Judgment :- Ramachandran, J. When W.A.No.880 of 2006 came before the Division Bench, it had been stated that there were other connected matters pending. Parties were agreeable that all the cases could be taken up and disposed of, together. W.P.(c)No.19893 of 2005 had not been listed on 1.8.2006, but since already the above case had been ordered to be posted along with W.P.(C)No.16720 of 2006, this too had been roped in. 2. W.P.(C).Nos.36071 of 2003, 3815 of 2005, 19893 of 2005 and 16720 of 2006 had been filed by a company – M/s. Canon Granties Private Limited. W.A.No.880 of 2006 has been filed by the Kerala State Pollution Control Board challenging the order passed in R.P.No.916 of 2005 dated 28.3.2006. The review petition had been filed by the Board aggrieved by the judgment dated 8.4.2005 passed in W.P.(C) No.1759 of 2005, again filed by M/s. Canon Granites Private Limited. W.P.(C) No.33368 of 2003 is filed by a public spirited person, feeling aggrieved about the permission granted for the company to work a granite crushing unit. The principal respondent in all the above petitions is the appellant in W.A.No.880 of 2006, the Kerala State Pollution Control Board. In view of the orders that were passed from time to time, W.P.(C) Nos.36071 of 2003, 33368 of 2003 and 3815 of 2005 have practically become infructuous to the extent at least that they are not to be independently considered. Nevertheless, the general issues could be narrated, so as to have a comprehensive view for deciding as to the manner in which the petitions and appeals are to be disposed of. 3. M/s. Canon Granites Private Limited, (hereinafter referred to as ‘the company’) had installed a granite crushing unit at Kadavalloor Panchayath after securing licences and no objection certificates from all concerned authorities some time in the year 1998. The licence authorised them to install machineries, with a capacity of 60 H.P. It was renewed from time to time and was valid up to 3.12.2005 when W.P.(C) No.36071 of 2003 came to be filed. 4. Two new crusher motors had been installed by the company late in the year 2003, after obtaining permission from the Panchayath for the civil works. The idea was to expand the capacity of the existing unit. 4. Two new crusher motors had been installed by the company late in the year 2003, after obtaining permission from the Panchayath for the civil works. The idea was to expand the capacity of the existing unit. An application had been presented before the Pollution Control Board under the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981 some time in August, 2003, with all requisite details. They owned 24 acres of land where the project was situated. The application was in the prescribed form. According to the company, no follow up steps were seen taken, but in the mean while, petitioner in W.P.(C).No.33368 of 2003 had been making representations alleging that additional capacity was being utilised, and the Board is required to intervene. According to the company, they were issued with an order later, on 21.12.2003, the gist of which was as following. The Board had received a complaint of unauthorised expansion. When inspection had been conducted on 20.10.2003, two additional secondary crushers were seen installed. There were other short falls in the matter of control of pollution, and an explanation is required to be submitted. 5. By their reply, the company had informed that already an application had been filed on 18.8.2003, and if there were any short falls, they were prepared to attend thereto. Permission had been solicited for installation of additional capacity. The Board had responded however by issuing a notice alleging that the company had violated condition No.3, by installing and operating two additional crushers without prior permission, and therefore, steps were being taken for disconnecting electrical connections to them. 6. Apprehending coercive action, W.P.(C).No.36071 of 2003 is seen filed. An interim stay had been granted by this Court. With modifications, the stay is continuing. Further sequence of events could be summarized as following. 7. The application seeking for consent had been rejected on 15.1.2003. Statutory appeal before the Air Appellate Authority, Trivandrum was thereupon filed. This had been finally disposed of on 6.10.2004; the authority pointing out that the revised criteria was mandatory to be followed in the matter of grant of consent and the authority had no jurisdiction to go beyond the same. This change in the norms and justifiability thereof with particular reference to the unit, substantially, is the bone of contention between the parties. Relevance of O.P.No.33368 of 2003 has lost significance in this context. 8. This change in the norms and justifiability thereof with particular reference to the unit, substantially, is the bone of contention between the parties. Relevance of O.P.No.33368 of 2003 has lost significance in this context. 8. The minimum distance required as per earlier guide lines was that measuring from the centre point of the crusher, there should not be any dwelling house within a distance of 100 metres, to the periphery of the house. This was changed and increased as 250 metres effective from 30.4.1998. It was found by the Appellate Authority that the impugned orders are not possible to be interfered with as these norms had to be applied, and there was no provision for relaxation. W.P.(C).No.1759 of 2005 had in fact come to be filed thereafter, pointing out the unreasonableness involved. The restriction was unreasonable, it was submitted and it operated to clip the wings of an industry and the provisions were arbitrary. By a short judgment dated 8.4.2005, the court had held as following:- “The only reason for not granting NOC to the petitioner to run the unit is that there are a few houses within 250 metres of the crushing site. According to counsel for the petitioner, the occupants of the houses have no objection and are residing more than 200 metres away from the site, It is seen from the photograph produced that the petitioner has made massive investment and constructed pucca plant apparently ensuring prevention of pollution. In a similar case, the Division Bench of this Court direct the Pollution Control Board to consider whether there is actual pollution and if not, to grant NOC. In the circumstances, the second respondent is directed to monitor pollution level after permitting the petitioner to conduct trial run for eight house and find out the impact of pollution. If there is no pollution, he will recommend to the first respondent to issue NOC. If there is pollution, he will give details of pollution and decline NOC which the petitioner is free to challenge.” The Board felt aggrieved about this judgment and had filed W.A.No.2360 of 2005, but the same was not entertained by the court holding that it would have been proper for the Board to file an application for review if they were aggrieved about the directions. R.P.No.916 of 2005 came to be filed in the aforesaid context, but the petition was dismissed by the learned Judge holding that there were no grounds for review. This order is challenged in W.A.No.880 of 2006. 8. It is to be noted at this juncture that the learned Judge had referred to a similar case, relating to a crusher unit. Since the whole idea of the Act and the Board, a creature of the statute, was to curb and minimize pollution, the Board was to consider whether there is actual pollution and if not, NOC was to be granted. In effect, the direction was that pollution levels were to be monitored after permitting the petitioner to conduct trial runs for eight hours, and thus finding the real and available situations. 9. The next writ petition had come to be filed, aggrieved about the resistance and reservations that had been shown by the board in the matter of issuing NOC, after the earlier direction had come to be passed. While considering W.P.(C).No.19893 of 2005, at the initial stage, the learned Judge had referred to the observations made by the Division Bench referred to earlier as one which perhaps could be followed as guidelines, in such matters. Of course, the criteria prescribed by the Board in the matter of prescribing conditions, evidenced by Circular dated 30.4.1998 had been upheld in the said judgment (W.A.No.637 of 2004). But, it was with reservations, as the Division Bench was of the opinion that the Board has to reconsider claims pertaining to relaxation of distance rules in respect of units which worked sophisticated machineries and risk of pollution was minimum. A copy of the judgment in W.A.No.637 of 2004 had been brought to our attention, produced as Annexure-B in W.A.No.880 of 2006. The writ appeal was one filed by the Pollution Control Board aggrieved about certain directions passed by the learned Judge and by a scholarly analysis, the Division Bench had examined the underlying objectives for such prescriptions. Court also indicated the parameters which normally could have been employed while assessing the given situation. It had been held that the prime object of the Act was the preservation on natural resources of earth. Control of air pollution was one vital issue, to be strived for. Provisions were therefore mandatory to be enforced. Court also indicated the parameters which normally could have been employed while assessing the given situation. It had been held that the prime object of the Act was the preservation on natural resources of earth. Control of air pollution was one vital issue, to be strived for. Provisions were therefore mandatory to be enforced. The Board had the duty to lay down the norms, having regard to the quality of air, but this was to be backed up with scientifically designed parametes. 10. Referring to the standards specified by clause (j) and Annexure II of Schedule VI of the Act, it had been noticed that in case of stone crushing units, the suspended p.m. (per million) contribution value at a distance of 40 metres from a controlled, isolated as well as from a unit located in the cluster should be less than 600 micr.grams/Nm3. The court had also observed that the boundaries of two crushers should be at least 2 Kms. apart. The Division Bench had noticed that an earlier decision by a Bench dated 4.4.2002 in OP No.13430 of 1996 and 2004 of 1997 had upheld a condition laid down by earlier Circular, viz., that the prohibited distance is to be 100 metres. The Court took cognisance of the submissions made on behalf of the Board, for the enhancement of the prohibited distance. They had found mushroom growth of crusher units. It had been pleaded that the distance fixed as 250 metres was reasonable. 11. The Division Bench at that time did not accept the contention of the industrialist that fixation of 250 metres distance was unreasonable. But, according to them, nevertheless, the provision could not be applied with all its rigidity in all available cases. Due to operational efficiency of the machines, practically if there is no dust pollution, the contention that special features should not have been overlooked for technical reasons, was a point worthy of serious consideration. The court observed that it was ill-equipped and did not have the expertise to pronounce upon the merits of the contentions, but such issues necessarily were to be taken notice of by statutory boards by conducting studies and deliberations. In respect of an individual stone crusher unit which is equipped with techniques to minimize noise and dust pollutions, they do deserve a separate treatment and the distance ruled was not to be applied in absolute rigidity. In respect of an individual stone crusher unit which is equipped with techniques to minimize noise and dust pollutions, they do deserve a separate treatment and the distance ruled was not to be applied in absolute rigidity. It was therefore directed that the Board should take a decision as to whether the distance should be uniform for all crusher units or whether appropriate changes were to be made in the case of units which are using the modern machinery. 12. Thus, we feel that after the judgment, in W.P.(C).No.1759 of 2005, which referred to these principles, what was expected of the Board therefore was to examine the case of the company as to whether they deserve a special treatment since the only objection pointed out for rejecting the application was that there were residential premises within two hundred and fifty metres of the establishment. Since the company had submitted a formal application, on 2.8.2003 itself, and it was pending with the Board, we do not think, there was necessity or reason for the Board to hold that they unauthorisedly started operation of additional units and therefore, were to be blacklisted. 13. We notice that there was allegation of adamancy on the part of the Board all through out for one reason or another. Company refers to repeated letters which had been addressed to the Board requesting for follow up action as required by judgment in W.P.(C).No.1759 of 2005. Such letters are stated to have been written on 16.4.2005, 26.4.2005 and 11.4.2005, but there was no real response forthcoming. According to the company, on the other hand, the Chairman had directed the company to contact the Environmental Engineer for getting guidance. However, the said officer entered the scene by making demands for huge bribe. Reportedly, he was in dire need of substantial funds. It is stated that exasperated, a complaint had been lodged to the police and even a trap had been laid, which led to recovery of Rs.2 lakhs as received by an associate of the then Environmental Engineer. Consequential departmental proceedings are state to be in progress. 14. We find that as their requests were at standstill, they had filed an application alleging contempt of the orders of the court as C.O.C.No.790 of 2005. Allegation was that no trial run as required by the direction of the learned Judge was carried out. Consequential departmental proceedings are state to be in progress. 14. We find that as their requests were at standstill, they had filed an application alleging contempt of the orders of the court as C.O.C.No.790 of 2005. Allegation was that no trial run as required by the direction of the learned Judge was carried out. The move as above was scuttled, since results pertaining to an alleged trial run carried out on 20.8.2005 had been produced as exhibit. It was averred that there was excess of pollution limits. The petition was closed at that time with liberty given to the company to challenge the Board’s proceedings appropriately. 15. The petition filed thereafter namely, W.P.(c).No.19893 of 2005 was resisted, with great vigor. Coercive steps were in the offing. When it came for admission, however, the Court had directed that the direction for dismantling the additional crushers required to be stayed. The company was however not to operate those two additional units. An affidavit was directed to be filed regarding the methodology carried out for the alleged inspection that had been carried out, but it seems such affidavits were not forthcoming. The court had observed that “there is reason to believe that the trial run was not properly held.” The Board was directed to hold a fresh trial run and an Advocate Commissioner had been appointed to witness the trial run. In the process followed, the company was represented by the National Productivity Council, New Delhi. The report dated 4.1.2006 refers to the expert’s opinion. The Experts-SGS Laboratories, Madras gave an opinion that dust pollution generated from the crusher units are much below the permitted limit of 600 micrograms the report from the Central Pollution Board also showed that the dust pollution and noise pollution were below the permitted limit. 16. The reports were filed before the learned Judge, but objections had forth come. It was argued that although a trial run had commenced on 11.9.2005, the same was not completed. The learned Judge records “The petitioner blames the Engineer of the Pollution Control Board, who on the contrary accused the petitioner for non-completion of the trial run and monitoring the pollution level”. 17. But, straight away, the court had not come to any conclusion as such, but directed the Advocate Commissioner to conduct a fresh trial run in the presence of the Additional Director of Central Pollution Control Board. 17. But, straight away, the court had not come to any conclusion as such, but directed the Advocate Commissioner to conduct a fresh trial run in the presence of the Additional Director of Central Pollution Control Board. This had been duly carried out. The report indicated that level of pollution was far lesser than prescribed limits. On receiving the report, the Judge observed that it would appear that “the consent can be granted to the petitioner subject to the implementation of the stipulations contained therein.” The Board was to examine “whether consent to establish and operate the two secondary crusher units was to be considered provided the petitioner is otherwise eligible.” It had been observed that this Court was consistent that the Board was expected to take a pragmatic view instead of a pedantic view. Having regard to the technology employed, a lesser distance than 250 metres could have been sufficient in view of the findings of the Central Pollution Control Board. The State Board could not have gone behind it. It was therefore directed that within six weeks, the claim for consent was to be taken up and orders passed. This order is dated 13.1.2006. It is clear that though the court was satisfied of the claim of the company, nevertheless, the duty to pass orders on the application had been entrusted to the statutory authority. 18. Claiming to be acting on the report of the Zonal Officer, and other relevant proceedings, an order had been passed thereafter on 30.5.2006. The decision was that the company is not to be permitted to operate the additional secondary crushers. They were established in violation of Section 21 of the Air (Prevention and control of Pollution) Act, and Circular dated 30.04.1998. Thus the issue had come back to square one. Petitioner/company had initially challenged the order by filing C.C.C.No.318 of 2006, but reserving the right of the petitioner to challenge the orders, the C.C.C. was closed. There was a direction for payment of token cost, perhaps to record the displeasure. The order dated 30.5.2006 has thereafter been subjected to challenge in W.P.(C).No.16720 of 2006, which is the last of the group. 19. In line with the order passed in W.P.(C).No.19893 of 2005 dated 13.1.2006, an interim order had been passed by the learned Judge on 29.6.2006 in W.P.(C).No.16720 of 2006. The order dated 30.5.2006 has thereafter been subjected to challenge in W.P.(C).No.16720 of 2006, which is the last of the group. 19. In line with the order passed in W.P.(C).No.19893 of 2005 dated 13.1.2006, an interim order had been passed by the learned Judge on 29.6.2006 in W.P.(C).No.16720 of 2006. In very strong terms, it had been observed that since already the factory is working, addition of two machineries may not make any difference on the location-impact. It was further held that injustice is done to the cause of the petitioner persistently by the State Pollution Control Board by not permitting working of the two additional crushers installed three years back at a cost of over rupees one crore. The court was of the view therefore that petitioner was to be permitted to operate the two additional crushers. Liberty is given to the Board to monitor the amount of pollution and if necessary, liberty to get the order as above modified/reviewed. We find that although the establishment is working, so far, no report has come to be filed. This, perhaps, discloses a situation that the monitoring carried out was not sufficient enough to interdict them. 20. Evidently, the Board might have felt that all these ‘inconveniences’ would be the direct result of judgment in W.P.(C).No.1759 of 2005. The writ appeal is therefore projected with greater vigor. One may well even characterize it as a ‘cynically enterprising’. Mr. Babu Joseph Kuruvathazha submits that there was an imperative duty on the part of the company to conform its business in line with Section 21 of the Air Act and the circular which had been issued from time to time and especially the one dated 30.4.1998. This is in answer to the submission made by the petitioner, company that a negative approach was unwarranted. We feel that the Board cannot shut eyes to the realities. The inspection by an impartial person in the presence of experts indicate that by additionally working two units, there was no pollution beyond the permissible limits. A plain understanding, therefore, might be that the Board is unhappy about observations that have been made by the earlier Division Bench to which the learned judge had made reference. It is possible to conclude that the Board is finding it difficult to digest the observation, perhaps feeling that inroads made are intended to usurp their expertise. 21. A plain understanding, therefore, might be that the Board is unhappy about observations that have been made by the earlier Division Bench to which the learned judge had made reference. It is possible to conclude that the Board is finding it difficult to digest the observation, perhaps feeling that inroads made are intended to usurp their expertise. 21. One need not be a technocrat to sense presence of prejudice in human activities. Beurocrats are expected to function judiciously, and there should not be arbitrariness in their approach. The fundamental rights of a person to carry on a profession is recognised by the Constitution of India. Any restriction could be upheld only if they primarily satisfy the test of reasonableness. The Circulars are to be read and understood as guidelines—they do not have the rigor of statute or rules. 22. The Board thus far has not disclosed the reason for enhancing the distance limit from 100 metres to 250 metres. The restrictions are not intended to strangulate entrepreneurship. The Division Bench had perhaps considered that it may not be necessary to put spokes in the functioning of the Pollution Control Board in larger public interest or to suspect their wisdom. Now, it has turned out that the Board acting through its officers obviously refuses to see eye to eye with the hope that had been given voice. As referred to earlier, due application has been submitted for running the industry as early as on 18.8.2003. The learned Judge, while passing interim order in W.P.(C) No.19893 of 2005, had indicated the general areas the respondents were expected to traverse while passing the orders. This has been ignored, although the order still binds them. We have not been informed of a situation where there was attempt to misled the Board or suppress the activities relating to expansion. The alleged violation of Section 21 of the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981 is therefore imaginary. The directions of this Court in respect of understanding and implementation of the Circular dated 30.4.1998 also had fallen into deaf ears, and it is time for this Court to step in, as the tirade and consequent litigation cannot be permitted to stay on. We hope that it is not the Board’s outlook that has been given expression now, but it may be purely the mind set of some of the officers alone. 23. We hope that it is not the Board’s outlook that has been given expression now, but it may be purely the mind set of some of the officers alone. 23. Resultantly, we set aside Ext.P8 order in W.P.(C) No.16720 of 2005. Interim order dated 29.6.2006 would be deemed as final order for all purposes, and excepting routine inspections the Board is not to interfere with their work or utilization of additional capacity. 24. The decision as above entails the dismissal of W.A.No.880 of 2006 as well as O.P.No.33368 of 2003. Rest of the petitions will stand closed, and are to be deemed as disposed of in the light of the observations and directions that had already been passed. There will be no order as to costs.