H. K. RATHOD, J. ( 1 ) HEARD learned Advocate Mr. Darshan M. Parikh for the petitioner Bank of Baroda and Mr. Mansuri, learned Advocate appearing for the workmen. Through this petition, the petitioner bank has challenged the award made by the Industrial Tribunal (Central) Vadodara in Reference (ITC) No. 7 of 1998 dated 31. 12. 2005 wherein the tribunal has set aside the order of termination dated 10. 9. 1996 in favour of the concerned workmen namely Shri K. L. Bhegde, R. A. Rathod, M. U. Shevale, K. V. Solanki, B. R. Soni, B. R. Solanki, FM Solanki, GD Chunara, DZ Parmar, AM Rao,ad Vankar, and GB Suthar has also directed the Bank of Baroda to pay Rs. 1,50,000. 00 Rupees one lac fifty thousand only to each of the workmen concerned and to pay an amount of Rs. 10,000. 00 to the union towards costs. ( 2 ) THIS Court has by order dated 10. 4. 2006, issued rule and notice as to interim relief returnable on 24. 4. 2006. Ad. interim relief in terms of para 7 (B) of the petition was also granted by this Court. Matter has, therefore, been considered by this Court for interim relief. ( 3 ) LEARNED Advocate Mr. Parikh has submitted that the workmen have also challenged the award in question and their petition has also been admitted by this Court. It was also his submission that the provisions of Section 25f of the ID Act, 1947 are not applicable to the facts of this case. In support of his submission, he has placed reliance upon the decision of Hon ble Supreme Court in case of Rajasthan Tourism Development Corpration v. Intejam Ali Zafri reported in [2006] 6 SCC page 275. Relying upon the aforesaid decision, he further submits that a person who has not been recruited as per regular procedure under the recruitment rules is not entitled for the benefit of Section 25f of the ID Act, 1947 in case termination of services of such an employee. It was also submitted that the case of similarly situated employees was rejected by the Division Bench of this Court in LPA No. 1028 of 1996 in Special Civil Application NO. 642 of 1996. In reply to this contention, it was pointed out by the learned Advocate Mr. It was also submitted that the case of similarly situated employees was rejected by the Division Bench of this Court in LPA No. 1028 of 1996 in Special Civil Application NO. 642 of 1996. In reply to this contention, it was pointed out by the learned Advocate Mr. Mansuri on behalf of the workmen that the rejection of claim of such similarly situated employees was in a direct petition before this Court. According to him, though they may be similarly situated employees but they adopted different forum for redressal of their grievance against the termination order. It was also his submission that in exercise of extra ordinary jurisdiction, this Court is having limited powers and jurisdiction for interference with the impugned action and the Industrial Tribunal in reference proceedings is having wide powers while adjudicating the reference and, therefore, rejection of case by this Court in LPA cannot be considered against or adverse as has been suggested by the learned Advocate Mr. Parikh before this Court. He also submitted that the amount of Rs. 1,50,000. 00 has in all been awarded for each of the workman concerned as lumsum amount in lieu of reinstatement and back wages after a period of eleven years and it being a money decree, therefore, some part of the compensation may be released in favour of the workmen concerned for enabling them to maintain their families during this intervening period. He also submitted that the Industrial Tribunal (Centre) Baroda has not granted reinstatement to the workmen concerned and, therefore, during the pendency of this petition, workmen are unable to pray for even benefits of Section 17b of the ID Act, 1947 and object of Section 17b of the ID Act, 1947 is to see that during the higher up proceedings, at least, workman may get something to maintain himself and his family, otherwise, fight between two unequal, mighty bank and weak workman would ultimately ruin the workman and therefore, some part of the amount of compensation is required to be released in favour of the workmen concerned for enabling them to survive and maintain themselves during the intervening period. According to him, when reinstatement has been stayed, being subsistence allowance, workman is entitled for full wages last drawn by him which is not recoverable or refundable in case if ultimately the contentions of the management, bank in this case are upheld by this Court and, therefore, it was his submission that some part of the amount of compensation released in favour of the workmen concerned, otherwise, it would amount to denial of legitimate right to workman when employer has filed petition challenging award in higher up proceedings, ( 4 ) I have considered the submissions on interim relief made by the learned advocates for the parties. However, since I am considering the matter for interim relief only, I am not expressing any opinion on the merits of the matter after consideration of the submissions made by both the learned Advocates before this Court on interim relief. ( 5 ) LEARNED Advocate Mr. Parikh has raised contention before this Court that the initial appointment of these workmen is not in accordance with law and, therefore, Section 25f would not apply. Factual aspect has been narrated by the tribunal in para 31 of the award that these workmen were appointed in response to the advertisement dated 10. 8. 1991 and all the workmen had submitted applications to bank and thereafter, they were selected and appointed on probation and according to the order of appointment on probation, it was necessary for either of the parties to give one month notice in advance in case of termination and they were appointed on fixed salary of Rs. 1600. 00 and their services were terminated on 10th September, 1996. So, as per the discussion made by the Industrial Tribunal in para 32, prima facie, appointment of the workmen is not de hors the rules but some sort of procedure of selection was followed by the bank for making appointment of the workmen. As regards the reliance placed by Mr. Parikh on the decision in Rajasthan Tourism Development Corporation (supra), same aspect has been considered by the apex court in case of Vikramaditya Pandey v. Industrial Tribunal and reported in 2001 AIR SCW 310. Para 6 of said judgment is reproduced as under: ( 6 ) WE have carefully considered the respective contentions made on behalf of the parties. Parikh on the decision in Rajasthan Tourism Development Corporation (supra), same aspect has been considered by the apex court in case of Vikramaditya Pandey v. Industrial Tribunal and reported in 2001 AIR SCW 310. Para 6 of said judgment is reproduced as under: ( 6 ) WE have carefully considered the respective contentions made on behalf of the parties. It is not in dispute that the Award passed by the Tribunal was not challenged by the Bank. The Tribunal as well as the High Court have concurrently found that the case of the appellant was one of retrenchment and that the appellant was working between the period 4-12-1981 to 19-7-1985 with small motivated breaks and that in any case he worked for more than 240 days in a year before termination of services. The Tribunal in para 5 of its Award has stated thus: it is however evident that he worked for much more than 240 days in an year before his service ceased. It is also clear that breaks were given and ad hoc appointment made every time for 90 days or less. This was evidently done to stick to the letter of the law regarding the authority of the bank in regard to making appointments only for limited periods in ad hoc or temporary arrangement, as specified in the service Regulations, 1975. It is however, clear that services of the workman were needed as the work was available but a continuing temporary appointment was not made even though under Regulation 5 (iii) of the Service Regulations such longer term stop-gap appointment (and not only for 90 days) can be made with prior approval of the competent authority (the Board ). It would thus, appear that attempt was made confirm to the letter of law and not its spirit in so far as provisions regarding retrenchment under the Industrial Disputes Act go. The only issue before the High Court was whether the appellant was entilted to reinstatement in service with back wages, once the termination of his services had been held to be illegal and moreso when the same was not challenged. The only issue before the High Court was whether the appellant was entilted to reinstatement in service with back wages, once the termination of his services had been held to be illegal and moreso when the same was not challenged. Ordinarily, once the termination of service of an employee is held to be wrongful or illegal the normal relief of reinstatement with full back wages shall be available to an employee; it is open to the employer to specifically plead and establish that there were special circumstances which warranted either non-reinstatement or non-payment of back wages. In this case we do not find any such pleading of special circumstances either before the Tribunal or before the High Court. Since Regulation 103 of the Regulations is referred to in the order of the Tribunal as well as in the High Court and it has bearing in deciding the controvercy, the focus is needed on it. It reads: 103. The provisions of these regulations to the extent of their inconsistency with any of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, U. P. Dookan Aur Vanijya Adhishthan Adhiniyam, 1962, Workmen s Compensation Act, 1923 and any other Labour Laws for the time being in force, if applicable to any Co-operative Society or class of co-operative societies, shall be deemed to be inoperative. By plain reading of the said Regulation it is clear that in case of inconsistency between the Regulations and the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the State Act, the Workmen s Compensation Act, 1923 and any other labour laws for the time being in force, if applicable to any co-operative society or class of co-operative societies, to that extent Regulations shall be deemed to be inoperative. In other words, the inconsistent provisions contained in the Regulations shall be inoperative, not the provisions of the other statutes mentioned in the Regulation 103. The Tribunal in this regard correctly understood the Regulation but wrongly refused the relief on the ground that no reinstatement can be ordered on a regular employment in view of the provisions contained in the said Regulation. The Tribunal in this regard correctly understood the Regulation but wrongly refused the relief on the ground that no reinstatement can be ordered on a regular employment in view of the provisions contained in the said Regulation. But the High Court read the Regulation otherwise and plainly misunderstood it in saying that if there is any inconsistency between the Regulations and the Industrial Disptues Act, 1947 and other labour laws for the time being in force the Regulations will prevail and the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and other labour laws shall be deemed to be inoperative. This misreading and wrong approach of the High Court resulted in wrong conclusion. In the view it took as to Regulation 103 the High Court proceeded to State that even if there was retrenchment in view of Regulation 5 of the Regulations the Labour Court was not competent to direct reinstatement of the appellant who was not recruited in terms of Regulation 5 because the Labour Court had to act within the ambit of law having regard to the Regulations by which the workman was governed. In this view the High Court declined relief to the appellant which in our view cannot be sustained. The Tribunal felt difficulty in ordering reinstatement as the appellant was not a regular employee. The appellant ought to have been ordered to be reinstated in service once it was found that his services were illegally terminated in the post he was holding including its nature. Thus in our opinion both the Tribunal as well as the High Court were not right and justified on facts and in law in refusing the relief of reinstatement of the appellant in service with back wages. But, however, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and taking note of the fact that the order of termination dates back to 19-7-1985 we think it just and appropriate in the interest of justice to grant back wages only to the extent of 50%. 6. But, however, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and taking note of the fact that the order of termination dates back to 19-7-1985 we think it just and appropriate in the interest of justice to grant back wages only to the extent of 50%. 6. Second decision on the same issue is when the appointment is made contrary to the service rules/de hors recruitment statutory rules, then, Section 25f would apply or not and whether the provisions of the ID Act, 1947 should have to be considered while deciding legality and validity of the termination or not has been considered by the apex court in case of Nagar Mahapalika now Municipal Corporation v. State of UP and Ors. reported in 2006 (5) SCALE page 145. It is a decision given by the apex court on 2nd May, 2006. Relevant paragraph 25 of the said decision is reproduced as under: 25. It is now well settled by a reason of a catena of decisions of this Court that only because the Labour Court may grant relief of reinstatement with full backwages, the same should be granted as a matter of course. The Applicant herein has clearly stated that the appointments of the Respondents have been made in violation of the provisions of the Adhiniyam, An application made in violation of the provisions of Adhiniyam is void. The same, however, although would not mean that the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act are not required to be taken into consideration for the purpose of determination of the question as to whether the termination of workmen from service is legal or not but the same should have to be considered to be an important factor in the matter of grant of relief. The Municipal Corporation deals with public money. Appointments of the Respondents were made for carrying out the work of assessment. Such assessments are done periodically. Their services thus should not have been directed to be continued despite the requirements therefor having come to an end. It is, therefore, in our considered view, not a case where the relief of reinstatement should have been granted. ( 7 ) AS regards decision in Rajasthan Tourism Development Corporation (supra) reference of which was made by the learned Advocate Mr. It is, therefore, in our considered view, not a case where the relief of reinstatement should have been granted. ( 7 ) AS regards decision in Rajasthan Tourism Development Corporation (supra) reference of which was made by the learned Advocate Mr. Parikh before this Court, looking to the case before this Court, said decision is not applicable because in reported decision, apex court has considered provisions of Section 25f of the ID Act, 1947 and Section 25b being condition precedent for attracting Section 25f is that the workman must have worked for 240 days continuously in one calendar year but respondent in said case a house attendant had worked for only 227 days in about four years period from the date of his initial appointment till the date of termination of his services, therefore, it was held that Section 25f is not attracted. Observations made by the apex court in para 4 are in light of the aforesaid factual back ground of the reported case. Apex Court has not examined issue whether Section 25f is applicable in case of initial appointment itself is void but merely observed that it is the settled principle of law that when initial appointment itself is void, then, Section 25f is not applicable while terminating service of a workman. Apex court has not considered two decisions referred to by me in aforesaid paragraph, one is Vikramaditya Pandey v. Industrial Tribunal and Anr. reported in 2001 AIR SCW 310 and the another is Nagar Mahapalika now Municipal Corporation v. State of UP and Ors. reported in 2006 (5) SCALE page 145 where specific question has been examined that even though appointment or engagement is contrary to recruitment rules, then, while deciding legality and validity of such termination, provisions of the ID Act, 1947 would apply and same are required to be considered by the concerned court. Therefore, looking to the facts of the present case, factual details are altogather different than those mentioned reported decision of Rajasthan Tourism Development Corporation Ltd. (supra ). So, said decision of Rajasthan Tourism Development Corporation is not helpful to petitioner and is not applicable in facts of this case, therefore, submission made by learned Advocate Mr. Parikh by relying upon the aforesaid decision is not accepted by this Court. ( 8 ) I have considered the submissions made by the learned Advocate Mr. Parikh. So, said decision of Rajasthan Tourism Development Corporation is not helpful to petitioner and is not applicable in facts of this case, therefore, submission made by learned Advocate Mr. Parikh by relying upon the aforesaid decision is not accepted by this Court. ( 8 ) I have considered the submissions made by the learned Advocate Mr. Parikh. Controversy in light of three decisions including the one in case of Rajasthan Tourism Development Corporation (supra) is, prima facie, no more res integra. However, since I am not examining the matter on merits but considering the case only for the purpose of interim relief, not expressing any final opinion as it would affect either of the parties to these proceedings adversely and since the matter is yet to be examined finally at the time of final hearing. However, prima facie, looking to the facts of this case and keeping in mind one aspect that from the date of termination 10th September, 1996 at present, at least there is likely to be completed 10 years from the date of termination and, therefore, without expressing any final opinion on the merits of the matter and only on the basis of prima facie consideration of the matter, ad. interim relief granted earlier by this Court in this matter is modified as under: 8. Petitioner is directed to deposit an amount of Rs. 50,000. 00 (Rs. Fifty thousand only) in respect of each workmen whose names have been mentioned in the operative portion of the award within four weeks from the date of receipt of copy of this order before Registry of this Court. ( 9 ) PETITIONER is also directed to keep aside an amount of Rs. 1,00,000. 00 (Rupees one lac only) in respect of each workmen whose names have been mentioned in the operative portion of the award and to invest the same in a cumulative fixed deposit for a period of five years subject to renewal from time to time in case if the matter is not heard finally by that time with accrued interest thereon, within four weeks from the date of receipt of copy of this order. It is clarified that the workmen shall not be entitled for interest accruing on such cumulative fixed deposit till the matter is finally heard and decided by this Court. ( 10 ) AFTER the amount of Rs. 50,000. It is clarified that the workmen shall not be entitled for interest accruing on such cumulative fixed deposit till the matter is finally heard and decided by this Court. ( 10 ) AFTER the amount of Rs. 50,000. 00 deposited in respect of each workman whose names have been mentioned in the operative portion of the award by the petitioner, Registry of this Court is directed to pay the same to each of the workmen by way of an account payee cheque drawn in the name of each workman whose names have been mentioned in the operative portion of the award after proper identification by their advocate, subject to filing of an undertaking by each of the workmen herein to the effect that ultimately if the petition is allowed and directions will be issued against them by this Court, then, they will refund the said amount to the petitioner without any interest thereon, subject to final orders that may ultimately be passed in this matter. ( 11 ) DIRECTIONS issued by this Court in para 9 of this order shall also be subject to the final orders that may ultimately be passed by this Court at the time of final hearing of the matter. ( 12 ) AD. interim relief granted earlier in this matter is confirmed subject to the aforesaid directions.