Judgment S.N. Jha, CJ.-This special appeal is directed against the order of the learned Single Judge dated 28.07.2005 in S.B. Civil Misc. Appeal No. 285/2001 dismissing the appeal of the appellant. The appellant had filed appeal against an award of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Bhilwara allowing compensation of Rs. 2,19,000/-to the claimants. 2. In view of the controversy raised by the appellant it is not necessary to state the facts of the case. Case of the appellant is that in view of the definition of the term owner in Section 2(30) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, the person in whose name the ownership of the vehicles stands registered i.e., the registered owner alone is liable for compensation, and the registered owner of the vehicle in the instant case being Respondent No. 1, Mool Chand, the appellant cannot be held liable for compensation. “Owner” is defined under Section 2(30) of the Act to mean- “a person in whose name a motor vehicle stands registered, and where such person is a minor, the guardian of such minor, and in relation to a motor vehicle which is the subject of hypothecation, the person in possession of the vehicle under that agreement.” According to the Counsel for the appellant, juxtaposed with the definition of owner in the old Act i.e., the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 under which the terms was defined vide Section 2(19) to mean,-“where the person in possession of a motor vehicle is a minor, the guardian of such minor, and in relation to a motor vehicle which is the subject of a hire purchase agreement, the person in possession of the vehicle under that agreement.” it would be clear that only registered owner can be treated as owner and liable for compensation. 3. The object of the definition or interpretation clause in an enactment is to provide a key to the proper interpretation of the enactment and, secondly, to shorten the language of the enactment part of the statute to avoid repetition of the same words contained in the definition every time the particular thing is sought to be referred to in the enactment. But the meaning given in the definition or interpretation clause is subject to the context in which the term occurs -to use the exact words, “unless the context otherwise requires.” The meaning, therefore, can be moulded, if required, to suit the context.
But the meaning given in the definition or interpretation clause is subject to the context in which the term occurs -to use the exact words, “unless the context otherwise requires.” The meaning, therefore, can be moulded, if required, to suit the context. The definition clause i.e., Section 2 of the Motor Vehicles Act also begins with the same words “In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires -”. It is also to be kept in mind that although key to the interpretation, the substantive provisions of any statute are those of the enactment part and not of the definition part. 4. The question whether a person who is not the registered owner of the vehicle can be held liable for compensation has to be answered in the context of Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act whereunder claim for compensation is made and decided by the Claims Tribunal. Section 166 does not lay down that the claim can be made against the owner of the vehicle. Sub-section (2) thereof states that the application under Sub-section (1) shall be “in such form and contain such particulars as may be prescribed.” As per the form prescribed, among other things, the claimant is no doubt required to disclose the names and particulars of the owner, besides the driver and the insurer of the motor vehicle, but that is for the purpose of notice. Which of them, and to what extent, is liable for compensation is to be decided on the basis of materials brought on record keeping in view the general principles and relevant provisions of the Act, at the trial by the Claims Tribunal. The proceeding under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act is in the nature of torts. The person principally liable for damages i.e., compensation is the driver, the owner is vicariously liable as a joint tort-feasor because it is at his instance and on his behalf that the driver drives the vehicle as high agent. It is in this background that the question is to be considered as to whether the person who is not the registered owner of the vehicle but is the actual owner is liable for compensation. 5. In the instant case the accident took place on 012.1997. Much earlier, on 03.02.1989 the appellant had purchased the vehicle.
It is in this background that the question is to be considered as to whether the person who is not the registered owner of the vehicle but is the actual owner is liable for compensation. 5. In the instant case the accident took place on 012.1997. Much earlier, on 03.02.1989 the appellant had purchased the vehicle. The appellant admittedly being the purchaser of the vehicle the question is whether he can disown the liability. It is relevant to mention that the appellant was not only the actual owner of the vehicle, but he was also driving the vehicle himself at the time of the accident. 6. Another aspect of the case is that Section 50 of the Act contemplates transfer of ownership within specified period - fourteen days in the case of transferor and thirty days in the case of transferee. Under Sub-section (3) of Section 50, in case of failure to report to the registering authority the fact of transfer within the aforesaid period, both the transferor and transferee are liable to pay in lieu of any action that may be taken against them under Section 177 such amount not exceeding one hundred rupees as may be prescribed under Sub-section (5). In terms of the proviso to Sub-section (3) if they fail to pay the amount action may be taken under Section 177, where the amount is paid, no action is to be taken. Section 177 of the Act provides for penalty of fine which may extend to one hundred rupees in case of first offence and three hundred rupees in the case of second and subsequent offences for contravention of the provisions of the Act or any rule, or regulation or notification made thereunder. 7. Section 50 read with Section 177 of the Motor Vehicles Act thus casts an obligation not only on the transferor but also on the transferee to inform the registering authority in the prescribed form alongwith documents the fact of transfer. Giving such information is apparently for the purpose of transfer of ownership of the vehicle in the name of the transferee. If the law mandates the transferee to get the ownership of the vehicle transferred in his name, where he fails to inform the registering authority and get the ownership of the vehicle transferred, can be escape liability of compensation on the ground that he is not registered owner of the vehicle? 8.
If the law mandates the transferee to get the ownership of the vehicle transferred in his name, where he fails to inform the registering authority and get the ownership of the vehicle transferred, can be escape liability of compensation on the ground that he is not registered owner of the vehicle? 8. The provisions relating to compensation in accident cases are in the nature of beneficial legislation for the benefit of the victims of the motor accidents and the victim cannot be left in the lurch for failure of the transferee to get the ownership transferred in his name. The legislature apparently did not envisage that the transferee will not get the ownership transferred in his name and yet take the plea that he is not liable for compensation. If such interpretation were to accepted it would amount to giving premium to default. No person can be allowed to claim benefit of his own default. 9. It may not be out of place to mention here that in the instant case the Insurance Company was absolved of the liability because the vehicle was not insured. It need hardly be pointed out that the Insurance Company merely discharges the liability of the owner under the terms of the insurance policy. In the above premises, we do not think the appellant can be allowed to get away and escape the liability merely on the ground that he was not the registered owner of the vehicle on the basis of definition in Section 2(30) of the Act. 10. In fairness to the appellant, we may mention that two more submissions were advanced - first, that the deceased died as a result of his own negligence and, second, that the amount of compensation was on the higher side. The Claims Tribunal and the learned Single Judge having concurrently held against the appellant, we are not inclined to go into these questions in special appeal. 11. In the result, we find no merit in the appeal which is accordingly dismissed.