Judgment R.S. Chauhan J.-Camouflaging of the brutal murder of his wife by the appellant sets the tone for this case. The appellant has challenged the Judgment dated 17.04.2001, whereby the Additional Sessions Judge, Rajgarh, District Alwar has convicted the appellant of offence under Section 302 IPC and has sentenced him to life imprisonment and has imposed a fine of Rs. 2,500/-and to further undergo a sentence of one year of rigorous imprisonment in default thereof . 2. The brief facts of the case are that on 210.1999 while Ramesh Chand (PW. 9) and Tundaram (PW. 10) were grazing their goats in the jungles of village Tunda, they noticed few vegetables lying there. When they went close to the vegetables, they noticed a dead body of a woman lying there. They informed the local Sarpanch, Bansidhar (PW. 8). Thereupon, Bansidhar submitted a written report (Ex. P. 2) before the Head Constable, Om Prakash (PW. 15). On 210.1999, Om Prakash, in turn, reached the Police Station Tehla and submitted a written report (Ex. P. 13) wherein he claimed that on 210.1999 the Sarpanch, Banshidhar had submitted a written report to him. According to the said repot a dead body of a woman had been discovered in the plantation area (to be referred to as the jungle) near the bend in the road situated in the lower part of the valley of village Kundla. On the basis of the said report an Inquest Report under Section 174 of the Criminal Procedure Code (henceforth to be referred to as the “Code”, for short) was prepared. The Head Constable and some villagers had gone to the spot and seen a body of a dead woman. But for a blouse on the body, the rest of the body was naked. The examination of the dead body had revealed that the woman had been killed by a sharp weapon, and her face was hit with stones. Since murder was suspected, the Head Constable had submitted the said report. On the basis of the Report, a formal FIR, FIR No. 149/99 was chalked out for offence under Section 302 IPC and the investigation was carried out. The dead body was identified by Ramchandra Saini (PW. 3) as the body of his daughter, Smt. Mathuri W/o Bhag Chand, the appellant. After fifty-five days of the alleged murder, the police arrested the appellant. The dead body was identified by Ramchandra Saini (PW. 3) as the body of his daughter, Smt. Mathuri W/o Bhag Chand, the appellant. After fifty-five days of the alleged murder, the police arrested the appellant. The charge-sheet was filed against the appellant for offence under Section 302 IPC. 3. In order to prove its case, the prosecution examined twenty witnesses and submitted thirty-one documents. Although the defense did not examine any witness, it did submit five documents. After examining the oral and documentary evidence, vide Judgment dated 17.04.2001, the learned trial Court was pleaded to convict and sentence the appellant as aforementioned. 4. Mr. R.R.L. Gupta has vehemently argued that the case is based on circumstantial evidence. According to him, the chain of circumstantial evidence is incomplete. Therefore, the conviction is unsustainable. He has further argued that according to the evidence of PW. 17 Dr. Ghansi Ram Meena, the Medical Board had discovered that the deceased had sexual intercourse prior to her death. According to him, it is inconceivable that a husband would have sexual intercourse with his wife, murder her, and leave her naked body in the jungle. Moreover, the prosecution has failed to prove the motive for the alleged murder. Mr. Gupta suggested that it is a case of rape and murder by some unknown persons and that the police have falsely implicated the appellant in the case. Further, although the prosecution has relied on the recovery of the knife and of the jewelry of the deceased to connect the appellant to the alleged murder, both the recoveries are suspect. Therefore, according to him, the prosecution has not proved the case beyond a reasonable doubt. 5. On the other hand, the Learned Public Prosecutor, Mr. R.P. Kuldeep has argued that the chain of circumstantial evidence is complete. Hence, the impugned Judgment is legal and valid. 6. We have heard the learned Counsels for the parties, have perused the impugned Judgment and critically examined the record before us. 7. Undoubtedly, the case is based on circumstantial evidence. It is, indeed, a settled principle of law that conviction can be based on circumstantial evidence. In the case of State of U.P. vs. Satish, 2005 (3) SCC 114 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has summarized the factors, which must be satisfied before a conviction can be recorded on the basis of circumstantial evidence. It is, indeed, a settled principle of law that conviction can be based on circumstantial evidence. In the case of State of U.P. vs. Satish, 2005 (3) SCC 114 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has summarized the factors, which must be satisfied before a conviction can be recorded on the basis of circumstantial evidence. Firstly, the circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought to be drawn, must be cogently and firmly established; secondly, those circumstances should be of definite tendency unerringly pointing towards guilt of the accused; thirdly, the circumstances, taken cumulatively should form a chain so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that within all human probability the crime was committed by the accused and none else; fourthly, the circumstantial evidence in order to sustain conviction must be complete and incapable of explanation of any other hypothesis than that of the guilt of the accused and such evidence should not only be consistent with the guilt of the accused but should be inconsistent with his innocence. Hence, while dealing with the present case, we should keep these factors in mind. 8. PW. 3, Ramchandra tells us that he had married his daughter, Smt. Mathuri to the appellant. He also tells us that Smt. Mathuri’s elder sister, Romoti (PW. 13) was married to the appellant’s elder brother, Ramswaroop. According to him, Bhag Chand had come to fetch his wife at their house. He had stayed the night, and on the next day he had taken his wife with him. PW. 5, Smt. Narayani Devi (the mother of the deceased), PW. 6 Ghanshyam Saini (the brother of the deceased) and PW. 7 Birdha have corroborated the testimony of Ramchandra. PW. 5 Smt. Narayani states that Bhag Chand was eager to take his wife back on the very day he had reached the in-laws’ house. However, as no mode of transportation was available on that day, he had stayed the night. On the next day, she had packed pulses and vegetables for her daughter. She had accompanied the young couple to the bye-pass, where they boarded a truck. PW. 2 Budharam, and PW. 4, Smt. Prabhu both claims that a young couple had boarded the truck. On the next day, she had packed pulses and vegetables for her daughter. She had accompanied the young couple to the bye-pass, where they boarded a truck. PW. 2 Budharam, and PW. 4, Smt. Prabhu both claims that a young couple had boarded the truck. Smt. Prabhu states that “near the village of Rupwas, Mathuri whom I know and her husband, whose name I don’t know, but who is present in the Court today, boarded the truck. At the bottom of the valley, on the bye-pass, where a road leads to the Village Sankat, the accused tried to stop the truck. But, I told him “this road leads to Sankat”. Therefore, the truck driver did not stop the truck. Later on, the accused stopped the truck in the valley. When I asked Mathuri, where she was going she informed me that she was going to her in-laws’ place. Both the accused and Mathuri got off from the truck and went away.” 9. PW. 9, Ramesh Chand states that on 210.1999 when in the evening, he was grazing his goats at the bottom of the valley, he and Tundaram (PW. 10) saw some vegetables lying in the forest. When they went near the vegetables, they noticed the dead body of a woman. The neck was slit on one side, and the face had wounds caused by a stone. He informed the Sarpanch, Bansidhar. Tundaram corroborates his testimony. So does Bansidhar (PW. 8). PW. 15, Om Prakash states that Bansidhar informed him about the discovery of a dead body of a woman in the jungle. He and the villagers went to the site and inspected the body and carried out the investigation. According to the testimony of PW. Dr. Ghansi Ram Meena, Smt. Mathuri had sustained four injuries, out of which three were incised wounds. A cut on the right side of her neck had cut the artery; her right cheek had a cut and so did her chin. There was blood clot between her right ear and her right dye. These injuries were ante-mortem in nature. The cause of death was loss of blood due to the incised wounds. 10. PW. 13, Romoti (the elder sister of the deceased) states that on the day Mathuri was killed, the accused did not come back home. Instead, he came back the next evening. These injuries were ante-mortem in nature. The cause of death was loss of blood due to the incised wounds. 10. PW. 13, Romoti (the elder sister of the deceased) states that on the day Mathuri was killed, the accused did not come back home. Instead, he came back the next evening. When he was asked about his whereabouts, he told them that he had gone on the Company’s jeep. The next day, when her father came with some of the relatives and with the police, the appellant ran away. According to the Arrest Memo (Ex. P. 11) the appellant was arrested about fifty-five days after the alleged murder. 11. The prosecution has cogently and convincingly proved that the appellant went to his in-laws’ house to pick up his wife. He and his wife left their house on the next day. When they were leaving, Mathuri’s mother had packed vegetables and pulses with her. The couple boarded a truck. The couple got off the truck near the place where the dead body was discovered by Ramesh Chand (PW. 9) and Tundaram (PW. 10). Both of them informed the local Sarpanch, Banshidhar (PW. 8). In turn, he informed the Head Constable Om Prakash (PW. 15). Both according to the Post-mortem Report (Ex. P. 20) and the testimony of Dr. Ghansi Ram Meena, the death was homicidal. According to PW. 13, Smt. Romoti, on the day Mathuri was killed, the appellant did not return back home. Instead he came back the next evening and gave a false explanation about his whereabouts. The next day, when her father, Ramchandra (PW. 3) reached her house, alongwith some relatives and the police, the appellant ran away. He absconded for forty-five days. These established facts complete the chain of circumstances pointing unerringly to the appellant’s guilt. 12. His conduct also proves his guilt. He went to his in-laws’ house and was eager to leave the place. He wanted the truck to stop at a place, which was not near his village. The truck did not stop. He got down near the place where the Shepard discovered the body. In the middle of the jungle, he not only slit his wife’s neck with a knife, but also hit her face with stone, in order to disfigure her face. The truck did not stop. He got down near the place where the Shepard discovered the body. In the middle of the jungle, he not only slit his wife’s neck with a knife, but also hit her face with stone, in order to disfigure her face. He took away the clothes and exposed her body in order to make it look like as though she had been raped and murdered by unknown persons. Thus, he tried to camouflage his crime. He did not go home, but went away for that day. Next day when he returned home, he gave a false explanation for his absence to his sister-in-law. He was least bothered about his wife’s whereabouts. He did not search for her; he did not seek help from the police to trace her out. Instead, he went about his usual business of life as though nothing had happened to his wife. When he saw his father-in-law and the police close on his heels, he ran away. He absconded from the law for fifty-five days. His conduct reveals a diabolical mind that has plotted a cold-blooded murder of the wife. 13. Presumptions are not alien to Criminal Jurisprudence. In the case of State of West Bengal vs. Mir Mohammad Omar, 2000 (8) SCC 382 , their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court had observed: Presumption of fact is an inference as to the existence of one fact from the existence of some other facts, unless he truth of such inference is disproved. Presumption of fact is a rule in law of evidence that a fact otherwise doubtful may be inferred from certain other proved facts. When inferring the existence of a fact from other set of proved facts, the Court exercising a process of reasoning and reaches a logical conclusion as the most probable position. The above principle has gained legislative recognition in India when Section 114 is incorporated in the Evidence Act. It empowers the Court to presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened. In that process the Court shall have regard to the common course of natural events, human conduct etc. in relation to the facts of the case. It empowers the Court to presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened. In that process the Court shall have regard to the common course of natural events, human conduct etc. in relation to the facts of the case. Section 106 of the Evidence Act states that “when any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him.” In the above noted case, the Apex Court held that “this section is not intended to relieve the prosecution of its burden to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. But the section would apply to cases where the prosecution has succeeded in proving facts from which a reasonable inference can be drawn regarding the existence of certain other facts, unless the accused by virtue of his special knowledge regarding such fats, failed to offer any explanation which might drive the Court to draw a different inference”. Relying on the case of Shambhu Nath Mehra vs. State of Ajmer, AIR 1956 SC 404 , the Apex Court approved the opinion of Vivian Bose J, when His Lordships had held about Section 106 of the Evidence Act, that “This lays down the general rule that in a criminal case the burden of proof is on the prosecution and Section 106 is certainly not intended to relieve it of that duty. On the contrary, it is designed to meet certain exceptional cases in which it would be impossible, or at any rate disproportionately difficult for the prosecution to establish facts which are “especially” within the knowledge of the accused and which he could prove without difficulty or inconvenience. . . The word “especially” stresses that. It means facts that are pre-eminently or exceptionally within his knowledge.” 14. In the instant case, it was within the “especial knowledge” of the appellant as to what happened to his wife from the time they got off from the truck till her body was discovered by the shepard. Yet, in his statement under Section 313 of the Code, the appellant has not offered any explanation about the death of his wife. He has maintained a studied silence on this point. Section 106 of the Evidence Act places a burden on the accused to offer an explanation to the Court about those things, which are within his special knowledge. Yet, in his statement under Section 313 of the Code, the appellant has not offered any explanation about the death of his wife. He has maintained a studied silence on this point. Section 106 of the Evidence Act places a burden on the accused to offer an explanation to the Court about those things, which are within his special knowledge. However, in the instant case, the appellant has not discharged the said burden. Taking a holistic view of the circumstances, the conclusion is inevitable that the appellant had killed his wife. 15. Although there appears to be no motive for the murder, but lack of motive would not weaken the prosecution case, when the chain of circumstances is otherwise complete. In the present case, the chain of circumstances is not only complete, but it also points unerringly to the guilt of the accused. The circumstances are also incompatible with his innocence. Hence, the prosecution has proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt. 16. For these reasons, we do not find any merit in the instant appeal and the same stands accordingly dismissed. The conviction and the sentence of the appellant under Section 302 IPC are confirmed.