ORDER : 1. Heard Sri C. Praveen Kumar, the learned Counsel representing the petitioner, the learned Public Prosecutor and Sri T.M.K. Chaitanya, the learned Counsel representing respondents 2 and 3 who were impleaded by virtue of the order of this Court dated 10-3-2005 in Crl. M.P. No. 495/2005. 2. This episode is in relation to the death of one young lady by name Adilakshmi, a final year B.Com. student, the daughter of the petitioner/complainant. Respondents 2 and 3 who were impleaded in the present Criminal Petition filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter in short referred to as “Code” for the purpose of convenience) are shown as. A-1 and A-2 in P.R.C. No. 1/2000 on the file of VII Metropolitan Magistrate, Visakhapatnam. The petitioner/complainant aggrieved of the order of the learned Magistrate in declining to take cognizance of the offences under Sections 302, 306 read with 201 I.P.C. as against respondents 2 and 3 had preferred this Criminal Petition raising several grounds praying for the quashing of the said impugned order and to issue suitable directions. The learned Magistrate in fact had taken cognizance of the offence under Section 506 Part II I.P.C. as against Ananda Prasad @ Baji Naidu S/o. Satyanarayana - A-2 shown as 3rd respondent in the present Criminal Petition. 3. There appears to be some controversy between the parties relating to the maintainability of this Criminal Petition under Section 482 of the Code on the ground that the said order may fall or may not fall within the meaning of Interlocutory order under Section 397(2) of the Code. This controversy is at the time of taking cognizance of the offences or declining to take cognizance of the offences by the learned Magistrate and incidentally the locus standi of the accused to participate in the enquiry and the limitations thereof at the pre-cognizance stage also had been raised. The Counsel on record made elaborate submissions relating to several of the aspects which had been referred to in the impugned order, the meticulous consideration of the report received from the police, sworn statements recorded by the Court, the contents of the complaint and also reference being made to the decisions in V. Sankaraiah v. State of A.P. (1), 2002 Crl. LJ. 3201 (A.P.) and Bura Manohar v. The State of A.P. (2), 2002 Crl. LJ. 3201 (A.P.) and Bura Manohar v. The State of A.P. (2), 2002 Crl. L.J. 3322 (A.P.) and would maintain that inasmuch as virtually the impugned order had been made by the learned Magistrate without just considering the prima facie case for taking cognizance but going into several details which may have to be gone into at the appropriate stage i.e., trial, the same cannot be sustained. Incidentally, the impugned order was referred to wherein it was stated that Sri S.K. Shareef, Advocate represented the accused before the VII Metropolitan Magistrate, Visakhapatnam. 4. While dealing with an order releasing some of the accused on perusal of the police report and subsequent order summoning them, whether would fall under Interlocutory order or not within the meaning of Section 397(2) of the Code, the Apex Court in Amarnath v. State of Haryana (3), (1977) 4 SCC 137 : AIR 1977 S.C. 2185 observed that such order cannot be said to be an Interlocutory order and does not fall within the mischief of sub-section (2) of Section 397 of the Code and is not covered by the same and that being the position a Revision against this order was fully competent under Section 397(1) or under Section 482 of the Code because the scope of both these Sections in a matter of this kind is more or less the same. Strong reliance was placed on V.R. Nedunchezhian v. State (4), 2000 Crl. L.J. 976 (Madras), Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra (5), (1977) 4 SCC 551 : AIR 1978 S.C. 47 : 1978 Crl. L.J. 165, V.C. Shukla v. State (6), 1980 Crl. L.J. 690 : 1980 Supp SCC 92 : AIR 1980 S.C. 962 , Haryana Land Reclamation and Development Corporation v. State of Haryana (7), (1990) 3 SCC 588 and Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi (8), (1983) 1 SCC 1 . Further, elaborate submissions were made in relation to the framing of charges, alteration of charges, addition of accused at the appropriate stage, at the time of trial, on the strength of the evidence which may be available before the Court and strong reliance was placed on State of Maharashtra v. Salman Salim Khan (9), 2004 Crl. L.J. 920, State of Maharashtra v. Salman Salim Khan (10), 2003 (8) SUPREME 861 and Sohan Lal v. state of Rajasthan (11), (1990) 4 SCC 580 . L.J. 920, State of Maharashtra v. Salman Salim Khan (10), 2003 (8) SUPREME 861 and Sohan Lal v. state of Rajasthan (11), (1990) 4 SCC 580 . Reliance also was placed on R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab (12), AIR 1960 S.C. 866 wherein the nature and scope of inherent power of High Court to quash criminal proceedings at Interlocutory stage had been dealt with. The Counsel representing the parties also placed reliance on Ashok Kumar v. Mariappan (13), 1993 (1) ALT (Crl.) 655 (Madras), K.M. Mathew v. State of Kerala (14), (1992) 1 SCC 217 : AIR 1992 S.C. 2206 to explain the scope and ambit of Sections 202, 203 and 204 of the Code. Further, reliance was placed on Chandra Deo v. Prokash Chandra (15), 1963 (2) Crl. LJ. 397 : AIR 1963 S.C. 1430 , Nagawwa v. Veeranna (16), 1976 Crl. LJ. 1533 : (1976) 3 SCC 736 : AIR 1976 S.C. 1947 . Certain submissions were made in relation to whether an order issuing process or declining to issue process which may have the effect of termination of the proceedings would fall under interlocutory order or intermediate or final order and whether the remedy is by way of Criminal Revision Case under Section 397 of the Code or by way of a Criminal Petition under Section 482 of the Code. This hair splitting thin distinction or the procedural technicality need not detain this Court any longer for the reason, that a Criminal Revision Case also would lie to the self-same Court though such order may be revisable even before the Court of Session. 5. As already referred to supra, this episode is relating to the mysterious and suspicious death of one Adilakshmi, hereinafter referred to as “deceased”, the daughter of the petitioner/complainant. Several of the factual details had been narrated in the complaint. On a careful reading of the impugned order, the learned Magistrate recorded several reasons, placed reliance on certain decisions and ultimately had taken cognizance under Section 406 Part II I.P.C. as against Medida Ananda Prasad @ Baji Naidu s/o. Satyanarayana - A-2, alone and consequent thereupon a Calendar Case was directed to be registered in stead of P.R.C. No. 4/2000. It appears that the learned Magistrate had taken cognizance of the offences under Section 306 readwith Section 201 I.P.C. as against A-1 and A-2 and the same was registered as P.R.C. No. 4/2000. It appears that the learned Magistrate had taken cognizance of the offences under Section 306 readwith Section 201 I.P.C. as against A-1 and A-2 and the same was registered as P.R.C. No. 4/2000. But however, the said order was set aside in Crl. P. No. 4304/2002 and 2641/2002 and in the light of the same, the learned Magistrate had recorded reasons in detail and ultimately came to the conclusion that cognizance can be taken under Section 506 Part II I.P.C. as against Medida Ananda Prasad @ Baji Naidu S/o. Satyanarayana - A-2 alone. 6. The principal question appears to be whether the death, of the deceased is suicidal or homicidal. Several of the facts had been narrated in the complaint. It is also stated that under the peculiar circumstances, a second complaint also was made. 7. At the commencement of the impugned order it was recorded as hereunder: “This case coming on for final hearing before me in the presence of Sri T. Venkata Ratnam and Sri V. Govinda Raju, advocates for the complainant and of Sri Sk. Shareef, advocate for the accused and same having stood over for consideration till this day, this court made the following elaborate and appropriate orders as per the Directions of the Hon'ble High Court in Crl. Petition No. 4304/2000 Dt. 12-8-2002 filed by Ex. A.2 and also in Crl. Petition No. 2641/2002 Dt. 22-10-2002 filed by Ex. A. 1.” 8. As can be seen from the impugned order, it is clear that respondents 2 and 3 herein, the accused were represented by an Advocate. It is no doubt true that the material on record would not disclose the participation of the accused at the pre-cognizance stage. In the decision referred (15) supra, it was held at paras 7, 8 and 12 as hereunder: “Taking the first ground, it seems to us clear from the entire scheme of Ch. XVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure that an accused person does not come into the picture at all till process is issued. This does not mean that he is precluded from being present when an enquiry is held by a Magistrate. He may remain present either in person or through a counsel or agent with a view to be informed of what is going on. This does not mean that he is precluded from being present when an enquiry is held by a Magistrate. He may remain present either in person or through a counsel or agent with a view to be informed of what is going on. But since the very question for consideration being whether he should be called upon to face an accusation nor he has no right to take part in the proceedings no has the Magistrate any jurisdiction to permit him to do so it would follow from this, therefore, that it would not be open to Magistrate to put any question to witnesses at the instance of the person named as accused but against whom process has not been issued; nor can he examine any witnesses at the instance of such a person. Of course, the Magistrate himself is free to put such questions to the witnesses produced before him by the complainant as he may think proper in the interests of justice. But beyond that, he cannot go. It was, however, contended by Mr. Sethi for respondent No. 1 that the very object of the provisions of Ch. XVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure is to prevent an accused person from being harassed by a frivolous complaint and, therefore, power is given to a Magistrate before whom complaint is made to postpone the issue of summons to the accused person pending the result of an enquiry made either by himself or by a Magistrate subordinate to him. A privilege conferred by these provisions can according to Mr. Sethi, be waived by the accused person and he can take part in the proceedings. No doubt, one of the objects behind the provisions of Sec. 202, Cr.P.C. is to enable the Magistrate to scrutinise carefully the allegations made in the complaint with a view to prevent a person named therein as accused from being called upon to face an obviously frivolous complaint. But there is also another object behind this provision and it is to find out what material there is to support the allegations made in the complaint. It is the bounden duty of the Magistrate while making an enquiry to elicit all facts not merely with a view to protect the interest of an absent accused persons, but also with a view to bring to boor: a person or persons against whom grave allegations are made. It is the bounden duty of the Magistrate while making an enquiry to elicit all facts not merely with a view to protect the interest of an absent accused persons, but also with a view to bring to boor: a person or persons against whom grave allegations are made. Whether the complaint is frivolous or not has, at that stage, necessarily to be determined on the basis of the material placed before him by the complainant. Whatever defence the accessed may have can only be enquired into at the trial. An enquiry under Sec. 202 can in no sense be characterised as a trial for the simple reason that in law there can be but one trial for an offence. Permitting an accused person to intervene during the enquiry would frustrate its very object and that is why the legislature has made no specific provision permitting an accused person to take part in an enquiry. It is true that there is no direct evidence in the case before us that the two persons who were examined as court witnesses were so examined at the instance of respondent No. 1 but from the fact that they were persons who were alleged to have been the associates of respondent No. 1 in the first information report lodged by Panchanan Roy and who were alleged to have been arrested on the spot by some of the local people, they would not have been summoned by the Magistrate unless suggestion to that effect had been made by counsel appearing for respondent No. 1. This inference is irresistible and we hold that on this ground, the enquiry made by the enquiring Magistrate is vitiated. In this connection, the observations of this court in Vadilal Panchal v. Dattatraya Dulaji, (1961) 1 SCR at p. 9 : (AIR SC 1113 at p. 1116 may usefully be quoted: “the enquiry is for the purpose of ascertaining the truth or falsehood of the complaint; that is, for ascertaining whether there is evidence in support of the complaint so as to justify the issue of process and commencement of proceedings against the person concerned. The section does not say that a regular trial for adjudging the guilt or otherwise of the person complained against should take place at that stage, for the person complained against can be legally called upon to answer the accusation made against him only when a process has issued and he is put on trial”. 9. Coming to the second ground, we have no hesitation in holding that the test propounded by the learned single judge of the High Court is wholly wrong. For determining the question whether any process is to be issued or not, what the Magistrate has to be satisfied is whether there is “sufficient ground for proceeding” and not whether there is sufficient ground for conviction. Whether the evidence is adequate for supporting the conviction can be determined only at the trial and not at the stage of enquiry. A number of decisions were cited at the bar in which the question of the scope of the enquiry under Sec. 202 has been considered. Amongst those decisions are: Paranand Brahmachari v. Emperor, AIR 1930 Pat 30; Radha Kishan Sao v. S.K. Misra, AIR 1949 Pat 36; Ramkisto Sahu v. State of Bihar, AIR 1952 Pat 125 ; Emperor v. J.A. Pinan, AIR 1931 Bom 524 and Baidya Nath Singh v. Musppatt, ILR 14 Cal 141. In all these cases, it has been held that the object of the provisions of Sec. 202 is enable the Magistrate to form an opinion as to whether process should be issued or not and to remove from his mind any hesitation that he may have felt upon the mere perusal of the complaint and the consideration of the complainant's evidence on oath. The courts have also pointed out in these cases that what the Magistrate has to see is whether there is evidence in support of the allegations of the complainant and not whether the evidence is sufficient to warrant a conviction. The learned Judges in some of these cases have been at pains to observe that an enquiry under Sec. 202 is not to be likened to a trial which can only take place after process is issued, and that there can be only one trial. No doubt, as stated in sub-sec. The learned Judges in some of these cases have been at pains to observe that an enquiry under Sec. 202 is not to be likened to a trial which can only take place after process is issued, and that there can be only one trial. No doubt, as stated in sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 202 itself, the object of the enquiry is to ascertain the truth or falsehood of the complaint, but the Magistrate making the enquiry has to do this only with reference to the intrinsic quality of the statements made before him at the enquiry which would naturally mean the complaint itself, the statement on oath made by the complaint and the statements made before him by persons examined at the instance of the complainant. …… …… On the basis of these observations it was urged that this court has held that a Magistrate has the power to weigh the evidence adduced at the enquiry. As we read the decision it does not lay down an inflexible rule but seems to hold that while considering the evidence tendered at the enquiry it is open to the Magistrate to consider whether the accused could have acted in self defence. Fortunately, no such question arises for consideration in this case but we may point out that since the object of an enquiry under Sec. 202 is to ascertain whether the allegations made in the complaint are intrinsically true, the Magistrate acting under Sec. 203 has to satisfy himself that there is sufficient ground for proceeding. In order to come to this conclusion, he is entitled to consider the evidence taken by him or recorded in an enquiry under Sec. 202, or statements made in an investigation under that section, as the case may be. He is not entitled to rely upon any material besides this. By “evidence of other witnesses” the learned judges had apparently in mind the statements of persons examined by the police during investigation under Sec. 202. It is permissible under Sec. 203 of the Code to consider such evidence along with the statements of the complainant recorded by the Magistrate and decide whether to issue process or dismiss the complaint. The investigation in that case was made by the police under Sec. 202 Cr. P.C. at the instance by the Presidency Magistrate. Apparently, the statements of the various witnesses questioned by the police were self-contradictory. The investigation in that case was made by the police under Sec. 202 Cr. P.C. at the instance by the Presidency Magistrate. Apparently, the statements of the various witnesses questioned by the police were self-contradictory. That being the case, it was open to the Presidency Magistrate to consider which of them to accept and which to reject. The enquiring Magistrate has not stated nor has the High Court found in the case before us that the evidence adduced on behalf of the complainant and his own evidence were self-contradictory, and therefore, it could not be said that there was anything intrinsically false in the allegations made in the complaint. Learned counsel for the appellant referred us to the decision of this court in Ramgopal Ganpatrai Ria v. State of Bombay, 1958 SCR 618 at p. 638. ( AIR 1958 SC 97 at pp. 106 and 107). In that case, after quoting a passage from Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol 10, 3rd Edn, in Art. 666 at p. 365 where the law regarding commitment for trial has been stated, this court has observed: “In each case, therefore the magistrate holding the preliminary inquiry has to be satisfied that a prima facie case is made out against the accused by the evidence of witnesses entitled to a reasonable degree of credit, and unless he is so satisfied, he is not to commit. Applying the aforesaid test to the present case, can it be said that there is no evidence to make out a prima facie case, or that the voluminous evidence adduced in this case is so incredible that no reasonable body of persons could rely upon it. As already indicated, in this case, there is a large volume of documentary evidence the latter being wholly books and registers and other documents kept or is used by the Mills themselves which may lend themselves to the inference that the accused are guilty or to the contrary conclusion. The High Court has taken pains to point out that this is one of those cases where much can be said on both sides. It will be for the jury to decide which of the two conflicting versions will find acceptance at their hands. The High Court has taken pains to point out that this is one of those cases where much can be said on both sides. It will be for the jury to decide which of the two conflicting versions will find acceptance at their hands. This was preeminently a case which should have been committed to the Court of Session for trial, and it is a little surprising that the learned Presidency Magistrate allowed himself to be convinced to the contrary”. Thus, where there is a prima facie case even though much can be said on both sides, a committing Magistrate is bound to commit an accused for trial. All the greater reason, therefore, that where there is prima facie evidence, even though an accused may have a defence like that in the present case that the offence is committed by some other person or persons, the matter has to be left to be decided by the appropriate forum at the appropriate stage and issue of process cannot be refused. Incidentally, we may point out that the offence with which respondent No. 1 has been charged with is one triable by jury. The High Court, by dealing with the evidence in the way in which it has done, has in effect sanctioned the usurpation by the Magistrate of the functions of a jury which the Magistrate was wholly incompetent to do.” 10. On a careful reading of the impugned order, it cannot be said that the participation of the accused at the stage of enquiry was only to the limited extent of being present either in person or through a Counsel or agent with a view to be informed of what is going on, but it appears to be something beyond thereto. In the decision referred (16) supra, it was observed at para-2 by the Apex Court as hereunder: “……it is not necessary for us to enter into the merits of the case at this stage. It is well settled by a long catena of decisions of this Court that at the stage of issuing process the Magistrate is mainly concerned with the allegations made in the complaint or the evidence led in support of the same and he is only to be prima facie satisfied whether there are sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused. It is well settled by a long catena of decisions of this Court that at the stage of issuing process the Magistrate is mainly concerned with the allegations made in the complaint or the evidence led in support of the same and he is only to be prima facie satisfied whether there are sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused. It is not the province of the Magistrate to enter into a detailed discussion of the merits or de-merits of the case nor can the High Court go into this matter in its revisional jurisdiction which is a very limited one. 11. In Chandra Deo Singh v. Prokash Chandra Bose, (1964) 1 SCR 639 - ( AIR 1963 S.C. 1430 ) this Court had after fully considering the matter observed as follows; “The Courts have also pointed out in these cases that what the Magistrate has to see is whether there is evidence in support of the allegations of the complainant and not whether the evidence is sufficient to warrant a conviction. The learned Judges in some of these cases have been at pains to observe that an enquiry under Section 202 is not to be linked to a trial which can only take place after process is issued and that there can be only one trial. No doubt, as stated in sub-section (1) of Section 202 itself, the object of the enquiry is to ascertain the truth or falsehood of the complaint, but the Magistrate making the enquiry has to do this only with reference to the intrinsic quality of the statements made before him at the enquiry which would naturally mean the complaint itself, the statement on oath made by the complainant and the statements made before him by persons examined at the instance of the complainant.” 12. Indicating the scope, ambit of Section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure this Court in Vadilal Panchel v. Dattatrya Dulaji, (1961) 1 SCR 1 -( AIR 1960 S.C. 1113 ) observed as follows; “Section 202 says that the Magistrate may, if he thinks fit, for reasons to be recorded in writing, postpone the issue of process for compelling the attendance of the person complained against and direct an inquiry for the purpose of ascertaining the truth or falsehood of the complaint; in other words, the scope of an inquiry under the Section is limited to finding out the truth or falsehood of the complaint in order to determine the question of the issue of process. The inquiry is for the purpose of ascertaining the truth or falsehood of the complaint; that is, for ascertaining whether there is evidence in support of the complaint so as to justify the issue of process and commencement of proceedings against the person concerned. The section does not say that a regular trial for adjudging the guilt or otherwise of the person complained against should take place at that stage; for the person complained against can be legally called upon to answer the accusation made against him only when a process has issued and he is put on trial.” It would thus be clear from the two decisions of this Court that the scope of the inquiry under Section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is extremely limited - limited only to the ascertainment of the truth or falsehood of the allegations made in the complaint-(i) on the materials placed before the Court; (ii) for the limited purpose of finding out whether a prima facie case for issue of process has been made out; and (iii) for deciding the question purely from the point of view of the complainant without at all adverting to any defence that the accused may have. In fact it is well settled that in proceedings under Section 202 the accused has got absolutely no locus standi and is not entitled to be heard on the question whether the process should be issued against him or not.’ 13. This Court is not expressing any opinion relating to the merits and demerits of the matter. In fact it is well settled that in proceedings under Section 202 the accused has got absolutely no locus standi and is not entitled to be heard on the question whether the process should be issued against him or not.’ 13. This Court is not expressing any opinion relating to the merits and demerits of the matter. However, this Court, on a careful reading of the commencement of the impugned order and also the way in which the reasons had been recorded, is thoroughly satisfied that the accused in the aforesaid P.R.C. were actively represented by an Advocate which would amount to active participation beyond the permissible limits at the precognizance stage. In the light of the views expressed by the Apex Court in the decisions referred to supra, inasmuch as the same is impermissible the impugned order cannot be sustained and accordingly the same is hereby quashed and the matter is remitted the learned Magistrate to reconsider the matter afresh in accordance with law in the light of the observations specified supra. 14. The Criminal Petition is allowed to the extent indicated above.