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2006 DIGILAW 558 (AP)

Penugonda Sreenivasa Reddy v. Penugonda Prameela

2006-04-21

RAMESH RANGANATHAN

body2006
ORDER Criminal Revision Case No. 983 of 2002 is filed, by Accused 1 to 3 in C.C. No. 24 of 2001 before the Judicial Magistrate of I Class, Kurnool, against the order of the I Additional District and Sessions Judge, Kurnool in Crl.R.P.No.25 of 2001 dated 01-07-2002, to the extent the learned Sessions Judge took the case on file against A-1 to A-3 for the offence punishable under Section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act 1989. 2. Criminal Petition No. 101 of 2003 is filed by Smt. Penugonda Prameela, the complainant in C.C.No.24 of 2001, against the order of the I Additional District and Sessions Judge, Kurnool in Crl.R.P.No.25 of 2001 to the extent the learned Sessions Judge held that there was no material to take the case on file, against A-4 to A-9, for the offence under Section 494 IPC and under Section 3(1)(x) of the Schedule Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. 3. Parties shall hereinafter be referred to as they are arrayed in Criminal Petition No.107 of 2003. In her complaint filed in C.C.No.24 of 2001, for offences under Section 494 and 498-A IPC, Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act and Section 3(1)(x) and (xii) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act 1989, the petitioner herein alleged that she is a member of the Scheduled Caste and a graduate in Nursing, that she was living at her parents' house in Kurnool and was working as a tutor at the Adarsha Nursing Home, Kurnool. It is alleged that accused No.1 was running a telephone booth and belonged to the forward community. The complainant and the 151 accused are alleged to have fallen in love and the 151 accused to have written a letter to the complainant expressing his love for her and his preparedness to marry her. It is alleged that they got married on 24-04-1997 as per Hindu rites at Manthralayam. The marriage was consummated and the complainant and the accused lived together, as wife and husband at house bearing No.41A of Lecturers colony, Kurnool. It is alleged that the marriage, of the 1st accused with the complainant, could not be digested by the parents of the 1st accused i.e., the 2nd and 3rd accused. The marriage was consummated and the complainant and the accused lived together, as wife and husband at house bearing No.41A of Lecturers colony, Kurnool. It is alleged that the marriage, of the 1st accused with the complainant, could not be digested by the parents of the 1st accused i.e., the 2nd and 3rd accused. The complainant would allege that accused Nos.2 and 3 demanded dowry from her and her parents, as a result of which her parents gave ten tolas of Gold, a Yamaha Motor Cycle worth Rs.40,000/- and cash of Rs.2,00,000/- as dowry. According to the complainant she gave birth to a male child through the 1st accused in March 1998. She would allege that her married life and delivery hampered her chances of employment, which was to the disappointment of the 2nd and 3rd respondents herein (accused 2 and 3). Added to it, the caste factor also haunted them again when alliances came for the accused for a second marriage. Accused 1 to 4 are alleged to have started harassing the complainant physically and mentally. The accused are said to have ill-treated and abused her on caste lines and in a filthy language. The complainant would allege that the harassment meted out to her by the 1st accused was noticed by their neighbours and that the panchayat elders had advised the accused not to harass the complainant. Accused No.1 to 3 are alleged to have pressurized the complainant to give her consent to the second marriage of the first accused and to have impressed upon her that, even after the second marriage, they would look after her well. The 1st accused is said to have married the 4th accused on 27-08-1999, to have kept the minor son of the complainant elsewhere and to have thereby secured her presence at the venue of the second marriage. It is alleged that the complainant, under mixed feelings of threat, sorrow and tension had attended the Kalyana Mandapam having no knowledge about the preparations for the second marriage, that the second marriage of the 1st accused was performed with the 4th accused in the presence of the complainant, that accused No.5 to 9, who are relatives of the 4th accused, performed the second marriage with the knowledge as to the subsistence of the first marriage between the 1st accused and the complainant. According to the complainant, after the second marriage, she was necked out of the house of the 1st accused and thereafter the complainant is said to have started living at her parents house at Kurnool. According to her, on one occasion, accused Nos.1 to 9 trespassed into her house and ransacked the place for the sake of photographs and other documents relating to the marriage and to have threatened that they would kill her if she gave a complaint to the police. The accused are alleged to have challenged the complainant uttering the following words: "MADIGA MUNDA MAVADU MOJUPADI NEEVADDAKU VASTHE, NEEVU BIDDANUKANI, VAKA REDDYKULANIKI MAA KODALU KAVALA ANUKUNTUNAVA? NEEVEKKADA, MARI MEMEKKADA. NEEKU MA ENTI PANIMANISHI HODA KUDA NEEKU LEDU. KULAMU THAKKUVA DANNI MEMU KODALUGA PETTUKOMU. CHADUVU VOKKTE KADU. MAAKU KULAMU KOODA VANDALLA". 4. Petitioner would allege that accused Nos.1 to 9 are liable to be punished for the offence under Section 494 IPC for performing the second marriage, that A-1 to A-4 are liable for punishment under Section 498-A IPC since they harassed the complainant, that accused Nos.1 to 9 are liable for punishment under Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act for taking dowry from her parents and that accused Nos.1 to 9 are also liable to be punished for the offence under Sections 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. 5. In his order in C.F.R.No.5911 of 2000, in C.C.No.24 of 2001, dated 18-01-2001, the learned Judicial Magistrate of I Class, Kurnool held that, on evaluation of the allegations and the statements recorded in the enquiry, in his opinion, there were grounds to presume that A-1 to A-3 only committed offences under sections 494 and 498-A IPC and there were grounds to issue process against them. The case was taken on file for the offence under Section 114 IPC against A-2 and A-3 and under Section 498-A IPC against A-1 to A-3. Process was ordered to be issued to A-1 to A-3 only. The complaint against A-4 to A-9 was dismissed, under Section 203 Cr.P.C, as groundless. 6. The case was taken on file for the offence under Section 114 IPC against A-2 and A-3 and under Section 498-A IPC against A-1 to A-3. Process was ordered to be issued to A-1 to A-3 only. The complaint against A-4 to A-9 was dismissed, under Section 203 Cr.P.C, as groundless. 6. The learned Magistrate held that the sworn statement, and the statements recorded at the time of taking cognizance of the offences in the complaint, do not form an integral part of the complaint, that there must be clear factual foundation laid in the complaint itself attracting the ingredients of the offence, that the Court is required to proceed entirely on the basis of the allegations made in the complaint per se and not to undertake an examination of the correctness or otherwise of the allegations. The learned Magistrate held that it must be presumed that the complainant had, prima facie, shown that the 1st accused had married her. The learned Magistrate took note of the statements of the mediators M.Jaya Ramudu and Satyanarayana that they, along with the complainant, came and paid Rs.1,50,000/-, Rs.40,000/- towards Yamaha Motor Cycle and Rs.50,000/- towards gold to A-1 to A-3, and held that their statements and the complaint allegations, prima facie, showed that they gave the amount to A-1 to A-3. The learned Magistrate held that there was no allegation as to how A-4 to A-9 came to know about the first marriage of A-1 with the complainant and that the complainant had admitted to have appeared at the marriage. The learned Magistrate held that offences under Sections 498-A and 494 IPC are not among the offences mentioned in Section 3 of the S.C. and S.T. (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, that since, even according to the complaint, both the complainant and the first accused lived happily for some time and had moved in the public, the offence under Section 3(i)(x) and (xii) were not attracted. The learned Magistrate held that there were no grounds to presume that A-4 to A-9 had committed any offence and even if the statements stood unrebutted, there were no grounds to bring home the guilt of the accused under any of the offences mentioned. 7. The learned Magistrate held that there were no grounds to presume that A-4 to A-9 had committed any offence and even if the statements stood unrebutted, there were no grounds to bring home the guilt of the accused under any of the offences mentioned. 7. The petitioner herein filed Crl.R.P.No.25 of 2001 before the I Additional District and Sessions Judge, Kurnool against the order of the Judicial Magistrate of I Class, Kurnool in C.F.R.No.5911 of 2000 in C.C.No.24 of 2001 dated 18-01-2001. The learned Sessions Judge took note of the fact that the learned Magistrate had recorded the statements of six witnesses, that the petitioner had made a specific allegation against A-1 to A-3 that they had demanded payment of additional dowry and in turn her parents had paid Rs.2,00,000/-, 10 tolas of gold and one Yamaha Motor Cycle as dowry, that in the sworn statement of P.W.-1 , (the complainant), as recorded by the learned Magistrate, she had specifically stated that her parents had retired as teachers and from their retirement benefits, Rs.1,80,000/-, 10 tolas of gold and one Yamaha Motor Cycle were presented to A-1 to A-3. The learned Sessions Judge held that demanding dowry attracted the provisions of Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act and that the trial Court did not take cognizance of the case, for offences punishable under Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, without appreciating the material on record in the proper perspective. The learned Sessions Judge held that there was prima facie material on record to take cognizance of the case for the offence punishable under Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act against A-1 to A-3. 8. The learned Sessions Judge held that there was prima facie material on record to take cognizance of the case for the offence punishable under Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act against A-1 to A-3. 8. The learned Sessions Judge, after taking note of the contention for commission of the offence under Section 494 IPC and that they had abused her raising her caste name, that the trial Court had come to the conclusion that there was no material on record to take cognizance of the offence against A-4 to A-9 as their presence was not spoken to by the petitioner specifically, that the complainant had alleged that A-1 had married A-4 in Namasthe Function Hall at Kurnool and that the petitioner had attended the said marriage, held that there was no allegation as to how A-5 to A-9 knew about the 1st marriage of A-1 with the petitioner and that A-5 to A-9 were none other than the relatives of A-4 with whom the marriage of A-1 had taken place. The learned Sessions Judge held that, in the absence of any material or evidence, it could not be said that A-5 to A-9 had performed the marriage of A-4 with A-1 knowing about the 1st marriage of A-1 with the petitioner simply on the ground that they had performed the marriage of A-4 with A-1 and that the material on record was not sufficient to take the case on file against A-4 to A-9 for the offence under Section 494 IPC. The learned Sessions Judge held that the trial Court had rightly come to the conclusion that there was no material to take the case on file against A-4 to A-9 for the offence under Section 494 IPC. 9. Insofar as the offence under Section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act 1989 is concerned, the learned Sessions Judge took note of the allegations in the complaint that A-1 to A-3 had abused and ill-treated the petitioner on caste lines and had abused her in the name of her caste as "MADIGA MUNDA NEEVU VATCHINAPPATINUNDI MAAKU DARIDRAM PATTINDI, EKKADAINA POYI CHAVU PO". The learned Sessions Judge held that it was clear that A-1 to A-3 had abused the petitioner in the name of her caste which clearly attracted the provisions of 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act 1989 and that the trial Court had erred in not taking the case on file against A-1 to A-3 for the offence under Section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act 1989. The learned Sessions Judge held that there was no specific allegation, in clear terms, in the complaint, against A-1 to A-3, for the offence punishable under Section 3(1)(xii) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act 1989. The learned Sessions Judge, on coming to the conclusion that, in the case on hand, there was no material against any of the accused for such explanation of the petitioner, held thus: "At the stage of taking case into cognizance against the accused, the truth or otherwise of the case cannot be looked into by the whether there is any prima facie material against the accused for the offences alleged to have been committed by them. But, in the case on hand, the learned Magistrate went on to discuss several aspects about the evidential value of the sworn statement of the deponents. It is not an appropriate stage to discuss the truth or otherwise of the allegations made in the complaint. The learned Magistrate erred in refusing to take case on file against A-1 to A-3 for the offences punishable under Section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act 1989 and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, but rightly refused to take cognizance of the case againstA-4 to A-9 for the offences alleged against them. Thus, the point is held accordingly." 10. The learned Sessions Judge allowed the revision petition in part, directed the Magistrate to take the case on file against A-1 to A-3 for the offence punishable under Section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act 1989 and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Action in addition to the offences already taken into cognizance against them and commit the case to the designated Court after following the procedure prescribed in the Criminal Procedure Code. The learned Sessions Judge however confirmed the order of the learned Magistrate with regards refusal to take the case on file against A-4 to A-9 for the offences alleged against them. 11. Aggrieved by the order of the I Additional District and Sessions Judge Kurnool, in Crl.R.P.No.25 of 2001 dated 01-07-2002, A-1 to A-3 in C.C.No.24 of 2001, filed Crl.R.C.No.983 of 2002. Aggrieved by the very same order of the learned Sessions Judge, the complainant filed Crl. Petition No.107 of 2003. 12. Sri C.Praveen Kumar, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the revision petitioners in Crl.R.C.No.983 of 2002, (accused 1 to 3), would submit that the learned Sessions Judge had erred in directing the Magistrate to take the case on file against A-1 to A-3 for the offence punishable under Section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act 1989. Learned Counsel would submit that under Section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act 1989, if a person not being a member of the Scheduled Caste or the Scheduled Tribe intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, "in any place within public view", he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months but which may extend to five years and with fine. Learned Counsel would submit that it is only when the insult is intentional or the intimidation is with the intent to humiliate a member of the Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe, and the insult or intimidation or humiliation was in a "place within public view", can the accused be said to have committed an offence under Section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities' Act 1989. Learned Counsel would submit that mere abuse of a member of the Scheduled Caste, in the name of her caste, is not sufficient and it is only if such an abuse was "in a place within public view" would the ingredients of Section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act 1989 be attracted. Learned Counsel would submit that mere abuse of a member of the Scheduled Caste, in the name of her caste, is not sufficient and it is only if such an abuse was "in a place within public view" would the ingredients of Section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act 1989 be attracted. Learned Counsel would refer to the order of the learned Sessions Judge wherein the learned Sessions Judge has referred to Section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act 1989 as dealing with insulting the member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe by a person who was not a member of either Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe "in a place within the public view". Learned Counsel would submit that though Sections 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act 1989 was extracted in the order, the learned Sessions Judge did not record any finding as to whether the insult or intimidation of the complainant or abusing her in the name of her caste was in a "place within public view". Learned Counsel would refer to the complaint itself wherein the petitioners herein were alleged to have trespassed into the house of the complainant, to have ransacked the house, to have threatened to kill the complainant, and to have thereafter challenged the accused complainants abusing her in the name of her caste. Learned Counsel would submit that a conjoint reading of paragraphs 13 and 14 of the complaint would show that the allegations of the complainant being abused in the name of her caste was in her house and since it was not in a place within the public view, Accused 1 to 3 cannot be said, even prima facie, to have committed an offence under Section 3(1)(x). Learned Counsel would place reliance on Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd., Mumbai v. Union of India, Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas 2000 (5) ALT 602 and K.Padma Reddy v. Station House Officer, Bellampally 2003 (2) An.W.R. 557 (A.P.) = 2003 (2) ALD (Cri.) 421 in this regard. 13. Learned Counsel would place reliance on Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd., Mumbai v. Union of India, Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas 2000 (5) ALT 602 and K.Padma Reddy v. Station House Officer, Bellampally 2003 (2) An.W.R. 557 (A.P.) = 2003 (2) ALD (Cri.) 421 in this regard. 13. Sri K.Rathangapani Reddy, learned Counsel for the complainant, would submit that the complainant, a woman belonging to the Scheduled Caste, cannot be expected to know the intricacies of law, and that the allegations in the complaint have to be read as a whole to ascertain as to whether the ingredients of Section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act 1989 are attracted. Learned Counsel would refer to para 13 of the complaint, wherein the petitioner is alleged to have been necked out from her house, to submit that the very fact that the petitioner was necked out from her house would show that on her being thrown out of the house, she was in the public view and that the ingredients of Sections 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act 1989 are attracted. Learned Counsel would place reliance on Y. Vasudeva Rao v. State of A.P. 2000 (3) ALT (Crl.) 214 (A.P.) and Goluguri Ramakrishna Reddy v. State of A.P., rep., by its Public Prosecutor High Court of A.P., Hyderabad 2005 (2) ALT (Crl.) 401 (A.P.), in support of his submission that the question, as to whether the offence had taken place within the public view or not, was a matter of evidence and should not be lightly interfered with in proceedings under Section 397 or Section 482 Cr.P.C. Learned Counsel would submit that the words used in the complaint clearly show that the petitioner was abused in the name of her caste and as such the ingredients of Section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act 1989 were attracted. 14. 14. While Sri C.Praveen Kumar, learned counsel for the revision petitioner, would state that both the learned Magistrate and the learned Sessions Judge had failed to examine the question as to whether the ingredients of Section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act 1989 are attracted and A-1 to A-3 cannot, on the basis of the complaint and the statements of the witnesses, be said to have committed the offence of which they are charged, "in a place within public view", Sri K.Rathangapani Reddy, learned Counsel for the complainant, on the other hand, would submit that these are all matters of evidence which are required to be examined at the stage of trial and not for the learned Magistrate to go into at the time of taking cognizance. 15. In this context, the judgments relied upon by either parties needs to be referred to. 16. In Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. (1 supra), this Court held as under: "........Having given serious consideration to the issue, I am of the view that the contention of the learned Government Pleader cannot be countenanced for the simple reason the very Section itself is specific that the insult or intimidation should have taken place in public view. It need not be a public place. It could also be a private place. The intention of the Parliament was very clear that this insult or intimidation should have been caused in a place within the public view. If it is committed in any place which is not within the public view, it would not be treated as an offence. Otherwise, the Parliament could have omitted the words within public view, and it would be redundant if the contention of the leaned Government Pleader is accepted. Admittedly, in the instant case, the alleged offence has taken place in the chambers of the Officers where there was no public, and which was not within the public view. It is not even the contention of the 4th respondent that the events were viewed by the public on the days mentioned by him in the complaint. In such a situation, it would be very difficult for this Court to conclude that even though public did not view the event, yet, it has to be treated as an offence under Section 3(1)(x) of the Act. In such a situation, it would be very difficult for this Court to conclude that even though public did not view the event, yet, it has to be treated as an offence under Section 3(1)(x) of the Act. The decision of Madhya Pradesh High Court fully covers the case on hand..........." (emphasis supplied) 17. In K. Padmareddy (2 supra), this Court held thus: "............As observed earlier, the truth or otherwise of the utterances attributed to the petitioner cannot constitute the subject-matter of this writ petition. In fact, the version put forward by the 3rd respondent is required to be taken as true, for the purpose of this case. In such an event, it cannot be said that the utterances do not constitute and offence, if taken to be true. This however, is not the end of the matter. A further question would arise as to whether the provisions referred to above get attracted to the facts of this case. The provision is very clear, in so far as it requires the intentional insult, or intimidation with an intent to humiliate the member of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe, to take place (in any public place within public view), to constitute an offence. Therefore, every utterance which comes within the purview of this provision by itself is not an offence, unless it is made in any place within public view. In the complaint, 3rd respondent has categorically stated that the scene of offence was the Chambers of the Municipal Commissioner and there is no allegation to the effect that such utterance was made 'within public view'. Once this basic ingredient is lacking, the offence cannot be said to have been committed by the writ petitioner. In the decision referred to above, this Court dealt with this aspect extensively and held that any of the comment or utterance made at a private place not being a place within public view does not attract the provisions of the Act or the Rules made thereunder........" (emphasis supplied) 18. In the decision referred to above, this Court dealt with this aspect extensively and held that any of the comment or utterance made at a private place not being a place within public view does not attract the provisions of the Act or the Rules made thereunder........" (emphasis supplied) 18. Goluguri Ramakrishna Reddy (4 supra), this Court held as under: ".............The Act, as seen from the statement of objects and reasons, seeks to achieve the purpose of providing stringent measures and punishments for committing atrocities against members belonging to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, which atrocities are generally perpetrated when these persons assert their right, it would be very absurd to think that if a member of Scheduled Caste or Schedule Tribe is insulted or intimidated with an intention to humiliate in a public place where there are no on lookers is not offence, but the same would be offence if any third person other than offender and the victim is present in a place. Such a thin line cannot be drawn while interpreting any of the clauses in Section 3(1) of the Act which by themselves are atrocities. The moment a member belonging to Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe complains that the accused has insulted or intimidated him or her by using caste name, an atrocity is committed and that has to be dealt with in accordance with law provided in tile Act as well as Cr.P.C. Therefore, it is not possible to accept the submission that whenever offence under Section 3(1)(x) of the Act to purportedly committed in a secluded place or in a place where there is no "public" offence is not made out. This Court, however, hastens to add that this aspect of the matter has to be decided by the criminal Court conducting trial and it cannot be a ground for quashing the criminal case at the stage of investigation or prosecution................. (emphasis supplied) 19. In Y. Vasudeva Rao (3 supra), this Court at paragraph 12 held thus: ".............The last submission of the learned counsel also does not merit any consideration. It is a submission that even if the contents of the complaint are taken to be true, the offence was not committed "in a place within public view" and therefore prosecution of the petitioners would be abuse of process of Court. There are three judgments of this Court on this aspect. It is a submission that even if the contents of the complaint are taken to be true, the offence was not committed "in a place within public view" and therefore prosecution of the petitioners would be abuse of process of Court. There are three judgments of this Court on this aspect. These are in J.Sumana V. Endluri Aseerwadamma: 2003(1) ALT (Crl.) 246 (A.P.), K.Padma Reddy v. Station House Officer, Bellampalli: 2003 (2) An.W.R. 557 (A.P.) and Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Union of India: 2000(5) ALT 602 . There are also two unreported judgments of this Court on this aspect, one being the judgment of my learned brother Hon'ble Sri Justice T.Ch.Surya Rao in Crl.P.No.3019 of 2001 dated 12-02-202 and the other being the judgment delivered by me in Crl.P.No.6099 of 2004. In the judgment delivered by me, after referring to all the judgments except the judgment in B.P.C.L. case, I observed as under. A number of cases under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., are being filed for quashing the case at the stage of investigation and/or at the stage of prosecution before the special Court. Whenever an offence under Section 3(1)(x) of the Act is alleged, one of the submissions is that the alleged insult or intimidation is not in a place within the public view and urged that the complainant; is not a person belonging to scheduled caste or scheduled tribe, that the complaint is filed to harass and to blackmail the accused in relation to a previous dispute and that such a complaint is filed to take vengeance against the accused. An answer to all these grounds, if it is to be in favour of the accused, requires further answers to other questions, as to what happened, when happened, how happened and why it happened. There can be no answer to these questions without there being full evidence before the Court. No one can arrive at a definite conclusion or plausible conclusion based on some hazy and vague material brought by the accused for evaluation by the Court. It would, therefore, be hazardous for this Court to venture into arena of conjecture to find answers. The Court should be cautious not to be swayed by the rhetoric presented by the accused, which is presented more often than not in every case for quashing. It would, therefore, be hazardous for this Court to venture into arena of conjecture to find answers. The Court should be cautious not to be swayed by the rhetoric presented by the accused, which is presented more often than not in every case for quashing. Dealing with Section 3(1)(x) of the Act and the phrase "......in any place within the public; view......" I held as under. Therefore, the phrase 'in a place within the public view' may be taken as a place where ordinarily the public visit for some purpose or other than with uninterrupted regularity though not continuously. Any place where a Government office is located, any market, a place of public entertainment and the like, where people are expected to go and are invited is a place' within the public view'. An office or an office room where the head of the office sits is also a place; within the public view but the private ante chamber of such officer cannot be treated as a place within the public view because except the personal servants of the officer, nobody can enter the private chambers. Similarly, an Officer's house is not a place within the public view. If a person opens any shop be it for selling services or be it for selling feed for prawn culture opens such a shop with an implied invitation to the public to visit the shop for purchasing the feed sold, such a shop must be given a public character and is certainly a place within public view. The Court cannot ignore that the Legislature uses the words ".....in any place within public view....." and not the term "public place" or the term only "public view". Therefore, one has to get the meaning of the words "place within the public view". Having regard to the language used in Section 3(1)(x) of the Act, it is reasonable to hold that an offence of insulting and humiliating a member belonging to Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe in any place where public view such incident whether one person or more persons), is an offence under the Act........" (emphasis supplied) 20. Whether or not the incident had occurred in a place within a public view is, normally, for the trial Court to examine, on the basis of evidence. Whether or not the incident had occurred in a place within a public view is, normally, for the trial Court to examine, on the basis of evidence. It is however also well settled law that the complaint, and the statements of witnesses recorded in this regard, should contain allegations to show, prima facie, that the ingredients of Section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention to Atrocities) Act 1989 are attracted. One of the ingredients of Section 3(1)(x) is that the offence must have been committed in a "place within public view". The learned Magistrate, before issuing process, has necessarily to determine whether on the basis of the complaint and the statement of witnesses, a prima facie case of the offence having been committed in a "place within public view" is made out. Once a prima facie case is made out of an offence under Section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act 1989 having been committed, the rest are all matters of evidence to be gone into during the course of trial. 21. The question as to whether the complaint and the evidence recorded, on the basis of which cognizance was taken, would make out a case against the accused of their having committed an offence under Section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act 1989 is for the Magistrate in the first place and thereafter for the learned Sessions Judge, in revision, to examine. Though the provision of Section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act 1989 was taken note of, neither the learned Magistrate nor the learned Sessions Judge have recorded a finding as to whether, on the basis of the complaint and the that the ingredients of Section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act 1989 were attracted, more particularly as to whether the incident had occurred in a "place within public view". 22. Since the learned Magistrate, while taking cognizance of the offence, is required to examine as to whether the ingredients of Sections 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act 1989 have been made out, atleast prima facie, and as the learned Magistrate, in the present case, has not done so, the matter is required to be remanded for his consideration afresh in accordance with law. 23. 23. I, therefore, deem it appropriate to quash the order of the learned Sessions Judge in so far as the learned Magistrate was directed to take the case on file against A-1 to A-3 for the offence under Section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (prevention of Atrocities) Act 1989 is concerned. The learned Magistrate shall, independently, examine and record his finding as to whether, prima facie, accused 1 to 3, on the basis of the complaint and the statement of witnesses, can be said to have abused, insulted or humiliated the petitioner in the name of her caste in "any place within public view" thereby attracting the ingredients of Section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act 1989. The criminal revision Case No.983 of 2002 is allowed to the extent indicated above, C.F.R.No.5911 of 2000 in C.C.No.24 of 2001 is restored to file and the learned Magistrate is directed to examine, prima facie, whether the petitioners herein had abused, insulted and humiliated the complainant in the name of her cast "in any place within public view", and had thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act 1989. 24. In so far as Criminal Petition No.107 of 2003 is concerned, Sri K.Rathangapani Reddy, learned Counsel for the petitioner would submit that, on receipt of the complaint, the learned Magistrate, at the stage of issuing process, is mainly concerned with the allegation in the complaint, the evidence led in support thereof and is only to be satisfied, prima facie, that there are sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused. Learned Counsel would submit that the learned Magistrate is not required to go into a detailed discussion of the merits and demerits of the case, is not supposed to weigh the evidence meticulously and that the standard to be adopted by the learned Magistrate, while scrutinizing the evidence at the stage of Sections 203 and 204, is not the same as at the stage of framing charges. Learned Counsel would place reliance on Smt. Nagawwa v. Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi AIR 1976 SC 1947 and Kewal Krishan v. Suraj Bhan AIR 1980 SC 1780 , J.R.D. Tala, Chairman, Tata Iron and Steel Company Ltd. v. MRs. Payal Kumar 1987 Crl.L.J. 447 (Delhi H.C.) in this regard. 25. Learned Counsel would place reliance on Smt. Nagawwa v. Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi AIR 1976 SC 1947 and Kewal Krishan v. Suraj Bhan AIR 1980 SC 1780 , J.R.D. Tala, Chairman, Tata Iron and Steel Company Ltd. v. MRs. Payal Kumar 1987 Crl.L.J. 447 (Delhi H.C.) in this regard. 25. Sri C. Praveen Kumar, learned Counsel for the respondent-accused, on the other hand, would contend that since the petitioner/complainant had already filed a revision before the learned Sessions Judge under Section 397(3) Cr.P.C., a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. was maintainable only in cases where manifest injustice had ensued as a result of the order passed under Section 397 Cr.P.C., and since the petitioner-complainant could not be said to have suffered manifest injustice, the criminal petition was not maintainable. Learned Counsel would rely on Krishnan V. Krishnaveni (1997) 4 SCC 241 and Kailash Verma v. Punjab State Civil Supplies Corporation 2005 (1) SCJ 437 = (2005) 2 SCC 571 in this regard. 26. With regards the contention regarding maintainability, the petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the Supreme Court in Krishnan8, held as under: "Ordinarily, when revision has been barred by Section 397(3) of the Code, a person –– accused/complainant –– cannot be allowed to take recourse to the revision to the High Court under Section 397(1) or under inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code since it may amount to circumvention of the provisions of Section 397(3) or Section 397(2) of the Code. It is seen that the High Court has suo motu power under Section 401 and continuous supervisory jurisdiction under Section 483 of the Code. So, when the High Court on examination of the record finds that there is grave miscarriage of justice or abuse of the process of the courts or the required statutory procedure has not been complied with or there is failure of justice or order passed or sentence imposed by the Magistrate requires correction, it is but the duty of the High Court to have it corrected at the inception lest grave miscarriage of justice would ensue. It is, therefore, to meet the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process that the High Court is preserved with inherent power and would be justified, under such circumstances, to exercise the inherent power and in an appropriate case even revisional power under Section 397(1) read with Section 401 of the Code. As stated earlier, it may be exercised sparingly so as to avoid needless multiplicity of procedure, unnecessary delay in trial and protraction of proceedings. The object of criminal trial is to render public justice, to punish the criminal and to see that the trial is concluded expeditiously before the memory of the witness fades out. The recent trend is to delay the trial and threaten the witness or to win over the witness by promise or inducement. These malpractices need to be curbed an public justice can be ensured only when trial is conducted expeditiously." (emphasis supplied) 27. Again in Kailash Verma (9 supra), the Supreme Court held as under: "..........Ordinarily, when a revision has been barred under Section 397(3) of the Code, the complainant or the accused cannot be allowed to take recourse to revision before the High Court under Section 397(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code as it is prohibited under Section 397(3) thereof. However, the High Court can entertain a petition under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code when there is serious miscarriage of justice and abuse of the process of the Court or when mandatory provisions of law are not complied with and when the High Court feels that the inherent jurisdiction is to be exercised to correct the mistake committed by the revisional Court..." (emphasis supplied) 28. It is clear that in cases where there is grave miscarriage of justice or abuse of process of Court or where the mandatory provisions of law have not been complied with, a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. would still be maintainable, even if jurisdiction under Section 397 of Cr.P.C. has already been exercised. If the allegations in the complaint is to be accepted as true, failure of both learned Magistrate and the learned Sessions Judge to take the case on file against A-5 to A-9 for the offence under Section 494 I.P.C. would undoubtedly be said to have resulted in grave miscarriage of justice to the petitioner herein. If the allegations in the complaint is to be accepted as true, failure of both learned Magistrate and the learned Sessions Judge to take the case on file against A-5 to A-9 for the offence under Section 494 I.P.C. would undoubtedly be said to have resulted in grave miscarriage of justice to the petitioner herein. The objections regarding maintainability of the petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. must therefore be rejected. 29. Sri K. Rathangapani Reddy, learned Counsel for the petitioner, would insist that accused Nos.5 to 9 be also charged of the offence under Section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act 1989. On a query from the Court as to whether there was any whisper in the complaint or the evidence adduced in support thereof, that A-5 to A-9 had abused, insulted or humiliated the petitioner "in a place within public view", learned Counsel would refer to paragraph 14 of the complaint which reads as under: "FINALLY THE ACCUSED HAVE CHALLENGED THE COMPLAINT BY SAYING THAT MADIGA MUNDA MAVADU MOJUPADI NEEVADDAKU VASTHE, NEEVU BIDDANUKANI, VAKA REDDYKULANIKI MAA KODALUKAVALAANUKUNTUNAVA? NEVEKKADA, MARI MEMEKKADA. NEEKU MA ENTI PANIMANISHI HODA KUDA NEEKU LEDU. KULAMU THAKKUVA DANNI MEMU KODALIGA PETTUKOMU. CHADUVU VOKKTE KADU. MAAKU KULAMU KOODA VANDALLA." Learned Counsel would submit that the very fact that the petitioner had attributed these abusive words to the accused would show that these abusive words were uttered by A-1 to A-9 together. The aforementioned contents of paragraph 14 undoubtedly show that abusive words were used against the accused. It is not specifically stated in the complaint that these abusive words were used by A-1 to A-9. Learned Counsel would seek to read the word "accused", in paragraph 14 of the complaint, as "accused 1 to 9". I am unable to accept this submission. It defines reason as to how A-1 to A-9 together, in one chorus, would have used these abusive sentences at the same time. Accepting this submission of the learned counsel would render the allegations in the complaint so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused. Accepting this submission of the learned counsel would render the allegations in the complaint so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused. The contention that both the learned Magistrate and the learned Sessions Judge had erred in not taking the case on file against accused 4 to 9 for the offence under Section 3(1)(x) of the S.C. and S.T. (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, must therefore be rejected. 30. It is no doubt true that for taking cognizance of an offence the learned Magistrate has to be satisfied, prima facie, that the allegations in the complaint, if unrebutted, make out a case of the accused having committed the offence of which they are charged. The scope of enquiry under Section 202 Cr.P.C. is extremely limited. At the stage of issuing process, the learned Magistrate is mainly concerned with the allegations made in the complaint or the evidence led in support thereof and is required only to be prima facie satisfied as to whether there are sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused. It is not the province of the learned Magistrate to enter into a detailed discussion of the merits or demerits of the case. The discretion conferred on the Magistrate has to be judiciously exercised by him. Once the Magistrate has exercised his discretion, it is not for this Court or for the learned Sessions Judge, in revision, to substitute its own discretion for that of the learned Magistrate or to examine the case on merits with a view to find out whether or not the allegations in the complaint, if proved, would ultimately end in the conviction of the accused. These considerations are beyond the scope and ambit of enquiry under Section 202 Cr.P.C. which culminates into an order under Section 204 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 31. These considerations are beyond the scope and ambit of enquiry under Section 202 Cr.P.C. which culminates into an order under Section 204 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 31. In Smt. Nagawwa (5 supra), the Supreme Court held as under: "Thus it may be safely held that in the following cases an order of the Magistrate issuing process against the accused can be quashed or set aside: (1) where the allegations made in the complaint or the statements of the witnesses recorded in support of the same, taken at their face value, make out absolutely no case against the accused or the complaint does not disclose the essential ingredients of an offence which is alleged against the accused; (2) where the allegations made in the complaint are patently absurd and inherently improbable so that no prudent person can ever reach a conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused; (3) where the discretion exercised by the Magistrate in issuing process is capricious and arbitrary having been based either on no evidence or on materials which are wholly irrelevant or inadmissible; and (4) where the complaint suffers from fundamental legal defects, such as, want of sanction, or absence of a complaint by legally competent authority and the like. 32. In Kewal Krishan (6 supra), the Supreme Court held thus: ".........At the stage of Sections 203 and 204 of the Criminal Procedure Code in a case exclusively triable by the Court of Session, all that the Magistrate has to do is to see whether on a cursory perusal of the complaint and the evidence recorded during the preliminary inquiry under Sections 200 and 202 of the Criminal Procedure Code, there is prima facie evidence in support of the charge levelled against the accused. All that he has to see is whether or not there is "sufficient ground for proceeding" against the accused. At this stage, the Magistrate is not to weigh the evidence meticulously as if he were the trial court. The standard to be adopted by the Magistrate in scrutinising the evidence is not the same as the one which is to be kept in view at the stage of framing charges. At this stage, the Magistrate is not to weigh the evidence meticulously as if he were the trial court. The standard to be adopted by the Magistrate in scrutinising the evidence is not the same as the one which is to be kept in view at the stage of framing charges. This Court has held in Ramesh Singh: AIR 1977 SC 2018 that even at the stage of framing charges the truth, veracity and effect of the evidence which the complainant produces or propose to adduce at the trial, is not to be meticulously judged. The standard of proof and judgment, which is to be applied finally before finding the accused guilty or otherwise, is not exactly to be applied at the stage of framing charges. A fortiori, at the stage of Sections 202/204, if there is prima facie evidence in support of the allegations in the complaint relating to a case exclusively triable by the Court of Session, that will be a sufficient ground for issuing process to the accused and committing them for trial to the Court of Session...................." 33. A prima facie case does not mean a case proved to the hilt but a case which can be said to be established if the complaint and the evidence in support thereof were to be believed. While determining whether a prima facie case is made out the relevant consideration is whether on the evidence on record it is possible to arrive at the conclusion in question and not whether that was the only conclusion which could be arrived at on that evidence. 34. Following the judgments of the Supreme Court in Smt. Nagawwa (5 supra) and Kewal Krishan (6 supra), the Delhi High Court in J.R.D. Tata (7 supra), held that the Magistrate is not required to go into a detailed discussion of the merits and demerits of the case. 35. 34. Following the judgments of the Supreme Court in Smt. Nagawwa (5 supra) and Kewal Krishan (6 supra), the Delhi High Court in J.R.D. Tata (7 supra), held that the Magistrate is not required to go into a detailed discussion of the merits and demerits of the case. 35. Insofar as the learned Magistrate has held that no case has been made out against accused 5 to 9 of their having committed an offence under Section 494 IPC, the learned Sessions Judge confirmed that said order holding that there was no allegation as to how A-5 to A-9 knew about the first marriage of A-1 with the petitioner and that, in the absence of any material on record, it could not be said that A-5 to A-9 had performed that marriage of A-4 with A-1 knowing about the first marriage of A-1 with the petitioner. 36. As rightly contended by Sri K. Rathangapani Reddy, since the petitioner had specifically alleged in her complaint that "accused Nos. 5 to 9, who are the relatives of the Accused-I have confirmed that second marriage with the knowledge as to the subsistence of the first marriage between the Accused-I and complainant", it was not for the learned Sessions Judge to re-appreciate the evidence or examine the truth or otherwise of the allegations made in the complaint, as only a prima facie case is required to be made out and the complainant, at this stage, is not required to prove to the hilt the guilt of the accused. 37. The learned Sessions Judge has erred in examining the merits of the allegations. The learned Magistrate, on the other hand, has totally ignored these allegations in coming to the conclusion that accused Nos. 5 to 9 could not be charged of an offence under Section 494 IPC. In the face of the aforesaid allegations, in the complaint, it was for the learned Magistrate to examine as to whether accused Nos.5 to 9 should also be charged of an offence under Section 494 IPC. While Sri K. Rathangapani Reddy, learned Counsel for the petitioner, would seek a direction in this regard, these are all matters for the learned Magistrate, in his discretion, to determine and not for this Court to substitute its discretion for that of the learned Magistrate. 38. While Sri K. Rathangapani Reddy, learned Counsel for the petitioner, would seek a direction in this regard, these are all matters for the learned Magistrate, in his discretion, to determine and not for this Court to substitute its discretion for that of the learned Magistrate. 38. It is no doubt true that the decision, as to whether the process should be issued or not, is for the Magistrate, in his wisdom to arrive at and not for this Court to substitute its own discretion for that of the Magistrate or to examine the case on merits with a view to find out whether or not the allegations in the complaint, if proved, would end in the conviction of the accused. The discretion which is conferred on the Magistrate is, however, to be judiciously exercised and when it is clear that the Magistrate has not judiciously exercised the discretion conferred on him, the order passed is required to be set aside requiring the Magistrate to re do the exercise. 39. Criminal Petition No.107 of 2003 is allowed to the extent indicated above, C.F.R.No.5911 of 2000 in C.C.No.24 of 2001 is restored to file and the learned Magistrate is directed to examine, prima facie, whether the case should be taken on file against Accused 5 to 9 of their having committed the offence under Section 494 read with Section 114 I.P.C. 40. Both Criminal Petition No.107 of 2003 and Cr.R.C.983 of 2002 are disposed of accordingly.