( 1 ) THE Judgment of the Court was as follows : the sole trustee who has taken office in place of the previous sole trustee, who was also the sole writ petitioner in this case, has taken out this application for restoration of the writ petitien that was dismissed for default by my order dated September 13th, 2002. ( 2 ) THE writ petition was admitted by order dated May 16th, 2000, which was made in presence of Advocates for the respondents. During pendency of the writ petition the petitioner died on May 19 ,2002. After assuming office the present petitioner took out the requisite application for substitution (CAN 7554 of 2002), Which Was filed on August 16th, 2002. ( 3 ) WHEN that application was pending decision, the writ petition itself was listed for final hearing, and by order dated September 13th, 2002 it was dismissed for default. This application for restoration after condoning delay was taken out on October 4th, 2005. It was stated that the petitioner acquired knowledge of dismissal of the case only on September 26th, 2005 ( 4 ) ON the strength of the decision in Jiviben Lavji Raganath v. Jadavji devshanker and Ors. , AIR 1978 Guj 32 , Counsel for the petitioner submits that since at the date the order dismissing the writ petition for default was made the original petitioner was dead, the order is a nullity. He contends that in any case, before giving decision in the application for substitution, there was no scope to make final order in the writ petition. He says that the application for substitution was served on the contesting respondents. ( 5 ) ON the other hand, Counsel for the respondents relies on the decision in Orient Paper Industries Ltd. v. Union of India and Ors. , 87 Cal WN 887, and submits that in view of provisions in Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the restoration application, not accompanied by any application for condonation of delay, is liable to be dismissed as not maintainable. He says that the petitioner has not shown any evidence that the substitution applicatian was served on his advocate-on-record. ( 6 ) I think for restoration of the writ petition, the petitioner is entitled to take out this application, even before the application for substitution is allowed. He says that the petitioner has not shown any evidence that the substitution applicatian was served on his advocate-on-record. ( 6 ) I think for restoration of the writ petition, the petitioner is entitled to take out this application, even before the application for substitution is allowed. Needless to say that in the absence of the writ petition, there is no scope to consider the substitution application. There is no reason to say that the writ proceedings abated on the death of the sole writ petitioner, because the substitution application was filed by the petitioner within the period of limitation. ( 7 ) I do not think, the order dismissing the writ petition is a nullity. It was not made in proceedings that had abated on the death of the sole writ petitioner. The substitution application filed within time was pending decision, and hence it cannot be said that no proceedings were pending before this Court. I would rather say that while the substitution application was pending decision, there was no scope to make any final order in the writ petition. The substitution application was to be decided first. ( 8 ) BUT in ignorance of the fact that the substitution application was pending, the order dismissing the writ petition for default dated September 13th, 2002 was made. I think on this ground alone the restoration application should be allowed. I am also satisfied that explanations given for non-appearance of advocate for the petitioner, when the writ petition was taken up for consideration, are good explanations, and that the Advocate was prevented by sufficient cause from participating in the proceedings. ( 9 ) THE last question that has arisen for consideration is whether in the absence of any separate application for condonation of delay in filing the restoration application the prayer for condonation can be considered. As to the decision cited by Counsel for the respondents, I see no reason to disagree with the proposition that provisions in Article 137 may apply to an application for restoration. I would rather clarify by saying that that questian has not actually arisen for decision before me. ( 10 ) I, however, find that a prayer for condonation has been made, though not by a separate application. In my view, while exercising writ powers the court should not go by the technicalities, but by the concept of doing real justice to the parties. ( 10 ) I, however, find that a prayer for condonation has been made, though not by a separate application. In my view, while exercising writ powers the court should not go by the technicalities, but by the concept of doing real justice to the parties. To my mind, when a prayer for concbnation has been made, there is no reason not to exercise my inherent power as a Court of plenary jurisdiction to consider the question of condonation of delay. ( 11 ) AS I have already indicated, the order dismissing the writ petition ought not to have been made, when the application for substitution was pending, i think, on such facts as are present in this case, a grave miscarriage of justice will take place, if the prayer for condonation is not considered and allowed on the ground that no separate application for the purposes has been made. For not taking out a separate application, the contesting respondents have not suffered any prejudice. ( 12 ) HENCE I am of the view that the prayer for condonation should be considered, though it has been made in the application for restoration itself. I find that the petitioner has sufficiently and satisfactorily explained the delay. He had no knowledge of the fact that the writ petition had been dismissed for default. Immediately after acquiring knowledge, he took out the requisite application. In my view, the prayer for condonation should be allowed. ( 13 ) FORTHESE reasons, I condone the delay in taking out this restoration application, and allow it without any order for costs. My order dated September 13th, 2002 dismissing the writ petition for default is recalled, and the writ petition is restored to its original number and file. It is put on record that Counsel for the petitioner has not made any prayer for interim order. He has rather said that no interim order had ever been made in the case.