H. K. RATHOD, J. ( 1 ) HEARD the learned Advocate, mr. P. V. Hathi, appearing on behalf of petitioner. ( 2 ) IN the present petition, the petitioner has challenged the award passed by industrial Tribunal, Rajkot in Reference no. 83 of 1995 dated 18. 1. 2006, whereby the Industrial Tribunal has directed to the petitioner to implement the Government resolution dated 17. 10. 1988 w. e. f. 1. 10. 1988 unless and until the service of respondent workman will regularize after obtaining the permissions from the State government. ( 3 ) LEARNED Advocate, Mr. Hathi, submitted that terms of reference is to make permanent Shri Babubhai Lakhabhai chudasma, Shri Devraj Puna Vaja and shri Kachara Sidi Alam after completion of 240 days in service and also to grant all the benefits which are available to permanent 2 employee with arrears. He also submitted that Industrial Tribunal has no jurisdiction to grant the benefit under Government resolution dated 17. 10. 1988 because there is no terms of reference which referred for adjudication. He also submitted that industrial Tribunal has jurisdiction only to examine or adjudicate the dispute which has been referred for it. Except that, the industrial Tribunal has no jurisdiction to adjudicate another issue which is not referred for adjudication. He relied upon the decision of Apex Court in case of State bank of Bikaner v. Om Prakash Sharma, 20. 06 SCC (Lands) 930. He further submitted that this Government Resolution has been taken in account without giving opportunity to the petitioner and, therefore, the award is bad. Except that, no other submission is made by learned Advocate, mr. Hathi and no other decision has been relied by him. ( 4 ) I have considered the submissions made by learned Advocate, Mr. Hathi and have also perused the award passed by industrial Tribunal. The dispute has been referred for adjudication by appropriate government on 14. 7. 1995. The dispute is in respect to three workmen to make them permanent and to grant benefit of permanency after completion of 240 days continuous service. The statement of claim was filed by Union vide Exh. 2 and submitted that these three workmen are working for more than 10 to 12 years as a labourer against the vacant post with the petitioner. The statement of claim was filed by Union vide Exh. 2 and submitted that these three workmen are working for more than 10 to 12 years as a labourer against the vacant post with the petitioner. The petitioner has not been making them permanent and, therefore, the dispute has been raised on the principle of "equal pay for equal work" and accordingly, the prayer has been made in the statement of claim. The written statement was filed by the petitioner vide exh. 6 raising certain legal contentions that reference is bad and without jurisdiction. It was also contended in the written statement that estoppal, acquiescence and waiver, bar is also applicable in this case. The petitioner raised very important question that District Panchayat is not an industry knowing fully well that the Apex Court has taken clear view in case of Bangalore water Supply and Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa, AIR 1978 SC 548 that District panchayat and even Corporations are "industry" within the meaning of Section 2 (j) of the I. D. Act,1947. This being a unequal fight with a body corporate being state authority against the poor workmen, those who are working in a post of labourer since more than 10 to 12 years. Therefore, it is relevant to refer the observations made by the Apex Court in case of Babulal nagar and Others v. Shree Synthetics Ltd. and others, AIR 1984 SC 1164 . Following observations are made :"nothing appears more well settled than that the extraordinary jurisdiction under Art. 226 conferred on the High Court was a weapon forged to overreach injustice and secure and advance justice. When, therefore, this extraordinary power is used to defeat justice and to promote technicality not only its raison d etre is violated but it becomes a handy instrument for those to whom litigation cost is a luxury enjoyed at the cost of others and employed to exhaust and harass an unequal opponent. Sad as it may appear that unfortunate situation emerges in this appeal. "1]. These observations made by the apex Court is fully applicable to the facts of the present case. The petitioner has raised the contention that State Government is a necessary party, therefore, it should have to be joined as a party. Sad as it may appear that unfortunate situation emerges in this appeal. "1]. These observations made by the apex Court is fully applicable to the facts of the present case. The petitioner has raised the contention that State Government is a necessary party, therefore, it should have to be joined as a party. A contention is also raised in the written statement that these employees were not selected by the petitioner and there is no set up of labourer in the petitioner District Panchayat and financial condition of the District panchayat is also weak. ( 5 ) THEREAFTER, workman was examined vide Exh. 8 and closing purshish was given by the workman. Thereafter, vide Exh. 13, one witness was examined on behalf of petitioner, who knows the three workmen, those who were performing the seasonal nature of work and they all were labourers working in the field. In cross-examination, the witness of petitioner has admitted that presence of each workman is noted by petitioner each day but, he is not aware that on which date, their services were terminated. He was ready to produce each muster in respect to three workmen and except them, no daily wagers are appointed by the petitioner. Thereafter, the petitioner has closed his evidence. The Government resolution was produced by workmen on record. Thereafter, submissions were made by both the parties before the Industrial tribunal. Ultimately, the Industrial tribunal has considered that no record has been produced by the petitioner, though his witness has agreed to produce the record. The presence has been noted on each day of all three workmen and their services were not terminated during last 10 to 12 years by the petitioner. These workmen are senior daily rated employees and there is no dispute raised by the petitioner that they were not working since 10 to 12 years with the petitioner. Therefore, considering the fact that in absence of documentary evidence not produced by petitioner on record, in spite of the fact witness has admitted in his evidence. Therefore, the industrial Tribunal has rightly not examined the question of permanency and considering the fact that Government resolution dated 17. 10. 1888 wherein after 10 years certain benefits are available to the employee which can be given by petitioner to the respondents workmen which will meet ends of justice. Therefore, accordingly direction has been issued by industrial Tribunal, Rajkot against the petitioner. 10. 1888 wherein after 10 years certain benefits are available to the employee which can be given by petitioner to the respondents workmen which will meet ends of justice. Therefore, accordingly direction has been issued by industrial Tribunal, Rajkot against the petitioner. ( 6 ) THE contention which has been raised by learned Advocate, Mr. Hathi, that industrial Tribunal has no jurisdiction to grant such benefit of Government resolution dated 17. 10. 1988, is not accepted simply on the ground that industrial Tribunal has very wide jurisdiction once the industrial dispute has been referred for adjudication. The demand of permanency is also included in the government Resolution dated 17. 10. 1988 after 10 years service as per the government Resolution, the workman is being permanent and penionsary benefit is also available to such workman. So consideration of Government Resolution dated 17. 10. 1988, amounts to considering the question of permanency which has been involved and decided by the State government while issuing Government resolution dated 17. 10. 1988. It is also necessary to quote Sub-Section (4) of the section 10 of the I. D. Act,1947 :"section : 10 (4) - Where in an order referring an industrial dispute to [a Labour court, Tribunal or National Tribunal under this section or in a subsequent order, the appropriate Government has specified the points of dispute for adjudication, [ the labour Court or the Tribunal or the national Tribunal, as the case may be,] shall confine its adjudication to those points and matters incidental thereto. "1]. This being an ancillary and incidental matter to the main relief and, therefore, Industrial Tribunal has jurisdiction to grant such relief being an ancillary and incidental matter of main demand of permanency. Therefore, the industrial Tribunal has jurisdiction and rightly granted the relief in favour of respondent workmen. ( 7 ) THE Division Bench of Andhra pradesh High Court in case of Indian Bank association v. Workmen of Syndicate Bank and Ors, reported in 1998 I LLJ 223, in para. 8, observed as under :"8. The next question of the reference being bad as in the guise of a reference the respondents were claiming modification of the terms of the agreement is also misconceived. 8, observed as under :"8. The next question of the reference being bad as in the guise of a reference the respondents were claiming modification of the terms of the agreement is also misconceived. It is well known, as a part of the jurisprudence applicable to the industrial law, that Industrial Tribunals are vested with the jurisdiction of also modifying the contract of service and in the process may entitle the workmen to better rights and facilities. The question was considered by the Apex Court in Co-operative Central Bank Limited v. Additional Industrial Tribunal, A. P. AIR 1980 SC 245 with the observation; "the jurisdiction which is granted to Industrial tribunal by the Industrial Disputes Act is not the jurisdiction of merely administering the existing laws and enforcing existing contracts. Industrial Tribunals have the right even to vary contracts of service between the employer and the employees which jurisdiction can never be exercised by a Civil Court or a Registrar acting under the Co-operative Societies Act, so that the circumstance that, in granting relief on issue No. 1, the Tribunal will have to vary the special bye-laws framed by the co-operative Bank does not lead to the inference that the Tribunal would be incompetent to grant the reliefs could only be granted by the Industrial Tribunal and could not fall within the scope of the powers of the Registrar dealing with a dispute under Section 61 of the Act. ". ( 8 ) THE decision which has been relied upon by learned Advocate, Mr. Hathi, as referred above, in case of State Bank of bikaner v. Om Prakash Sharma, 2006 SCC (Lands) 930, that was not the question decided which has been relied by learned advocate, Mr. Hathi. Real question of Rule-77, whether it is mandatory or not. It has been held by Apex Court that Rule 77 is not mandatory to be performed while terminating the service of workman because breach of Rule 77 at the most it amounts to face the criminal prosecution but, not implementing Rule-77, the termination cannot be set aside. Hathi. Real question of Rule-77, whether it is mandatory or not. It has been held by Apex Court that Rule 77 is not mandatory to be performed while terminating the service of workman because breach of Rule 77 at the most it amounts to face the criminal prosecution but, not implementing Rule-77, the termination cannot be set aside. That has been examined by Apex Court and another aspect about section 25g and Section 25h, there was nothing on record before the Labour Court about violation of 25g and 25h and, therefore, the Apex Court has come to conclusion that when there is no material on record which established the violation of section 25h and 25g, then, finding given by Labour Court is erroneous. However, the Apex Court has considered that Labour court has jurisdiction emanates from the order of reference and does not extend beyond the terms thereof. In case before the apex Court, the only question refers at the instance of the retrenched workmen was as to the legality of the appointment of another person in his place in violation of Section 25h of I. D. Act,1947. The finding of Labour court is that Section 25h of the i. D. Act, 1947 was not violated. The Labour court has considered altogether different question to examine the noncompliance of rule 77, ID Rules by omission to Maintain seniority record as contemplated therein. Therefore, the question of seniority was not at all referred for adjudication before the labour Court. Looking to the facts which are before the Apex Court and facts which are in present case, the decision of Apex court is not helpful to the petitioner. It is true that Labour Court / Industrial Tribunal having jurisdiction to adjudicate the order of reference and does not extend beyond the terms thereof. Looking to the facts of the present case, demand of permanency after completion of 240 days continuous service with difference of salary was a reference made to Industrial Tribunal. But, the industrial Tribunal has considered the demand of permanency in light of the government Resolution dated 17. 10. 1988 wherein after completion of 10 years, the daily wager becomes permanent. Therefore. considering the Government Resolution dated 17. 10. 1988 it is not outside the scope of order of reference. However, the petitioner has not raised any contention before the Industrial Tribunal that government Resolution dated 17. 10. 10. 1988 wherein after completion of 10 years, the daily wager becomes permanent. Therefore. considering the Government Resolution dated 17. 10. 1988 it is not outside the scope of order of reference. However, the petitioner has not raised any contention before the Industrial Tribunal that government Resolution dated 17. 10. 1988 was not applicable and not binding to the petitioner District Panchayat. A copy of the said circular was produced by workmen before the Industrial Tribunal and against that, no such submission is made which are made before this Court by petitioner. The submission which is not made before the industrial Tribunal raising the question that industrial Tribunal cannot examine the applicability of Government Resolution dated 17. 10. 1988 and then to raise, for the first time, plea before this Court, naturally, same cannot be entertained. However, in substance, by directing the petitioner district Panchayat to implement government Resolution dated 17. 10. 1988 it amouats to granting the benefit of permanency as mentioned in Government resolution that after completion of 10 years service as a daily wager, the workman is entitled the benefits of permanent employee. Therefore, looking to the facts of this case, the aforesaid decision is not helpful to the petitioner District Panchayat. However, in substance, the Industrial Tribunal has rightly considered being an ancillary and incidental matter relate to main dispute. For that, the Industrial Tribunal has not committed any error while directing the petitioner District Panchayat to implement the Government Resolution dated 17. 10. 1988. Therefore, it is not a question about Section 10 (4) of the I. D. Act,1947 as examined by Apex Court in respect to jurisdiction of Industrial Tribunal to be examined under Section 10 read with 10 (4)of the I. D. Act,1947. The Industrial tribunal has jurisdiction under Section 10 of the I. D. Act, 1947 to change the existing contract, to create a new contract and to impose new condition of service against the employer. These are the wide powers enjoyed by the Industrial Tribunal under the provisions of Section 10 the i. D. Act,1947. Further, Section 10, Sub-Section (4)of the I. D. Act,1947 also gives very wide jurisdiction to have necessary /incidental power relating to main dispute. Therefore, according to my opinion, decision which has been relied by learned advocate, Mr. These are the wide powers enjoyed by the Industrial Tribunal under the provisions of Section 10 the i. D. Act,1947. Further, Section 10, Sub-Section (4)of the I. D. Act,1947 also gives very wide jurisdiction to have necessary /incidental power relating to main dispute. Therefore, according to my opinion, decision which has been relied by learned advocate, Mr. Hathi, as referred above, is not helpful to the facts of the present case and looking to the facts of this case, the industrial Tribunal has rightly granted the benefit of Government Resolution dated 17. 10. 1988 and it was not objected by the petitioner before the Industrial Tribunal that this Government Resolution is not applicable to the petitioner. This government Resolution was produced on record by the workmen which has not been objected by the petitioner and there is no submission has been made before the industrial Tribunal that this Government resolution is not applicable to the petitioner- District Panchayat. Therefore, now to raise this contention that opportunity was not available which cannot be looked into. But, in fact, such opportunity was not availed by the petitioner. Therefore, all the contentions raised by learned Advocate, mr. Hathi, are rejected. The Industrial tribunal has rightly dealt with comprehensively to the dispute which has been examined by Industrial Tribunal, rajkot. For that, Industrial Tribunal has not committed any error which requires any interference by this Court while exercising the powers under Article 227 of the constitution of India. This Court cannot re-appreciate the evidence which has been appreciated by the Industrial Tribunal. In case when two views are possible, even though interference by this Court is unwarranted under Article 227 of the constitution of India. This view has been taken by the Apex Court in case of Indian overseas Bank v. I. O. B. Staff Canteen workers Union and another, reported in air 2000 SC 1508 . Relevant observations are in Para. 19 which is quoted as under :"19. The learned single Judge seems to have undertaken an exercise, impermissible for him in exercising writ jurisdiction, by liberally reappreciating the evidence and drawing conclusions of his own on pure questions of fact, unmindful, though aware fully, that he is not exercising any appellate jurisdiction over the awards passed by a tribunal, presided over by a Judicial officer. The learned single Judge seems to have undertaken an exercise, impermissible for him in exercising writ jurisdiction, by liberally reappreciating the evidence and drawing conclusions of his own on pure questions of fact, unmindful, though aware fully, that he is not exercising any appellate jurisdiction over the awards passed by a tribunal, presided over by a Judicial officer. The findings of fact recorded by a fact-finding authority duly constituted for the purpose and which ordinarily should be considered to have become final, cannot be disturbed for the mere reason of having been based on materials or evidence not sufficient or credible in the opinion of the writ Court to warrant those findings at any rate, as long as they are based upon some material which are relevant for the purpose or even on the ground that there is yet another view which can be reasonably and possibly one taken. The Division Bench was not only justified but well merited in its criticism of the order of the learned single Judge and in ordering restoration of the Award of the Tribunal. On being taken through the findings of the Industrial tribunal as well as the order of the learned single Judge and the judgment of the division Bench, we are of the view that the industrial Tribunal had overwhelming materials which constituted ample and sufficient basis for recording its findings as it did, and the manner of consideration undertaken, the objectivity of approach adopted and reasonableness of findings recorded seem to be unexceptionable. The only course, therefore, open to the writ judge was to find out the satisfaction or otherwise of the relevant criteria laid down by this Court, before sustaining the claim of the canteen workmen, on the facts found and recorded by the fact-finding authority and not embark upon an exercise of re-assessing the evidence and arriving at findings of ones own, altogether giving a complete go-bye even to the facts specifically found by the Tribunal below. " ( 9 ) HENCE, there is no substance in the present petition. Accordingly, present petition is dismissed.