O. P. SRIVASTAVA, J. Since the facts of the above two writ petitions are identical and the common arguments have been advanced by the learned Counsel for the petitioners, both these petitions are being disposed of by this common judgment. 2. Through the above writ petitions the petitioners have prayed for a writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the order dated 18-1-2005 passed by District Magistrate under Section 3 (2) of the National Security Act, 1980 (in short act) with a writ in the nature of habeas corpus for their release. 3. The facts leading to the passing of impugned order dated 18-1-2005, in brief, are that the petitioners were found involved in cow slaughter and they were, therefore, challanged and are being prosecuted separately. However, the said act of the petitioners disturbed the public order and the police had to take so many steps as mentioned in the grounds to control the situation. Therefore, since the District Magistrate was satisfied that they were likely to get themselves released and indulged in prejudicial activities impugned order has slapped against the petitioners. 4. The petitioners made statutory representation to the various authorities but they were rejected. 5. We have heard learned Counsel for the petitioners and the learned A. G. A. 6. The petitioners, Counsel has although taken several grounds in the petition but before us he pressed three grounds. 7. Firstly, it has been submitted that since the alleged offence is an act involving law and order and for which petitioners are being prosecuted, therefore, provisions of the Act were not attracted. Secondly, it has been alleged that the State has an opportunity to oppose the bail application and mere moving of bail application by the petitioners, no cause of action has arisen to invoke the provisions of the Act. Thirdly, it has been submitted that the detention order is unjustified and cannot continue for the simple reason that purpose to clamp the detention order is to frustrate the release of the petitioners on bail. 8. We have considered the submissions of the learned Counsel for the parties. 9. As regards the first point the Supreme Court in Arun Ghosh v. State of West Bengal, 1970 Supreme Court Cases (Cr.) 67, has laid down the distinction between, public order, and, law and order as follows: "public order was said to embrace more of the community than law and order. 9. As regards the first point the Supreme Court in Arun Ghosh v. State of West Bengal, 1970 Supreme Court Cases (Cr.) 67, has laid down the distinction between, public order, and, law and order as follows: "public order was said to embrace more of the community than law and order. Public order is the even tempo of the life of the community taking the country as a whole or even a specified locality. Disturbance of public order is to be distinguished from Acts directed against individuals which do not disturb the society to the extent of causing a general disturbance of public tranquillity. It is the degree of disturbance and its effect upon the life of the community in a locality which determines whether the disturbance amounts only to a breach of law and order. Take for instance, a man stabs another. People may be shocked and even disturbed but the life of the community keeps moving at an even tempo, however much one may dislike the act. Take another case of a town where there is communal tension. A man stabs a member of the other community. This is an act of a very different sort. Its imprecations are deeper and it affects the even tempo of life and public order is jeopardized because the repercussions of the act embrace large sections of the community and incite them to take further breaches of the law and order and to subvert the public order. " 10. On examination of the facts and situation arising out of the offence committed together with the steps which had to be taken to control the situation arising out of alleged act of the petitioners, takes us to the conclusion that it was a clear case of disturbance of public order. Although, this Court is not suppose to go into the question of satisfaction of District Magistrate unless there is some specific reason but in the instant case, after going through the grounds we find that looking to the detailed reasons and several steps taken subsequent to the alleged act, the District Magistrate cannot at all be said to be unjustified of coming to the conclusion that it was the case of disturbance of public order. We, therefore, do not find any substance in the argument otherwise. 11. We, therefore, do not find any substance in the argument otherwise. 11. As regards remaining two points, it would be suffice to refer the judgments of Honble Supreme Court in Abdul Sathar Ibrahim Manik v. Union of India & Ors. , 1992 Supreme Court Cases (Cri) 1, wherein at page 16 under point (2), it has been clearly said that the order of detention cannot be quashed on the ground that proper course for the authority was to oppose the bail application and if bail is granted notwithstanding such opposition the same can be questioned before a higher Court. Therefore, even if the authority had an opportunity to oppose the bail application the same cannot be ground to quash the detention order. Furthermore, if the District Magistrate is satisfied that after release on bail the petitioners were likely to indulge in activities prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and then even if the detention order amounts to frustrate bail application, the same is not liable to be quashed. The purpose of the Act is to stop person coming out of jail if he is likely to indulge in prejudicial activities after release. The provision of preventive detention cannot be allowed to be frustrated on the ground that detention order itself would frustrate the bail order. 12. Therefore, other submissions of the learned Counsel for the petitioner also deserve to be rejected. 13. In view of the above, the writ petitions being devoid of merit are hereby dismissed. Petition dismissed. .