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2006 DIGILAW 53 (KAR)

SUMAIRA FATIMA v. STATE BY K. G. HALLI POLICE STATION, BANGALORE

2006-01-16

V.JAGANNATHAN

body2006
ORDER The petitioner, a Pakistani National, is before this Court in this petition under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. praying setting aside the order dated 13-9-2005 passed by the 12th Additional Sessions Judge, Bangalore, in Cri. R.P. No. 15014 of 2005, refusing to set aside the order dated 10-2-2005 passed by the Traffic Court I, Bangalore, in C.C. No. 437 of2004, rejecting the application for discharge of the petitioner. 2. The facts giving raise to this petition briefly stated are to the effect that the petitioner, being a Pakistani national, came to India on 11-6-2004 and she was permitted to stay upto 25-7-2004. The Inspector of Police, Kadugondanahalli Police Station, found that the petitioner had overstayed till 28-7-2004 without having a proper residential permit and, therefore, he submitted FIR and a case was registered in FIR No. 288 of 2004 for the offence under Clause 7(2) of the Foreigners Order, 1948 read with Section 14 of the Foreigners Act, 1946. Following the charge-sheet being laid, the petitioner was produced before the Metropolitan Magistrate, Traffic Court I, Bangalore, and she made an application for grant of bail, which was allowed subject to certain conditions and the petitioner also made an application under Section 239 of the Cr. P. C. praying the Trial Court to discharge her from the case. The learned Metropolitan Magistrate, by his order dated 10-2-2005, declined to discharge her and dismissed the application. Aggrieved by the said order as well as the conditions imposed by the Trial Court while granting her bail, the petitioner approached the learned Sessions Judge under Sections 397 and 399 of the Cr. P.C. and sought for setting aside the order dated 10-2-2005 and to allow her application filed for discharge. The learned Sessions Judge, in Cri. R.P. No. 15014 of 2005, by his order dated 13-9-2005, refused to interfere with the order of the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, declining to discharge the petitioner it is this order of the learned Sessions Judge that is impugned in this petition. 3. The learned Sessions Judge, in Cri. R.P. No. 15014 of 2005, by his order dated 13-9-2005, refused to interfere with the order of the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, declining to discharge the petitioner it is this order of the learned Sessions Judge that is impugned in this petition. 3. Heard the arguments of the learned Counsels for the petitioner as well as the learned Government Pleader for the State and carefully perused the material placed on record, including the orders passed by the learned Sessions Judge in the revision petition and that of the learned Metropolitan Magistrate refusing to discharge the petitioner from the criminal case, as well as the objections filed by the State. 4. The learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the only question for consideration is whether, as on 28-7-2004, the petitioner was found to be in India without having proper residential permit and, in this regard, he submitted that though the initial period granted to the petitioner to stay in India was confined upto 25-7-2004, the fact that there were certain developments which culminated in the petitioner finding an ideal marriage partner in Bangalore, leading to the marriage taking place on 18-7-2004, the petitioner was forced to stay beyond the original dead line i.e., 25-7-2004. But, however, she was given the extension subsequently covering the period from 26-7-2004 to 26-1-2005 and further extension from 26-1-2005 to 25-1-2006 is pending. As such, although the petitioner had no essential permit to stay beyond 26- 7 -2004, in view of the fact that permit was extended subsequently from 26-7-2004 onwards upto 26-1-2005, the petitioner is deemed to have valid residential permit even during the period, which is the subject-matter of the criminal case that is pending before the learned Magistrate. As such, although the petitioner had no essential permit to stay beyond 26- 7 -2004, in view of the fact that permit was extended subsequently from 26-7-2004 onwards upto 26-1-2005, the petitioner is deemed to have valid residential permit even during the period, which is the subject-matter of the criminal case that is pending before the learned Magistrate. It was further submitted that the petitioner applied for VISA extension on 22-7-2004 and after the said application was processed, the Central Government was pleased to grant extension of VISA for a further period of six months and, therefore, the question of the petitioner overstaying beyond the original permit period does not arise and in view of the period between 26-7-2004 upto 26-1-2005 having been regularized by the Central Government, the question of the petitioner committing the offence under Clause 7(2) of the Foreigners Order, 1948 read with Section 14 of the Foreigners Act, 1946 will not arise and hence, both the Courts below erred in rejecting the prayer of the petitioner to discharge her from the case. 5. On the other hand, the learned Government Pleader for the State submitted that the initial period of residential permit was only upto 25-7 -2004 and as on the said date, no permission had been obtained by her to stay beyond 25-7-2004 and, secondly, even as per the residential permit which was granted to her covering the period from 18-5-2004 to 26- 7 -2004, an application for extension of the period of the permit will have to be made fifteen days before and, therefore, as the petitioner had failed to make such an application, it is deemed that her stay beyond 26-7-2004 was without a valid residential permit being granted by the Competent Authority and, therefore, the learned Magistrate was not in error in rejecting the application filed by the petitioner for discharge and for the very same reasons, the order of the learned Sessions Judge in the revision also does not call for interference. 6. While dealing with the scope of Section 482 of the Cr. P.C., the Supreme Court in a recent decision in the case of Mohd. Malek MandaI v Pranjal Bardalai1, has observed thus: "8. Before parting, we may also note that wide extraordinary power of quashing vested in the High Court is to be exercised sparingly and with caution and not to stifle legitimate prosecution. P.C., the Supreme Court in a recent decision in the case of Mohd. Malek MandaI v Pranjal Bardalai1, has observed thus: "8. Before parting, we may also note that wide extraordinary power of quashing vested in the High Court is to be exercised sparingly and with caution and not to stifle legitimate prosecution. Such a power is required to be exercised in a case where the complaint does not disclose any offence and it is frivolous, vexatious or oppressive. At that stage, there cannot be meticulous analysis of the case .... ". Further reference is also made to the decisions of the Apex Court in the case of Balkar Singh v Jagdish Kumar and K. Kalimuthu v State. 7. Keeping the above principles in view, if we look at the case on hand, the charge levelled against the petitioner is that she was violated Clause 7(2) of the Foreigners Order, 1948 read with Section 14 of the Foreigners Act, 1946. Whether subsequent to the expiry of the residential permit on 25-7-2004, the petitioner overstayed till 28-7-2004 without having proper residential permit; or whether the subsequent permission granted to her would have the effect of regularising the earlier period during which she was found to have overstayed; and whether there was violation of the condition of the residential permit which requires that an application for extension of the period of permit must be made at least fifteen days before, are all matters which involve mixed questions of law and fact and, therefore, it is suffice to say that, at this stage, both the Courts below have found sufficient material to proceed against the petitioner for her alleged overstay beyond the permit period. 8. The Apex Court, in the case of Delhi Administration u Mohammad Iqbal has observed that, "the charge is that by failing to obtain a residential permit the respondent contravened the provision of Clause 7(2) of the Foreigners Order. His failure to obtain the residential permit as well as his contravention of the Foreigners Act suffices to hold that not only he had mens rea but he was guilty of an offence of contravention of Clause 7(2) of the Foreigners Order and Section 8(2) of the Foreigners Act". 9. His failure to obtain the residential permit as well as his contravention of the Foreigners Act suffices to hold that not only he had mens rea but he was guilty of an offence of contravention of Clause 7(2) of the Foreigners Order and Section 8(2) of the Foreigners Act". 9. For the aforesaid reasons, in my view, the orders passed by the Courts below refusing to discharge the petitioner cannot be faulted and I refrain from making any further observation lest it may prejudice the case of the parties before the Trial Court. 10. In the result, the petition stands dismissed.