JUDGMENT M. M. DAS, J. — Though notices of the writ petition issued to the opp. parties have been duly served, except opp. party No. 1 - Union of India, none of the other opp. parties has entered appearance in this case. Mr. Ramesh Agarwal, learned counsel appearing for the Union of India is also absent when the matter is taken up. We, therefore, proceed to hear this case on merit. 2. The petitioner in the present writ petition has chal¬lenged the order under Annexure-6 passed by the opposite party No. 3 banning all Tippers/trucks controlled/owned by the petitioners/relatives and associates from transporting coal in all the Collieries/areas of M.C.L. till the disposal of the Criminal Cases said to be pending against the petitioners and subject to the out-come of the said cases. 3. It appears from the record that a similar order was passed by the opposite party No. 2 on 2.3.2004 (Annexure-1) which was challenged by the petitioners in W.P.(C) No. 5212 of 2004. The said writ petition was heard and disposed of by order dated 6.2.2006 holding as follows: “xxx xxx xxx ......... The order is passed without limiting any time period. In our opinion, such an unqualified order could not have been passed by opposite party No. 3 without issuing show-cause notice to the petitioners. Such an order banning transportation activities of the petitioners by engaging the aforesaid trucks could have been passed without any time-limit provided the petitioners were served with show cause notice and they were given an opportunity to represent their case, if they had any. In the absence of such formalities being complied with, we are constrained to hold that the impugned order dated 2.3.2004 under Annexure-1 was in violation of the principle of natural justice and hence the same is struck down. However, it is open to oppo¬site party No. 3 to proceed with the matter afresh after issuing regular show cause notice to the petitioners.” 4. It has averred in the writ petition that consequent upon passing of the above order, the petitioners, on 9.2.2006 approached the opposite party No. 3 and requested him to allow the petitioners to transport coal from the areas of the M.C.L. but they were not allowed to do so in spite of the fact that the previous order banning such transportation was struck down by this Court in W.P.(C) No. 5212 of 2004. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that since the previous ban order was struck down by this Court, the opposite party No. 3 should have allowed them to carry on transport of coal in different Collieries/areas of M.C.L. It further appears that the opposite party No. 4 issued a notice dated 8.3.2006 to the petitioners calling upon them to submit their explanation as to why their business with M.C.L. shall not be suspended by blacklisting them and their family members/relatives/associates from any type of business like civil contracts, road sales and transportation of coal etc. and re¬quired the petitioners to file such explanation by 25.3.2006. 5. The petitioners submitted their explanation on 23.3.2006 stating, inter alia, that they should not be condemned for the alleged false cases. The petitioners have alleged that the opposite party Nos. 3 and 4 without conducting any enquiry with regard to the allegations made against the petitioners and without providing them with any material on which the opposite parties rely upon, in support of a ban order against the petitioners, the opposite party No. 3 again passed an order on 8.3.2006 which can be said to be a re-production of the previous order which was struck down by this Court. The impugned order under Annexure-6 passed by the opposite party No. 3 is quoted hereunder : “MAHANADI COALFIELDS LIMITED OFFICE OF THE GENERAL MANAGER : KALINGA AREA TALCHER P.O. N. S. NAGAR; DIST. ANGUL (ORISSA) L. No. GM(KA)/Pers/06/1209 Dt. 10.04.2006 By Regd. With A/D. To Shri Bhabani Shankar Sahoo S/O. Nirakar Sahoo Sri Bipin Bihari Sahoo S/O. Nirakar Sahoo Sri Abanikanta Sahoo S/O. Nirakar Sahoo Sri Ramesh Ch. Sahoo, S/O. Late Chandramani Sahoo All are of village-Badasinghada, P.O. Badajorada, P.S. Vikrampur, Dist. Angul. Ref : Your reply dated 08.03.2006 to the undersigned in connection with show cause notice issued to you. Sub : Assault on Sri A.S.R. Seshaya, Supdt. of Mines and Sri B.N.Chief Sr. Coal Loading Inspector of Bharatpur Project. In reference to the Writ Petition No. W. P. (C) No. 5212 of 2004 order dtd. 06.02.2002 of the Hon’ble High Court of Orissa, show-cause notices are sent to you and you have replied the same vide letter dated 08.03.2006. I have gone carefully through your reply dated 08.03.2006. Coal Loading Inspector of Bharatpur Project. In reference to the Writ Petition No. W. P. (C) No. 5212 of 2004 order dtd. 06.02.2002 of the Hon’ble High Court of Orissa, show-cause notices are sent to you and you have replied the same vide letter dated 08.03.2006. I have gone carefully through your reply dated 08.03.2006. It is ascertained that, (i) G.R.Case No. 123/04 Under Sec. 147, 148, 294, 506, 234, IPC (ii) G.R.Case No. 128/04 Under Sec. 341, 323, 294, 506, 34 IPC (iii) G. R. Case No. 129/94 Under Sec. 148, 152, 506, 34 I.P.C. are pending against you in the Court of Hon’ble SDJM, Talcher and you are on bail. Your explanation to that effect is untrue. Your claim for sympathetic consideration as Land oustee did not have any relevancy to this case and nobody is above law. Your explanation in toto is unsatisfactory and you deserve no liberal consideration at this end. Hence, the Tippers/trucks controlled/owned by you/your relatives/associates are banned for any transport in all the collieries/Areas of Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. Till disposal of the above criminal cases and subject to the out-come of the order of the Court. Yours faithfully, Sd/- Illegible General Manager MCL, Kalinga Area.” 6. This Court while disposing of the previous writ peti¬tion by order dated 6.2.2006 has categorically held that the previous ban order dated 2.3.2004 (Annexure-1) was passed in violation of the principles of natural justice and observed that it is open to the opposite party No. 3 to proceed with the matter afresh after issuing regular show cause notice to the petitioners. The moot question which arises for determination in this case is, whether the opposite party No. 3 has passed the impugned order under Annexure-6 violating the principles of natural justice even after this Court has struck down the similar previous order on the ground of violation of principles of natu¬ral justice. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that a bare reading of the impugned order under Annexure-6 would go to show that the General Manager has repeated the ban order which was struck down by this Court previously by merely stating that the explanation furnished by the petitioners is untrue. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that a bare reading of the impugned order under Annexure-6 would go to show that the General Manager has repeated the ban order which was struck down by this Court previously by merely stating that the explanation furnished by the petitioners is untrue. He further submits that the impugned order, as it appears, has been passed only for the reason that three G.R.Cases have been registered against the petitioners inasmuch as by the said order, a stigma has been attached to the petitioner which the General Manager could not have done without affording an opportunity of hearing to the petitioners and without giving them sufficient scope to explain their conduct. Learned counsel further submits that even though pursuant to the previous order passed by this Court the petitioners were asked to file explanation but the same cannot be said to be in substantial compliance with the principles of natural justice and, therefore, the impugned order under Annex¬ure-6 still retains the character of an ex parte adverse adjudi¬cation. 8. On perusal of the impugned order, we find that the General Manager except stating that some criminal cases are pending adjudication against the petitioners has assigned no reason as to why the ban order passed therein is justified. 9. In the Full Bench decision in the case of V. Punnen Thomas v. State of Kerala, AIR 1969 Kerala 81, Justice Mathew gave a descending opinion which reads thus : “Reputation can be viewed both as an interest of personality and as an interest of substance, viz., as an asset,” and recalled these words of Rescoe Pound : “On the one hand there is the claim of the individual to be secured in his dignity and honour as part of his personality in a world in which one must live in society among his fellow men. On the other hand there is the claim to be secured in his reputation as a part of his substance, in that in a world in which credit plays so large a part the confidence and esteem of one’s fellow-men may be a valuable asset”. (See : Interest of Personality”-28 Harvard Law Review, pp. 445-447). On the other hand there is the claim to be secured in his reputation as a part of his substance, in that in a world in which credit plays so large a part the confidence and esteem of one’s fellow-men may be a valuable asset”. (See : Interest of Personality”-28 Harvard Law Review, pp. 445-447). “As the memorandum in question cast a stigma on the reputation of the petitioner, which is both an interest of personality and an interest of substance, and as it is attended with civil consequences to the petitioner, and as it operates as a punishment for an alleged irregularity, I think, the memorandum should have been proceeded by notice and an opportunity of being heard. If anybody were to say that Ext. P-1 is an administrative proceeding and so no notice or opportunity of being heard was required and that no interference under Article 226 is possible, I would answer him in the high and powerful words of Mr. Belloc, “you have mistaken the hour of the night : it is already morning”. This minority view of Justice Mathew was approved in the case of Joseph Vilangandan v. Executive Engineer, Buildings & Roads (PWD) Division, Ernakulam, (1978) 3 SCR 514 : AIR 1978 SC 930 . 10. In Erusian Equipment & Chemicals Ltd. v. State of West Bengal, (1975) 1 SCC 70 , the Supreme Court observed that fundamentals of fair-play require that the person concerned should be given an opportunity to represent his case before he is put on the black list. Again in the case of Reghunath Thakur v. State of Bihar, (1989) 1 SCC 229, the Supreme Court reiterated that it is an implied principle of the rule of law that any order having civil consequences should be passed only after following the principles of natural justice and it has to be realized that blacklisting any person in respect of business venture has civil consequences for the future business of the person concerned in any event. In such cases, even if the rules do not require, it is an elementary principle of natural justice that parties affected by any order should have right of being heard and making repre¬sentations against the order. In such cases, even if the rules do not require, it is an elementary principle of natural justice that parties affected by any order should have right of being heard and making repre¬sentations against the order. Further, it is well settled princi¬ple of law that while taking a punitive action against a person by passing an order, the concerned authority is required to give reasons for such conclusion arrived at by him as that would facilitate the higher authority/Court to examine the correctness of the said order. However, in the present case, we find that the impugned order under Annexure-6 is punitive in nature, but the General Manager has not assigned any reason for coming to the conclusion that the explanation submitted by the petitioners is unsatisfactory. 11. Applying the above principles of law, we have no hesi¬tation in holding that the General Manager, MCL, Kalinga area even though afforded the petitioners an opportunity of filing an explanation pursuant to the observation made by this Court in the previous writ petition referred to above, but the same cannot be construed to be in sufficient compliance of the principles of natural justice as the petitioners were not afforded with any opportunity of hearing nor any opportunity to explain the allega¬tions made against them. Considering the nature of the impugned order which undoubtedly has civil consequences for the future business of the petitioners, only affording them with an opportunity of filing of an explanation, in our view, is not in sufficient compliance with the principles of natural justice. The impugned order dated 10.4.2006 under Annexure-6, therefore, cannot be sustained. 12. We, accordingly, quash the said impugned order dated 10.4.2006 under Annexure-6 and allow the writ petition. S. B. ROY, C.J. I agree. Petition allowed.