Judgment 1. The petitioners appeal has virtually stood abated having not substituted one of the plaintiffs-respondents after his death by his legal representatives. 2. Heard both the sides. 3. that originally the sole plaintiff filed a suit for eviction of the defendants-appellants-petitioners. During pendency of the suit, the sole plaintiff died and was substituted by her four sons as co-owners. The trial Court allowed the suit and decreed eviction. The defendants carried the matter in appeal. The appeal having been admitted was pending. It came to their knowledge in December, 2003 that one of the plaintiffs who resides in another village had died in April, 2001. Accordingly, an application was filed on 16.12.2003 for condoning the delay in making substitution and another application was filed with the prayer to allow substitution. This was opposed by the surviving plaintiffs-respondents in the appeal. The appellate Court before whom this matter was, relied upon the case of Union of India Vs. Ram Charan AIR 1964 Supreme Court 215 to hold that apart from statement that the plaintiff was of another village and, as such, the defendants-appellants could not know of his death, there was no further explanation and in that view of the matter, there was no sufficient cause shown. Thus, the application was rejected. While doing so, it was also observed that there was no formal application for setting aside abatement. It is this order against which the present revision application has been preferred. Having considered the matter. I am of the view that the impugned order cannot be sustained. The learned appellate Court referred extensively to Order 22 Rule 9 casting an obligation solely on the defendants-appellants. Not at one place, it referred the provision of Order 22 Rule 10A which makes it obligatory on all counsel appearing for parties to inform the Court of death of their client. This Rule 10A to Order 22 was inherited in 1976 in order to overcome such situations where one party not being in touch with or not in contact with other party, the other party would not know of his death. In the present case, admittedly, the learned Advocate on whom statutory responsibility was cast by virtue of Rule 10A to Order 22 took no steps and, as such, the petitioners were unaware of the death. Further, the other plaintiffs-respondents were own brothers of the deceased plaintiffs-respondents. In the present case, admittedly, the learned Advocate on whom statutory responsibility was cast by virtue of Rule 10A to Order 22 took no steps and, as such, the petitioners were unaware of the death. Further, the other plaintiffs-respondents were own brothers of the deceased plaintiffs-respondents. They also took no steps after the death. In such circumstances to expect the defendantsappellants to discharge their obligation all by themselves is expecting more than what the legislature contemplated. The two provisions, Rule 9 of Order 22 have to be read alongwith Rule 10A of Order 22 have to be read alongwith Rule 10A of Order 22. The duties are divided. I may also refer to a decision of the Apex Court in the case cf Bhagwan Swaroop and Ors. Vs. Moolchand and Ors. AIR 1983 Supreme Court 355 wherein it has been held with reference to Order 22: "That a Code of Procedure is designed to facilitate justice and further its ends; not a penal enactment for punishment and penalties; not a thing designed to trip people up." 4. The Apex Court has held that the Court should not take a hyper-technical approach which if carried to end may result in miscarriage of justice. I may also observe that the remaining plaintiffs-respondents are none else than own brothers or their heirs of the deceased and, thus, the right to sue/defend subsists. The present case is such a case. 5. I, therefore, set aside the order and allow the revision application and direct the appellate Court to set aside the abatement and substitute the legal representatives.