DIVISIONAL TRAFFIC OFFICER, KARNATAKA STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION, MYSORE DIVISION, MYSORE v. K. RAMAIAH
2006-07-04
H.V.G.RAMESH
body2006
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER The petitioner-KSRTC of Mysore Division is challenging the order of the Principal District Judge, Mysore dated 20-9-2002 in Miscellaneous Appeal Nos. 12, 13, 16, 17 and 18 of 1998 reversing the order passed by the Competent Authority/Officer under the provisions of Karnataka Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1974. 2. According to the petitioner, shop bearing Nos. 12, 4, 3, 8, 1 had been allotted to the respective respondents for carrying on a particular business and that the occupants of the premises have been in unauthorised occupation after expiry of the period of allotment, having no right to carry on the business in the premises by virtue of efflux of time. Further, since these respondents-allottees are claiming as tenants, notices were issued to them determining the tenancy as required under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. After determination of the tenancy, petitioner filed a complaint before the 7th respondent who is the Competent Officer of the KSRTC alleging unauthorised occupation of the shop premises mentioned above against respondents 1 to 6 and that they are labile to be evicted under the provisions of the Karnataka Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1974 (for short 'the Act'), from these premises situate at the KSRTC Bus Stand, KR. Circle, Mysore belonging to the KSRTC. The Competent Officer, after issuance of notice and on the appearance of the respondents, has held an enquiry and passed a common order dated 23-3-1998 ordering the respondents to vacate and hand over vacant possession of the schedule premises to the complainant/petitioner within forty-five days from the date of the said order acting under Section 5 of the Act. 3. Being aggrieved by the said order, the respondents have moved the District Judge, Mysore in MA Nos. 12, 13, 16, 17 and 18/1998. By order dated 20-9-2002, the District Judge has allowed the appeal by setting aside the order of the Competent Officer holding that respondents 1 to 6 are not in unauthorised occupation of the premises and that there is no valid determination of the tenancy. 4. In the meanwhile, there was also negotiations between the officials of the Corporation and the occupants of the shop premises and since the negotiations failed, proceedings were initiated against the respondents under the provisions of the Act.
4. In the meanwhile, there was also negotiations between the officials of the Corporation and the occupants of the shop premises and since the negotiations failed, proceedings were initiated against the respondents under the provisions of the Act. Aggrieved by the order of the District Judge, Mysore, the petitioner-Corporation is seeking for an issuance of writ of certiorari to quash Annexure-B - order of the Principal District Judge, Mysore in the miscellaneous appeals mentioned above. 5. Heard Sri Jayaprakash, Counsel representing the petitioner; Sri R.N. Narasimhamurthy, Senior Counsel representing some of the respondents and Sri D.S. Hosmath, Counsel representing the legal heirs of 3rd respondent. 6. It is seen, the writ petition against the 5th respondent is shown to have been dismissed. 7. At the outset, it is the submission of the petitioner's Counsel that there was a notice issued on 27-4-1992 determining the tenancy as per the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. Ignoring the said notice issued by the petitioner, learned District Judge has passed the impugned order and it is his further submission that there cannot be any such waiver of notice despite some efforts or talks being made by the officials of the KSRTC and the respondents. 8. Learned Counsel has taken me through the order passed by the Competent Officer of the KSRTC i.e., after the notice dated 27-4-1992 issued as per the Transfer of Property Act determining the tenancy; and thereafter has taken me through the notice issued under Section 4(1) on 27-3-1996 of the Act terminating the tenancy after having given an opportunity to the respondents to participate in the proceedings and the order passed under Section 5 of the Act directing to vacate and hand over possession, and submitted that ignoring this aspect, the learned District Judge, mainly on the ground that no notice has been issued terminating the tenancy, proceeded to pass the order which is illegal. It is his further submission that, in similar circumstances, the order passed by the District Judge in another set of cases has been set aside by this Court in W.P. Nos. 149 and 150 of 2002 decided on 11-3-2003 and that the said order of the learned Single Judge in setting aside the order of the District Judge has been confirmed by this Court in a Division Bench in W.A. Nos. 3229 and 3491 of 2003 by order dated 17-9-2003.
149 and 150 of 2002 decided on 11-3-2003 and that the said order of the learned Single Judge in setting aside the order of the District Judge has been confirmed by this Court in a Division Bench in W.A. Nos. 3229 and 3491 of 2003 by order dated 17-9-2003. The learned District Judge without understanding the legal provisions of Section 2(g) and Section 4 and 5 of the Act, has passed the order which is liable to be quashed. 9. Per contra, learned Senior Counsel submitted that despite issuance of show-cause notice dated 27-4-1992, the petitioner went on accepting the rentals and as such, it amounts to waiver of notice on termination of tenancy. As per Section 113 of the Transfer of Property Act, the respondents are tenants by 'holding over' and submitted further that the conduct of the petitioner in moving for settlement with the respondents amounted to waiver of notice of tenancy and no due notice has been issued in between the notice issued in 1992 and thereafter till the filing of the complaint before the Competent Officer and there is no valid termination of tenancy and that by the conduct of the parties, there was implied waiver and there should be due issuance of notice as required. In Support of his argument, learned Counsel relied upon the decision in Damodar Narayana Naik Gardikar v State of Karnataka and Others to contend that no grounds are mentioned in the alleged notice and, eviction on the basis of such bald notice without assigning any reasons much less regarding termination of tenancy cannot be acted upon to consider as if it is a due notice and another decision in Nasir Ahmed v Assistant Custodian General, Evacuee Property, Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow and Another, to contend that there is no such valid notice being issued and that notice issued should contain the grounds on which the property is sought to be declared as unauthorised or regarding termination of notice and the notice did not contain any such ground much less regarding termination of tenancy, and submitted that there is violation of the principles of natural justice in not issuing valid notice much less non-mentioning of the grounds and even the grounds mentioned in the notice are not in accordance with the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act and also under the provisions of the Act. 10.
10. Further, Counsel for the 3rd respondent submitted that this property has been allotted to him by the Rent Controller and no such notice is prescribed under the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 regarding termination of tenancy and the order passed by the Competent Authority directing to vacate and hand over possession is without any authority as the proceedings has to be initiated under the provisions of Section 21 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 and not for any other reasons. Accordingly, it is his submission that the order of the District Judge setting aside the order passed by the Competent Officer does not call for interference. 11. In the light of the arguments advanced, let me consider whether due notice has been issued as required and contemplated as per the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act and the provisions of the Act and, whether the impugned order passed by the District Judge is liable to be quashed. 12. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the decisions in B. Srinivasa Acharya v District Judge and also the decision in Electric Power Devices Company v Senior Divisional Manager, Life Insurance Corporation of India and Another, to contend that the provisions of the Act is applicable and that no such prior notice of termination of tenancy be given to unauthorised occupants and that if a person continues in occupation without consent of the authority, then such occupation is unauthorised occupation and Competent Officer is entitled to pass an order of eviction and further, as per the provisions of the Act, it is not necessary to establish that it is for bona fide need as is required under the Rent Act. 13. In the decision in the case of Nasir Ahmad, it is held thus: "4. Under Rule 6 of the Administration of Evacuee Property (Central) Rules, 1950, the notice under Section 7 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950 must be issued in the prescribed form and contain the grounds on which the property is sought to be declared evacuee property. As stated earlier, the notice that was issued in this case merely reproduced the form without mentioning the particulars on which the case against the appellant was based. It was essential to state the particulars to enable the appellant to answer the case against him.
As stated earlier, the notice that was issued in this case merely reproduced the form without mentioning the particulars on which the case against the appellant was based. It was essential to state the particulars to enable the appellant to answer the case against him. Clearly therefore, the notice did not comply with Rule 6 and could not provide a foundation for the proceedings that followed. 5. What is said in the preceding paragraph makes it plain that the authority concerned did not apply his mind to the relevant material before issuing the notice. The same thing is apparent from another fact. It has been stated that on November 29, 1952 the Deputy Custodian, Deoria, dropped the proceeding seeking to declare the appellant an intending evacuee and that on the same day he directed the initiation of a proceeding under Section 7. Section 7 requires the Custodian to form an opinion that the property in question is evacuee property within the meaning of the Act before any action under that section is taken. Also, under Rule 6, the Custodian has to be satisfied from information in his possession or otherwise that the property is prima facie evacuee property before a notice is issued. On November 29, 1952 no evidence was found to support a declaration that the appellant was an intending evacuee. There is no material on record to suggest that on that very day the authority had before him any evidence to justify the initiation of a proceeding to declare the appellant an evacuee and his property as evacuee property. The notice under Section 7 thus appears to have been issued without any basis. The Assistant Custodian General who found no merit in the revisional application preferred by the appellant overlooked these aspects of the case. We are therefore, unable to agree with the High Court that the Assistant Custodian General's order did not suffer from any error". 14. In Damodar Narayana Naik Gardikar, this Court has held thus: "The facts and circumstances on the basis of which a person, in the opinion of the Estate Officer is an unauthorised occupant, should be specifically stated in the notice.
14. In Damodar Narayana Naik Gardikar, this Court has held thus: "The facts and circumstances on the basis of which a person, in the opinion of the Estate Officer is an unauthorised occupant, should be specifically stated in the notice. If the notice neither specifies fact, substance of the report nor the substance of the order of the Revenue Authorities or the particulars of facts on the basis of which the opinion may have been formed, it can be said that no show cause notice in the eye of law has been issued and eviction on basis of such a defective notice is illegal". 15. In B. Srinivasa Achar, this Court has held thus: "The definition as contained in Section 2(g) of the PP Act includes the continuance in occupation by any person of the public premises after the authority under which he was allowed to occupy the premises has expired. In view of the law in force namely, the PP Act governing the field, the unauthorised occupant does not become authorised merely because protection was given against the arbitrary evictions under the provisions of the KRC Act earlier. Under the provisions of the PP Act it is not at all contemplated that any prior notice of termination of tenancy be given to an unauthorised occupant". 16. In Electric Power Devices Company, it is observed thus: "If the lease has been determined validly and thereafter if, a person continues in occupation without consent of the owner or lessor or authority, then such occupation is to be deemed to be an unauthorised occupation and Section 5, requires two things to be established, one i.e., the premises in question is a public premises, and the other, is that, the defendant in the case alleged to be in occupation of the building happens to be an unauthorised occupant or the person is in unauthorised occupation of the public premises. If the two conditions are established, then in that case, authority is entitled to pass order directing said person to vacate the premises, which is in his occupation, within the time fixed or within 15 days of publication". 17. It appears, these respondents are the occupants of the shop premises belonging to the KSRTC and carrying on business in the said premises since 1965. Originally, the premises were let out for a period of three years.
17. It appears, these respondents are the occupants of the shop premises belonging to the KSRTC and carrying on business in the said premises since 1965. Originally, the premises were let out for a period of three years. According to the petitioner, there was increase in the number of commuters and bus services and they felt .the need to take possession' of the shop premises to convert it for the purpose of establishing a police station to maintain law and order and to open some counters for issuance of passes to students and for other similar purposes like providing but shelters and ladies waiting Room. It appears there was negotiations between the officials of the Corporation and the respondents to enhance licence fee at the rate of Rs. 10/- per sq. ft. and that the respondents had to pay the licence fee for three years after the poriod of initial licence and, as per the petitioner, the licence fee to be enhanced was also subject to concurrence of the Board of KSRTC. But however, the respondents are said to. have not come forward to enter into a fresh agreement and prior to that there was also issuance of notice as required under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. In continuation of the earlier notice issued, a notice under Section 4(1) of the Act also came to be issued on 27-3-1996 calling upon the occupants of the shops to vacate and hand over the premises by the end of 18-4-1996. The notices have been served, the parties have appeared and filed counter before the Competent Authority and participated in the proceedings. 18. According to the respondents, they have to be evicted under the Rent Control Act or after notice of termination of tenancy as required under the Transfer of Property Act and not under the provisions of the Act as they are in occupation of the premises for more than twenty years as tenants and have earned good will and reputation. According to them, there is no termination of the tenancy of the occupants and even if there is any such termination, it was waived by acceptance of the rents subsequently. 19. In this regard, it has to be noted that these respondents have participated in the proceedings before the Competent Officer and notices have also been issued as required under law.
19. In this regard, it has to be noted that these respondents have participated in the proceedings before the Competent Officer and notices have also been issued as required under law. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has taken me through the contents of the notice dated 27-31996 issued under Section 4(1) of the Act in which it is mentioned that these respondents have become unauthorised occupants and it is also stated in the notice on what grounds they are unauthorised occupants and in respect of one of the shops i.e., Shop No. 12; it is noted that there is change of business without taking prior permission and also that he had not agreed to pay the excess licence fee after the period of three years and there is non-compliance of the terms of the agreement. It is also stated in the notice that one of the respondents i.e., the 1st respondent moved the Rent Controller by filing an application under Section 19 of the said Act to deposit the licence fee and that the said application came to be rejected. Stating that even after the expiry of the lease period, he is in occupation and as such he is an unauthorised occupant and due notice has been issued as contemplated under Section 4 of the Act. Thereafter, the respondents also are shown to have participated before the Competent Officer of KSRTC and have examined witnesses on their behalf and also produced documents in their support. 20. Further, learned Senior Counsel appearing for some of the respondents has relied on Nasir Ahmad's case, in which case, it is observed that notice under Rules 6 and 7 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950 must mention the ground on which the property is sought to be declared as a Evacuee property. Similarly, in the instant case, notice issued under Section 4(1) of the Act contemplates the ground and also mentions that the respondents are unauthorised occupants and that the notice was duly serviced and respondents have also participated in the proceedings before the Competent Officer and after hearing them, order has been passed by the competent office directing respondents to vacate and hand over possession. As such, it cannot be said that there was no such notice issued nor can it be said that there is non-compliance of the principles of natural justice. 21.
As such, it cannot be said that there was no such notice issued nor can it be said that there is non-compliance of the principles of natural justice. 21. Learned Counsel for the respondents has also relied on Damodar Narayana Naik's case, to attend that grounds should be mentioned in the notice and that in the instant case, no such grounds are mentioned. It is seen, in the notice issued under Section 4(1) of the Act, the grounds are clearly mentioned and the ground on which the respondent has become an unauthorised occupant is also clearly mentioned. In such circumstance, the decision relied upon by the learned Counsel is of no avail to him. 22. As regards the contention that it is a tenancy and not licence and it requires due notice to be issued and by the conduct of the petitioner, there is waiver of termination of tenancy in Srinivasa Acharya's case, referring to Section 2(g) of the Act, the Division Bench of this Court has held that the definition as contained in Section 2(g) of the Act includes continuance in occupation by any person of the public premises after the authority under which he was allowed to occupy the premises has expired. In view of the law in force, the unauthorised occupation does not become authorised merely because protection was given against the arbitrary evictions under the provisions of the Rent Control Act earlier. The Court has further noted that under the provisions of the Act it is not contemplated that any prior notice of termination be given to an unauthorised occupant. 23. In this set of cases, it is noted that the respondents were given due notice as per provisions of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and in between, there were some negotiations between the parties and in that context, it is the contention of the respondents' Counsel that there is estoppel and also waiver of termination of tenancy by conduct as the negotiations failed. It is also seen that due notice as contemplated under Section 4(1) of the Act has been issued and the respondents thereafter have participated in the proceedings before the Competent Authority and later they have suffered an order of eviction.
It is also seen that due notice as contemplated under Section 4(1) of the Act has been issued and the respondents thereafter have participated in the proceedings before the Competent Authority and later they have suffered an order of eviction. However, the learned District Judge has come to the conclusion that the tenants, even after termination of the tenancy, continued as tenants by holding over as per Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act and that the tenancy of the respondents has not been determined as per Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and as such, the initiation of the proceedings under the provisions of the Act is not valid. The learned District Judge was also of the view that no such notice has been issued to the tenants and as on the date of issuance of notice under Section 4(1) of the Act, the respondents herein are not the unauthorised occupants and the issuance of notice under Section 4(1) is bad in law and the Competent Officer is only competent to pass eviction order against unauthorised occupants and not against authorised occupants. 24. In similar circumstance, some of the orders of the District Judge have been challenged before this Court as noted earlier, in W.P. Nos. 149 and 150 of 2002 which was disposed of by a Single Judge of this Court on 11-3-2002. Referring to Section 2(g) of the Act, this Court has observed that unauthorised occupation means that if a person were to continue in occupation of any premises after the expiry of the lease or agreement or whose tenancy has been terminated or ceased, and has held that the tenants have no authority whatsoever to continue their possession after termination of the lease. 25. In the instant case also, originally there was said to be lease/licence for a period of three years. Though there were some negotiations taking place in between after issuance of notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, the negotiations failed. As such, it cannot be said that the petitioner has given consent by his conduct of accepting the rents and that there is waiver of termination of tenancy. Even as per the ratio laid down in Srinivasa Achar’s case no such prior notice of termination is required in case of unauthorized occupation.
As such, it cannot be said that the petitioner has given consent by his conduct of accepting the rents and that there is waiver of termination of tenancy. Even as per the ratio laid down in Srinivasa Achar’s case no such prior notice of termination is required in case of unauthorized occupation. Admittedly, in these set of cases, respondents 1 to 4 and 6 are in occupation of the shop premises on lease/licence for a period of three years and thereafter there was no such continuation. More over the premises in question is a public premise. In the circumstances, the Act is applicable. Further, the order passed in W.P. Nos. 149 and 150 of 2003 in similar circumstances had been confirmed by the Division Bench of this Court in W.A. Nos. 3299 and 3491 of 2003. Accordingly, I am of the view that the impugned order passed by the learned District Judge is liable to be quashed while upholding the order passed by the Competent Authority. 26. In the result, the writ petition is allowed. The order passed by the learned District Judge in M.A. Nos. 12, 13, 16, 17, and 18/1998, dated 20-9-2002 is quashed. Respondents 1, 2, 4 and legal representatives of 3rd respondent have been given one year time from today, to vacate and hand over possession of the premises.