JUDGMENT Hon’ble N.K.Mehrotra, J.—This is an appeal under Section 10-F of the Companies Act, 1956 against the Company Petition No. 66 of 2005 pending before the Company Law Board, Principal Bench, New Delhi challenging the orders dated 29.8.2005, 13.9.2005, 17.10.2005, 18.10.2005 and 6.12.2005 passed in the proceedings under Sections 397, 398, 399 read with Section 402, 403 and 406 of the Companies Act (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’). 2. Appellant Sushma Jhunjhunwala is a share holder of M/s. J.R.Agro Industries Limited, the respondent No. 5 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Company’). According to the appellant, she alongwith some other share-holders of the Company were of the opinion that the affairs of the Company were not being conducted properly and there is a serious rift between the Board of Directors of the Company. Since the share holders of the Company constituting more than 10% of the equity shareholding in the Company, were of the opinion that their interest in the company are not being managed well by the present Board of the Company, they gave a notice dated 26.7.2005 to the company requiring the Board of Directors of the Company to requisition the Extra Ordinary General meeting of the Company so as to enable the share-holders to decide the future of the Management of the Company. They received a reply from the Company that the notice under Section 169 of the Companies Act, 1956 was invalid and the request could not be considered. 3. It is alleged that after the aforesaid happening Shri Yadurish Rai Jhunjhunwala, the Chairman and Managing Director of the Company alongwith two other Directors of the Company, the respondent Nos. 3 and 4 filed a Company Petition No. 66 of 2005 before the Company Law Board under Sections 397,398 and 399 read with Section 402,403 and 406 of the Companies Act, 1956 claiming therein the following reliefs : (i) To direct the respondent group to handover the affairs of the Company to the petitioner in terms of the family settlement. (ii) To declare the notice dated 26.7.2005 issued by the respondent Nos. 7 to 10 to hold Extra Ordinary General Meeting and to amend the articles of association to abolish the position of the Chairman and Managing Director of the Respondent No. 1, Company is oppressive illegal and void. (ii) To declare the notice dated 26.7.2005 issued by the respondent Nos. 7 to 10 to hold Extra Ordinary General Meeting and to amend the articles of association to abolish the position of the Chairman and Managing Director of the Respondent No. 1, Company is oppressive illegal and void. (iii) To declare the Memorandum of understanding dated 26.2.2005 illegally binding and that the division of the business affairs of the respondent No. l and 4 company amongst the family members shall be followed. (iv) To declare that the petitioner and the respondents group are holding 50:50 shareholding and in case of any difference, the directions may be given to transfer the shares out of the quota of the respondents to hold the parity of 50:50 betweens the groups. (v) To direct the respondent No. 4 Company to repay the loan amount and also make the payments for the interest amount to the respondent No. 1 Company and; (vi) to relieve the respondent No. 1 company and the petitioners from the consequences of default arose on account of request for withdrawal of the amount from the unsecured loans. 4. The petition was taken up on 29.2.2005. The Company Law Board passed the first impugned order on 29.8.2005 which is as follows : “Petition mentioned. The Board will consider the requisition for the EGM and in case the Board decide to hold EGM, the leave of this Board should be obtained. No Director would be stopped from entering the factory premises. Respondents to file their reply to the petition by 30.9.2005 and rejoinder to be filed by 20.10.2005. The petition will be heard on 11.11.2005 at 10.30 a.m.” 5. After passing of the order dated 29.8.2005, another order was passed by the Company Law Board on 13.9.2005 restraining the respondents of the Company Petition No. 66 of 2005 from entering the premises of the Company M/s. J.R. Agro Industries Limited., and at the same time also restrained the petitioners from entering the premises of M/s. J.R. Organics, the subsidiary company of M/s. J.R.Agro Industries Limited. This is the second impugned order. After that the petitioners in the Company Petition No. 66 of 2005 preferred an application on 13.10.2005 praying that the share-holders of the Company should be restrained from meeting pursuant to the notice dated 26.9.2005 under Section 169(6) of the Companies Act. This is the second impugned order. After that the petitioners in the Company Petition No. 66 of 2005 preferred an application on 13.10.2005 praying that the share-holders of the Company should be restrained from meeting pursuant to the notice dated 26.9.2005 under Section 169(6) of the Companies Act. The Company Law Board passed third impugned order on this application on 17.10.2005 adjourning the Extra Ordinary General Meeting which was to be held on 19.10.2005 till further orders of the Company Law Board on the ground that the Company Law Board was trying to resolve the dispute amicably. Afterwords, the matter was again taken up on the mentioning of Sri Y.K. Jhunjhunwala, on 18.10.2005 for incorporating certain other conditions in the order which had been agreed on 17.10.2005 but could not be mentioned in the order dated 17.10.2005. This is the fourth impugned order which is as follows : “The petitioners will immediately withdraw their letter to PNB making allegations against the respondents with a copy to the respondents. The petitioner will deposit all preference share certificates with the Bench Officer within three days time. Adjourned to 8.11.2005 for further implementation of MOU.” 6. On 26.10.2005, an application for modification /correction of the order dated 18.10.2005 was preferred by Sri Y.K. Jhunjhunwala, the husband of the appellant and one of the Directors. Objections were invited and 6.12.2005 was fixed for hearing on this application. On 6.12.2005, the Company Law Board rejected the prayer for modification/correction of the order dated 18.10.2005. It is the last impugned order in this appeal. 7. The respondent Nos. 6, 7, 8, 11, 12 and 13 represented through Shri Anupam Mehrotra, Advocate are supporting the appeal. The respondent Nos. 1, 5, 9 and 10 are the formal parties. The respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 4 are represented through Shri Prashant Chandra, Advocate and Shri Virendra Bhatia, the Advocate General assisted by Smt.Nalini Jain. The appeal has been opposed by the respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 4. 8. The contesting respondents have raised certain preliminary objections relating to maintainability of the appeal. The first argument is that only one appeal under Section 10-F of the Act against five impugned orders is not maintainable. The second argument is that the appeal against the first four impugned orders dated 29.8.2005, 13.9.2005, 17.10.2005, and 18.10.2005 is time barred. 8. The contesting respondents have raised certain preliminary objections relating to maintainability of the appeal. The first argument is that only one appeal under Section 10-F of the Act against five impugned orders is not maintainable. The second argument is that the appeal against the first four impugned orders dated 29.8.2005, 13.9.2005, 17.10.2005, and 18.10.2005 is time barred. The third argument is that the last order dated 6.12.2005 does not involve any question of law as is mandatory requirement under Section 10-F of the Act. The next argument by the contesting respondents is that the latest impugned order dated 6.12.2005 is a consenting order and the main ground of appeal as stated here before this Court challenging the jurisdiction of the Company Law Board to proceed in the matter has not been raised before the Company Law Board by the appellant or the other respondents who are supporting the case of the appellant here in the instant appeal. The relevant provisions under Sections 397, 398, 399, 402, 403, 406 and 433 are as follow : “ 397. Application to [Tribunal] for relief in cases of oppression.—(1) Any member of a company who complain that the affairs of the company [are being conducted in a manner prejudicial to public interest or] in a manner oppressive to any member or members (including any one or more of themselves) may apply to the [Tribunal] for an order under this section, provided such members have a right so to apply in virtue of Section 399. (2) If on any application under sub-section (1) the [Tribunal] is of opinion— (a) that the company’s affairs [are being conducted in a manner prejudicial to public interest or] in a manner oppressive to any member or members; and (b) that to wind up the company would unfairly prejudice such member or members, but that otherwise the facts would justify the making of a winding up order on the ground that it was just and equitable that the company should be would up; the [Tribunal] may, with a view to bringing to an end the matters complained of, make such order as it thinks fit 398. Application to [Tribunal] for relief in cases of mismanagement.— (1) Any members of a company who complain; (a) that the affairs of the company [are being conducted in a manner prejudicial to public interest or] in a manner prejudicial to the interests of the company, or (b) that a material change (not being a change brought about by, or in the interests of, any creditors) including debenture holders, or any class of shareholders, of the company has taken place in the management or control of the company, whether by an alteration in its Board of Directors, or manager or in the ownership of the company’s shares, or if it has no share capital, in its membership, or in any other manner whatsoever, and that by reason of such change, it is likely that the affairs of the company will be conducted in a manner prejudicial to public interest or in a manner prejudicial to the interests of the company; may apply to the [Tribunal] for an order under this section, provided such members have a right so to apply in virtue of Section 399. (2) If, on any application under sub-section (1), the [Tribunal] is of opinion that the affairs of the company are being conducted as aforesaid or that by reason of any material change as aforesaid in the management or control of the company, it is likely that the affairs of the company will be conducted as aforesaid the [Tribunal] may, with a view to bringing to an end or preventing the matters complained of or apprehended, make such order as it thinks fit 399. Right to apply under Sections 397 and 398.—(1) The following members of a company shall have the right to apply under Section 397 and 398 :— (a) in the case of a company having a share capital, not less than one hundred members of the company or not less than one-tenth of the total number of its members, whichever is less, or any member or members holding not less than one-tenth of the issued share capital of the company, provided that the applicant or applicants have paid all calls and other sums due on their shares; (b) in the case of a company not having a share capital, not less than one-fifth of the total number of its members. (2) For the purposes of sub-section (1), where any share or shares are held by two or more persons jointly, they shall be counted only as one member. (3) Where any members of a company are entitled to make an application in virtue of sub-section (1), any one or more of them having obtained the consent in writing of the rest, may make the application on behalf and for the benefit of all of them. (4) The Central Government may, if in its opinion circumstances exist which make it just and equitable so to do, authorise any member or members of the company to apply to the [Tribunal] under Section 397 or 398, not withstanding that the requirements of clause (a) or clause (b), as the case may be, of sub-section (1) are not fulfilled. (5) The Central Government may, before authorising any member or members as aforesaid require such member or members to give security for such amount as the Central Government may deem reasonable, for the payment of any costs which the [Tribunal] dealing with the application may order such member or members to pay to any other person or persons who are parties to the application. 402. 402. Powers of [Tribunal] on application under Section 397 or 398.— Without prejudice to the generality of the powers of the [Tribunal] under Section 397 or 398, any order under either section may provide for— (a) the regulation of the conduct of the company’s affairs in future; (b) the purchase of the shares or interests of any members of the company by other members thereof or by the company; (c) in the case of a purchase of its shares by the company as aforesaid, the consequent reduction of its share capital (d) the termination, setting aside or modification of any agreement, howsoever arrived at, between the company on the one hand, and any of the following persons, on the other, namely : (i) the managing director, (ii) any other director, (iii) [***], (iv) the manager, upon such terms and conditions as may, in the opinion of the [Tribunal] be just and equitable in all the circumstances of the case; (e) the termination, setting aside or modification of any agreement between the company and any person not referred to in clause (d), provided that no such agreement shall be terminated, set aside or modified except after due notice to the party concerned and provided further that no such agreement shall be modified except after obtaining the consent of the party concerned; (f) the setting aside of any transfer, delivery of goods, payment execution or other act relating to property made or done by or against the company within three months before the date of the application under Section 397 or 398, which would, if made or done by or against an individual, be deemed in his insolvency to be a fraudulent preference; (g) any other matter for which in the opinion of the [Tribunal] it is just and equitable that provision should be made. 403. Interim order by [Tribunal].—Pending the making by it of a final order under Section 397 or 398, as the case may be, the [Tribunal] may, as the application of any party to the proceeding, make any interim order which it thinks fit for regulating the conduct of the company’s affairs, upon such terms and conditions as appear to it to be just and equitable. 406. 406. Application of Sections 539 to 544 to proceedings under Sections 397 and 398.—In relation to an application under Section 397 or 398, Sections 539 and 544, both inclusive, shall apply in the form set forth in Schedule XI. 433. Circumstances in which company may be wound up by Tribunal—A company may be would up by the Tribunal,— (a) if the company has, by special resolution, resolved that the company be would up by the Tribunal; (b) if default is made in delivering the statutory report to the Registrar or in holding the statutory meeting; (c) if the company does snot commence its business within a year from its below seven, and in the case of a private company, below two; (e) if the company is unable to pay its debts; (f) if the Tribunal is of the opinion that it is just and equitable that the company should be wound up; (g) if the company has made a default in filing with the Registrar its balance sheet and profit and loss account or annual returns for any five consecutive financial years; (h) if the company has acted against the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality; (i) if the Tribunal is of the opinion that the company should be wound up under the circumstances specified in Section 424-G; Provided that the Tribunal shall make an order for winding up of a company under clause (h) on application made by the Central Government or a State Government]. 9. 9. Since the appeal has been filed under Section 10-F of the Companies Act, 1956, the provisions under Section 10-F of the Companies Act, 1956 are as follow: “10-F. Appeals against the orders of the Company Law Board.—Any person aggrieved by any decision or order of the Company Law Board [made before the commencement of the Companies (Second Amendment) Act, 2002 may file an appeal to the High Court within sixty days from the date of communication of the decision or order of the Company Law Board to him on any question of law arising out of such order; Provided that the High Court may, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal within the said period, allow it to be filed within a further period not exceeding sixty days].” 10. The first objection of the contesting respondents against the maintainability of the appeal is that one appeal cannot be filed against the several orders, we find that appellant Sushma Jhunjhunwala who is the respondent No. 8 in the Company Petition under Sections 397, 398, 399 read with Sections 402 and 406 of the Companies Act has challenged several orders dated 29.8.2005, 13.9.2005, 17.10.2005, 18.10.2005 and 6.12.2005 in the instant appeal. Under the Companies Act, the only provision of appeal is under Section 10-F and any person aggrieved by any decision or order may file an appeal to the High Court within sixty days from the date of communication of the decision or order. It appears from the provisions under Section 10-F, that the intention of the Legislature is that there can not be one appeal against several orders because a period of limitation is prescribed for filing the appeal in Section 10-F itself. So we are of the view that one appeal against five orders passed during the proceedings in the Company Petition is not maintainable. 11. The next objection of the contesting respondents is that the appeal against several orders is time barred. Prima facie, it appears that the appeal was filed on 2.1.2006 after expiry of the prescribed period of limitation from the impugned orders dated 29.8.2005, 13.9.2005, 17.10.2005, and 18.10.2005 therefore, the appeal against the first four impugned orders is time barred. 12. 11. The next objection of the contesting respondents is that the appeal against several orders is time barred. Prima facie, it appears that the appeal was filed on 2.1.2006 after expiry of the prescribed period of limitation from the impugned orders dated 29.8.2005, 13.9.2005, 17.10.2005, and 18.10.2005 therefore, the appeal against the first four impugned orders is time barred. 12. The learned Counsel for the appellant has submitted that the first four impugned orders have merged into the order dated 6.12.2005, therefore, one appeal is maintainable and since the earlier orders have been merged in the order dated 6.12.2005, the appeal is still within time after calculating the period of sixty days from the date of latest impugned order dated 6.12.2005. After seeing the different orders dated 29.8.2005, 13.9.2005, 17.10.2005, 18.10.2005 and 6.12.2005, it appears to us that every order is of different nature and there is no question of merger of these orders in the latest order dated 6.12.2005. It appears that the appellant was not aggrieved against either of the first four impugned orders and therefore, she did not prefer any appeal against those orders well within time. We find that the arguments advanced by the learned Counsel for the appellant has no force. 13. The appellant felt aggrieved mainly by the order dated 6.12.2005 (Annexure No. 14). It is an order on the application for modification of the order dated 18.10.2005. The very heading of this application indicates that this application was moved for correction /modification of the order. The cause of grievance was that the last portion of the order in which the phrase “for further implementation of MOU” was mentioned. The cause of action is that the phrase used “for further implementation of MOU” should be recalled. The respondents in the Company Petition were not aggrieved against the entire order dated 18.10.2005. The order dated 18.10.2005 was passed in the open Court by the Company Law Board in presence of the parties and no objection was raised then and there. No doubt, it was a hand written order but there was nothing illegible in the order. It also appears to be a consenting order because the Company Law Board was implementing the MOU. No doubt, it was a hand written order but there was nothing illegible in the order. It also appears to be a consenting order because the Company Law Board was implementing the MOU. The objections raised by the respondents were taken into consideration by the Company Law Board and the petitioners were directed to do certain acts, so that the parties may agree to implement the MOU. It appears from the impugned orders that the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 had expressed that they had already cancelled the MOU since the petitioners have breached the terms of the MOU more particularly with respect to payment of interest on the loans given by the respondents to the Company. On this objection, the petitioners of the Company Petition offered to pay the interest from the date of the MOU. The respondents before the Company Law Board insisted on a higher rate of interest. As a via-media, it was suggested that the interest should be paid at the rate of 11% but from 1.1.2005 and not from the date of MOU. The respondents before the Company Law Board also desired that the petitioners should hand over the preference shares to the respondents to enable them to avail bank facilities for J.R. Organics and also wanted a direction to the petitioners to withdraw their letters to PNB making allegations against the respondents. After passing of the order dated 17.10.2005 in the proceedings for implementation of the MOU, the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 met the Presiding Officer of the Company Law Board and pointed out that in the order dated 17.10.2005, then-request for handing over the preference shares to them as well as the directions to the petitioners to withdraw their letter to the PNB had not been indicated and as such they desired that the order should be modified. The order was modified accordingly and these conditions were indicated in the order by the Presiding Officer. All these conduct during the proceeding indicate that the order dated 17.10.2005 as modified later on was a consenting order and i.e. why the Presiding Officer of the Board has fixed a dated 8.11.2005 for further implementation of the MOU. 14. The order was modified accordingly and these conditions were indicated in the order by the Presiding Officer. All these conduct during the proceeding indicate that the order dated 17.10.2005 as modified later on was a consenting order and i.e. why the Presiding Officer of the Board has fixed a dated 8.11.2005 for further implementation of the MOU. 14. We have gone through the document on record and we do not find anywhere the case of either of the appellant or the respondents supporting the appellant here that they have denied the existence of the MOU. No doubt, the MOU is not a signed document but for MOU, there is no law prescribing the proforma of the MOU. The MOU is nothing but it is only a writing indicating the conditions of the agreement between the parties on the basis of mutual understanding. It is not required in the prescribed proforma. It is not required to be signed by all the parties. Moreover, in this case we do not find that either parties has challenged the fact that the Company being a family Company and the family members had entered into the memorandum of understanding on 26.2.2005,. It is a different matter that the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 in the Company Petition submitted before the Company Law Board that they had cancelled the MOU and they were not willing to accept it because of the breaches committed by the petitioners of the Company Law Petition and those breaches were stated before the Company Law Board by those respondents. But because of intervention of the Presiding Officer of the Company Law Board, the parties agreed to remove those complaints made by the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 before the Company Law Board. So all these proceedings as indicated in the impugned order dated 6.12-2005 goes to show that all the orders were consenting orders and it is settled law that the appeal against the consenting orders is not maintainable. 15. 2 and 3 before the Company Law Board. So all these proceedings as indicated in the impugned order dated 6.12-2005 goes to show that all the orders were consenting orders and it is settled law that the appeal against the consenting orders is not maintainable. 15. The main argument of the learned Counsel for the appellant before this Court is that by mere perusal of the reliefs claimed in the Company Law Petition before the Company Law Board goes to show that those reliefs are beyond the scope of Sections 397 and 398 of the Companies Act and the decision to proceed on the petition itself is not in accordance with law and the Company Law Board has no jurisdiction to proceed under Sections 397 and 398 of the Companies Act by passing the order to restrain the Extra Ordinary General Meeting requisitioned under Section 169 of the Act and the Company Law Board was not competent to implement the MOU. A perusal of the entire document on record specially the objections on behalf of the respondent No. 8 Sushma Jhunjhunwala (appellant in this appeal) Annexure No. 6 and application for correction/modification of the order dated 18.10.2005 moved by Y.K.Jhunjhunwala, the respondent No. 3 in the Company Petition (respondent No. 7 in this appeal) Annexure No. 10 goes to show that there is no averment in any of the pleadings or applications or objections moved by either the appellant here or the supporting respondents in this appeal that any plea of jurisdiction was ever raised before the Company Law Board by these parties. The plea that the Company Law Board had no jurisdiction to proceed in the matter has been taken for the first time in this appeal before this Court. While it is settled law that the plea of jurisdiction must have been raised at the very first instance. It appears that the parties have participated in the proceedings and several impugned orders have been passed in those proceedings and neither party has raised any issue of jurisdiction there before the Company Law Board, therefore, the appeal on the ground of jurisdiction cannot be entertained without raising any objection with regard to the jurisdiction before the Company Law Board. 16. 16. Similarly, we find that there is no case either of the appellant or respondents supporting the appellants there before the Company Law Board that there was no MOU on the alleged date between the parties at all. The grievance was that certain obligations on the part of the petitioners in the Company Petition, were not fulfilled and therefore, the respondents had cancelled the MOU but on persuasion those respondents agreed to proceed further in the matter of implementation of the MOU. 17. In view of the above arguments with regard to the non-existence of the MOU and the jurisdiction of the Company Law Board cannot be entertained here in this appeal. 18. The learned Counsel for the contesting respondents has relied on several decisions in Trackparts of India Limited and others v. KN.Bhargava and others, 2002 Company Cases VoL109, page 350, Salkia Businessmen’s Association and others v. Howrah Municipal Corporation and others, AIR 2001 SC 2790 , Amteshwar Anand v. Virender Mohan Singh and others, (2006) 1SCC148, and M.Purandara and others v. Mahadesha S. and others, (2005) 6 SCC 791 . 19. In M.Purandara and others v. Mahadesha S. and others case (supra) it has been held by the Supreme Court that there can be no interference by the High Court on those grounds which were not raised before the Tribunal and the High Court should not entertain those pleas which were not before the Tribunal. In Salkia Businessmen’s Association and others v. Howrah Municipal Corporation and others case (supra). It has been held by the Supreme Court that there can be no interference in the orders passed on the basis of the compromise. In Amteshwar Anand v. Virender Mohan Singh and others case (supra) it has been held that there is a principle that Courts lean in favour of upholding a family arrangement instead of disturbing the same on technical or trivial grounds particularly when the parties have mutually received benefits under the arrangement. 20. The learned Counsel for the contesting respondents laid much emphasis on the judgment of this Court in Trackparts of India Limited and others v. KN.Bhargava and others case (supra) in which it has been held that an appeal under Section 10-F of the Companies Act, lies only on a question of law arising out of the order of the Company Law Board. The scope of the appeal cannot be stretched beyond this permissible limit. Further this Court has held that even if the case of oppression, the Court is not powerless to do substantial justice between the parties. That means to say that even on the failure of the plea of oppression, the Company Law Board is empowered to pass appropriate order in a petition under Sections 397 and 398 of the Companies Act which may be deemed fit in the interest of the company and the shareholders. 21. The learned Counsel for the appellant has argued that in Trackparts of India Limited and others v. K.N.Bhargava and others, case (supra) this Court has relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Needle Industries (India) Limited and others v. Needle Industries Newey (India) Holding Limited and others, (1981) 3 SCC 333 which does not say so as has been held by this Court in Trackparts of India Limited and others v. K.N. Bhargava and others case (supra). But we do not agree with the contention raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant. The same view was taken by the Supreme Court which is as follows : “Even though the company petition fails and the appeals succeed on the finding that the Holding Company has failed to make out a case of oppression, the Court is not powerless to do substantial justice between the parties and place them, as nearly as it may, in the same position in which they would have been, if the meeting of May 2, were held in accordance with law. Since the Indian shareholders were always willing to pay a premium on the excess holding on the rights shares, this is a factor which, to some extent, has gone in their favour on the question of oppression. Having had the benefit of that stance, they must now make it good. They should be asked to pay the difference in order to nullify their unjust and unjustifiable enrichment at the cost of the Holding Company.” 22. The learned Counsel for the appellant has further referred decisions of the Supreme Court in Bihar Public Service Commission and another v. Dr. Shiv Jatan Thakur and others, AIR 1994 SC 2466 . They should be asked to pay the difference in order to nullify their unjust and unjustifiable enrichment at the cost of the Holding Company.” 22. The learned Counsel for the appellant has further referred decisions of the Supreme Court in Bihar Public Service Commission and another v. Dr. Shiv Jatan Thakur and others, AIR 1994 SC 2466 . Rashunaatha Swamp Mathur and others v. Har Swarup Mathur and others, 1970 Company Cases Vol 40 page 282 and Kilpest P. Limited and others v. Shekhar Mehra, 1996 Company Cases, Vol 86. page 615 but in view of the aforesaid findings, we are not required to discuss all these cases here. 23. We are of the view that one appeal is not maintainable against several orders under Section 10-F of the Companies Act. We also hold that the appeal against the orders dated 29.8.2005, 13.10.2005, 17.10.2005 and 18.10.2005 is time barred. We also hold that the plea of jurisdiction has not been taken before the Company Law Board by the appellant or any of the respondents. Therefore, such plea cannot be permitted to be agitated here in this appeal. We also hold that the impugned order dated 6.12.2005 is the consenting order and there is no case of the appellant before the Company Law Board that the parties never entered any MOU on 26.2.2005. We also hold that even if, the allegation of oppression in the mis-management are not made out, the Company Law Board is not powerless to do substantial justice between the parties. The Company Law Board passed order which is just an equitable in the circumstances of the case after exercising the power under Sections 397 and 398 read with Section 402 of the Companies Act. There is no bar that the member Incharge of the management cannot file any petition under Sections 397 and 398 read Section 402 of Companies Act, we hold that any member of the Company may move before the Company Law Board under Sections 397 and 398 read with Section 402 of the Companies Act. 24. Before closing our order, we would like to observe that the Company Law Board should have avoided the passing of the adverse remarks against the lawyer in the impugned order. Therefore, the adverse remarks passed against Shri Dhruv Mathur shall stand expunged. 25. In view of the aforesaid reasons and with the above observations, the appeal is dismissed. 24. Before closing our order, we would like to observe that the Company Law Board should have avoided the passing of the adverse remarks against the lawyer in the impugned order. Therefore, the adverse remarks passed against Shri Dhruv Mathur shall stand expunged. 25. In view of the aforesaid reasons and with the above observations, the appeal is dismissed. Appeal Dismissed. ———