performed and/or exercised by the Acting Chief Justice, any clog on the authority or dominion of the Acting Chief Justice in this context would tantamount to rewriting the above constitutional provision. A contrario sensu, for due and efficient discharge of the duties of the office of the Chief Justice, the prerogative to exercise all powers therefore would be an inseparable adjunct. 24. The word "duties" appearing in Article 223 in the above perspective appears to be all comprehensive and in absence of any restraint whatsoever limiting the function of the Acting Chief Justice only to the judicial and administrative acts, we do not feel persuaded to hold that the Acting Chief Justice of a High Court in the integrated scheme under Chapter V to Part VI of the Constitution of India has been divested of the competence to frame rules under Article 229(2) of the Constitution of India. Though, there is no manner of doubt, that the Acting Chief Justice cannot be wholly equated with a regular Chief Justice, but for the limited purpose of performing the duties of the office of the Chief Justice in the contingencies under Article 223 of the Constitution of India, no distinction is possible. Though, there is no manner of doubt, that the Acting Chief Justice cannot be wholly equated with a regular Chief Justice, but for the limited purpose of performing the duties of the office of the Chief Justice in the contingencies under Article 223 of the Constitution of India, no distinction is possible. It would be incongruent to acknowledge the legitimacy of the acts of the Acting Chief Justice pertaining only to administrative and judicial functions disregarding the constitutionally conferred legislative powers to make rules under Article 229(2) in absence of any perceptible reservations therein. Such a view would be incompatible with the scheme outlined by Article 216, 223 and 229 of the constitution as well. It would be mutilative of the very purpose of inducting the Acting Chief Justice to man the office of the Chief Justice and perform the essential duties for sustaining the framework and the functioning of the Constitutional institution. No dichotomy between judicial and administrative duties on one hand and the legislative functions on the other is fathomable in the relevant constitutional paradigm. It is, therefore, not possible to sustain the contention of want of legislative competence of the Acting Chief Justice of this Court in effecting the impugned amendment to the Rules contained in the notification dated 30.5.2001. 25. The decision of the Apex Court in Supreme Court Employees' Welfare Association (Supra) and the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan (Supra) which principally deal with the scope of ambit of the rule making powers under Article 229 of the Constitution of India do not further the case of the Appellants. 26. The Apex Court while dilating on the scope and ambit of the power of the Chief Justice of the High Court on the rule making power for regulating the conduct of service of officers and the severance thereof observed as follows in High Court of Judicature for Rajashtan v. Ramesh Chand Paliwal and Anr. (1998) 3 SCC 72 . 18. This article makes the Chief Justice of the High Court, the Supreme Authority in the matter of appointments of the High Court officers and servants. (1998) 3 SCC 72 . 18. This article makes the Chief Justice of the High Court, the Supreme Authority in the matter of appointments of the High Court officers and servants. This article also confers rule-making power on the Chief Justice for regulating the conditions of service of the officers and servants of the High Court subject to the condition that if the rules relate to salaries, allowances, leave or pensions, they have to have the approval of the Governor of the State. If the legislature of the State has made any law, the rules made by the Chief Justice would operate subject to the conditions made in that law. 19. The Rule making power of the Chief Justice is subject to three restrictions: (i) If the rules relate to salaries, allowances, leave or pensions, they have to be approved by the Governor of the State. (ii) If the legislature of the State has made any law, the rules made by the Chief Justice will operate subject to that law. (iii) If the Governor of the State has, by rule, provided that no person, not already attached to the Court, shall be appointed to any office connected with the Court save after consultation with the State Public Service Commission, the Chief Justice while making appointment on such post shall first consult the State Public Service Commission. 20. It is obvious that if the legislature has not made any law referred to in this article of the Governor has not made any rule requiring the State Public Service Commission to be consulted, the rules made by the Chief Justice would operate independently and the chief Justice will also not be under any obligation to consult the State Public Service Commission. 21. Under Article 229, the power of appointment can also be exercised by such other Judge or Officer of the Court as may be directed by the Chief Justice. So also the rule making power can be exercised by some other Judge or Officer of the Court provided he is authorized in that behalf by the Chief Justice. 26 A. This Court in Assam Judicial Service Association and Anr. So also the rule making power can be exercised by some other Judge or Officer of the Court provided he is authorized in that behalf by the Chief Justice. 26 A. This Court in Assam Judicial Service Association and Anr. v. Chief Justice, Gauhati High Court and Ors., 1986(2) GLR 330 had expressed itself identically as hereunder: However, in the instant case the High Court Rules themselves expressly confer absolute discretion on the Hon'ble Chief Justice in the matter of appointments to the High Court Services. The express provision may not be curtailed by general principles on which the provision was not based. It was for very good reasons that the High Court Service Rules conferred such a discretion on the Hon'ble Chief Justice. The word 'absolute' means complete: perfect final, without any condition or encumbrance, unconditional; complete and perfect in itself; without relation to or dependence on other things or persons. (See Black's Law Dictionary). As Rule 6 speaks of 'absolute discretion' we have to understand it in that sense. As the maxim goes, 'loquendum ut vulgus; sentiendum docti'-we must speak as the common people; we must thing as the learned. The rule is that when words are used in a technical sense they must be understood technically; otherwise, when they may be supposed to be used in ordinary exception. 'A verbis legis non est recedendum'. The words of a statute must not be departed from. A Court is not at liberty to disregard the letter of a statute, in favour of a supposed intention. In Bradbury v. Enfield Borough Council (1967) 1 WLR 1311 it has been held that even though a court is satisfied that the legislature did not contemplate the consequences of an enactment, a court is bound to give effect to its clear language. It is settled law that where the language of an Act is clear and explicit, we must give effect to it, whatever may be the consequences, for in that case the words of the statute speak the intention of the legislature. As Rule 7 confers absolute discretion on the Hon'ble Chief Justice, no exception can be taken in selecting one of the categories namely 'any other person' to which Respondent No. 5 belonged. He did not belong to the other two categories. 27. In Union of India v. Syad Sarwar Ali and Ors. As Rule 7 confers absolute discretion on the Hon'ble Chief Justice, no exception can be taken in selecting one of the categories namely 'any other person' to which Respondent No. 5 belonged. He did not belong to the other two categories. 27. In Union of India v. Syad Sarwar Ali and Ors. (Supra), the question posed was whether the puisne Judge of a High Court who had retired as such, but had, during his tenure for sometime been the Acting Chief Justice would be entitled to the benefit of ceiling of pension available to a Chief Justice. The Apex Court observed that the right to pension arises only when there is termination of service either by retirement, resignation or death and the claim was untenable as the incumbent had retired as a puisne Judge. It held that merely because at an earlier point of time he had served as the Acting Chief Justice would not mean that he was the Chief Justice on the date of his retirement. It was in that context that the Apex Court observed that an Acting Chief Justice appointed under Article 223 of the Constitution cannot be equated with the Chief Justice under Article 216 of the Constitution. We are of the opinion, having regard to the contextual facts of the reported decision that the above observation does not signify any limitation or restriction on the performance of the duties of the office of the Chief Justice by an Acting Chief Justice to deduce the absence of legislative power to frame rules under Article 229(2) of the Constitution of India. 28. We find our view reinforced in Ashok Tanwar (Supra). The question which arose before the Apex Court there was that whether consultation with the Acting Chief Justice was sufficient compliance of the requirement of the consultation with the Chief Justice of the State in the matter of appointment of the President of the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission. The following extract from para 27 of the decision is of determinative significance. 27. The following extract from para 27 of the decision is of determinative significance. 27. In the very terms of Article 223 of the Constitution, when the office of Chief Justice of a High Court is vacant or when any such Chief Justice is by reason of absence or otherwise, unable to perform the duties of the office of the Chief Justice, duties of the office of Chief Justice shall be performed by such one or the other Judges of the Court as the President may appoint for the purposes. Plain reading of this article shows that one or the other Judges of the High Court appointed in the vacancy of the office of Chief Justice. No restriction or limitation in performance of duties by the Acting Chief Justice can be read into the said article. The article also does not indicate as to which of the duties of the Chief Justice can be performed or which of the duties cannot be performed by the Acting Chief Justice. Appointment of one or the other judges of a High Court as Acting Chief Justice is meant to carry on the work of the High Court and the judiciary in the State. May be sometimes appointment of Chief Justice to a High Court may take some time for various reasons and consequently the Acting Chief Justice continues to work for longer period. but that itself does not take away the powers conferred by the Constitution on a Judge to act as Chief Justice to perform the duties of the Chief Justice. Normally the seniormost puisne Judge is appointed as Acting Chief Justice. Such puisne Judge is expected to act appropriately in discharging the duties of the office of Chief Justice. It is a rule of prudence that the Acting Chief Justice may not take major decisions could wait for a Chief Justice. Assuming that some decisions taken by an Acting Chief Justice are required to be modified or corrected, that can be done either on the administrative side or on the judicial side by the High Court or by this Court including the Chief Justice of India, as the case may be. Assuming that some decisions taken by an Acting Chief Justice are required to be modified or corrected, that can be done either on the administrative side or on the judicial side by the High Court or by this Court including the Chief Justice of India, as the case may be. In some cases if appointment of Chief Justice of a High Court takes a longer time and the Acting Chief Justice cannot discharge the duties of the office of the Chief Justice, the work of the High Court or the State judiciary or for the matter wherever the opinion of the Chief Justice is required, like the one under Section 16 of the Act, it will result in anomalous position leading to paralyzing the working or may be sometimes creating a deadlock. When Article223 of the Constitution in specific terms confers powers on the Acting Chief Justice to discharge the functions of the office of Chief Justice without any limitation or rider, it cannot be accepted that an Acting Chief Justice cannot perform the duties expected to be performed by him under Section 16 of the Act. The issue was thus answered in the affirmative. 29. The above, notwithstanding, would the retrospective operation extended to the amendment vitiate the same? 30. The Apex Court in K. Narayanan and Ors. (Supra) while quoting with approval a passage from its decision in B.S. Yadav v. State of Haryana AIR 1981 SC 561 defining that rules under proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India can be given retrospective effect, held that the same, however must not operate discriminately or in violation of any constitutional right so as to affect vested right. 31. Reiterating the same view, the Apex Court in Chairman Railway Board (Supra) proclaimed that a rule which operates in futuro so as to govern the rights of those already in service cannot be assailed on the ground of retroactivity as being violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, but a rule which seeks to reverse from an anterior date any benefit which has been granted or availed of, the same can be assailed as being transgressive of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution to the extent it operates retrospectively. 32. 32. That the function of the Chief Justice of India in framing rules under Article 146(2) which is para meteria with the one under Article 229(2) for the Chief Justice of the High Court is legislative in nature was held in Supreme Court Employees Welfare Association (Supra). 33. The Apex Court in B.S. Vadera (Supra) held that in absence of any enactment by the appropriate Legislature, the rules framed under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India can be given full effect both prospectively and retrospectively and would thus be unassailable unless denounced on the ground that it breaches Part III or any other Constitutional provision. 34. The permissibility of retrospective operation of rules framed under Article 309 of the Constitution of India was underlined by the Apex Court also in Raj Kumar (Supra) and in Bhakta Ramegowda and Ors. (Supra). The view that the rules made under proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution are legislative in character and therefore could be given the retrospective effect was reiterated. 35. Having regard to the nature of the powers conferred by Article 229(2) we have no hesitation to hold that the rules to be framed thereunder would be legislative in nature which by the analogy with Article 309 of the Constitution of India can be given a retrospective effect. This, however would be subject to the limitation that such retro activity does not result in divestiture of any vested right of the members of the service governed thereby. Apart therefrom, the same would also be subject to impugnment on the ground of violation of constitutional or legal rights. 36. The assertions in the present appeal against the retrospectivity of the rules being consequential, unfair advantage to the Respondent No. 4 in the matter of promotion over his seniors and contemporaries in service, we would confine the scrutiny to the said challenge. The facts comprising the service profile of the Respondent No. 4 and his advancement in career are not in dispute. Having joined the service of this Court as Lower Division Assistant as on 01.09.1990 he is much junior to several others still stagnating in the posts of LDAs, UDAs and Superintendents. The facts comprising the service profile of the Respondent No. 4 and his advancement in career are not in dispute. Having joined the service of this Court as Lower Division Assistant as on 01.09.1990 he is much junior to several others still stagnating in the posts of LDAs, UDAs and Superintendents. The Respondent No. 4 instead of waiting for his turn to avail the normal channel of promotion responded to the call of option for the post of Secretary to the Chief Justice and after a process of comparative assessment of suitability was appointed to the said post which was then borne in Class II(D) of the High Court Service. The Appellant association seemingly had no objection or reservation to this appointment of the Respondent No. 4, considering the said post to be ex cadre for the purpose of promotion to the higher post. Inclusion of the said post in Class II(A) with retrospective effect from 05.09.1999, making him eligible to be considered for promotion to the post of Deputy Registrar reachable by a Lower Division Assistant in the normal course through his channel of promotion after at least 30 years of service, on the other hand, has posted him over his seniors and contemporaries in service, thus, adversely affecting their chances of promotion to the higher rank. Per se thereby, the right of the members of the Appellant association for being considered for promotion has not been effected or affected by the impugned amendments. A mere chance of promotion being not a condition of service, the impugned amendments prima facie are not violative of any vested right of the other serving employees of the High Court whose cases are being espoused by the Appellant association. Their right to be considered for promotion to the higher posts is intact. Having regard to the fact that no incumbent in service has a right to be promoted and his claim entertainable in law is one for a fair consideration for advancement in service, in the face of the judicially evolved principles noticed hereinabove bearing on retrospectivity, we are unable to strike down the rules on this count as well. 37. Visibly no allegation of malafide and rightly has been made. There is no trace of any allegation of unwarranted exercise of power either. 37. Visibly no allegation of malafide and rightly has been made. There is no trace of any allegation of unwarranted exercise of power either. The Appellant association does not contend as well that the Respondent No. 4 was either ineligible or wanting in merit to hold the post of the Secretary to the Chief Justice. Admittedly before his appointment options were called for from willing candidates and he having responded thereto and found most suitable, he was thus appointed on selection. No objection and/or reservation on his appointment was made by the Appellant association. 38. There is obviously a qualitative difference in the nature and responsibility of the duties of the Secretary to the Chief Justice from that of a Lower Division Assistant, Upper Division Assistant or Superintendent in the general cadre. To put it differently, the post of Secretary to the Chief Justice and the aforementioned posts cannot be placed at par. Under the Rules, the post of the Secretary to the Chief Justice is otherwise a regular and permanent one. It is too fundamental to state that it is normally within the discretion of the employer to increase the cadre strength or to encadre a particular post in any grade thereof and there is no corresponding right vested in any employee to demand adjustment or encadrement of any post in a particular manner. Creation, abolition, encadrement or excadrement of post (s) in a service is usually the prerogative of the employer and is unquestionable unless vitiated by a violation of any constitutional or legal right or prompted by collateral and extraneous considerations. Bearing in mind, the duties and responsibilities attached to the post of the Secretary to the Hon'ble Chief Justice, we do not feel persuaded to hold that the encadrement of the said post in Class IIA of the High Court Service is ex-facie either illogical or irrational. Thereby per se neither the scheme of the Rules suffer an impringement nor any vested right of the members of the Appellant association, legal or constitutional has been violated. 39. The above notwithstanding yet another aspect bearing on the appointment as the Secretary to the Chief Justice needs mention. Thereby per se neither the scheme of the Rules suffer an impringement nor any vested right of the members of the Appellant association, legal or constitutional has been violated. 39. The above notwithstanding yet another aspect bearing on the appointment as the Secretary to the Chief Justice needs mention. The relevant records reveal that even before the appointment of Respondent No. 4, induction to the post of Secretary to the Chief Justice had been made from the grade of UDA and Stenographer Grade I on merit with due regard to seniority decisively in the discretion of the Hon'ble Chief Justice. Some initial appointments though temporary were also regularized subsequently. Similarly, by an order dated 7.10.1999, while the Respondent No. 4 was in the said office, his appointment to the post of Secretary to the Chief Justice was confirmed w.e.f. 16.12.1998. Consequently, the Respondent No. 4 became a permanent incumbent in that post w.e.f. 16.12.1998. This order dated 7.10.1999 has remained unchallenged. The official records pertaining to the appointment of Respondent No. 4 reveals that on his selection and appointment, he submitted his joining report on 16.12.1997 itself and took over charge of the Office from the outgoing incumbent Shri R.C. Baruah. 40. When two posts of Deputy Registrar fell vacant on the superannuation of Shri R.C. Baruah and Shri Gokul Chandra Kalita on 1.3.2002 and 1.4.2002 respectively, a representation was submitted by the Appellant association resisting the possible candidature of Respondent No. 4 for such promotion. The Respondent No. 4 also submitted his representation on the issue and on a consideration of the said representations and the relevant provisions of the Rules, the then Hon'ble Chief Justice of this Court declined to sustain the Appellant association's contentions. In so doing, the Hon'ble Chief Justice took note of the Respondent No. 4's appointment as Secretary to the Chief Justice following a selection. The Departmental Promotion Committee in its meeting held thereafter for considering the eligible candidates for promotion to the two posts of Deputy Registrar though also considered the case of the Respondent No. 4 did not recommend him both on the count of seniority as well as suitability. The selected candidates Smt. Pankaj Baruah and Shri Dinesh Chandra Goswami having been promoted thereafter, the Respondent No. 4 assailed their promotion in W.P. (C) 6522/02 as observed hereinbefore. 41. The selected candidates Smt. Pankaj Baruah and Shri Dinesh Chandra Goswami having been promoted thereafter, the Respondent No. 4 assailed their promotion in W.P. (C) 6522/02 as observed hereinbefore. 41. It was eventually by the order dated 18.7.2003 of the then Hon'ble Chief Justice that the Respondent No. 4 was promoted to the post of Deputy Registrar. The order dated 18.7.2003 referred to above interalia discloses that the service profile of the Respondent No. 4 had been closely scrutinized from his initial appointment as LDA in the Aizawl Bench of this Court. His promotion to the post of UDC, transfer to the Principal Seat, selection for the post of Secretary to the Chief Justice, confirmation in the said post and above all his meritorious service in the said post for the last five years were considered and his promotion was ordered from the date of that of his juniors in the Class IIA. Special emphasis on the fact that the Respondent No. 4 had been confirmed in the post of Secretary to the Chief Justice in support of his eligibility for being considered for the post of Deputy Registrar is decipherable from the said order. In that view of the matter, at this distant point of time, we leave the issue at that as the legality and/or validity of the promotion of the Respondent No. 4 is not in challenge before us. 42. The contemporaneous official records, however, reveal that on 18.7.2003 itself, the then Hon'ble Chief Justice separately recorded his view that appointment to the post of Secretary to the Chief Justice should be made on adhoc or temporary basis and not on permanent cadre post so that if the Chief Justice in his assessment considers the incumbent not upto his expectation, he could be relegated to the post from which he had been promoted. His Lordship expressed the opinion that considering the nature of the post and duties attached to it, the Chief Justice should be given absolute discretion to appoint any suitable person to the said post on adhoc or temporary basis to be reverted to his parent cadre, if not found suitable. It was further observed that during the incumbency, the holder of the post would, however, be eligible and would be considered for promotion to the higher post from the parent post he holds as per the relevant rules. It was further observed that during the incumbency, the holder of the post would, however, be eligible and would be considered for promotion to the higher post from the parent post he holds as per the relevant rules. Though necessary modifications of the Rules was also ordered thereby and a draft notification to the said effect had also been prepared, follow up steps did not seem to have been taken thereafter. 43. In view of the above recorded facts, we are of the considered opinion, having regard to the cardinality of the issue that the same deserves to be placed before the Hon'ble Chief Justice on the administrative side for his Lordship's consideration and esteemed decision. As it is, permanency of the incumbency in the post of Secretary to the Hon'ble Chief Justice has to be contingent on the confidence and satisfaction of his Lordship. It cannot be gainsaid that bearing in mind the nature of the duties to be performed by the holder of the said office, the person concerned should be able to earn the trust and pleasure of the Hon'ble Chief Justice besides rendering a performance befitting to the post and to the expectation of his Lordship. 44. In the wake of the above, we find no convincing or cogent ground to interfere with the judgment and order in appeal. It is, therefore, dismissed. We are in agreement with the conclusions recorded by the learned Single Judge, however, for the reasons cited hereinabove. In the facts and circumstances of the case there would be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed