ORDER R.K. Gupta, J. The petitioner by way of filing the present petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India has invoked the jurisdiction of this Court to challenge the order dated 18-5-2004 which is Annexure P/10 to the petition. The impugned order has been passed by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court No. 1, Bhopal exercising its jurisdiction u/s 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The claim of the petitioner before the Labour Court had been that Shri Uttam Kumar Pardasani was employed in the month of February, 2000. He claimed that he has not been paid salary by the management for a period from October, 2002 to May, 2003. He further claimed that he has not been paid his daily allowance, traveling allowance, telephone allowance, mail allowance and other monetary benefits. Therefore he was forced to file an application through the Union u/s 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. During the proceedings before the Labour Court an application was filed by the Union on 16-10-2003 objecting the appearance of an Advocate in terms of section 36(3), (4) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and the Court passed an order prohibiting appearance of the Advocate on behalf of the petitioner/company. Counsel for the petitioner has made two submissions. First submission is that the Labour Court has committed illegality by proceeding ex parte against the petitioner/company and therefore the order passed by the Labour Court (Annexure-P/10 dated 18-5-2004) is bad in law. The second submission which has been submitted on behalf of the petitioner/company is that even assuming that the Labour Court has rightly proceeded ex parte then it has no jurisdiction u/s 33-C(2) to entertain the claim of the employee and therefore the impugned order passed by the Labour Court is liable to be set aside. Dealing with the first submission of the Learned Counsel for the petitioner, complete order sheets of the Labour Court has been filed which is Annexure-P/9 to the petition. As it is evident from the order sheets, on 21-8-2003 on behalf of the petitioner, Advocate Shri Sanjay Shrivastava appeared and filed his Vakalatnama on the aforesaid date. The application, objecting appearance of an Advocate filed by the employee/Union u/s 33(3), (4) was supplied and the counsel for the petitioner/management sought time to the reply. As it is evident from the order sheets, on 21-8-2003 on behalf of the petitioner, Advocate Shri Sanjay Shrivastava appeared and filed his Vakalatnama on the aforesaid date. The application, objecting appearance of an Advocate filed by the employee/Union u/s 33(3), (4) was supplied and the counsel for the petitioner/management sought time to the reply. On 18-9-2003 reply to the said application was filed by the management through their counsel Shri Sanjeev Shrivastava and thereafter the matter was fixed for 9-10-2003 for the arguments of the parties on the said application. On 9-10-2003, on behalf of the management one Shri R. P. Sharma, Advocate appeared and submitted the written arguments to the application of the respondent/employee. On 16-10-2003, parties were absent and the Labour Court passed the order prohibiting the appearance of the Advocate of the management. The said order has been passed by the Labour Court on the ground that since on behalf of the union no Advocate had been appearing therefore in terms to section 36(4) of the I. D. Act, 1947 the appearance on behalf of the management through an Advocate was prohibited. Counsel for the petitioner submits that since on 16-10-2003, no one has appeared on behalf of the petitioner/management therefore after when the appearance of an Advocate of the company was prohibited then it was the bounded duty of the Labour Court to issue notice afresh to the management. It may be noticed that after the order sheet dated 16-10-2003 when the Labour Court prohibited the appearance of an Advocate appearing for the company then the case was fixed for written statement on 11-11-2003. On this date, a written statement has been filed on behalf of the petitioner/management. Thus, it was not a case where the petitioner/management was not aware of the date fixed by the Labour Court for 11-11-2003 by passing an order on 16-10-2003. The reply was filed on the date fixed by the Labour Court by the petitioner/management on 11-11-2003. On this basis, it is clear that the petitioner/management was aware of the date, fixed by the Labour Court for filing of the written statement/reply and the management also filed its reply on 11-11-2003. The order sheet of the case further shows that after 11-11-2003 there had been no appearance on behalf of the petitioner/company. On this basis, it is clear that the petitioner/management was aware of the date, fixed by the Labour Court for filing of the written statement/reply and the management also filed its reply on 11-11-2003. The order sheet of the case further shows that after 11-11-2003 there had been no appearance on behalf of the petitioner/company. On 11-11-2003, the Labour Court after receiving the written statement fixed the case for framing of the issues on 24-11-2003. It is also to be noticed that on 17-12-2003, on behalf of the petitioner/management an application was filed. This application was sent by the management through courier to the Labour Court. By the said application, the representative of the management expressed his inability to appear before the Labour Court on 13-12-2003. Labour Court vide its order sheet dated 17-12-2003 noted that the case was not fixed for 13-12-2003 and the actual date before the Labour Court was for 17-12-2003 even though application for adjournment was considered. The case thereafter was fixed for 24-1-2004. Again on 24-1-2004 an application for adjournment was submitted by the representative of the management which was received by the Labour Court on 23-1-2004. In the said application, the representative expressed his inability to appear before the Labour Court on 24-1-2004. The case thereafter was fixed for 20th February, 2004. On this date, no one appeared on behalf of the petitioner/company and therefore the Labour Court directed to proceed ex parte against the petitioner/company. The Labour Court directed the proceedings to go ex parte and the date was fixed for 16-3-2004 which is clear by the order sheet dated 20th February, 2004. On 16-3-2004, an application by the management was sent under Order 9, Rule 7 of the CPC by post. The said application was considered and rejected by the Labour Court vide its order dated 16-3-2004. On the basis of the aforesaid conduct and the order sheets which have been referred hereinabove, it is clear that the petitioner/company had not taken the proceedings before the Labour Court seriously. The said application was considered and rejected by the Labour Court vide its order dated 16-3-2004. On the basis of the aforesaid conduct and the order sheets which have been referred hereinabove, it is clear that the petitioner/company had not taken the proceedings before the Labour Court seriously. The view of the petitioner/company had been that as and when the application is sent to the Labour Court, the Labour Court was under the bounded duty to consider the application and thereafter it was the obligation of the Labour Court every time to communicate next date by post therefore the petitioner/company presumed that whenever an application is sent to the Labour Court, the Labour Court after considering the said application has to inform the petitioner/company about the next date by post. Such attitude against the Court proceedings by the management itself shows a conduct of the company that the company did not take seriously to the proceedings before the Labour Court and on the contrary thought that the proceedings before a Court of law can be taken up through postal correspondence. Though the Labour Court is not a Court but it has all the trapping of the Court. The proceedings before the Labour Court are judicial in nature and therefore the petitioner/company when was aware of the various dates fixed by the Labour Court and on such dates the Company still continued to send application and did not appear then it has to be held that the company in fact had been negligent in prosecuting the case before the Labour Court on extended to harass the employee by playing the delaying tactics. The proceedings before the Labour Court cannot be carried out by the postal correspondence between the parties as it is not the conciliator under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 but the proceedings where in a Court of law the petitioner/management when was aware of the various dates after 16-10-2003 and on the dates fixed by the Labour Court applications were submitted on the due dates. Thus, it is clear that the petitioner/company was aware of the dates fixed by the Labour Court in the case yet the management willfully avoiding to appear before the said Court and continued to enter into the postal correspondence. Thus, it is clear that the petitioner/company was aware of the dates fixed by the Labour Court in the case yet the management willfully avoiding to appear before the said Court and continued to enter into the postal correspondence. The reply was also filed by the management on 11-11-2003 though the Labour Court earlier vide order dated 16-10-2003 prohibited the appearance of an Advocate yet they were aware of the next date fixed by the Labour Court. Thus, it is not expected from a Court of law to every time sent communication for the next date when the management was aware of the previous dates by submitting the application and seeking their adjournment. From a Court of law it could alone be expected that it will issue summons to any non-applicant to file its reply and also to make arrangement for ensuring the attendance on their behalf by appointing or nominating the person. It may be further seen that even though on 17-12-2003 when the representative sought adjournment on the ground of illness of his wife the Labour Court was considerate enough to adjourn the case and the case was fixed for 24-1-2001. The petitioner/management was aware of this date and again submitted an application for adjournment. Thus, in a case where an employee seeks a relief that he has not been paid his salary from October, 2002 to May, 2003 and in such a situation seeking adjournment by the Company on one ground or the other cannot be treated a proper exercise and the management has to blame for itself rather than accusing the Labour Court that it has wrongly proceeded ex parte against the petitioner/company. Counsel for the petitioner/management during the course of the argument submitted that they were aware of the dates fixed by the Labour Court through their own sources. Thus, the petitioner/management was having the source to receive the information about the dates fixed by the Labour Court after 16-10-2002. Apparently, it shows that the management purposely was avoiding to appear before the Labour Court and was continuing to watch the proceedings from outside and such a conduct of the petitioner/company under no stretch of imagination can be treated to be a sufficient cause for setting aside the ex parte order passed by the Labour Court. Apparently, it shows that the management purposely was avoiding to appear before the Labour Court and was continuing to watch the proceedings from outside and such a conduct of the petitioner/company under no stretch of imagination can be treated to be a sufficient cause for setting aside the ex parte order passed by the Labour Court. Apart from the same when the application for setting aside the ex parte order was submitted by the management to the Labour Court then the Labour Court rejected the said application by passing an order on 16-3-2004. The Labour Court vide order dated 16-3-2004 rejected the application filed by the petitioner/company under Order 9, Rule 7 of the Civil Procedure Code. The petitioner/company did not challenge before this Court the legality, validity and correctness of the order dated 16-3-2004 passed by the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court was justified in proceeding ex parte against the petitioner/company. The next question which the counsel for the petitioner has submitted that before the Labour Court the application u/s 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 was not maintainable therefore the Labour Court was having no jurisdiction to entertain the claim. Thus the order passed by the Labour Court which is Annexure-P/10 to the petition is liable to be set aside. In support of this submission the counsel for the petitioner cited the judgments which are U.P. Electric Supply Co. Ltd. Vs. R.K. Shukla and Another, etc., , Punjab Beverages Pvt. Ltd., Chandigarh Vs. Suresh Chand and Another, , M/s Punjab Beverages Pvt. Ltd. Chandigarh v. Suresh Chand and another, 1995(1) SCC 235 , Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Limited Vs. The Workmen and Another, , Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. v. The workmen and another. Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the Labour Court exercising the jurisdiction u/s 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 merely is an executing Court. He submitted that in such proceedings, the Labour Court has no jurisdiction to create a right. He further submitted that Labour Court will have jurisdiction to execute the right as the Labour Court is an executing Court. The right of an employee should be pre-determined and such pre-determined right alone can be executed in a proceeding before the Labour Court u/s 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Counsel for the respondents relied upon Chief Mining Engineer East India Coal Co. Ltd. Vs. The right of an employee should be pre-determined and such pre-determined right alone can be executed in a proceeding before the Labour Court u/s 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Counsel for the respondents relied upon Chief Mining Engineer East India Coal Co. Ltd. Vs. Rameswar and Others, , R.B. Bansilal Abirchand Mills Co. Ltd. Vs. The Labour Court, Nagpur and Others, , National Building Construction Corporation Vs. Pritam Singh Gill and Others, , N. B. C. Corporation Ltd. v. Pritam Singh Gill and Others and on that basis it is submitted that the Labour Court has jurisdiction to entertain the application filed by the petitioner invoking its jurisdiction of section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. There is no dispute in relation to the proposition of law that the Labour Court will have no jurisdiction to entertain an application u/s 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 for the creation of a right and also it is an executing Court. The question for consideration in the present case arises is that when an employee submits that the has worked for a certain period and the management has not paid his salary then such a claim whether would be maintainable u/s under section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The employer cannot dispute the proportion that even though an employee worked and not paid his salary and if such an employee raises a claim before the Labour Court by invoking jurisdiction u/s 33-C(2) and the employer disputes such a claim then the Labour Court will have jurisdiction under the circumstances to adjudicate upon such a lis. The right of claiming salary after the employment is a right already recognized and which existed in favour of an employee to claim salary in case he has worked and salary is not paid by the employer. Merely because an artificial dispute by denying the claim of the petitioner is disputed that the employee has not worked then such an artificial dispute whether will have the effect of ousting the jurisdiction of the Labour Court u/s 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 or shall amount creation of a right. Merely because an artificial dispute by denying the claim of the petitioner is disputed that the employee has not worked then such an artificial dispute whether will have the effect of ousting the jurisdiction of the Labour Court u/s 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 or shall amount creation of a right. Right to claim salary after working is a right which already existed in favour of an employee whether employee has worked or not will be execution of such right and right to claim salary would depend upon the proof submitted by an employee to the Labour Court to justify its claim. But merely because the employer disputes the working of an employee that by itself would not be sufficient to oust the jurisdiction of the Labour Court. Allowing such claim would depend upon the proof furnished by an employee to the Labour Court. On the basis of the same it is clear that the jurisdiction of the Labour Court cannot be ousted u/s 33-C(2) merely on the ground that claim is disputed. However, if an employee attempts to create a new condition of service or further attempts to creation of a right then the jurisdiction under those circumstances shall be barred but when the right to claim salary already exist in favour of an employee then the Labour Court under such circumstances becomes the executing Court for adjudicating the claim of the salary. It may further be seen that section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, itself opens with the word that where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money and if any question arises as to the amount of money due then such question shall be decided by the Labour Court. Thus, entitlement to receive money as enumerated u/s 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act would only mean entitlement of an employee by creating a new right through the proceedings u/s 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, alone would be ousted but where a right to receive salary already is a recognized right in favour of an employee who has worked for his master then such a right in case he proves that he has really worked then in the present case, it would not be a case of creating a right but it would be a case of execution of a right therefore according to this Court the Labour Court will have jurisdiction in the present case. Counsel for the petitioner submitted that in the present case while filing the written statement a plea was raised that employee has abandoned the job w.e.f. 1-1-2003 and on this basis, he submitted that once the plea of abandonment of the employment is raised by the management in the written statement then this by itself is sufficient to oust the jurisdiction of the Labour Court. This point is also to be rejected. When the management raises the plea that the services of an employee are terminated then the employee cannot claim wages u/s 33-C(2) of Industrial Disputes Act, to have worked after service of the termination order. Thus, under these circumstances, the Labour Court cannot award the wages for the period after the termination and thus will have the effect of nullifying the termination. Therefore, in such cases, the Labour Court will not have the jurisdiction to entertain an application u/s 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, but where the employer though raises a plea of abandonment of the service by an employee and the employee claims that he has rendered the service or continued to render the service for the master then it will not be a case of abandonment. The employer before the Labour Court did not adduce any evidence and not proved by any documentary or oral evidence has been submitted to show that the employee has abandoned the job. Under these circumstances, an artificial plea of abandonment will have no effect on the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to entertain the application for salary u/s 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Under these circumstances, an artificial plea of abandonment will have no effect on the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to entertain the application for salary u/s 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. On the basis of the aforesaid discussion, it is thus held that the Labour Court u/s 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 has the jurisdiction to entertain the application and thus the petition as such is dismissed. Final Result : Dismissed