Judgment S.N. Jha, C.J.-This special appeal arises from the order of learned Single Judge dated 04.07.1994 in S.B. Company Petition No. 6/1997 directing that the company be advertised and appointing the Official Liquidator as the Provisional Liquidator of the appellant company. 2. The respondent Municipal Council, Sikar filed company petition under Section 433 of the Companies Act, 1956 seeking winding up the appellant company on the ground that it was unable to pay its debt. Facts of the case briefly are that the respondent paid a sum of Rs. 97,834.79/-in advance for supply of a new 4 wheels drive Mahendra Diesel Jeep CJ 500 D to the appellant which was a dealer of M/s. Mahendra & Mahendra. The appellant supplied the jeep but of 2 wheels drive instead of 4 wheels drive. The respondent did not accept the delivery and made request to either supply the jeep of the agreed specification or refund the money. The appellant in their reply to the company petition stated that on account of dispute amongst Directors of the appellant company, M/s. Mahendra and Mahendra had terminated their agency and the appellant had ceased to be their dealer. It also took the plea that there was no inability to pay the debt within the meaning of Clause (e) of Section 433 of Companies Act and the winding up petition was not maintainable. 3. From the impugned order of the learned Single Judge it appears that payments were made to the respondent in installments and by 18.05.1994, the entire principal amount had been paid. The respondent however claimed interest on the principal amount. The appellant disputed the claim and contended that for non-payment of interest which was a disputed liability, the dispute cannot be decided in a proceeding under Section 433 of the Companies Act the company cannot be wound up. Learned Single Judge relying on a decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India vs. Justice S.S. Sandhawalia, 1994 (1) JT 62 (SC), held that the respondent was entitled to get interest @ 18 per annum and accordingly rejecting the plea of the appellant ordered winding up of the company. 4. Learned Single Judge relying on a decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India vs. Justice S.S. Sandhawalia, 1994 (1) JT 62 (SC), held that the respondent was entitled to get interest @ 18 per annum and accordingly rejecting the plea of the appellant ordered winding up of the company. 4. From the record of this appeal, it appears that when appeal came up for preliminary hearing on 11.07.1994, the Division Bench directed the appellant to deposit the amount of interest within ten days and stayed the operation of the learned Single Judge till then. When the matter came up on 22.07.1994, the Court was informed that the entire amount of interest had been deposited and in the circumstances, the Court passed a clear order of stay. 5. The position which thus stands as on date is that the appellant has not only paid the principal amount to the respondent, it has also deposited the amount of interest payable thereon in this Court. The question for consideration is whether the order of winding up should be allowed to stand. 6. Clause (e) of Section 433 of the Companies Act under which the petition was filed for winding up reads as under:-“The company may be wound up by the Tribunal- (e) if the company is unable to pay its debts; 7. Section 434 of the Act contains provisions regarding deemed inability to pay the debts with a meaning of Section (e) of Section 433. The provision so far as relevant may also be quoted as under:-434. Company when deemed unable to pay its debts.-(1) A company shall be deemed to be unable to pay its debts - (a) if a creditor, by assignment or otherwise, to whom the company is indebted in a sum exceeding (one lakh rupees) then due, has served on the company, by causing it to be delivered at its regsitered office, by registered post or otherwise, a demand under his hand requiring the company to pay the sum so due and the company has for three weeks thereafter neglected to pay the sum, or to secure or compound for it to the reasonable satisfaction of the creditor; 8. Adverting to the instant case, it would appear that the payment was made by the respondent against delivery of a jeep of the particular specification. Adverting to the instant case, it would appear that the payment was made by the respondent against delivery of a jeep of the particular specification. A jeep was supplied but of a different type and the respondent refused to accept the delivery. It is at that stage that the dispute arose. Non-delivery of jeep of the correct specification apparently was on account of the fact that M/s. Mahendra and Mahendra Company Ltd. had terminated the agency and the appellant had ceased to be their dealer. In the circumstances, it was clearly not in a position to deliver the jeep of the correct specification, Undoubtedly, the appellant was required to refund the amount. It is not in dispute that the amount was refunded but after considerable delay. 9. In Pradeshiya Industrial & Investment Corporation of U.P. vs. North India Petrochemicals Ltd. & Anr., 1994 (3) SCC 348 , while construing of the expression “unable to pay its debts” in Clause (e) of Section 433 of the Companies Act the Supreme Court observed:-“What then is inability when the section says “unable to pay its dues”? That should be taken in the commercial sense. In that, it is unable to meet current demands. As stated by william James, V.C. It is “plainly and commercially insolvent-that is to say, that its assets are such, and its existing liabilities are such, as to make it reasonably certain-as to make the Court feel satisfied-that the existing and probable assets would be insufficient to meet the existing liabilities.” 10. The Court noticed with approval the observations in the case of Amalgamated Commercial Traders (P) Ltd. vs. A.C.K. Krishnaswami, 1965 (35) Comp. Cases 456, which the leading case on the point, and it would be useful to quote the relevant observations therein as under:- “It is well-settled that “a winding up petition is not a legitimate means of seeking to enforce payment of the debt which is bona fide disputed by the company. A petition presented ostensibly for a winding up order but really to exercise pressure will be dismissed, and under circumstances may be stigmatized as a scandalous abuse of the process of the Court. At one time petitions founded on disputed debt were directed to stand over till the debt was established by action. If , however, there was no reason to believe that the debt, if established would not be paid, the petition was dismissed. At one time petitions founded on disputed debt were directed to stand over till the debt was established by action. If , however, there was no reason to believe that the debt, if established would not be paid, the petition was dismissed. The modern practice has been to dismiss such petitions. But, of course, if the debt is not disputed on some substantial ground, the Court may decide it on the petition and make the order.” ......... If the debt was bona fide disputed, there cannot be neglect to pay within Section 434(I)(A) of the Companies Act. If there is no neglect, the deeming provision does not come into play and the ground of winding up, namely, that the company is unable to pay its debts is not substantiated.” 11. We have referred to the above observations to point out the scope of the winding up petition on the ground of inability to pay the debts by the debtor company. Facts of the case as noticed above lie in a narrow compass. The entire principal amount stands paid, though the payment was staggered but there does not appear to be any intention not to pay, there was no evidence as to inability to pay the debt on the part of the appellant company. We are of the view that there was no justification to order winding up on account of non-payment of the interest on the principal amount. We should not be understood as suggesting that the appellant was not liable to pay the interest. The position now is that the amount of interest has been deposited by the appellant. So far as winding up is concerned, the order visits the company with serious civil consequences. It virtually sounds death-knell for it. All that the respondent was interested in was getting refund of the money. The principal amount having been refunded and the interest amount also having been deposited in the Court pursuant to order of the Division Bench, we are of the view that the winding up would be an abuse of process of Court. 12. We accordingly set aside the order of learned Single Judge and allow the appeal. The respondent will be entitled to the amount deposited in this Court pursuant to order dated 11.07.1994 (Supra) according to rules.