( 1 ) EVEN though these criminal petitions are listed for admission, with consent, they are taken up for final disposal and all the petitions are disposed of by this common order. ( 2 ) THE facts leading to the filing of these petitions are summarised as follows : petitioners are accused in several cases filed by the respondent. They are employees of a private limited company which is now under liquidation. Proceedings are initiated at the behest of respondent-2 under section 200, Cr. P. C. read with Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (in short, the act') thereof against the petitioners who were former Managing Directors and Director of the wound-up company, viz. , Victory Glass and Industries Limited, alleging commission of offences under Section 142 of the Act. Suffice it to say that there was a delay of 3 days in filing the complaint and that was accompanied with an application for condonation of delay as contemplated under Section 142 (b) of the Act. The learned Magistrate having considered the application, has allowed the same, condoned the delay and issued process. The petitioners entered appearance and were admitted to bail. They have also filed an application under Section 203, Cr. P. C. for recalling the order dated 17-3-2003 directing issuance of process on the ground that they were not heard before the application filed for condonation of delay was allowed. The learned Magistrate has declined to entertain the same. The petitioners herein questioned the said order before the learned Additional City Civil and Sessions judge in a batch of criminal revision petitions. The Sessions Judge was of the opinion that the learned Magistrate does not have power under the Cr. P. C. to review his own-order. Hence the present petitions seeking to quash the complaint. 2a. Sri Sreeranga, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, would vehemently submit that a right has accrued to the petitioners, inasmuch as there was a delay in filing the complaint. Before the delay could be condoned, they ought to have been heard. In the circumstances, he submits that the proceedings are liable to be quashed. ( 3 ) SRI Raju, learned counsel for the respondent, opposes the prayer sought. He submits that there is a delay of 3 days in filing the complaint. Before the delay could be condoned, they ought to have been heard. In the circumstances, he submits that the proceedings are liable to be quashed. ( 3 ) SRI Raju, learned counsel for the respondent, opposes the prayer sought. He submits that there is a delay of 3 days in filing the complaint. There is no justifiable reason as to why the said order of issuing process and the application seeking condonation of delay should be recalled. ( 4 ) I have given rny anxious consideration to the said submissions. ( 5 ) SECTION 138 of the Act would deal with insufficiency of funds in a bank account. Section 142 would deal with taking of cognizance of the offence. Section 142 (b) of the act would specify the time-limit within which a complaint is required to be filed for the offence under Section 138. Under Section 142 (b), a complaint is required to be filed within one month from the date on which cause of action has arisen under clause (c)of the proviso to Section 142 of the Act. The proviso was added by Act No. 55/02 with effect from 6-2-2003 enabling the complainant to file the complaint after the prescribed period if he satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause in not making the complaint within the time prescribed. On a reading of the proviso which was inserted by Act No. 55/02, it becomes abundantly clear that a time-barred complaint could also be entertained if the complainant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause. Admittedly in the case on hand, there is a delay of 3 days in filing the complaint. The learned Magistrate, before taking cognizance and recording the sworn statement, has straightway condoned the delay in filing the complaint. Incidentally that exercise is done without notice to the petitioners. Undoubtedly a right has accrued in favour of the petitioners when there is a delay in lodging the complaint. The provisions of Section 142 (b) of the Act will have to be read in tandem with Section 142 (a) which starts with a nonobstante clause that 'no Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under Sec. 138 except upon a complaint, in writing, made by the payee or, as the case may be, the holder in due course of the cheque'. Clause (b) specifies that such complaint shall be made within one month of the date on which the cause of action arises under clause (c)of the proviso to Section 142. When there is a delay in filing the complaint, necessarily the complainant will file an application for condonation of delay. When such application is filed, notice obviously will have to be issued to the other side before the order is passed either allowing the application or declining the same. ( 6 ) THE observation made in Wade's administrative Law (10th Edition) is useful. Willes, J. said : "i am of the same opinion. I apprehend that a tribunal which is by law invested with power to affect the property of one of Her majesty's subjects, is bound to give such subject an opportunity of being heard before it proceeds; and that the rule is of universal application and founded on the plainest principles of justice. Now is the board in the present case such a tribunal? I apprehend it clearly is. . . " Byles, J. said : "it seems to me that the board are wrong whether they acted judicially or ministerially. I conceive they acted judicially, because they had to determine the offence, and they had to apportion the punishment as well as the remedy. That being so, a long course of decisions beginning with Dr. Bentley's case and ending with some very recent cases, establish that although there are no positive words in a statute requiring that the party shall be heard, yet the justice of the common law will supply the omission of the legislature. " ( 7 ) THE above quotations show clearly how the Courts are justified in their interventions. They held that every judicial act is subject to the procedure required by natural justice; and they then denominated the great majority of administrative acts as 'judicial' for this purpose. Instead of saying, as was in fact the truth, that natural justice must be observed in both judicial and administrative acts, the Courts stretched the meaning of 'judicial' in an unnatural way. It is fundamental to fair procedure that both sides should be heard i. e. 'hear the other side'. This rule is being enforced since long. No Court will overlook it and overlooking is one of the common errors to which human nature is prone. It is fundamental to fair procedure that both sides should be heard i. e. 'hear the other side'. This rule is being enforced since long. No Court will overlook it and overlooking is one of the common errors to which human nature is prone. ( 8 ) LORD Denning has said : 'if the right to be heard is to be a real right which is worth anything, it must carry with it a right in the accused man to know the case which is made against him. He must know what evidence has been given and what statements have been made affecting him and then he must be given an opportunity to correct or contradict them. ' ( 9 ) ANOTHER classic example is the statement of Willis, J. in a case which in essentials was the same as Cooper v. Wandsworth board of Works : 'in condemning a man to have his house pulled down, a judicial act is as much implied as in fining him 5 (sic) and as the local board is the only tribunal that can make such an order, its act must be a judicial act, and the party to be affected should have a notice given to him. . . . . . In the present case, there is nothing in the Act of Parliament to limit the natural inference as to the nature of the Act. ' ( 10 ) TAKING into consideration the fact that the delay of 3 days was condoned without notice to the petitioners, I am of the view that the proceedings commencing from taking cognizance and issuing process to the petitioners requires to be set aside as it is opposed to principles of natural justice. ( 11 ) CONSEQUENTLY, all the petitions are allowed. The order of the learned Magistrate condoning the delay, taking cognizance and issuing process is set aside. The matter stands remitted to the Magistrate to deal with the application of condonation of delay in accordance with law after affording an opportunity to the petitioners herein to file their objections, if they choose to do so. Order accordingly.