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2006 DIGILAW 535 (RAJ)

Hanuman v. Satish Kumar

2006-02-15

SANJAY DIXIT

body2006
DIXIT, MEMBER:—This review petition has been filed under Section 229 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955, the original order under review was passed in a revision petition Satish Kumar vs. Sitaram. (2). The brief facts of the case are that on 11.7.1974 a suit was instituted under Section 88, 188 by the applicants and by non- applicant No. 7 to 16 against the non-applicant No. 2 in respect of land in Khasra Nos. (3). That a reply was filed in respect of the above mentioned civil suit by the non-applicant No. 2 Chiranjilal. Issues were framed on 11.3.1976 and the suit was pending in the court of SDO, Jaipur at the time of the institution of this review petition. Along with that suit a temporary injunction was granted against the defendant Chiranjilal who was bound down by that temporary injunction. (4). On 19.10.1992 another suit for declaration, partition and permanent injunction was filed by Satish Kumar son of Chiranjilal against his father Chiranjilal in respect of land in khasra Nos. 178, 180, 186, 193 to 205, 207 and 208, 289, 296, 298 to 308, 312 and 315. (5). Firstly, a temporary injunction was issued and subsequently, an application for appointment of receiver was made in which receiver was appointed on all the lands mentioned in the foregoing para. It may be noted at this stage that khasra numbers 186, 193, 194, 197, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 207 and 208 were already the subject of temporary injunction issued on 26.7.1974 against Chiranjilal. That the applicants upon coming to know regarding the order dated 23.7.1994 filed an appeal No. 4/1994 in the court of R.A.A., Jaipur in which vide his decision dated 17.4.1995 the order of appointment of receiver on the entire land was set aside and the order was maintained only in respect of lands which were not the subject of a stay under the temporary injunction dated 26.7.1974. (6). No appeal or revision was made against the order dated 17.4.1995. However, after this Satish Kumar made an application under Order 1 rule 10 for becoming a party in the original suit, Moti vs. Chiranjilal which was dismissed and has become final. (6). No appeal or revision was made against the order dated 17.4.1995. However, after this Satish Kumar made an application under Order 1 rule 10 for becoming a party in the original suit, Moti vs. Chiranjilal which was dismissed and has become final. This land was purchased by one Sitaram and after mutations had been attested in his favour, Sitaram filed an appeal No. 232/97 in the court of Revenue Appellate Authority, in which the Revenue Appellate Authority, vacated his order of appointment of receiver in respect of the rest of the land also vide his order dated 7.4.1999. (7). A revision petition was preferred against the judgment of Revenue Appellate Authority, dated 7.4.1999 in the Board of Revenue and in its decision the Board passed an order-appointing receiver including khasra No. 178, 186, 193 to 197, 206, 208, 315, 200 and 202. Aggrieved by this order/applicants have filed the present review on the grounds that their rights have been seriously affected by the order passed by the Board of Revenue in revision and they were not made a party in the said revision even though they were the party in actual possession and important facts were concealed from the Board which resulted in a complete miscarriage of justice and has resulted in the patent error of appointment of receiver on lands which were subject matter of a different lis. (8). At the outset, preliminary objection was raised regarding the maintainability of the review petition by the non-applicant on the ground that review petition under Section 229 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 cannot be brought by a person which is not a party in the original petition under review. (9). Counsel for the non-petitioner stated that clause 1 of section 229 states that: Power of review by Board and other revenue courts—Subject to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Central Act V of 1908)— (1) the Board of its own motion or on the application of a party to a suit or proceeding, may review and may rescind, alter or confirm any decree or order made by itself or by any of its members, and (10). There is no mention of any party other than the party to a suit in this section as such the review application is not maintainable. (11). There is no mention of any party other than the party to a suit in this section as such the review application is not maintainable. (11). Replying to the preliminary objection the counsel for the petitioner stated that the petitioner is a party aggrieved in terms of the order 47 rule 1 CPC as the order of receiver made by this Honble Court is in respect of lands which are in his possession and on which he already holds a temporary injunction in his favour. Not only that, a decree has been passed in his favour in respect of lands mentioned and an appeal made by Chiranjilal is already pending against the decree in that matter in the court of the Revenue Appellate Authority. On the basis of decree mutation No. 1101 has already been decided in favour of the party along with a remark in the record of rights. (12). On consideration I find that section 229 reads as : Power of review by Board and other revenue courts—Subject to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Central Act V of 1908)— (1) the Board of its own motion or on the application of a party to a suit or proceeding, may review and may rescind, alter or confirm any decree or order made by itself or by any of its members, and (2) every revenue court, other than the Board, shall be competent to review any decree, order or judgment passed by such court. (13). It is clear from the plain reading of the provision that sub clause 1 and 2 of the Section have been made subject to the provisions of CPC 1908 or in other words the clause 1 and 2 have been suborned to the provisions contained in the CPC. (13). It is clear from the plain reading of the provision that sub clause 1 and 2 of the Section have been made subject to the provisions of CPC 1908 or in other words the clause 1 and 2 have been suborned to the provisions contained in the CPC. Order 47 rule 1 of the CPC reads as : Application for review of judgment.—(1) Any person considering himself aggrieved,— (a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred, (b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or (c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of record, or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order made against him, may apply for a review of judgment to the Court which passed the decree or made the order. (14). In the event any person aggrieved is an appellant that fits the description of the petitioner to a nicety. From the facts and circumstances of the case it is evident that the rights of the petitioner have been seriously affected in some part due to the clever use (or abuse) of the legal process by the non-petitioners. As such the provision of the CPC must prevail and the review application must be held to be maintainable. (15). In the main matter the arguments were made by the counsel for the petitioner cited (1998) 4 SCC page 447 Gopabandhu Biswal vs. K.C. Mohanty and Others to buttress his case being a party aggrieved. He said that as he was already holding an injunction in respect of lands mentioned in para No. 1 also, the non- petitioners have played a fraud on the court and abused the legal process, as they were fully aware of the proceedings in the main matter and have obtained this order by concealing those facts and misrepresenting before the court. The civil suit preferred by the son against father was also collusive in which the relief of temporary injunctions as well as that appointment of receiver were obtained by collusion. As such a complete fraud has been played upon this Honble Court to obtain the order, which is impugned here in review. (16). Now that the application for review has been held to be maintainable, the occasion is ripe for a distinction between an error apparent on the face of record and an erroneous decision. Very often, errors in law, which are patent, have also been held to be errors apparent on the face of record. It is also apposite that the scope of the term and for any other sufficient reason may also be discussed here. (17). In the case Shri Ambica Mills Co. Ltd. vs. S.B. Bhat ( AIR 1961 SC 970 ) -The Nature of error apparent on the face of the record has been discussed as follows : When an error of law can be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record? Sometimes it is said that it is only errors which are self-evident, that is to say, which are evident without any elaborate examination of the merits that can be corrected, and not those which can be discovered only after an elaborate argument. In a sense it would be correct to say that an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari must be self-evident; that is what is meant by saying it is an error apparent on the face of the record, and from that point of view, the test that the error should be self-evident and should not need an elaborate examination of the record may be satisfactory as a working test in a large majority of cases. (18). In the case Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde vs. Mallikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale, AIR 1960 SC 137 , it is summarized in the following terms: -Two possible opinions Where two opinions are possible as regards the error complained of, it cannot be said that there is an error apparent on the face of record. (19). (18). In the case Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde vs. Mallikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale, AIR 1960 SC 137 , it is summarized in the following terms: -Two possible opinions Where two opinions are possible as regards the error complained of, it cannot be said that there is an error apparent on the face of record. (19). In the case (1995) 1 SCC 58 CST vs. Pine Chemicals Ltd., it is summarized in the following term: Constitution of India Art. 137 - Review "Error apparent on the face of the record - words and phrases Interpretation of statute law at variance with the clear and simple language thereof, held, is an error apparent on the face of the record— It is also held in the same judgment that: Interpretation of law adopted by a Bench inconsistent with earlier decisions delivered by a coordinate Bench and larger Bench - Held, amounts to an error apparent on the face of the record - Per incuriam judgment. (20). In the case of Lily Thomas vs. Union of India (2000) 6 SCC 224 it has been said that: Review, held, is not an appeal is disguise-Its purpose is to ensure that justice is not defeated and that errors leading to miscarriage of justice are remedied-Power of review cannot be exercised merely to substitute a point of view-errors requiring review are those which are patent and apparent from the face of record and are errors of inadvertence and not those that need to be fished out. Per curiam: The power of review is not an inherent power. It must be conferred by law. A review petition is also not an appeal in disguise. It cannot be denied that justice is a virtue which transcends all barriers and the rules or procedures or technicalities of law cannot stand in the way of administration of justice. Law has to bend before justice. If the court finds that the error pointed out in the review petition was under a mistake and the earlier judgment would not have been passed but for erroneous assumption which in fact did not exist and its perpetration shall result in a miscarriage of justice nothing would preclude the court from rectifying the error. The power of review can be exercised for correction of a mistake but not to substitute a view. The power of review can be exercised for correction of a mistake but not to substitute a view. Such powers can be exercised within the limits of the statute dealing with the exercise of power. The review cannot be treated like an appeal in disguise. The mere possibility of two views on the subject is not a ground for review. Once a review petition is dismissed no further petition or review can be entertained. The rule of law of following the practice of the binding nature of the larger Benches and not taking different views by the Benches of coordinated in exercise of its powers under Article 136 or Article 32 of the Constitution and upon satisfaction that the earlier judgments have resulted in deprivation of fundamental rights of a citizen or rights created under any other statute, can take a different view notwithstanding the earlier judgment. (21). In the case Northern India Caterers (India) Ltd. vs. Lt. Governor of Delhi, (1980) 2 SCC 167 : it is said that: A party is not entitled to seek a review of the Courts judgment merely for the purpose of rehearing and for a fresh decision of the case. Departure from the normal principle that the Courts judgment is final would be justified only when compelling or substantial circumstances make it necessary to do so. Such circumstances may be that a material statutory provision was not drawn to the Courts attention at the original hearing or a manifest wrong has been done. Apart from the fact that the material now adduced by the Revenue was not brought to the Courts attention, the question is whether the judgment suffers from an error apparent on the face of the record. If the view adopted by the Court in the original judgment is a possible view having regard to what record states there is no error apparent on the face of the record. (22). If the view adopted by the Court in the original judgment is a possible view having regard to what record states there is no error apparent on the face of the record. (22). In case G. Veerappa Pillai vs. Raman & Raman Ltd. (AIR 1952 SC192), it is held that: Generally - scope of Judicial review Nature & Scope - Not in the nature of an Appellate Court on questions of fact: Writs as are referred to in Art. 226 are intended to enable the High Court to issue them in grave cases where the subordinate tribunals or bodies or officers act wholly without jurisdiction, or in excess of it, or in violation of the principles of natural justice or refuse to exercise a jurisdiction vested in them, or these is an error apparent on the face of the record, and such act, omission, error, or excess has resulted in manifest injustice. However, extensive the jurisdiction may be, it is so wide or large as to enable the High Court to convert itself into a Court of appeal and examine for itself the correctness of the decisions impugned and decided What is the proper view to be taken or the order to be made. (23). In the case Ahmedabad Municipal Corpn. vs. Virendra Kumar Jayantibhai Patel, (1997) 6 SCC 650 ) it is held that: Art. 226 Scope of High Courts power of judicial review-High Court has power to enquire whether finding of Tribunal is based on any evidence and if based on no evidence such finding suffers from error apparent on the face of the record calling for High Courts interference. "High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution are entitled to issue directions, writs and orders for correcting the record of the inferior courts or the tribunal. It is true that the High Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226, cannot convert itself into a court of appeal and assess the sufficiency or adequacy of the evidence in support of the finding of fact reached by the competent courts or the tribunals, but this does not debar the High Court from its power to enquire whether there is any evidence in support of a finding recorded by the inferior court or tribunal. There is a difference between a finding based on sufficiency or adequacy of evidence and a finding based on no evidence. There is a difference between a finding based on sufficiency or adequacy of evidence and a finding based on no evidence. If the finding of fact recorded by the tribunal is based on no evidence, such a finding would suffer from error of law apparent on the face of record." (24). In case Rajender Kumar vs. Rambhai ( AIR 2003 SC 2095 ) = RLW 2003(1) SC 139), it is held that: Order 47 R.l : Grounds for review-Error apparent on the face of record— Held, the first and foremost requirement of entertaining a review petition is that the order, review of which is sought (a) suffers from any error apparent on the face of the order, and (b) permitting the order to stand will lead to failure of justice- Held, on facts, the order under challenge did not suffer from any serious illegality/which called for correction by exercise of review jurisdiction. (25). In the case Meera Bhanja vs. Nirmala Kumar Choudhary (1995) 1 SCC 170 , it is held that: 0.47 R.l Scope of review power of High Court The review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47, Rule 1 CPC. The review petition has to be entertained only on the ground of error apparent on the face of the record and not on any other ground. An error apparent on the face of record must be such an error which must strike one on mere looking at the record and would not require any long-drawn process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two opinions. The limitation of powers of court under Order 47 Rule 1, CPC is similar to the jurisdiction available to the High Court while seeking review of the orders under Article 226. In the present case the approach of the Division Bench dealing with the review proceedings clearly shows that it has overstepped its jurisdiction under Order 47, Rule 1 CPC by merely styling the reasoning adopted by the earlier Division Bench as suffering from a patent error. It would not become a patent error or error apparent by doing so. The Review Bench has re- appreciated the entire evidence, sat almost as court of appeal and has reversed the findings reached by the earlier Division Bench. It would not become a patent error or error apparent by doing so. The Review Bench has re- appreciated the entire evidence, sat almost as court of appeal and has reversed the findings reached by the earlier Division Bench. Even if the earlier Division Benchs findings were found to be erroneous, it would be no ground for reviewing the same, as that would be the function of an appellate court. Right or wrong, the earlier Division Bench judgment had become final so far as the High Court was concerned. It would not have been reviewed by reconsidering the entire evidence with a view to finding out the alleged apparent error for justifying the invocation of review powers. Only on that short ground, therefore, this appeal is required to be allowed." (26). In the case Parsion Devi vs. Sumitri Devi (1997) 8 SCC page 715, it is held that: Or.47 R.l and S.114 Review-Scope of jurisdiction-Mistake or an error apparent on the face of record"-Is one which is self-evident and does not require a process of reasoning - Distinct from erroneous decision "Under O.47 R.l CPC a judgment may be open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of record. An error, which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of record justifying the record to exercise its power of review under 0.47 R.l CPC. In exercise of the jurisdiction under 0.47 R.l CPC it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be "reheard and corrected". There is a clear distinction between an erroneous decision and an error apparent on the face of record. While the first can be corrected by the higher forum, the latter only can be corrected by exercise of the review jurisdiction. A review petition has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be "an appeal in disguise." (27). While passing the impugned order, Sharma J. found the order in Civil Revision as an erroneous decision, though without saying so in so many words. Mechanical use of statutorily sanctified phrases cannot detract from the real import of the order passed in exercise of the review jurisdiction. Recourse to review petition in the facts and circumstances of the case was not permissible. Mechanical use of statutorily sanctified phrases cannot detract from the real import of the order passed in exercise of the review jurisdiction. Recourse to review petition in the facts and circumstances of the case was not permissible. The aggrieved judgment - debtors could have approached the higher forum through appropriate proceedings to assail the order of Gupta, J. and get it set aside but it was not open to them to seek a. "review" of the order of Gupta, J. on the grounds detailed in the review petition. Therefore, the impugned order of Sharma, J. cannot be sustained. (28). As a consequence of the setting aside of the impugned order, the remand order made by Gupta, J. would automatically stand reviewed but that will not solve the problem. Neither the Executing Court nor Gupta, J. while deciding the civil revision petition have recorded any finding as to the date or the time when the decree was allegedly breached. That was an essential fact to be determined before it could be considered whether Article 181 or Article 182 of the Limitation Act would apply to the facts and circumstances of the case. Therefore, with a view to do complete justice between the parties, it is appropriate to direct that the Executing Court shall, while deciding the execution application on merits, also consider this aspect and return a finding as to when the cause of action accrued to the decree-holder and then consider the question as to which article of the Limitation Act or Sharma, J. in their orders. This question would be considered, not as a preliminary objection, but along with all other issues on merits. The Executive Court shall dispose of the execution application on merits in accordance with law Bench Strength. (29). In the case Thungabhdra Industries Ltd. vs. Govt. of A.P. ( AIR 1964 SC 1372 ) O.47 R.l : Review-Distinction between an erroneous decision and a decision which is vitiated by error apparent There is a distinction, which is real, though it might not always be capable of exposition, between a mere erroneous decision and a decision, which could be characterised as vitiated by "error apparent". A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected, but lies only for patent error. A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected, but lies only for patent error. We do not consider that this furnishes a suitable occasion for dealing with this difference exhaustively or in any great detail, but it would suffice for us to say that where without any elaborate argument one could point to the error and say here is a substantial point of law which stares one in the face, and there could reasonably be no two opinions entertained about it, a clear case of an error apparent on the face of record would be made out. (30). In the case Nandi Investments & Enterprises vs. L.M. Saravamangala, (2005) 9 SCC 754 S.114 & Or.47 R.l and S.47 CPC - Review-Scope-Power to go behind decree at the stage of execution- "Error apparent on the face of record" what is: Judgment - debtor asserting before High Court in review that interest on principal was added twice and interest on interest was also added in respect of decretal amount to be paid under the decree-Held, High Court should have considered the said facts and not disposed of review petition merely by observing that executing court had passed the order and it could not go behind the decree-High Court should have recorded a finding in respect of the said calculations-Matter remitted to High Court for decision afresh. (31). In the case Green View Tea & Industries vs. Collector, Golaghat, (2004) 4 SCC 122 : S. 114 and Or. 47 R.l-Review-Grounds for Material evidence on record not taken into account in judgment sought to be reviewed-Held, constituted "error apparent on the face of record"-Matter remanded to High Court - On a perusal of the record it can be held that there are mistakes apparent on the face of record and it was a fit case for review by High Court (for reasons set out in paras 17 to 23), (Para 14) (32). In the case Dokka Samuel vs. Jacob Lazarus Chelly (Dr) (1997) 4 SCC 478 . In the case Dokka Samuel vs. Jacob Lazarus Chelly (Dr) (1997) 4 SCC 478 . S.114 and Or.47 R.l-Review by High Court—An error apparent on the face of record-Omission on the part of counsel to cite an authority of law does not amount to an error apparent on the face of record so as to constitute ground for reviewing prior judgment-On facts held, High Court was not justified in reviewing its earlier order and reversing the finding recorded by appellate court on the question whether document was a sale deed or it was for collateral purpose. (33). In the case Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Gokulprasad Maniklal Agarwal, (1999) 7 SCC 578 , it is held that: CPC S.114 and Or.47 R.l(l)-Review-Grounds for-Counsel wrongly explaining rules position to court - Rules describing reduction to a lower time scale or to a lower stage in a time scale, as a major penalty whereas appellants counsel by mistake stating before High Court that it was a major penalty-High Court on the basis of this statement, holding that promotion could not be denied to respondent on account of imposition of minor penalty on him-Appellants review petition dismissed by the High Court on the ground that there was no an error apparent on the face of record - Held, the High Court should have allowed the review. (34). In the case, Ajit Kumar Rath vs. State of Orissa (1999) 9 SCC 596 , it has been held that: SERVICE LAW Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 S. 22(3)(f)-Review-Scope of - Power of review available to the Tribunal under S. 22(3) (f), held, is not absolute and is the same as given to a court under S. 114 and Or. 47 R.l CPC - Any other sufficient reason" occurring in Or. 47 R.l, means a reason sufficiently analogous to the other reasons specified in the Rule - Scope of review is limited to correction of a patent error of law or fact which stares in the face, without any elaborate argument being needed to establish it. "Power of review available to an Administrative Tribunal is the same as has been given to a court under Section 114 read with Order 47 CPC. The power is not absolute and is hedged in by the restrictions indicated in Order 47. "Power of review available to an Administrative Tribunal is the same as has been given to a court under Section 114 read with Order 47 CPC. The power is not absolute and is hedged in by the restrictions indicated in Order 47. The power can be exercised on the application of a person, on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made. The power can also be exercised on account of some mistake or an error apparent on the face of record or for any other sufficient reason. A review cannot be sought merely for a fresh hearing or arguments or correction of an erroneous view taken earlier. The power of review can be exercised only for correction of a patent error of law or fact, which stares in the face without any elaborate argument being needed for establishing it. The expression "any other sufficient reason" used in Order 47, R.l means a reason sufficiently analogous to those specified in the rule. Any attempt, except an attempt to correct an apparent error or an attempt not based on any ground set out in Order 47, would amount to an abuse of the liberty given to the Tribunal under the Act to review its judgment. (35). In the case Sheonandan Paswan vs. State of Bihar (1983) 4 SCC 104 : 1983 SCC (Cri) 775 : AIR 1983 SC 1125 , it is held that: SUPREME COURT RULES, 1966 Or.40. R.l - Review, Error apparent on the face of record and serious legal infirmities in the majority decision in Sheonanda Paswan case, (1983) 1 SCC 438 alleged in review petition - Applying the well settled principles governing review and considering facts and circumstances of the case, plea for rehearing allowed. (36). In the case Revenue Divisional Officer V.A. Aruna, (1998) 6 SCC 494 = AIR 1998 SC 2655 , it is held that: TENANCY AND LAND LAWS: ANDHRA PRADESH LAND GRABBING (prohibition) act, 1982 (12 of 1982) s.17-A - Review jurisdiction - Nature and scope - Compared with Or. (36). In the case Revenue Divisional Officer V.A. Aruna, (1998) 6 SCC 494 = AIR 1998 SC 2655 , it is held that: TENANCY AND LAND LAWS: ANDHRA PRADESH LAND GRABBING (prohibition) act, 1982 (12 of 1982) s.17-A - Review jurisdiction - Nature and scope - Compared with Or. 47 R.l CPC - When can be invoked - Order under review must result in miscarriage of Justice - Mistake of fact - What amounts Review jurisdiction under Section 17-A of the Act can be invoked by the Special Court mainly with a view to prevent miscarriage of justice. Consequently, the order sought to be reviewed must appear to have resulted into miscarriage of justice and not merely that it might have occasioned dissatisfaction to the party that loses before the Special Court in the first instance. But even apart from that, as Section 17-A clearly lays down, review shall be entertained only on the grounds mentioned therein, meaning thereby it is not a full-fledged power of reconsideration of the entire case as if it was a second innings on facts and law permitted by the legislature to the Special Court once it decided a lis between the parties earlier. The grounds of review are limited as mentioned in the said section. It is, of course, true that these grounds are wider than the grounds on which review is allowed under Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC, because even on the mistake of fact or even on ignorance of material fact, a review is permitted. It is also true that an an error apparent on the face of record is a separate ground for reviewing the order of the Special Court as laid down under Section 17-A. However, there is a clear distinction between review power and appellate power. A review can never be said to be an appeal in disguise. Therefore, in order to effectively invoke the jurisdiction of the Special Court in review proceedings, it has to be shown that the mistake of fact, which is alleged by the review petitioner, should be such that it gets directly embedded in the final order, in the sense it goes to the root of the matter. The phrase, "judgment or order passed on a mistake of fact" shows that the mistake of fact must be so patent that it directly results in an erroneous order sought to be reviewed. The phrase, "judgment or order passed on a mistake of fact" shows that the mistake of fact must be so patent that it directly results in an erroneous order sought to be reviewed. In other words, the mistake of fact must have a direct nexus with the ultimate order, which but for such a patent mistake, would not have been so rendered. It has to be shown that but for such a mistake of fact, a contrary result might have followed. Therefore, before a review petitioner can invoke Section 17-A it should be shown that the mistake of fact is a patent mistake and not a latent one. Mere mistakes in appreciation of evidence or in any inference drawn from facts could be corrected only in proceedings before a higher forum and not in review proceedings. It is, therefore, not possible to agree with the view that once a mistake of fact is pointed out and once it is shown that the inference of fact is drawn which is conjectural, that by itself would be a ground for review under Section 17-A. As a court of first instance, even if inference is drawn from available data of facts and if that inference is found fault with, unless that inference is of such a nature that but for that inference the ultimate result would have been different, it would not amount to any glaring mistake of fact on which such judgment can be sought to be reviewed under Section 17-A. Since in the present case the earlier decision was arrived at by the Special Court on appreciation of oral and documentary evidence and the conclusion was reached on facts that the respondents were in adverse possession of the plot in question even though the title of the appellants was held proved, it could not be said that there was any such mistake of fact which was so patent that but for such mistake, the final conclusion about adverse possession of the respondents would have been different. Under these circumstances, the majority of the Members were not justified in reopening the earlier decision of the Special Court. (37). In the case State of Orissa vs. Commr. Under these circumstances, the majority of the Members were not justified in reopening the earlier decision of the Special Court. (37). In the case State of Orissa vs. Commr. of Land Records & Settlement (1998) 7 SCC 162 , it is held that: ORISSA BOARD OF REVENUE ACT, 1951 (23 OF 1951) S. 7 - Review, powers of - Orissa Survey and Settlement Act, 1958 (3 of 1959) - Ss. 6-D, 15, 25, 32 & 33 - Board of Revenue has power of review under S.7 of 1951 Act - This power can be exercised by the Board for reviewing the order passed in its revisional jurisdiction under Ss. 6-D, 15, 25 and 32 of the 1958 Act - Where the revisional jurisdiction is delegated to Commission under S.33 of the 1958 Act, order passed by Commissioner as delegate of the Board has to be treated as the order passed by the Board itself and hence such order cannot be revised by the Board on the principle that the Board cannot revise it own order-that order of the delegate i.e., the Commissioner cannot also be reviewed by the Board as review can be made by the same Judge/authority who had passed the order under review and the order having been passed by the Commissioner and not the Board, it is not open to review by the Board - But Commissioner as a delegate exercising the revisional power of the principal i.e., the Board under the 1958 Act is also entitled to exercise the power under S.7 of the 1951 Act to review the order passed in revision under the 1958 Act is also entitled to exercise the power under S.7 of the 1951 Act to review the order passed in revision under the 1958 Act-However, as in the case of the principal, that power of review has to be exercised by the delegate i.e., the Commissioner only for correction of "mistakes or errors apparent on the face of record" - Power of revision under S.7 not wider than that under Or.47 R.l CPC-Civil Procedure Code, 1908, Or.47 R.l-Orissa Survey of Settlement Act, 1958 (3 of 1959), Ss.6-D, 15,25,32 & 33. (38). (38). In the case Board of Control of Cricket in India vs. Netaji Cricket Club, (2005) 4 SCC 741 , it has been held that: "Section 114 CPC empowers a court to review its order if the conditions precedent laid down therein are satisfied. The substantive provision of law does not prescribe any limitation on the power of the Court except those which are expressly provided in Section 114 CPC in terms whereof it is empowered to make such order as it thinks fit. Order 47 Rule 1 CPC provides for filing an application for review. Such an application for review would be maintainable not only upon discovery of a new and important piece of evidence or when there exists an error apparent on the face of record but also if the same is necessitated on account of some mistake or for any other sufficient reason, what would constitute sufficient reason would depend on the facts and circumstances of the case. The words "sufficient reason" in Order 47 Rule 1 CPC are wide enough to include a misconception of fact of law by a court or even an advocate. An application for review may be necessitated by way of invoking the doctrine "actus curiae neminem gravabit." Thus, a mistake on the part of the court, which would include a mistake in the nature of the undertaking, may also call for a review of the order. The jurisdiction of the High Court in entertaining a review application cannot be said to be ex facie bad in law. It is also not correct to contend that the Court while exercising its review jurisdiction in any situation whatsoever cannot take into consideration a subsequent event. In a case of this nature when the Court accepts its own mistake a understanding the nature and purport of the undertaking given by the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Board and its correlation with as to what transpired in the AGM of the Board held on 29.9.2004, the subsequent event may be taken into consideration by the Court for the purpose of rectifying its own mistake." (39). In Rajah Kotagiri Venkata Subamma Rao vs. Rajah Vellanki Venkatarama Rao, 279-A, 197, Lord Davey at page 205 of the Report said that "the section does not authorize the review of a decree which was right when it was made on the ground of the happening of some subsequent event." (40). In Raja Shatrunji vs. Mohd. Azmat Azin Khan, (1971) 2 SCC 200 : AIR 1971 SC 1474 , to has been held that: The principles of review defined by the words "any other sufficient reason" in Or.47 of the Code would mean a reason sufficient on grounds analogous to those specified immediately previously in that order. The grounds for review are the discovery of new matters of evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or the review is asked for on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record. (41). In the case of Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos vs. Mar Poulose Athanasius, AIR 1954 SC 526 : (1955) 1 SCR 520 : ILR 1954 TC 867 : 1954 Ker LT 385, it is held as follows : O.47 R.l- "Any other sufficient reason"-Meaning- Misconception of true circumstances-whether sufficient reason. "Relying on the decisions of (49 IA 144 : 61IA 378 and 1949 FCR 36) it was held that the words "any other sufficient reason" must mean "a reason sufficient on grounds, at least analogous to those specified in the rule." (42). The proper procedure was to move the court in whose judgment the error is alleged to have crept in, whose judgment is said to be founded on a misconception as to the concession made by the learned Advocate appearing before it, a misconception by the court of a concession made by the Advocate or of the attitude taken up by the party appears to be a ground analogous to the grounds set forth in the first part of the review section and affords a good and cogent ground for review. (43). (43). Further, when the error complained of is that the court assumed that a concession had been made when none had in fact been made or that the court misconceived the terms of the concession or the scope and extent of it, it will not generally appear on the record but will have to be brought before the court by way of an affidavit as suggested by the Privy Council as well as by this Court and this can only be done by way of review. The cases to which reference has been made indicates that the misconception of the court must be regarded as sufficient reason analogous to an error apparent on the face of the record." (44). I feel impelled to quote from the Judgment of the Hon. Supreme Court in the case of A.R. Antulay vs. R.S. Nayak; a Constitution Bench Judgment (1998) 2 SCC 602. The Hon. Judge Mukharji, Oza and Natarajan observed that "An order of the Court, be it administrative or judicial, which is given per incuriam and in violation of certain constitutional limitations and in derogation of the principles of natural justice, can always be remedied by the court ex debito justiciar. It can do so in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction in any proceeding pending before it without insisting on the formality of a review application. No prejudice need be proved for enforcing the fundamental rights. Violation of a fundamental right itself renders the impugned action void. So also the violation of the principles of natural justice renders the act a nullity. (45). The basic fundamentals of the administration of justice are that no man should suffer because of the mistake of the court. No man should suffer a wrong by technical procedure of irregularities. Rules or procedures are the handmaids of justice and not the mistress of the justice. Ex debito justitiae if the circumstances warrant. The irregularity committed by the Constitution Bench in giving the impugned decision (1984) 2 SCC 183 , 243) has to be corrected not on construction or misconstruction of a statute but because of non-perception of certain provisions and certain authorities which would amount to derogation of the constitutional rights of the citizen. It is proper for the court to act ex debito justitiae in favour of the appellant whose fundamental rights have been infringed." (46). It is proper for the court to act ex debito justitiae in favour of the appellant whose fundamental rights have been infringed." (46). Of course, we are not dealing with a matter concerning fundamental rights, but the above ruling has been quoted only to exemplify the doctrine that the Court owes a debt of justice to the parties that have been wronged due to any order given per incuriam, as is the case here. It also supports the theory that such orders can be set aside even without an application having been made whereas we have a full fledged review petition by a person seriously aggrieved and prejudiced by the order which on the face of it appears to have been passed per incuriam. The facts of this case reveal the following : 1. That there was a suppression of facts in the petition made to this court with regard to another Judgment (RAA 1995) and with regard to the Khasra Nos. that were later interpolated into the order under review. 2. That the initial proceedings in the 1992 proceedings raise a very strong suspicion of collusion, even though no specific evidence has been produced. 3. That the factum of lis pendens, which was within the knowledge of the present non-petitioner, was deliberately withheld. 4. That the Court was deliberately misled into impugning the subject matter of the 1995 Order of the RAA when that order was not impugned before this Court by making out as if the subject matter of the 1999 Order also included the subject matter of the 1995 Order. (47). In the case S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu vs. Jagannath, (1994) 1 SCC 1 ), the Hon. Supreme Court has dealt with such situations and has come down very hard on litigants who dishonestly try to take advantage by an abuse of legal process. The counsel for the non-petitioner have very vehemently argued that the litigation has become final and the petitioner has no right qua the non-petitioner in respect of the subject matter which is impugned here in review. The facts and circumstances of the case, however, speak most eloquently in a discordant tone against the conduct of the non-petitioners. The counsel for the non-petitioner have very vehemently argued that the litigation has become final and the petitioner has no right qua the non-petitioner in respect of the subject matter which is impugned here in review. The facts and circumstances of the case, however, speak most eloquently in a discordant tone against the conduct of the non-petitioners. The Hon. Apex Court has held in the above case that "the principles of finality of litigation cannot be pressed to the extent of such an absurdity that it becomes an engine of fraud in the hands of dishonest litigants. The courts of law are meant for imparting justice between the parties. One who comes to the court, must come with clean hands. A person, whose case is based on falsehood, has no right to approach the court. He can be summarily thrown out at any stage of the litigation. A judgment or decree obtained by playing fraud on the court is a nullity and non est in the eyes of law. Such a judgment/decree - by the first court or by the highest court-has to be treated as a nullity by every court, whether superior or inferior. It can be challenged in any court even in collateral proceedings. (48). A fraud is an act of deliberate deception with the design of securing something by taking unfair advantage of another. It is a deception in order to gain by anothers loss. It is cheating intended to get an advantage. A litigant, who approaches the court, is bound to produce all the documents executed by him, which are relevant to the litigation. If he withholds a vital document in order to gain an advantage on the other side then he would be guilty of playing fraud on the court as well as on the opposite party. (49). In this case the respondent, on his own volition, executed the registered release deed in favour of C. He knew that the appellants had paid the total decretal amount to his master C. without disclosing all these facts, he filed the suit for partition of the property on the ground the purchased the property in his own behalf and not on behalf of C. Non-production and even non-mentioning of the release deed at the trial is tantamount to playing fraud on the court. Therefore, the judgment of the High Court is set aside and that of the Trial Court is restored. The appellants shall be entitled to costs quantified at Rs. 11,000/-." (50). The similarities between the case discussed above and the impugned case are indeed very proximate. I find from the facts and the circumstances of the case that the non-petitioner has known the real story all along and yet he misled this court into believing that the impugned order related to all the lands and not to the lands which were impugned in the 1999 order of the RAA. The fact of the 1995 order was totally concealed as also the fact of the suit and lis pendens even though the non-petitioner had full knowledge of the same, himself having applied to become a party to the same. This observation is being made without prejudice to the fact that the very first proceedings in the year 1992 between the son and father raise a very strong suspicion of collusive proceedings. (51). With this background, we are now in a better position to deal with the grounds of review. As we have seen from the number of authorities that we have quoted from, the review lies "on account of some mistake" or "an error apparent on the face of record" or "for any other sufficient reason". When we apply the facts and circumstances of the present case to these grounds, we find that all these three grounds are made out in the present review petition. (52). In the BCCI vs. Netaji case, the Hon. Apex Court has held that it was justified on the part of the High Court to admit its own mistake and review its decision accordingly. In our situation, it is ex-facie established that this court passed an order on a subject matter that was not even impugned under the mistake impression that all the lands were the subject matter of the impugned order whereas the receiver was vacated only in respect of the lands that were impugned. This mistake, as we have seen was the result of a deliberate fraud played on the Court. (53). As far as a situation emanating from an error apparent on the face of record is concerned, every decision that we have quoted advances the cause of review in a situation warranting this. This mistake, as we have seen was the result of a deliberate fraud played on the Court. (53). As far as a situation emanating from an error apparent on the face of record is concerned, every decision that we have quoted advances the cause of review in a situation warranting this. The errors of law have also been held to be errors apparent. In the CST vs. Pine Chemicals case, a per incuriam judgment has been covered within the amplitude of the definition of error apparent. An error of inadvertence is eminently placed in this pantheon of classification. Lily Thomas case has exemplified this most eloquently. A distinction between "an error apparent on the face of record" and an erroneous decision has been made in Meera Bhanja vs. Nirmala Chaudhary, Parsion Devi vs. Sumitri Devi and also in the Lily Thomas vs. Union of India. The present case, however, is not that of an erroneous decision, but as discussed, it is occasioned by a mistake of fact and misconception of fact, and has also resulted in a manifest error on the face of record in that it has decided a subject matter which was not impugned before it. (54). The third term as a ground of review is "for any other sufficient reason". This term has been held to be analogous to the other two terms discussed and has been discussed in some detail in the case of Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos vs. Mar Poulose Athanasius and it has been held that this must mean "a reason sufficient on grounds, at least analogous to those specified in the rule". This ground, in the present case is the fraud played on the Court to mislead it into committing grave errors apparent on the face of record and committing mistakes of jurisdiction in impugning subject matter that were not germane in the facts and circumstances. The Raja Shatrunji vs. Mohd. Azmat Azim Khan case also lends weight to this line of reasoning. (55). Thus we conclude that all the grounds for review are present in the facts and circumstances of this case. The petition of review is allowed, the order under review is set aside totally and the impugned order of the RAA dated 7.4.1999 in regard to the vacation of appointment of receiver is ordered to be maintained. (55). Thus we conclude that all the grounds for review are present in the facts and circumstances of this case. The petition of review is allowed, the order under review is set aside totally and the impugned order of the RAA dated 7.4.1999 in regard to the vacation of appointment of receiver is ordered to be maintained. Needless to reiterate that the order of the Revenue Appellate Authority, dated 17.4.1995, which was not the subject matter of the order under review is not to be touched at all. (56). This court is of the view that the actions of the non- petitioner have seriously prejudiced the legal process and such acts need to be discouraged with a heavy deterrent cost so that the petitioners and their counsels remain alive to the need of maintaining the sanctity of the legal process. The present case is a testimony to the great lengths to which the litigants and their counsels can go to pervert the legal process. In the case of Ram Awatar Agarwal vs. Corpn. Of Calcutta, (1999) 6 SCC 532 ), the Hon. Supreme Court awarded an exemplary cost of Rs. 1 lakh. In the instant case, the petitioners have been abusing the legal process through various stratagems of collusion, perversion of legal process and by playing fraud on this Court for nearly 14 years. It is distressing to note that an unscrupulous litigant in order to circumvent orders of courts adopts dubious ways and takes recourse to ingenious methods including filing of fraudulent litigation to defeat the orders of court. In the case of Rajappa Hanamantha Ranoji vs. Mahadev Channabasappa (2000) 6 SCC 120 ) = (RLW 2002(2) SC 289) also, the Hon. Apex Court has canvassed awarding of heavy deterrent cost. I, therefore, think this to be a fit case for awarding exemplary costs quantified at Rs. 50,000/- in favour of the petitioners. Pronounced in the open court.