JUDGMENT 1. :- This bunch of writ petitions relates to the question of entitlement of the candidates to be appointed as Primary and Upper Primary School Teachers, appointments to which posts is being done under the provisions of Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, read with Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Rules, 1996, hereinafter called as "the Rules". In this bunch, different writ petitions have different facts, like someone having acquired particular qualification from particular University, or from particular Board, and the question raised is regarding its recognition, or equivalence, while in some cases the question about the candidate not having particular subjects in the qualifying examinations, or the candidate having the subject but having failed therein, though having passed in the overall examination, and so on. Likewise the grounds of challenge that have been raised in different writ petitions, are also in varying language. However, all the writ petitions involve a common question of law, which will decide the fate of all these writ petitions, therefore, all these writ petitions are being decided by this common order. 2. The common question involved in all these writ petitions, is about validity of Rule 266(3) of the Rules. According to which, for eligibility, the candidate must possess minimum qualification of Senior Secondary under new (10+2) scheme, or Higher Secondary under old scheme, from Rajasthan Board of Secondary Education or equivalent, and Secondary School Certificate from Rajasthan Board of Secondary Education or equivalent, with five subjects, three of them shall be Mathematics, English & Hindi. The other qualification requirements are not relevant for the present controversy; therefore, I need not go into them. The precise controversy, being the central controversy, in all these writ petitions, in other words is, as to whether the respondents can insist, on the candidate to be required to possess the Secondary School Certificate, whether from Rajasthan Board or other equivalent, but then, the candidate is required to have been passed, with at least three subjects, being Mathematics, English and Hindi. In yet other words, as to whether the provisions of Rule 266(3), requiring the candidate to have obtained qualification, at least with three subjects Mathematics, English, and Hindi, is valid, or not, and whether, the candidate not having either or more of the three subjects, are entitled to claim to be eligible for appointment. 3. In yet other words, as to whether the provisions of Rule 266(3), requiring the candidate to have obtained qualification, at least with three subjects Mathematics, English, and Hindi, is valid, or not, and whether, the candidate not having either or more of the three subjects, are entitled to claim to be eligible for appointment. 3. I need not go into the details of the facts of these writ petitions, as in all these matters; all the petitioners are the candidates, who do not possess the qualification of Secondary School Certificate, with all the three subjects, being Hindi, English and Mathematics. In some cases some candidates have two subjects, or someone have one subject, but then none of them have three subjects, while someone, though having three subjects, have failed in one of the subjects, though he has otherwise passed the overall examination. This much narration of facts is sufficient, for the purpose of deciding the present controversy. 4. The contentions raised on behalf of the petitioners in the writ petitions are, that the rule was amended by notifying in official gazette dated 21.5.98, providing above qualification only for Primary School Teachers. However, subsequently Upper Primary Schools have also been placed under the jurisdiction of Panchayati Raj Department. Then, the amendment has been brought. However, no similar qualification, with regard to the Teacher, for recruitment of Upper Primary School Teacher, was added, or inserted, by the statute. On this basis, the condition No. 5 of the advertisement has been challenged. Then, it is alleged, that there is no nexus with the object, sought to be achieved, in laying down the condition of these three subjects. The other ground raised is, that the petitioners have obtained the Secondary School Certificate qualification from the Board of Secondary Education Rajasthan, or its equivalent, and since for obtaining that qualification, having these three subjects was not necessary, by subsequent amendment, the qualification acquired by the candidates cannot be rendered otiose, by providing for the necessity of having the three subjects, as it results into deprivation of his/her right of seeking appointment. Then, reliance is placed on the Division Bench judgment of this Court, in Kailash Chandra v. State of Rajasthan, reported in 2005 WLC (Raj.) UC-138 , wherein the Division Bench after comparing the scheme of qualification framed under the Rajasthan Educational Subordinate Service Rules, 1971 and also after viewing the system prevailing in the State of Rajasthan, held, that the qualification of B.Ed. for the post of Primary School Teacher was unjustified, and was struck down. On this basis, it is contended, that when the person having qualification of Bechalor's Degree in Education, is qualified to teach the students of class 6th to 10th standard in the Upper Primary Schools, and in Secondary Schools, and it does not necessitate the candidate to be possessing three subjects, therefore, also the provisions of Rule 266(3) are ultra vires. In some of the writ petitions a ground has also been taken to the effect, that under the Rajasthan Educational Subordinate Service Rules, no such provision or condition, exists, as provided in Rule 266(3), while Rules of 1971 are the basic rules, prevailing in the State of Rajasthan, and therefore, also the provisions of Rule 266(3) has no nexus to the object sought to be achieved. In some writ petitions this provision has been alleged to be arbitrary and resulting into deprivation of the incumbents of the right of earning his livelihood, and property, and thus has been assailed on the ground of it being in violation of Article 21 and 300-A of the Constitution. In some cases it is contended, that when the candidate has the necessary qualification from the Board with all the three subjects, by having passed the over all examination, but then, simply because, he has failed in one of the three subjects, he cannot be deprived of the right of appointment, as the rule only requires, that the candidate should have three subjects, and does not require, the candidate to have passed in all the three subjects. 5. The advertisement in these cases were issued on 2.6.2004, the applications were to be submitted by 5.7.2004. Therefore, written examinations have been conducted, and the result thereof has been declared. Accordingly a merit list has also been prepared. Thereafter on account of the candidates having not passed the Secondary School Examination, with all three subjects, they are not being given appointment, therefore, the writ petitions have been filed. 6. Therefore, written examinations have been conducted, and the result thereof has been declared. Accordingly a merit list has also been prepared. Thereafter on account of the candidates having not passed the Secondary School Examination, with all three subjects, they are not being given appointment, therefore, the writ petitions have been filed. 6. Some writ petitions have been admitted, while in some matters show cause notices have been issued. However, prayer for interim stay has been made, for direction to the respondents, to provisionally appoint the petitioner, or in some cases prayer has been made to keep requisite number of posts of teachers to be kept vacant, in the particular category, to which the candidate belongs. It is in this background, that the matters were bunched up under different orders of the Court, passed on different dates, and at the request of the learned counsel appearing, looking to the urgency of the matter, all these matters were heard for final hearing at this stage itself. 7. Mr. G. R. Punia, the learned counsel for the petitioners, opening the argument, relied upon the judgment of this Court in State of Rajasthan Vs. Smt. Vimla Doongarwal, reported in 1995 WLC (Raj.) UC-174 , and Vinay Kumar Swami v. State of Rajasthan reported in 2000 (2) RLR 749 = RLW 2001 (1) Raj. 265. 8. However, Mr. Lodha the learned Addl. Advocate General raised preliminary objection, and submitted, that the provisions of Rule 266 did come for consideration before Division Bench of this Court, in Richhpal Singh v. State of Rajasthan reported in 2005 (1) RLR 607 = 2005 (1) WLC (Raj.) 548 , and the Division Bench had upheld the validity of Rule 266. May be, that the validity of precise sub-rule (3) was not required to be gone into, but then, when Rule 266, whole hog, was challenged on different grounds, and validity was upheld, thereafter it is not open to the candidates to go on challenging the provisions of Rule 266, simply by challenging it otherwise, on different grounds. May be, that the validity of precise sub-rule (3) was not required to be gone into, but then, when Rule 266, whole hog, was challenged on different grounds, and validity was upheld, thereafter it is not open to the candidates to go on challenging the provisions of Rule 266, simply by challenging it otherwise, on different grounds. Then, relying upon the judgment of Hon'ble the Supreme Court, in Maharashtra State Board of Secondary & Higher Secondary Education v. Paritosh Bhupesh Kurumarsheth, reported in AIR 1984 SC 1543 , it was contended, that therein in para-18, Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down the basic tests for judging the validity of provisions of the rule, but then, none of those grounds have been alleged, therefore, writ cannot be entertained. Then it was informed, that the Division Bench judgment, in Kailash Chandra's case has been recalled by the Division Bench, and therefore, reliance thereon is wholly misplaced. Apart from the fact, that in Kailash Chandra's case, the requirement of candidate having passed in three subject in Higher Secondary, or Senior Secondary, was not a subject matter of consideration, rather the question involved in that case was, about eligibility of the candidates possessing qualification of B.Ed. or B.S.T.C. The next preliminary objection taken was, that the petitioner has made a wrong averment, to the effect, that basic rule prevailing in the State of Rajasthan for appointment of teachers was Rajasthan Educational Subordinate Service Rules, 1971, wherein also, no such stringent rule or conditions, as provided under Rule 266(3) existed, and inviting my attention to the Rules of 1971, it is pointed out, that therein also, identical conditions existed, since long before, and therefore, on the ground of making this misstatement itself, the petition is liable to be dismissed. The next preliminary objection raised is, that advertisement is of June 2004, in response whereto the petitioner applied, and appeared for examination, the result was declared in January, 2005, and 25,000 persons have been appointed, the petitioner also thus participated in the examination, and therefore, at this belated stage, is estopped from maintaining the present writ petition, challenging any of the stipulation of the advertisement, or any sub-clause of the Rule 266. The next objection raised is, that the question, as to what should be the qualification, to be prescribed for eligibility for appointment to a particular post, is a question, which rests in the domain of the employer, and under Article 226 jurisdiction, it is not open to the petitioner, to call upon this Court, to vary such qualification. 9. After the learned counsel for the respondent raised the preliminary objections, Mr. Punia, learned counsel for the petitioner, arguing the writ petition, read to me the stipulation in the advertisement Annexure-1, and submitted that on the face of the language of the advertisement, it was not necessary for the petitioner, to challenge it, and it is only now, when the petitioner is sought to be denied appointment, by putting distorted interpretation, that the petitioners were required to file the writ petitions. It was pointed out, that condition no. 5 of Annexure-1 (Advertisement) providing for academic qualification clearly means, that the candidate should possess the qualification of Sr. Secondary (10+2) under the new scheme from Board of Secondary Education Rajasthan or Higher Secondary from the Board of Secondary Education Rajasthan, and Secondary School Certificate from Rajasthan Board of Secondary Education, and should have five subjects, which must include three subjects being Mathematics, English & Hindi, or should have equivalent qualification. Thus, according to the learned counsel the requirement of passing three subjects is applicable only to the qualification obtained from Board of Secondary Education Rajasthan Ajmer, and is not applicable to the qualification obtained from other Board, or University, which is equivalent to the qualification obtained from Board of Secondary Education Rajasthan, Ajmer. Then, it was contended, that in the original Rule 266, as enacted, the requirement of three subjects was not there, and has been added by amendment on 21.5.1998. Learned counsel produced for perusal of the Court, Hindi and English, version of the amendment, and tried to build up an argument, that according to English version of the amendment, the candidate should possess the qualification of Sr. Secondary academic under new 10+2 scheme or Higher Secondary under old scheme from Board of Secondary Education or equivalent, and Secondary School Certificate from Rajasthan Board of Secondary Education, or equivalent with five subjects, three of them shall be Mathematics, English and Hindi. Secondary academic under new 10+2 scheme or Higher Secondary under old scheme from Board of Secondary Education or equivalent, and Secondary School Certificate from Rajasthan Board of Secondary Education, or equivalent with five subjects, three of them shall be Mathematics, English and Hindi. Thus, according to the learned counsel, according to the English version, in case the candidate possess the qualification from the Board of Secondary Education, then the requirement of three subjects is not there, and it is therefore only if, the candidate possess an equivalent qualification, as that of Rajasthan Board, these three subjects are necessary, and relying upon English version it was submitted, that instance of three subjects, for candidates possessing qualification from Rajasthan Board, is wholly uncalled for. Then, reliance was placed on the Division Bench judgment, in Vimla Doongarwal's case to contend, that the requirement of the candidate possessing these three subjects (Mathematics in that case) was not upheld, and it was held, that the candidate was possessing the qualification of Secondary School Examination, and therefore, insistence of holding extra qualification was struck down. Reliance was then placed on the judgment, in Surendra Kaur Gudwan Vs. State of Rajasthan reported in RLW 1993 (2) 443 , to contend, that the requirement of the candidate having subject of Elementary Mathematics, as a compulsory subject in the Matriculation, was found to be not enforceable. Thus, it was contended that the only condition for eligibility should be about the candidate possessing particular academic qualification, which is recognised, and the condition about the candidates having particular subjects, in obtaining that qualification cannot be insisted. Thus, it was contended that the only condition for eligibility should be about the candidate possessing particular academic qualification, which is recognised, and the condition about the candidates having particular subjects, in obtaining that qualification cannot be insisted. Then, reference was made to Rule 277-A inserted by the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj (Amendment) Rules, 2004, and it was contended that according to this Rule 277-A, for appointment, R.P.S.C. is to send the list to the Director, and for that the R.P.S.C. is to conduct an examination, syllabus for which examination is specified in Second Schedule, and according to this Second Schedule, the paper is to include the subjects of Hindi, English, Mathematics, General Science, and Social Studies, each carrying 20 marks, and the standards of contents of subject would be of Secondary standard, and therefore, when in the written examination for selection, the candidate is required to pass the examination in all these five subjects, there is no nexus with the object sought to be achieved, in further insisting upon that the candidate should have these subjects in his academic qualification of Secondary School Examination. It was then contended, that in the application form, submitted in response to the advertisement, the petitioner had disclosed the qualifications possessed, and even thereafter, with eye open, the petitioners were permitted to appear in the examination, and they did pass, in such circumstances, now they cannot be denied the right of appointment. Regarding candidates' obtaining qualification from other Universities or Boards, it was contended that those qualifications have been recognised to be equivalent to the qualification conferred by the Board of Secondary Education, and in any case it is not open to the respondents, to lay down any condition qua other institutions or Universities or Board, on which the respondents have no control. It was next contended, that in the judgment in Richhpal Singh's case, the validity of Rule 266(3) of the Rules was never a subject matter of challenge, inasmuch as, the precise things, which the Division Bench was called upon to decide, have been cataloged in para-13 of the judgment as under : 13. It was next contended, that in the judgment in Richhpal Singh's case, the validity of Rule 266(3) of the Rules was never a subject matter of challenge, inasmuch as, the precise things, which the Division Bench was called upon to decide, have been cataloged in para-13 of the judgment as under : 13. The impugned amendments in the Act and the Rules are challenged on the following grounds : (i) The State has no legislative competence to provide for conducting competitive examination for appointment to service of teacher, by R.P.S.C., as 'Panchayat' defined under Article 243(d) means a 'Self-Government', outside the scope of Article 321; (ii) The impugned amendment interferes with the autonomy provided to the Panchayats by Article 243-A and 243-B of the Constitution of India; (iii) The impugned amendment is hit by Article 21-A, 45 and 350-A inasmuch as there is a Constitutional mandate to make an endeavour by every State and the local authority to provide adequate facilities for instructions in the mother tongue at the primary stage of education to children belonging to linguistic minority groups; (iv) The amendment is discriminatory inasmuch as there are two sets of statutory provisions for recruitment on the post of Teacher Gr. III i.e. for teachers working under the Rural Development and Panchayati Raj and other teachers in the Urban Areas under the control & supervision of Education Department." 10. Therefore, according to the learned counsel, Richhpal Singh's case does, in no way, come in the way of the petitioners, in maintaining the present writ petitions, and since the provisions of Rule 266(3) are wholly arbitrary, and having no nexus, whatever, to the object sought to be achieved, it is liable to be struck down, as it also adversely affects the rights of the candidates, possessing the qualification, to seek employment, and thus violates Articles 21 of the Constitution. 11. Then, Mr. R. K. Soni, learned counsel for the petitioners, in some of the writ petitions in the bunch, also made his submissions in support of the writ petitions. 11. Then, Mr. R. K. Soni, learned counsel for the petitioners, in some of the writ petitions in the bunch, also made his submissions in support of the writ petitions. He has contended, that when the validity of statute is challenged, what should be the criteria for consideration of the challenge, has been laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Harakchand v. Union of India, reported in AIR 1970 SC-1453 , and according to this judgment, when a law is challenged, it is necessary in the first place of ascertain the policy underlying the statute, and the object intended to be achieved by it. Having ascertained the policy, and the object, the Court has to apply a dual test in examining its validity (i) whether the classification is rational & based upon an intelligible differentia which distinguished persons or things that are grouped together from others that are left out of the group, and (ii) whether the basis of differentiation has any rational nexus or relation with its avowed policy and object. 12. Then, on the basis of Harakchand's case it was contended, that in reply no stand has been taken by the State, about the object, or the policy, or the nexus, or reasonableness, or as to how by this legislation the object will be achieved, as, till then examination by the R.P.S.C. in three subjects were not required, however, after insertion of Rule 277-A, this requirement cannot be insisted upon, as the need of possessing three subjects in the Board, stands satisfied by this examination. Then, the submission made on the anvil of Rule 277-A by Mr. Punia was reiterated. Then, the other submission made is, that on the strength of academic qualification of the Secondary, or Senior Secondary Qualification, the petitioners have obtained B.S.T.C., which they would otherwise not have obtained, as the qualification of B.S.T.C. makes them eligible for the appointment on the post of Teacher Gr. III, and the qualification is of no other use. In that view of the matter, when the petitioners have acquired the qualification entitling them to be appointed as Teacher Gr. III, now they cannot be deprived of the right to seek employment as Teacher Gr. III by insisting of three subjects in academic qualification. Learned counsel maintains, that the provision of Rule 266(3) is arbitrary, discriminatory, and has no reasonable differntia. III, now they cannot be deprived of the right to seek employment as Teacher Gr. III by insisting of three subjects in academic qualification. Learned counsel maintains, that the provision of Rule 266(3) is arbitrary, discriminatory, and has no reasonable differntia. Regarding the judgment in Maharashtra State Board's case, it was contended, that the judgment does not confine the ground of challenge to the statute, rather the validity of the statute is to be judged on the touchstone, laid down in Harakchand's case as well. It was also contended, that in the case of Sunita Sharma Vs. State of Rajasthan, reported in 1997 (1) RLR 271 = 1998 (2) WLC-481 , no reasoning, whatever, has been given, and therefore, that judgment cannot be taken to be a judgment, upholding the validity of Rule 266(3). 13. On the ether hand, learned A.A.G. submitted, that the judgment in Kailash Chandra's case had already been recalled, and thereafter, the matter was heard on merits, and those writ petitions have been dismissed. Since the main burden of the present writ petition is, by relying upon the judgment in Kailash Chandra's case, on this sole ground the writ petitions are liable to be dismissed. Then, the preliminary objections, raised on the anvil of the estoppel, and conduct of the petitioner in having appeared in the examination and on that count being debarred from maintaining the writ petition was reiterated. Reliance in this regard was placed on the judgment of this Court in Dr. M. C. Mehta Vs. State of Rajasthan, reported in 1972 ILR 22 (Raj.) 711 , Madan Lal v. State of J&K, reported in (1995) 3 SCC-486 , and Vijay Soni v. Rajasthan High Court, reported in 2001 (2) RLR 697 = 2001 (2) WLC (Raj.)-750 . Reiterating the preliminary objection initially raised, reliance was also placed on the Division Bench judgment of this Court in, Ram Narayan v. State of Rajasthan, reported in 1995 (1) WLC (Raj.) 37 , to contend, that once the validity of a particular rule has been challenged, and upheld, the practice of filing the writ petitions, on one ground, or the other, challenging the virus is increasing, which reflects on the conduct of the incumbent, approaching the Court suppressing material facts, and the practice was strongly deprecated. Then, relying upon another Division Bench judgment of this Court, in State of Rajasthan v. Mukesh Kumar Jhajharia, reported in 2001 (1) WLN-500 , it was contended, that it was held by the Division Bench, that Senior Higher Secondary (Vocational) is not equivalent to Sr. Higher Secondary (Academic), and the person possessing qualification of Sr. Higher Secondary (Vocational) is not eligible for appointment as Teacher Gr. III, and thus the prescription of qualification, has been found to be valid, by the Division Bench. Then, reliance was placed on Sunita Sharma's case, and it was contended, that therein the question of requirement of the candidate having passed Mathematics, as one of the subject, along with English and Hindi, as prescribed in Rajasthan Educational Subordinate Service Rules, was considered and was upheld, and the claim for appointment to the post of Physical Training Instructor Gr. III was declined. 14. It was then contended, that the question about prescribing the requirement of knowledge of particular subject to the particular level, or equivalence of particular qualification, for the purpose of eligibility to be appointed on particular post, is a matter, resting within, the exclusive domain of the employer, and/or the expert body on the subject, and interference cannot be claimed under Article 226, as if this Court were an appellate authority over such decisions. Reliance in this regard was placed on the judgment of Hon'ble the Supreme Court, in V. K. Sood v. Secretary, Civil Aviation, reported in AIR 1993 SC- 2285 , para-6 & 7, and that of this Court in, D r. Rajesh Sharma v. State of Rajasthan, reported in 2003 WLC (Raj.) UC-116 . Then relying upon the judgment of Hon'ble the Supreme Court, in Anant Mills v. State of Gujarat reported in AIR 1975 SC-1234 , specially para-20 it was contended, that even for the purpose of deciding the question of validity, on the parameters laid down by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Harakachand's case, the petitioner has to make the precise averments, and has also to place the material on record; while in the present case, neither there is any sufficient pleadings, containing the relevant data, nor any material has been placed, and in absence thereof, the respondents should not be expected to give any reply, as intended by the learned counsel for the petitioner, and therefore, the challenge is required to be negatived. It was maintained, that the challenge is a simulated one, after the declaration of the result. Replying contention about the Hindi and English version of the amendment, carrying different meanings, it was contended, that apart from the fact, that it is a total misconception, there is no pleadings in this regard in the writ petition, and relying upon the judgment of Hon'ble the Supreme Court, in Kumari Chitra Vs. Union of India, reported in AIR 1970 SC-35 , it was also contended, that the petitioner was required to show the prejudice, which may have been suffered by him, while no such prejudice is shown to have been suffered. Reliance in this regard was also placed on the judgment of Hon'ble the Supreme Court, in Canara Bank Vs. V. K. Awasthy, reported in JT 2005 (4) SC-40 and U.P. State Textile Corporation Ltd. Vs. P.C. Chaturvedi reported in JT 2005 (12) SC-90 . It was then contended, there are series of judgments in this regard to show, that requirement of three subjects in the academic qualification has prevailed for the last around a decade, and it was never found to be invalid, and umpteen, rather innumerable appointments have been made, taking the requirement of three subjects, being necessary, and innumerable candidates, who did not possess the three subjects, have been rejected over this long number of years, and therefore also, it would not be proper to upset the legal position, which has prevailed for this long number of years, and having been adjudicated upon by this Court. My attention was invited to the judgment of this Court, in Kanta Parihar Vs State of Rajasthan, reported in 1999 (2) RLR-106 , and Mukesh Kumar's case. 15. In rejoinder Mr. R. K. Soni submitted, that indirect consideration of the requirement of three subjects, as done in various judgments, is of no adverse consequence, for the purpose of adjudging the validity of the requirement of three subjects, which is being decided in the bunch of present writ petitions. It was then submitted, that since the Civil Procedure Code is not applicable, the strict rules of pleadings cannot be insisted upon, and with this, the stock argument was made, ab out the object of procedural laws. It was then submitted, that since the Civil Procedure Code is not applicable, the strict rules of pleadings cannot be insisted upon, and with this, the stock argument was made, ab out the object of procedural laws. It was also submitted that the petitioners have approached without any delay, there is no estoppel, and that in the matters like the present one, the aspect of the prejudice is not relevant. It was also submitted, that even in the B.S.T.C. course, these three subjects Hindi, English, and Mathematics are taught, and thus, in passing B.S.T.C. examination, an in passing the examination conducted under Rule 277-A, the knowledge of the candidates in three subjects is sufficiently tested, and thus, the object stands fulfilled. Mr. Soni and Mr. Punia also submitted, that in some cases, the candidate was having the three subjects, but did not pass in some one of the subjects, but then since he passed in the aggregate, he was conferred the qualification. Likewise according to the Instructions (Anudeshika) of the Board, in some cases, the candidate is entitled to be given grace marks, for the purpose of treating him to have passed in the ver all examination, and thus, in the cases, where the candidates have acquired the qualification, with the three subjects, notwithstanding the fact, that he may not have passed in one of the three individual subjects, it cannot be said, that out of the essentials of Rule 266(3), he is not having one of the three subjects, and therefore, such candidates also are entitled to be given appointment, on their own merit. 16. Mr. Lodha then again read the provisions of Rule 266(3), and submitted, that the interpretation sought to be put, is preposterous. The clear object of the provision is, that the candidate should have passed in all the three subjects, in order to be eligible, for being considered for appointment, on the post of Teacher Gr. III. 17. I have considered the submissions. 18. True it is that in some cases, the petitioners have taken ground, to challenge Rule 266(3), to the effect that identical provision does not exist in the corresponding provisions of Rajasthan Educational Subordinate Service Rules, 1971, and thus on the face of it, it clearly, does amount to a patent misstatement of fact. 17. I have considered the submissions. 18. True it is that in some cases, the petitioners have taken ground, to challenge Rule 266(3), to the effect that identical provision does not exist in the corresponding provisions of Rajasthan Educational Subordinate Service Rules, 1971, and thus on the face of it, it clearly, does amount to a patent misstatement of fact. Of course, on this fact being pointed out, in some cases, learned counsel for the petitioner filed application, informing, that he does not want to press this contention. In my view, once such an important misstatement has been made, it is not open to the petitioner, to get out of the situation, simply by moving this type of application. Consequently, the petitions, in which this misstatement has been made, are liable to be dismissed even on this sole ground. 19. Since I am deciding these cases as bunch, and in many of the other matters, this ground has not been taken, therefore, in any case I have to adjudicate the controversy on merits also, therefore, instead of identifying the writs liable to be dismissed on this ground, I proceed to consider the contentions on merits as well. 20. Straightway taking the judgments of this court in Vimla Doongarwal, and Surendra Kaur's case, it would suffice to say that both these cases are cases, which considered the position of law, as it prevailed prior to the amendment of the Rules, being Rajasthan Educational Subordinate Service Rules. In Surendra Kaur's case it was found that Rule 11 of the Rules provides, that a candidate for direct recruitment to the post of Teacher Gr.III should be matriculate with a Certificate of Training and has the working knowledge of Hindi, written in Deongari script, and the knowledge of Rajasthan culture. It was considered, that this rule nowhere provides, that the candidate should have the Elementary Mathematics as one of the compulsory subjects in the Higher Secondary Examination; when the Rules of the Board of Secondary Education for Rajasthan permit a person to have an additional subject in place of Elementary Mathematics then the Certificate of Higher Secondary, obtained by the incumbent cannot be ignored simply on the ground that the incumbent did not pass the Higher Secondary Examination with Elementary Mathematics as compulsory subject. It was specifically held that "The law nowhere lays down the qualification for appointment on the post of III Grade Teacher that a candidate must have passed the Higher Secondary Examination with Elementary Mathematics as a compulsory subject. Even the Advertisement Annexure 4, by which applications were invited for appointment, also does not contain any such condition." It was with this finding, that it was held that no amendment in the Rules can be made by executive instruction, laying down the requirement of Elementary Mathematics or English as the necessary subjects, in the Higher Secondary Examiantion, for appointment on the post of III Grade Teacher. It was again noticed, that "No amendment of this effect has been made in the relevant Rules". Likewise in Vimla Doongarwal's case also, the only consideration was, that the rule nowhere provides any other additional qualification, or the qualification, that a candidate has to pass the Secondary Examination with particular subject(s), and the only qualification prescribed under the Rules is that of Secondary Examination passed, any by an administrative order/notification the State Government cannot provide any additional qualification, that the Secondary Examination has to be passed by the candidate with particular subjects. So far as the case in hand are concerned, now there is a specific provision under the Rules, iritroduced by way of amendment of 1998, obviously after passing of the aforesaid judgment, and therefore, the basis on which these two judgments proceed, stands removed. So far the judgment in Vinay Kumar Swami's case is concerned, in that case again, the validity of the rule was not gone into, rather it was found, that the petitioner therein had passed Secondary Examination with Sanskrit, as optional subject, and in Senior Secondary Examination, appeared in Hindi compulsory paper, and qualified the paper of "Hindi Mother Tongue" from Central Board, which is approved, and recognised by the State Government. On these facts this Court held, that Sanskrit cannot be treated as inferior language in comparison to Hindi, and that the petitioner has opted Sanskrit subject as one of the subjects, and not Hindi, as one of the subjects, and was wrongly not found eligible, and thus his candidature was ordered to be considered for the appointment on the post. Thus, the Vinay Kumar Swami's case is distinguishable on facts. Thus, the Vinay Kumar Swami's case is distinguishable on facts. Coming to Kailash Chandra's case, in view of the fact, that the judgment has been recalled, by the Division Bench, thereafter the writ petition has been dismissed, therefore, that judgment also does not help the petitioner at all. 21. Taking up Richhpal Singh' case, a look at this judgment shows, that therein the validity of Rule 266 was challenge, after giving background of the old law, and the new law, and the amendments were challenged on the ground of State having no legislative competence to provide for examination to be conducted by the Rajasthan Public Service Commission, and that, the amendment interferes with the autonomy, provided to the Panchayats,' by Article 243-A and 243-B of the Constitution of India, and that the amendment is hit by Article 21-A, 45 and 350-A, inasmuch, as there is a Constitutional mandate, to make an endeavour by every state, and the local authority, to provide adequate facilities for instructions in the mother tongue, at the primary stage of education, to children, belonging to linguistic minority groups, and that, it is discriminatory, as there are two sets of statutory provisions for recruitment on the post of Teacher Gr. III i.e, for teachers working under the Rural Development and Panchayati Raj, and other teachers in the Urban Areas, but then, the fact does remain, that Rule 266 as such, was under challenge, and in para-11, Hon'ble Division Bench has quoted the unmended and amended provisions in juxtaposition, and had thereafter considered the matter. Then in para-14, the Division Bench had reaffirmed, and cataloged, the permissible parameters, on which the Court should try to sustain its validity, to the extent possible, and it should strike down the enactment, only, when it is not possible to sustain it. 22. True it is, that in this judgment, in para-13 the Division Bench did catalogue the grounds on which the amendments were challenged. But, then, the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Ram Narayan's case is also required to be kept in mind, wherein it was observed that the practice of filing writ petition on one ground or the other challenging the same point including the point of virus is increasing which reflects the conduct of the incumbent approaching the Court, with this the practice was strongly deprecated. Consequently, the petitioners should not be allowed lightly, to challenge a part of the rule by weaving different grounds.22-A. However, notwithstanding this, instead of standing to ceremonies, erring against myself, I proceed to consider the validity of the provisions of Rule 266(3) on its own merits. 23. Before proceeding to consider the validity of Rule 266(3), I may deal with the objection raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner, about variance in the language of the amendment, if considered by reading the amendment in both the languages, Hindi as well as English, and it giving rise to two different situations. The English version reads as under : "(3) Primary and Upper Primary School Teacher (100% by direct recruitment).-(i) Senior Secondary under new (10+2) scheme or Higher Secondary under old scheme from Rajasthan Board of Secondary Education or equivalent and Secondary School certificate from Rajasthan Board of Secondary Education or equivalent with 5 subjects, 3 of them shall be Mathematics, English and Hindi. (ii) B.S.T.C, B.Ed. : Provided that for appointment of widow and divorcee woman on the posts of teacher, required qualification of B.S.T.C./B.Ed. shall be relaxed, if that are competent otherwise and they submit a bond to the effect that they will obtain the qualification of B.S.T.C./B.Ed. within a period of three years. They shall be entitled to receive leave for study to get B.S.T.C, B.Ed. qualification soon after their appointment." The Hindi version of the amendment reads as under : HINDI MATTER 358510 24. After perusing the two versions closely, in my view, the interpretation, sought to be put by the learned counsel for the petitioner, of the two versions in the different languages, is wholly misplaced. If the two versions are read together, it is clear that the provision requires that the candidate should possess academic qualification whether from Rajasthan Board or from other equivalent, but in either case the qualification should be with five subjects, and three of them have to be Mathematics, English and Hindi. It is preposterous to say that according to English version these three subjects are required where the candidates have obtained academic qualification from other equivalent, and are not required if the candidate has obtained academic qualification from Rajasthan Board. It is preposterous to say that according to English version these three subjects are required where the candidates have obtained academic qualification from other equivalent, and are not required if the candidate has obtained academic qualification from Rajasthan Board. While according to the Hindi version the three subjects are required only in cases the qualification is obtained from Rajasthan Board of Secondary Education, and that, these subjects are not required, to have necessarily been passed, in case of academic qualification obtained being equivalent to that of the Rajasthan Board of Secondary Education. Now, if we look at the two versions, as the learned counsel wants me to read, and the two versions are accordingly read, ultimately the argument may be carried to the proposition, that in either case, the candidate must not be insisted upon, to have obtained qualification with these three subjects, irrespective of the fact, as to wherefrom does he obtain the qualification, as, in case had the qualification having been obtained from Rajasthan Board, and according to English version the three subjects are not necessary if it is obtained from other Board, and according to Hindi version it is necessary. This cannot be the way in which the provision is to be interpreted. It is no less significant an aspect, that this ground is not taken in the writ petition. The reasons for this omission are not far to seek. During course of hearing, the way, and the stage, at which this argument was built up, did clearly show, that this argument was innovated only in an attempt to get over the difficulty, created by the preliminary objection of the.learned counsel for the respondent, on the anvil of estoppel, on account of the petitioners having applied in response to the advertisement, and having appeared in the examination. The argument precisely made was, that in view of the Hindi version, as given in the advertisement, the petitioners were not ineligible, and therefore, they applied, and appeared in the examination, while now they are being sought to be held ineligible. Thus, even this background of raising of this argument, is enough, to persuade me to negative the argument. 25. The argument precisely made was, that in view of the Hindi version, as given in the advertisement, the petitioners were not ineligible, and therefore, they applied, and appeared in the examination, while now they are being sought to be held ineligible. Thus, even this background of raising of this argument, is enough, to persuade me to negative the argument. 25. Coming to the question of the validity of Rule 266(3), so far as the judgment in Harakchand's case in concerned, of course, in this case, the tests were laid down by Hon'ble the Supreme Court, as read by the learned counsel for the petitioner. However, that was a case, relating to challenge to the provisions, with regard to license of dealers, and certified goldsmiths, and the provisions were challenged on the ground of being discriminatory, and violative of equality, the submission made was, that according to Section 27 and 39, the provisions with regard to licensing of the dealers, were more harsh, than in case of registered goldsmiths, and Hon'ble the Supreme Court found, the licensed dealers, and certified goldsmiths, to be forming separate classes, and the classification was found to be reasonable. It was found, that licensed dealer is essentially a trader, does the business of buying and selling ornaments, while certified goldsmith is a craftsman, who does the actual manufacture of ornaments. Then, after considering the various differences, between licensed dealers and certified goldsmith, Hon'ble the Supreme Court proceeded to ascertain the policy, and object of the Act, and applied the dual test, and found both the tests to be satisfied. 26. As this place, without going into the controversy raised by Mr. Lodha, on the anvil of the judgment of Hon'ble the Supreme Court, in Anant Mills' case, or about the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner, that it is for the respondent to explain the object, and the reasonable differential, I would better like to examine the validity, on the parameters laid down, even in Harakchand's case. 27. Lodha, on the anvil of the judgment of Hon'ble the Supreme Court, in Anant Mills' case, or about the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner, that it is for the respondent to explain the object, and the reasonable differential, I would better like to examine the validity, on the parameters laid down, even in Harakchand's case. 27. To start with, I may refer to the judgment of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Ram Sukh v. State of Rajasthan, reported in AIR 1990 SC-592 , wherein Hon'ble the Supreme Court referred to the previous judgment, in Andhra Kesri Education Society v. Director of School Education, reported in AIR 1989 SC-183 , wherein it was held as under : "The teacher alone could bring out the skills and intellectual capabilities of students. He is the 'engine' of the educational system. He is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values. He need to be endowed and energized with needed potential to deliver enlightened service expected of him. His quality should be such as would inspire and motives into action the benefiter." 28. Then these observations were found to be equally important to primary school teachers, and in para-7 it was held as under : "The primary school teachers are of utmost importance in developing a child's personality in formative years. It is not just enough to teach the child alphabets and figures, but much more is required to understand child psychology and aptitude." 29. And before making this observation, Hon'ble the Supreme Court showed its concern about the importance of the teacher by observing in para-6 as under : "We are not less sympathetic to the petitioners who are out of job but we cannot forget the welfare of those who are not before the court. They are the tiny tots who require proper handling...." 30. Then again Hon'ble the Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra Vs. Vikas Sahal Roudale, AIR 1992 SC 1926 , has expressed grave concern for such appointments, observing that the teacher of primary school plays a pivotal role in molding the career, character and moral fibers and aptitude for educational institutes in young children. The formal education needs proper equipment by the teachers to meet the challenges of the day, to impart lesson with latest technicalities to the students of secular, scientific and rational out-look. The formal education needs proper equipment by the teachers to meet the challenges of the day, to impart lesson with latest technicalities to the students of secular, scientific and rational out-look. It emphasised upon great need to give a proper training to the teachers. He would have a role of imparting education to the innocent and unwary children. Similar view had also been taken in N. M. Nageshwaramma v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1986 SC 1188 , and Sir Johns Teachers Training Institute, AIR 1994 SC 43 . 31. Thus, the primary concern is, of imparting proper education to the children. What should be the academic qualification of the incumbent, seeking employment on the post of teacher, has been a matter, which has undergone a long process of evaluation, and it is in this process, that in the Rajasthan Educational Subordinate Service Rules, the qualifications, as prescribed in Rule 266(3), was added in the year 1995. Since these rules were the basic rules, governing the field of appointment of Teachers Gr. III, the amended qualification thereunder held the field. However, with eanctment of Panchayati Raj Act, and the primary schools having been placed under the control of Panchayati Raj Institutions, an incongruous situation emerged, viz., that for getting appointment as Teacher Gr. III in urban areas, different qualifications were required, while for seeking appointment in the school run by Panchayati Raj Institutions, a different, albeit lesser, qualification was required, which appears to have not been felt conducive and therefore, in the year 1998, the qualification for recruitment to the post of primary school teachers under the Panchayati Raj Act was also amended. 32. True it is, that the qualification as prescribed in Rule 266(3), as such is not shown to have been considered, about its validity, in any of the judgment of this Court, but then, there are cases and cases, where the different aspects of the qualification were considered, and in that process, it did come to be adjudicated by this Court, that for seeking appointment as Teacher Gr. III, possessing the academic qualification, with the three subjects is a must. This is one aspect of the matter. The other aspect of the matter which may be considered is, that these are the basic subjects, which are required to be taught by the Teacher Gr. III, and if an incumbent is appointed as Teacher Gr. III, possessing the academic qualification, with the three subjects is a must. This is one aspect of the matter. The other aspect of the matter which may be considered is, that these are the basic subjects, which are required to be taught by the Teacher Gr. III, and if an incumbent is appointed as Teacher Gr. III without this qualification, the hazards are writ large. 33. Even at the cost of repetition, in my view, the object in insistence on possessing three subjects in academic qualification is writ large, inasmuch as, under the Rajasthan Education Service Rules this was the provision, and in absence of the provision also the requirement was felt by the State, and therefore, the administrative circulars were issued, which of course, were struck down in Vimla Doongarwal's case and Surendra Kaur's case as unsustainable in absence of the provision in the Rules. However, thereafter the rule was amended, and a challenge to the whole rule was not sustained. Then when a circular was issued by the State, to the effect, that the candidates possessing qualification of Sr. Secondary (Vocational) is not equivalent to Sr. Secondary (Academic) for the purpose of recruitment, that circular was also challenged, and in that case the amendment made in Rule 266(3) providing for requirement of possessing three subjects was considered by the Division Bench, in Mukesh Kumar's case, and in that case various previous judgments of this Court were noticed, and the object of the introduction of Vocational qualification was considered in para-17. Then, in para-18 the judgment of Hon'ble the Supreme Court, in Ram Sukh's case was considered. Then, yet another judgment of Hon'ble the Supreme Court, in State of Rajasthan v. Shyam Lal Joshi, reported in AIR 1994 SC 1409 , was considered, and in para-23 the circular was upheld, holding that the circular, in no manner, amends Rule 266, but is only clarificatory; and is in consistence with the judgments of Division Bench of this Court. Thus, in substance, the object of introduction of the three subjects, and the object of introduction of Vocational course, was considered in juxtaposition, and it was affirmed, that the candidates possessing Vocational qualification, since do not possess qualification in these subjects, are not eligible to be appointed, except where the post of available any where in the trade, in which they acquired the skill. 34. 34. The provision has been introduced after analogous provision having been introduced in Rajasthan Educational Subordinate Service rules, and while interpreting the provisions of those Rules, in Mukesh Kuar's case, it was held by the Division Bench, that Senior Higher Secondary Vocational is not equivalent to Sr. Higher Secondary (Academic). The precise aspect considered was, that according to the rule, the obtaining of qualification with the three subjects was necessary, and it was contended, that no distinction has been made in the rule, in respect of the candidates having qualification of Senior Secondary (Vocational), or (Academic), and on that ground the circular was challenfed to be arbitrary. While the contention of the respondent was based, on the ground, that the candidate possessing qualification of Senior Secondary (Vocational) is not eligible for appointment, as they do not fulfill the eligibility criteria, as per the rules. It was contended that the circular has been issued as per the directions given in various judgments of this Court, namely; D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 699/93 Gun-nail Kaur Vs. Zila Parishad, Sriganganagar dated 14.11.1994 , D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 690/97 Prem Kala v. State dated 17.6.1997 , and D.B. Civil Special Appeal (Writ) No. 857/97 Rajpal Singh Vs. Director Gramin Vikas and Panchayati Raj Vibhag dated 13.5.1998 , wherein it was decided, that for the purpose of appointment to the post of Teacher Gr. III, the qualification of Senior Secondary (Vocational) is not to be treated equivalent to Sr. Secondary (Academic), and to resolve the controversy, the said circular was issued in the interest of public at large. Then, it was found, that in the judgments mentioned above, the qualification of vocational course is not equivalent to the qualification of academic. Then, the subjects studied in the two courses were discussed, according to which, even in Vocational qualification, subjects, like Hindi and English were included. Then, reference was made to judgment of this Court, in Ram Chandra Swami v. State of Rajasthan, reported in 1993 (3) WLC- 741 , which in turn relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble the Supreme Court, in Ram Sukh' case, and it was held, that by the circular, the prescribed qualification is not sought to be altered, or amended, but is only intended to clarify the position, in the larger public interest. 35. 35. This judgment in Mukesh Kumar's case is also an answer to the submissions made on behalf of the learned counsel for the petitioners to the effect that by making this provision by way of amendment, the qualification acquired by the petitioners cannot be rendered otiose, and that the qualification of B.S.T.C. has only been acquired for the purpose of seeking appointment as Teacher Gr. III, as that qualification is of no other good, with the result that such provision rendering such qualification meaningless is required to be struck down. In Mukesh Kumar's case also, the petitioners has qualified their Secondary, Sr. Secondary (Vocational), and thereafter had done the B.S.T.C. course, and the argument was made, to the effect, that so far academic and vocational qualification is concerned, the rule making authority has not made any distinction and that after acquiring the qualification of Sr. Secondary the petitioners were considered eligible for the course of B.S.T.C. and therefore, insistence of requirement of these three subjects is arbitrary and illegal, and the Division Bench, predominantly on the considerations of the fact, that in the vocational qualification, the candidate may not have these three subjects, upheld the circular requiring the candidate to have these three subjects. Thus, on the face of the judgment of Mukesh Kumar's case this contention cannot be accepted. 36. Then, in Sunita Sharma's case this Court was called upon to consider the validity of the amendment prescribing the minimum qualification being Senior Secondary Certificate of Board of Secondary Education recognised by the Government of Rajasthan and Secondary or equivalent examination recognised by the Government of Rajasthan with five subjects, three of them should be Mathematics, English and Hindi with certificate in physical education, and it was contended, that the petitioner had obtained certificate of Secondary way back in the year 1982, at which time, under the scheme, while choosing different subjects, the petitioner was exempted from opting, and appearing, in the subject of Mathematics, and since a valid certificate of passing the Secondary has been issued by the Board, it should be presumed, that the petitioners have the requisite qualification of Secondary School Certificate, or Higher Secondary, irrespective of the subject. Then, considering the contentions, in para-12 it was held as under:- "12. It is for the State Govt. to frame the Rules and lay down requisite qualifications looking to the nature of post. Then, considering the contentions, in para-12 it was held as under:- "12. It is for the State Govt. to frame the Rules and lay down requisite qualifications looking to the nature of post. Merely because qualifications or conditions does not suit a particular person, the Rules or the amendment in this regard cannot be struck down or be held discriminatory or violative of Article 14 or 16 of the Constitution of India." Then, in para-13 it was held as under : "13. The Apex Court in number of cases, has held that it is for the expert body to suggest requisite qualifications and the Rule Making Authority or the legislature is to regulate the method of recruitment and proscribing qualification etc. while framing the Rules in this regard. The court should not trench into such matters. Reliance can be placed on the judgment of Apex Court in the case of J. Ranga Swamy v. State of Andhra Pradesh and others, reported in 1990 (1) SCC 288 , V. K. Sood v. Secretary, Civil Aviation and others, reported in 1993 Suppl. (3) SCC 9 and Dr. A. P. Singh Nargang Vs. P. G. Institute, reported in 1994 SCC page 698 ." And accordingly, the writ petition was dismissed. In my view, the judgment in Sunita Sharma's case is also a complete answer, to persuade me, not invoke my jurisdiction to strike down the provision of Rule 266(3), simply on the ground of the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner, this judgment not containing reasons. 37. At this point, I may consider the submissions made on the side of the petitioner, that the candidate while acquiring the qualification of B.S.T.C., does have to pass in all these three subjects, then in view of the provisions of Rule 277-A, even in the examination conducted by the R.P.S.C., the candidate is to pass in all these three subjects and therefore, insistence on possessing the academic qualification with these subjects is unreasonable. 38. It may at once be observed that the requirement of, and the level of knowledge, expected to be possessed at these two levels, is entirely different, as compared to the one, at the level of acquiring academic qualification. 38. It may at once be observed that the requirement of, and the level of knowledge, expected to be possessed at these two levels, is entirely different, as compared to the one, at the level of acquiring academic qualification. It may gainfully be recalled, that all over the country, in all combined competitive examinations, for selection for admission in higher education, it is always insisted, that at the school level, the candidate should have passed with a particular percentage of marks, in the relevant subjects. If the logic advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is accepted, then, the requirement cannot be insisted in those cases as well, as in combined competitive examinations also, the candidate has to secure merit, in those subjects as well. Likewise the other aspect is, that a look at Rule 277-A shows, that the examination is to be of 20 marks, and the papers enlisted in entry-(vi) are of 200 marks, and therein the three subjects are assigned 20 marks each. Significantly, in this rule also, it is not the requirement, that the candidate should, of necessity, secure a particular minimum number of marks in each individual subjects. Obviously, it is well nigh possible, that a candidate may secure high merit by obtaining good marks in other subjects, notwithstanding having obtained, altogether no marks, in these three subjects, or in either of them. Thus, it cannot be said, that by virtue of Rule 277-A, the requirement of subjects are fulfilled so as to hold the provision of Rule 266(3) to be ultra virus. Yet another aspect of the matter is, that may be, that by virtue of the candidate acquiring qualification of B.S.T.C. and by virtue of passing the examination prescribed in Rule 277-A the candidate may be shown to have reasonable proficiency in the three subjects, and consequently, requirement of having the three subjects in academic qualification need not be insisted upon, but then, the question, that still survives is, as to whether on that count the provision of Rule 266(3) can be said to be ultra virus the Constitution? It is settled law that presumption is always in favour of the validity of the statute, and is never in favour of its validity. It is settled law that presumption is always in favour of the validity of the statute, and is never in favour of its validity. Therefore, the provision has to be approached with a view to find grounds of its validity, and it is to be struck down only when it is not possible to uphold it. As against which approach of the learned counsel for the petitioners is, as if, I am to sit as an appellate authority, over the wisdom of the authorities framing the statute. I am afraid this not within the scope of Article 226 jurisdiction for the purpose of validity, at least one, million dollar circumstance, even by itself, should be enough that requirement of this qualification has held field, in the Rules of 1971, since 1995, and the impugned provisions since 1998, and innumerable number of selections, and recruitments have been made, and likewise candidature of innumerable number of candidates had been rejected, as such, it would not be advisable for me to strike down the provision at this point of time, simply because, despite availability of sizable number of candidates, with the prescribed qualifications, the petitioners do not possess those qualifications. It is not a case, where the qualification prescribed is such, that the candidates with such qualification cannot be available. It is always in the interest of the consideration of striving towards excellence, as contemplated by Article 51-A of the Constitution, that if a better qualification is prescribed as the eligibility requirement for recruitment, then no effort should be made to interpret the provision in such a manner, or judge its validity in such a manner, that it may open the arena, wide open, for inferior quality of carnlidates becoming eligible for seeking appointment. 39. Then, I may also refer to the judgment of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in V.K. Sood's case wherein Hon'ble the Supreme Court was requested that looking to their inefficiency in the pilots' operational capability, repeatedly air accidents have been occurring endangering the lives of innocent travellers, the Court should regulate the prescription of higher qualifications and strict standards to the navigators or to the pilots to be insisted, and Hon'ble the Supreme Court declined by observing that it is for the expert body, and not for the Court. It was further held in para-7 as under : "...Moreover it is for the rule making authority or for the Legislature to regulate the method of recruitment, prescribe qualifications etc. It is open to the President or the authorised person to undertake such exercise and that necessary tests should be conducted by U.P.SC. before giving the certificates to them. This is not the province of this Court to trench into and prescribe qualifications in particular...." 40. Likewise the Division Bench of this Court in Dr. Rajesh Sharma's case, considering the submissions about the stipulations about the qualification prescribed in the advertisement, and the qualification possessed serving the purpose, held in para 14 as under : ....We are of the opinion that it is not the domain of the court to examine as to whether the degree of M.Sc. (Med.) Bio-chemistry could be treated as a post graduate degree in Veterinary Science or Animal Husbandry or not. It is the job of the expert body and a purely academic exercise, upon which the courts are always reluctant to embark and should not embark. Once the qualification held by the appellant for the purpose of appointment on the post in question had been examined at more than one stages by the expert body at the level of the RPSC as also at the level of the Government, as has been mentioned in the earlier part of this judgment and it had been found that the qualification held by the appellant could be treated as post graduate degree in Veterinary Science or Animal Husbandry and on that basis, after thorough examination on this issue at the level of the expert body, the appellant was consciously considered to be eligible and found suitable. There was no scope for the learned Single Judge to sit as an appellate body over the decision of an expert body and to hold that the appellant did not possess the requisite qualification for the purpose of appointment in question." In view of the above judgments, it is obvious, that sitting in writ jurisdiction, am not entitled to hold that since the candidate is to pass in the three subjects in B.S.T.C., so also in the examination conducted under Rule 277-A, the requirement prescribed in Rule 266(3) is bad, or is liable to be set aside. Realising the limitations of my jurisdiction, I do not feel inclined to strike down Rule 266(3), for this reason as well. 41. Now, I may deal with the contention, about the candidate being simply required to have the three subjects, while obtaining academic qualification, and it being not necessary to pass, in all the three subjects. Suffice it to say, that the argument has been projected in an attractive frame, but then, language of the statute is required to be read in a meaningful manner. As found above, the provision has the purpose, and has been holding field for long time, the expression used in Rule 266(3) "with five subjects, three of them should be Mathematics, Hindi and English", obviously means, that out of the five subjects, he should have passed in the three subjects. Accepting the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner, may mean, that a situation may' arise, where a particular candidate may have had all the three subjects, and even despite failing in all the three subjects, he may have acquired the qualification, by aggregate of the marks in all other subjects. This situation cannot be allowed to come about. Therefore, in my humble view, language of Rule 266(3) has to be interpreted to mean, that he should have passed in all the three subjects, individually. 42. Then the conduct of the petitioners can also not be lost sight of, inasmuch, as the petitioners applied in response to the advertisement, did appear in the examination, thereafter, since they could not be found eligible to be appointed the advertisement is being challenged now. 42. Then the conduct of the petitioners can also not be lost sight of, inasmuch, as the petitioners applied in response to the advertisement, did appear in the examination, thereafter, since they could not be found eligible to be appointed the advertisement is being challenged now. It is strange to note, that in order to get out of the difficult situation, emerging from the submission of the learned counsel for the respondent, on the anvil of the conduct of the petitioners, disentitling to maintain the petitions, on account of their having appeared in the examination, a contention has been raised to the effect, that on the language of the advertisement, specially condition No. 5, about academic qualification, the petitioners are eligible, and in that process, the argument was built up, on the basis of Hindi version and English version of the provision, but then what is significant to note is, that while filing the writ petitions, the petitioners were ad idem, to the effect, that the condition No. 5 of the advertisement does render the petitioners ineligible, for being appointed, and precisely for this reason, the advertisement is also challenged in all these writ petitions. That being the position, on the face of the judgments, in Dr. M. C. Mehta's case, Madan Lal's case and Vijay Soni's case the petitioners are estopped from maintaining the present writ petitions at this belated hour, after having applied and having appeared in the examination. 43. Thus, taken from any stand point, I do not find any force in the writ petitions, and the same are, therefore, dismissed.Petition Dismissed of. *******