S. K. SETH, J. ( 1 ) THIS revision is against the order dated 7. 5. 2004 passed by the 5th additional District Judge, (Fast Track) Ratlam in Misc. Civil Case No. 3 of 2003 refusing to reject the application for grant of Letters of administration filed by non-applicant No. 1. ( 2 ) NON-APPLICANT No. 1 on 25. 1. 1994 applied for grant of Letters of Administration of the estate of Late Noel Brown. She claimed that being sole beneficiary under the Will dated 21. 1. 1975 said to have been executed by Noel brown her late husband, she is entitled exclusively to the bequeathed estate. Learned Court below issued Citation, and in response, present applicant along with her husband (non-applicant No. 2 herein) filed objections and denied the claim of non-applicant No. 1. One of the objections she took that present application out of which this revision arises was not maintainable because non-applicant No. 1 withdrew her earlier application for same relief in respect of same estate on 22. 9. 1986 without liberty to institute fresh proceedings. Subsequent application, therefore, is not maintainable being hit by provisions of Order XXIII, Rule 1 (4) of the Civil Procedure Code. Learned Court below based upon aforesaid objection, framed additional issue Nos. 3 and 4 and by the order impugned answered them against applicant. Hence this revision. ( 3 ) LEARNED counsel appearing for applicant referred to order XXIII, Rule 1 sub-rule (4) of the Civil Procedure Code and submitted that application for Letters of Administration is in the nature of civil suit. In view of provisions contained in section 295 of the Indian succession Act, 1925 provisions of the Civil procedure Code are applicable to such application with full force. He therefore, contended that the Court below erred in law in holding that notwithstanding the earlier compromise leading to withdrawal of earlier application without liberty, subsequent application was maintainable. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for respondent/beneficiary supported the order impugned and submitted that no interference is warranted with it. ( 4 ) AFTER having heard and considering rival submissions and contentions urged by learned counsel for parties, I find no merit and substance in this revision. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for respondent/beneficiary supported the order impugned and submitted that no interference is warranted with it. ( 4 ) AFTER having heard and considering rival submissions and contentions urged by learned counsel for parties, I find no merit and substance in this revision. ( 5 ) THE Indian Succession Act, 1925 (hereinafter referred to as 'the act' for short) is a self contained Code insofar as the question of making an application for probate, letters of administration, etc. This is clearly manifest in the fascicule of the provisions of the Act. Succession governed by the Act can broadly be divided into intestate and testamentary succession. The testamentary succession is generally made applicable to everyone in India except those who are exempted under the Act. Under Section 213 of the Act, no right as executor or legate can be established in any Court unless a Court of competent jurisdiction in India has granted Probate of the Will under which the right is claimed or has granted Letters of administrations with the Will annexed. A probate or letter of administration granted by the competent Court is conclusive evidence of the execution and genuineness of the Will propounded and the rights of executor appointed to represent the estate of testator, unless it is tainted with fraud. The action of Court when it makes a grant is in the nature of proceedings in rem and so long the order remains in force, it is conclusive not only against all parties who may be before the Court but also against all persons whatsoever. A probate Court is a Court of conscience and it does not decide the rights between the parties. A probate Court has to deliver a judgment which should become a judgment in rem. The probate proceedings must take form as nearly as may be of a suit according to provisions of Civil Procedure code. There is no definition of the word "suit" either in the Civil Procedure Code or in the general Clauses Act. In fact, suits of civil nature can only be entertained by Civil Courts. When a legal right of civil nature and its infringement are alleged, ordinarily a suit would lie before the Civil Court and would be governed by the procedure laid down in Civil Procedure Code. In fact, suits of civil nature can only be entertained by Civil Courts. When a legal right of civil nature and its infringement are alleged, ordinarily a suit would lie before the Civil Court and would be governed by the procedure laid down in Civil Procedure Code. No doubt section 268 read with section 295 on the first flush leaves an impression that the provisions of Civil Procedure code are applicable to the proceedings either for grant or for revocation of probate or letter of administration with the Will annexed. However , on a deeper probe, it is clear that the word "as far as may be practicable" carves out an exception. Thus, the proceedings before the Probate Court may be akin to a suit of a civil nature, but in the strict sense of the word, it is not a suit deciding inter-parties right which has a binding effect between them and their successors. On the other hand, a Probate Court does not decide any question of title except the genuineness of the Will and the competence of the executor of the Will. As between the parties, decision rendered by ordinary Civil court and the decision rendered by the Probate Court on the question of truthfulness, genuineness of the Will, the decision of the probate Court is a judgment in rem which will bind not only the parties before it, but the whole world. It is a well accepted preposition of law which does not admit any doubt. The decision of the ordinary Civil Court dealing with the same issue would not constitute a judgment in rem. In the aforesaid backdrop of legal position, it is clear the applicability of provisions of order XXIII of the Civil Procedure Code per se are inapplicable with full vigour to proceedings under the Act, because of the use of expression 'as nearly as may be' in section 295. The point is no longer res-Integra. See jugeshwar Nath Sahai and another v. Jagatdhuri Prasad and others. That Division bench decision is an authority that an application for probate cannot legally be disposed of by a compromise. Said decision has been followed by the Division Bench of Lahore High court in Banwarilal and others v. Mst. Kishan devi and Others. In view of the above, no infirmity or illegality could be attached to order impugned. That Division bench decision is an authority that an application for probate cannot legally be disposed of by a compromise. Said decision has been followed by the Division Bench of Lahore High court in Banwarilal and others v. Mst. Kishan devi and Others. In view of the above, no infirmity or illegality could be attached to order impugned. ( 6 ) IN view of the foregoing discussion, this revision fails and accordingly is dismissed. Parties are left to bear their own costs. Revision dismissed. .