ORDER 1. Challenging the action initiated by the Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner, Sub. Regional Office, Gwalior, exercising powers in a proceeding pending before him under section 7A of the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act of 1952") by issuing non-bailable warrant of arrest against petitioner No.2, this petition has been filed by the petitioners with a prayer to quash the order dated 20 March 2006 passed by the said authority issuing non-bailable warrant of arrest and restraining the said respondent from taking action under section 32 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as "the CPC"). 2. Petitioner No.1 is a society registered under the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Societies Registration Act, 1973 and has established certain professional educational institute known as GICT College of Professional Education, Gwalior. Petitioner No.2 is President of the said society which is known as Devi Ahilya Bai Ghatge Uccha Shiksha Samiti. It is settled that the society has less than twenty employees and therefore, the provisions of the Act of 1952 are not applicable to the petitioners' establishment. However, on 31 May 2000, respondent No.3 has issued coverage letter allotting Provident Fund Code No. 15362 and has granted coverage to the petitioner as it has employed more than thirty eight persons on and from 21 July 1997, and thereafter in the inquiry proceeding under section 7 A of the Act of 1952 before respondent No.3, petitioners have raised various objections including applicability of the Act and have also claimed infancy power under section 16(1)(d) of the Act. In the pending proceeding, respondent No.3 had issued summons to the petitioners vide Annexure P-4 dated 25 October 2005 directing them to produce various documents as indicated therein. In the summons issued, petitioners' establishment was directed to produce the record on 16 November 2005. Thereafter, various proceedings have taken place, petitioner No. 2 had appeared on 5 December 2005, he was granted bail on the said date and was directed to produce the record. However, in spite of various dates being granted when records were not produced, impugned order has been passed directing for issuance of non-bailable warrant of arrest against petitioner No.2. Thereafter, various proceedings have taken place, petitioner No. 2 had appeared on 5 December 2005, he was granted bail on the said date and was directed to produce the record. However, in spite of various dates being granted when records were not produced, impugned order has been passed directing for issuance of non-bailable warrant of arrest against petitioner No.2. It is the case of the petitioners that while conducting a proceeding under section 7 A of the Act of 1952, the competent authority, namely, respondent No.3, discharges quasi-judicial function and is not empowered to issue any coercive process like warrant of arrest nor can he compel any person to come and give evidence and produce documents under section 7 A of the Act of 1952 compelling attendance of a witness and taking recourse to the provision for penalty in default as contained in section 32 CPC, is not permissible. It is the case of the petitioners that once the establishment has filed its objection and has produced the available documents, respondent No.3 can at best proceed ex parte in the matter as contemplated in section 7 A sub-section (3A) of the Act of 1952 and is not empowered to enforce attendance of a person by such coercive method by issuing warrant of arrest. Taking me through the provisions of section 7 A of the Act of 1952, so also, sections 27, 28, 29, 30 and 32 CPC, and placing reliance on various judgments, it was argued by Shri O.K. Agarwal, learned counsel for the petitioners that in a inquiry under section 7 A of the Act of 1952, the Provident Fund Commissioner or the competent authority is not empowered to issue warrant of arrest for compelling attendance of a person for recording his statement or for producing the documents. That apart, on merit, Shri Agrawal argues that all the documents available with the petitioners having been produced, and therefore, it was not a fit case where extreme step of issuing warrant of arrest was required to be resorted to. Accordingly, contending that the respondent No.3 is exercising power in an arbitrary and illegal manner, petitioners seek interference in the matter and quashing of the interlocutory order passed. 3. Accordingly, contending that the respondent No.3 is exercising power in an arbitrary and illegal manner, petitioners seek interference in the matter and quashing of the interlocutory order passed. 3. In support of the contentions advanced, Shri O.K. Agrawal invites my attention to a judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Vignan Education Development Society, Ongole vs. Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner and Authority, Guntur and others [2005-II LLJ 728], wherein it has been observed by the learned Judge that the Provident Fund Commissioner does not have power to issue warrant of arrest against an employer for his failure to respondent to a show cause notice. That apart, placed reliance on the following judgments in support of his aforesaid contention. (1) Sang ram Singh vs. Election Tribunal, Kotah and another [ AIR 1955 SC 425 ]; (2) Smt. Saraswati Devi and others vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others [ (1980)4 SCC 738 ]; (3) Keshab Narayan Banerjee and others vs. State of Bihar [ (2000) 1 SCC 607 ], and (4) Dwarka Prasad vs. Mst. Rajkunwar Bai [ 1976 JLJ 242 = AIR 1976 MP 214 ]. 4. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioners at length and perused the record. 5. The question requiring determination is an to whether the competent authority conducting inquiry with regard to determination of money due from a employer under section 7 A of the Act of 1952 is empowered to enforce attendance of any person for his examination or for discovery and production of documents by issuing a warrant of arrest against him. Subsection (2) of section 7 A of the Act of 1952 contemplates that the officer conducting the inquiry under sub-section (1) shall, for the purpose of such inquiry, have the same powers as are vested in a Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 for trying a suit in respect of the following matters namely :- (a) enforcing the attendance of any person or examining him on (b) requiring the discovery and production of documents; (c) receiving evidence on affidavit; (d) issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses. This sub-section further contemplates that any inquiry under this section shall be deemed to be judicial proceeding within the meaning of sections 193 and 228, and for the purpose of section 196, of the Indian Penal Code. 6. This sub-section further contemplates that any inquiry under this section shall be deemed to be judicial proceeding within the meaning of sections 193 and 228, and for the purpose of section 196, of the Indian Penal Code. 6. Thereafter, sub-section (3A) of section 7 A of the Act of 1952 contemplates provision for taking action in case a person required to attend the inquiry under sub-section (1) fails to attend such inquiry without assigning any valid reason. 7. It is the case of the petitioners that in a proceeding under section 7 A of the Act of 1952 in case the employer does not cooperate the Provident Fund Commissioner can proceed ex parte in the matter under sub-section 3A and cannot compel attendance of the person, this argument seems to be wholly misconceived. Both the sub-sections, namely, sub-section (2) and sub-section (3A) operate under different eventualities. Sub-section 3(A) contemplates a provision where the employer, employee or any other person required to attend the inquiry under sub-section (1) fails to attend such inquiry without assigning any valid reason or fails to produce any document or to file any report or return when called upon to do so, the officer conducting the inquiry may decide the applicability of the Act or determine the amount due from any employer, as the case may be, on the basis of the evidence adduced during such inquiry and other documents available on record. Accordingly, in such case this section entitles the authority concerned to proceed ex parte and determine the amount due on the basis of the material available on record on the other hand, sub-section (2) empowers the authority to make coercive step for compelling and enforcing attendance of a person and for production of documents. Merely because the authority has power to proceed ex parte in the matter, it cannot be construed that the authority is not empowered to exercise the powers under sub-section (2), it is for the authority concerned to proceed in the matter in the facts and circumstances of a particular case and if the authority concerned wants to proceed under sub-section (2) for conducting proper inquiry, petitioners cannot make any grievance on the ground that the authority should proceed under sub-section (3A) of section 7 A of the Act of 1952. This question is also required to be considered from a different angle. This question is also required to be considered from a different angle. While making assessment of the Provident Fund dues to be paid by the employer and the contribution to be recovered from the employee, determination of the amount of contribution becomes very relevant and if for calculating the said amount, records like wages register, balance sheet, etc., are necessary, it is for the competent authority to take a decision in the matter as to whether he will fix the amount of contribution after going through the records or proceed on the basis of his own assumptions. Discretion exercised by the authority insisting upon production of documents cannot be questioned until and unless it is established that the same is arbitrary and vitiated by malafides. 8. It is clear from the provisions of sub-section (2) of section 7 A of the Act of 1952 that all the powers vested in a Court under the Code of Civil Procedure can be exercised by the authority concerned in a proceeding under section 7 A for the purpose of enforcing attendance of any person and for the purpose of discovery and production of documents, section 27 to 32 of the Code of Civil Procedure contemplates the manner in which summons are to be issued and order for discovery of documents and summoning of witness can be passed. Section 30 of the Code of Civil Procedure deals with power to order discovery and the like and section 31 CPC, deals with summons to witness. Section 32 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads as under : "32. Penalty for default. -- The Court may compel the attendance of any person to whom a summons has been issued under section 30 and for that purpose may - (a) issue a warrant for his arrest; (b) attach and sell his property; (c) impose a fine upon him not exceeding five thousand rupees; (d) order him to furnish security for his appearance and in default commit him to the civil prison." 9. From the aforesaid provision, it is clear that if orders have been passed by the Court for the purpose of production or discovery of documents under section 30 of the Code and inspite of the summons being issued in that regard if a default is committed, the Court can compel attendance of any person to whom summons have been issued under section 30 and for that purpose is empowered to issue warrant for his arrest. 10. It is therefore clear from the aforesaid provision that in case the person to whom summons is issued for production of document or discovery of any document and he commits default in attendance, the Court is empowered to issue warrant of arrest under section 32. A combined reading of sub-section (2) of section 7 A of the Act of 1952 along with section 30 and 32 of the Code of Civil Procedure clearly indicates that for the purpose of enforcing attendance of a person and for requiring discovery and production of documents, the authority conducting inquiry under section 7 A is empowered to issue a warrant of arrest in case the person to whom summons have been issued commits any default. There is nothing in the provisions of section 7 A which goes to indicate that the respondent No. 3 is not empowered to enforce attendance of a person and call for discovery and production of documents by issuing warrant of arrest. I am of the considered view that the provisions of sub-section (2) of section 7 A of the Act of 1952 does empower the authority conducting inquiry to enforce attendance of a person by issuance of warrant and the argument to the contrary advanced by the petitioners is wholly misconceived. The judgment in the case of Vignan Education Development Society, Ongole (supra) relied upon by Shri O.K. Agrawal will not apply in the facts and circumstances of the present case as the said judgment has not considered the effect of sub-section (2) of section 7 A of the Act of 1952 and the provisions of section 30 and 32 of the Code of Civil Procedure. That apart, that was a case where the employer failed to respond to the show cause notice issued under section (1) of section 7 A and it was in the backdrop of the aforesaid fact that the High Court held that in case a defendant does not respondent to the show cause notice, a civil Court can proceed ex parte but cannot seek his arrest. The said case is clearly distinguishable as this is not a case where warrant bf arrest is issued to the employer for not responding to the notice issued under section 7 A but action is being taken under sub-section (2) of section 7 A of the Act of 1952 as the person who was directed to produce documents for the purpose of inquiry has failed to comply with the directives issued by the authority concerned pursuance to which the warrant of arrest has been issued. I am of the considered view that the judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court will not apply in the facts and circumstances of the present case. 11. The other cases relied upon by Shri O. K. Agrawal, learned counsel for the petitioners are all distinguishable on fact and on law and none of the cases relied upon by him have considered the provision akin to subsection (2) of section 7 A of the Act of 1952 which empowers the authority conducting the inquiry to take recourse to the procedure• contemplated under section 30 and 32 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This Court in the case of Dwarka Prasad (supra) was considering the question of bailable warrant issued to a witness under Order XVI Rule 10 CPC, had interfered in the matter on merit finding that the witnesses had not intentionally avoided appearance. Similarly, the judgment in the case of Keshab Narayan Banerjee and others (supra) deals with the word "Court" and the same is of no help to the petitioners. In the case of Smt. Saraswati Devi (supra), the power of a administrative authority conducting proceeding under section 680 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 was considered and it was held in the aforesaid case that the State Government while acting under section 68D in a quasi-judicial function is empowered to evolve own procedure in the absence of express provisions to the contrary. The said case deals with the procedure to be followed when there is no express statutory provision. Once there is a express provision under the statute, like sub-section (2) of section 7 A of the Act of 1952, the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case will not be applicable. 12. As far as the case decided by the Supreme Court in the case of Sangram Singh (supra) is concerned, it does not apply in the facts and circumstances of the present case because it deals with the question as to whether non-appearance in response to summons under section 27 of the Code will not entail to invoke the penalty clause under section 32 of the Code. In the said judgment, it has been held that for not responding to a summons under section 27, recourse to the remedy of imposing penalty under section 32 of the Code cannot be invoked. The said judgment is clearly distinguishable as it does not deal with the question of taking action under section 32 of the Code. In the said judgment itself, it is clearly held that when there is disregard to the summons issued under section 30, it may entitle punishment under section 32 of the Code. If that be so, in the present case summons issued to the petitioners, i.e., Annexure P-4 dated 25 October 2005 is for production of the documents and is one under section 30 of the Code and for the said default punishment under section 32 of the Code can be imposed by issuing warrant of arrest. Accordingly, I am of the considered view that none of the judgment relied upon by Shri Agrawal apply in the facts and circumstances of the present case and issuance of warrant of arrest against the petitioners being in conformity with the powers vested in respondent No.3 under sub-section (2) of section 7 A of the Act of 1952, I find no error in exercise of the powers by the said authority. The argument in this regard advanced by the petitioners is wholly misconceived and has to be rejected. 13. Having held so, the next question would be as to whether in the facts and circumstances of the present case, taking recourse to the extreme coercive step of issuing non-bailable warrant of arrest was warranted. 14. The argument in this regard advanced by the petitioners is wholly misconceived and has to be rejected. 13. Having held so, the next question would be as to whether in the facts and circumstances of the present case, taking recourse to the extreme coercive step of issuing non-bailable warrant of arrest was warranted. 14. The records indicate that right from 21 July 1997, petitioners' establishment had committed default in the matter of payment of Provident Fund dues of its employees, and therefore, inquiry as contemplated under section 7 A of the Act was initiated. In the said inquiry, notice for production of documents. Annexure P-4 was issued and the petitioners were directed to produce the following documents, namely; (a) Attendance Register (b) Eligibility Register (c) Cash book, ledger and vouchers (d) Labour payment register/salary bill (e) Any other document/register for determination relating to attendance, payment etc., made to the employees. These documents were necessary for calculating the Provident Fund Dues to be paid to the employees and recovery to be made from the petitioners. When the aforesaid summons was issued, it seems that the petitioners committed default in the matter of production of these documents. Order sheet, Annexure P-5 dated 17 November 2005 indicates that the petitioners' representative appeared on the said date in response to the summons. Annexure P-4 dated 28th October 2005 and prayed for time for submission of records. It was observed by the competent authority that as there is default in compliance with the provisions of the Act for more than eight years, unnecessary adjournment could not be granted and the case was adjourned to 21 November 2005 after imposing cost of Rs.2,000/- (Rupees two thousand only). On 21 November 2005, the order sheet Annexure P-7 indicates that none appeared for the establishment, and therefore, the case was adjourned and notice for personal appearance was issued on 5 December 2005, on which date, petitioner No.2 appeared and again took time to produce the records after filing certain challan with regard to certain deposit of amount. He gave a bond for Rs.20,000/- (Rupees twenty thousand only) for his appearance and for production of documents in pursuance to summons Annexure P-4 dated 28 October 2005. It seems that thereafter the case was adjourned to 12th December 2005 for production of the documents. He gave a bond for Rs.20,000/- (Rupees twenty thousand only) for his appearance and for production of documents in pursuance to summons Annexure P-4 dated 28 October 2005. It seems that thereafter the case was adjourned to 12th December 2005 for production of the documents. On 12th December 2005 certain records were produced but the order sheet, Annexure P-8 indicates that complete records were not produced and the petitioner No.2, President of the society in spite of bail granted on 5 December 2005 and specific directions did not produce complete records. In view of all these, non-bailable warrant of arrest was issued against him and the case was posted to 27th December 2005. On this date also, he did not appear and the records indicate that on thirteen dates, case was adjourned from time to time but the complete records were not produced. Even though, Shri Agrawal, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that all the records available were produced but the order sheets, Annexure P-9 dated 21st February 2006 and Annexure P-1 dated 20th March 2006 indicate that initially when Shri O.P. Agrawal, Advocate appeared on 21st February 2006, he had submitted the un-audited copies of income and expenditure statement which were taken on record whereas on 7th February 2006 a direction was issued for submission or audited balance sheet / profit & loss accounts / income & expenditure statements. The same were not produced on 21 February 2006. The Advocate representing the establishment submitted that the establishment being a educational institute is not required to conduct audit, and therefore, audited statements are not available. When such statement was made with regard to non-maintenance of audited accounts statements and non-preparation of audited balance sheet, the establishment of the petitioners was directed to file affidavit of the Chairman of the society to this effect. However, on the next date fixed i.e., 27 February 2006, no affidavit was filed but an application. Annexure P-10 was filed signed by counsel appearing for the petitioners indicating that the audited accounts are lying in the office of the Chartered Accountant and prayed for 7 to 10 days time for producing the audited accounts from the office of the Chartered Accountant. Annexure P-10 was filed signed by counsel appearing for the petitioners indicating that the audited accounts are lying in the office of the Chartered Accountant and prayed for 7 to 10 days time for producing the audited accounts from the office of the Chartered Accountant. When this application was filed, the respondent No.3 / authority has taken serious note of the different stand taken by the petitioners' establishment and in the order, Annexure P-11 dated 27 February 2006 which is indicated by the authority is as under : "On 21.2.2006 Shri O.P. Agrawal, learned counsel has made a submission at bar that the establishment is neither legally required nor gets audited any of its books of accounts. Considering the same, directions were made that the fact as to non-conduct of audit be submitted on affidavit sworn in by the Chairman of the establishment. Today instead of submitting the affidavit the establishment has taken a "U" turn with the submission that the audited balance sheet are lying with the Chartered Accountant who is on audit tour. In view of the above, it appears that the application tiled for grant of time is not in bonafides. As the establishment has already availed as many as thirteen chances for submission of records it is not possible to grant any further time for submission of records." [Emphasis supplied] 15. Finding consistent default being committed by the petitioners on more than thirteen occasions, non-bailable warrant of arrest was issued against the petitioner No.2. Even though, non-bailable warrant of arrest was issued on 27th February 2006 vide Annexure P-11 and the next date fixed was 20th March 2006, this order was never challenged by the petitioners. On the next date, i.e., 20th March 2006, the impugned order, Annexure P-1 passed indicates that balance sheets were submitted and they were taken on record but the non-bailable warrant issued against the petitioner No.2 remain un-executed. As the authority/respondent No.3 found that the Chairman of the society is not appearing inspite of non-bailable warrant of arrest even though some documents were produced for reasons already indicated in the order sheet dated 27th February 2006 (Annexure P-11), respondent No. 3 did not withdraw the non-bailable warrant of arrest issued against the petitioner No.2 and sought for its execution by 20th April 2006. The aforesaid factual aspect of the matter indicates that the petitioners were taking different stands and the authority conducting the inquiry concluded that the petitioners are not cooperating in the inquiry by producing proper records, and therefore, coercive step has been taken. Discretion exercised by the competent authority, namely, respondent No.3 in taking recourse to the aforesaid coercive step in the backdrop of the facts that have come on record cannot be termed as arbitrary or illegal warranting interference in these proceedings under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. Once it is held that the authority conducting inquiry under section 7 A of the Act of 1952 is empowered to take recourse to the coercive step contemplated under section 32 of the Code of Civil, Procedure and when it is also found that the power is exercised on proper consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case, no case for interference is made out by this Court. 16. Accordingly, in the facts and circumstances of the case, I find that the submissions made by Shri D.K. Agrawal, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners to be wholly unsustainable. 17. Accordingly, this petition is dismissed without notice to the respondents and without any order as to cost.