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2006 DIGILAW 544 (KER)

Pradeep Narayanan v. Kerala State represented by the Special Tahsildar

2006-08-22

THOTTATHIL B.RADHAKRISHNAN

body2006
Judgment :- The writ petitioner’s lands were acquired for the second respondent. An award was passed by the Collector. A reference was made under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, hereinafter referred to as the “Act”. The reference was answered without the junction of the second respondent, the requisitioning authority. Armed with the decisions of the Apex Court in that regard, the second respondent had that award set aside by this Court on a count of non-hearing of the requisitioning authority. On remit, the claimant gave evidence. He was cross-examined. The first three sentences in the cross-examination were answers to suggestions as to whether the claimant was present in the proceedings leading to the award and whether he had tendered documents. He answered in the affirmative. This reply of the claimant to the cross-examination formed the basis of an argument before the Reference Court, without any written plea on record in that behalf, that the reference application was barred by limitation. That argument on behalf of requisitioning authority found favour with the Court below and it was held that the reference is barred by limitation. 2. Having regard to the fact that this writ petition stood admitted, the lower court records were called for an the original files, including the award of the Collector are before me. 3. The award is signed by the Officer exercising the powers of the Collector, namely, the Special Tahsildar (LA), Alappuzha. He signed it on 2-6-1999. The reference application was filed on 16-7-1999 under Section 18(1) of the Act. Taking the date of award as 2-6-1999 and on the assumption that the claimant was present before the Collector (the Officer who made the award) on 2-6-1999, the Reference Court has now held that the application for reference was filed beyond the period prescribed in proviso (a) occurring in Section 18 of the Act. However, a perusal of the original files which have been brought down from the Court below would show that the award, signed by the Special Tahsildar (LA), Alappuzha on 2-6-1999 is thereafter approved by the District Collector only on 5-7-1999. This, obviously, means that the award is one which will fall within the first proviso to Section 11(1) which requires that no award shall be made without the previous approval of the appropriate Officer as authorised by the Government. This, obviously, means that the award is one which will fall within the first proviso to Section 11(1) which requires that no award shall be made without the previous approval of the appropriate Officer as authorised by the Government. The award signed by the Special Tahsildar on 2-6-1999 would be only a hollow document, at least, to tie down the claimant in relation to the period of limitation provided by proviso (a) in Section 18 of the Act. Thus, the date of award has to be treated as 5-7-1999, the date on which the Collector approved the award. It is nobody’s case that the claimant was before the Collector when the award was signed. Even if it were, it makes no difference since the reference application was filed on 16-7-1999 well within time. Thus, it can be safely concluded that the application of the petitioner for reference was not barred by limitation. 4. The issue can be looked at from a different angle also. The petitioner was served with Ext.P1, notice under Section 12(2) of the Act. That notice is dated 13-7-1999. A notice under Section 12(2) is contemplated only when the person interested was not present either personally or through a representative when the award was made. As already noticed, the approval of the Collector was only on 5-7-1999 and it is therefore that Section 12(2) notice (Ext.P1) was issued thereafter on 13.7.1999. This is the proper way since, in law, the award can be treated as having come into force only after the Collector had granted the approval in terms of the first among the provisos occurring after sub-section 1 of Section 11 of the Act. In this view of the matter also, this writ petition is entitled to succeed. 5. For the reasons aforesaid, the impugned Ext.P4 order of the Court below is one that results in miscarriage of justice and deserves to be set aside invoking Article 227 of the Constitution of India, to ensure that justice is done to the writ petitioner. The same is accordingly set aside and the Court below is directed to proceed with the trial in LAR.No.14/2000 in accordance with law. Having regard to the time lag that has already undergone, it is further directed that the case shall be completed at the earliest, at any rate, before the mid summer vacation, 2007. 6. The same is accordingly set aside and the Court below is directed to proceed with the trial in LAR.No.14/2000 in accordance with law. Having regard to the time lag that has already undergone, it is further directed that the case shall be completed at the earliest, at any rate, before the mid summer vacation, 2007. 6. Having regard to what is stated above, I am inclined to impose an order of costs in favour of the petitioner. The second respondent will be liable to pay an amount of Rs.3,000/- as costs of this writ petition to be reckoned as part of costs in LAR.14/2000. The writ petition is allowed as above.