JUDGMENT I.A. Ansari, J. 1. By the impugned judgment and order, dated 31-8-2001, passed in S.T. No. 125 (W.T/K) of 2000, by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, West Tripura, Khowai, the 3 (three) accused-appellants stand convicted under Section 376(2)(g) of the I.P.C. and each of them stands sentenced to suffer imprisonment for life and pay fine of Rs. 10,000/- and, in default, suffer rigorous imprisonment for a further period of 3 (three) months. 2. The case against the accused-appellants, as unfolded at the trial, may, in brief, be described thus : The victim, R, used to live along with her 12 years old son, at the house of one G at Ganki, and earn her livelihood by doing domestic work at the houses of different people in her village. On 20-8-1991, when R was asleep and her son was not at home, the present two accused-appellants along with one Bidhu Paul and Shyamal Sutradhar came to her house at about 12 o' clock at night and called her from outside asking her to open the door of the house. Without suspecting any foul play, when R opened the door, all the miscreants entered into her room and they told her that her son had stolen away their timber. R stoutly denied the allegation that her son had committed theft. The accused-appellant No. 2, then, asked R to get a glass of water for him. After taking water, the accused-appellants and their said associates gave some indecent proposal to Rand, then, all of them, suddenly, caught hold of her, gagged her, threw her on the ground and committed rape on her one after the other. As R was unable to raise alarm, the miscreants continued to subject her to sexual assault till about 4 a.m. and, then, left, whereupon R reported the occurrence to her landlord and also other persons of the locality and requested them to do justice to her; but she received no help from any corner. Left with no alternative, she, eventually, got an Ejhar written and lodged the same, on 22-8-1991, with the police at Ganki Police Out Post. Treating this Ejhar as First Information Report, police registered a case and got R medically examined. During the course of investigation, the two accused-appellants absconded and, on completion of investigation, police laid charge-sheet against the 4 (four) accused persons aforementioned showing the present two appellants as absconders. 3. Treating this Ejhar as First Information Report, police registered a case and got R medically examined. During the course of investigation, the two accused-appellants absconded and, on completion of investigation, police laid charge-sheet against the 4 (four) accused persons aforementioned showing the present two appellants as absconders. 3. In course of time, while the present two accused-appellants along with accused-Shyamlal Sutradhar faced trial accused Bidhu Paul absconded. 4. To the charge framed against them, at the trial, under Section 376(2)(g) of the I.P.C. all the accused, facing the trial, pleaded not guilty. 5. In support of their case, prosecution examined altogether 12 witnesses. The accused were, then, examined under Section 313 of Cr. P.C. and in their examination aforementioned, the accused denied that they had committed the offence alleged to have been committed by them, the case of the defence being, briefly stated, thus : Though all the four accused named by R had visited the house of R, on 20-8-1991, at late hours of the night, looking for her son, who had stolen away their timber, they had not committed rape on R and that R had made false accusation of rape having been committed on her by them. Having, however, found the 3 (three) accused, who had faced the trial, guilty of the offence charged with, the learned trial Court convicted them accordingly and passed sentence against them as hereinabove mentioned. Aggrieved by their conviction and the sentence passed against them, the present 2 (two) accused-appellants have preferred this appeal. 6. We have heard Mr. P. K. Biswas, learned Counsel for the accused-appellants, and Mr. D.Sarkar, learned Public Prosecutor, Tripura. 7. In view of the fact that it is the evidence given by the prosecutrix R (PW 1), which forms the pivot around which revolves the entire case of the prosecution, it is imperative to carefully scrutinize her evidence, in the light of the other evidence available on record, to determine as to how far her evidence can be believed. With this object in mind, when we consider the evidence of P.W.1, we notice that according to her evidence, she used to stay, at the time of the alleged occurrence, as a tenant in the house of P.W.2. With this object in mind, when we consider the evidence of P.W.1, we notice that according to her evidence, she used to stay, at the time of the alleged occurrence, as a tenant in the house of P.W.2. Describing the occurrence, P.W.1 has deposed that on 20-8-1991, at about 12 o'clock at night, accused Anil Sarkar, Bidhu Paul, Shyamal Sutradhar and Panchu Jamatia came and called her from outside the house asking her to open the door, she opened the door without suspecting any foul play and, on the door being opened, all the 4 (four) accused entered into her room and told her that her son had stolen away their timber. It is in the evidence of P.W. 1 that when she denied that her son had stolen any timber, accused Panchu Jamatia asked her to get him a glass of water, she gave accused Panchu Jamatia (i.e. the accused-appellant No. 2) water and, then, the accused persons gave her some unethical proposal and, suddenly thereafter, they gaged her mouth, threw her on the ground and committed rape on her one after the other. It is also in the evidence P.W. 1 that as she had been gaged, she was unable to raise alarm and the accused continued to indulge in the commission of rape till about 4 a.m. 8. Coupled with what have been indicated above, P.W.1 has also deposed that she informed the elders in the village about the occurrence and sought justice from them, but as nothing was done by them, she informed the police, in writing, after two days, Ext. P-2 being her Ejhar, P.W. 1 has further deposed that the accused were her co-villagers and known to her. 9. What is, now, of immense importance to note is that the fact that the accused persons were known to P.W. 1 from before the alleged occurrence was not in dispute at the trial nor is the same in dispute in the present appeal. What is also important to note is that the accused did not dispute the evidence of P.W. 1 that they had visited her house on 20-8-1991 at about 12 o'clock at night. In fact, the accused-appellant No. 1, namely, Anil Sarkar has admitted, in his examination under Section313 of Cr.P.C, that they did go to the house of R as alleged by her. In fact, the accused-appellant No. 1, namely, Anil Sarkar has admitted, in his examination under Section313 of Cr.P.C, that they did go to the house of R as alleged by her. What also cannot be ignored is the fact that the evidence given by P.W.1 explaining as to why there was delay of two days in reporting the occurrence to the police has not, in fact, been disputed by the defence, while cross-examining P.W.1 nor did the defence dispute the assertion of P.W.1 that she had informed the elders in the village about the occurrence. 10. We may pause here to point out that in her cross-examination, P.W.1 asserted, in no uncertain words, that she had informed the elders in their village after the accused had left her house at about 4 a.m. The assertion, so made by her, remains unchallenged by the defence. We may also point out that in her cross-examination, P.W. 1 also asserted that she had fallen ill due to commission of rape on her and this was yet another reason for her belatedly lodging the complaint with the police. This assertion too of P.W. 1, if we closely scrutinize, is seen to have not been challenged by the defence. 11. Moreover, a close and dispassionate scrutiny of the evidence of P.W.1 shows that the crucial aspects of her evidence, as indicated hereinbefore, remains unchallenged. This apart, the defence also failed to elicit anything from her cross-examination to show that what this witness had deposed was untrue or false. The evidence of P.W.1 has, thus, remained unshaken on all relevant and crucial aspects. 12. What, thus, emerges from the above discussion is that notwithstanding the fact that the defence denied that the accused had committed rape on P.W.1, the fact remains that all material aspects of the evidence of P.W.1 remained unshaken and largely undisputed. 13. Bearing in mind the state of unshaken evidence of P.W.1, when the turn to the evidence of the doctor (P.W.11), we notice that according to his evidence, on 22-8-1991, he examined, on police requisition, R at Khowal Hospital and found an abrasion over her right shoulder and multiple abrasions over the right lateral part of her abdomen, the sizes of these abrasions varying between one inch and three inches. 14. 14. As the medical examination of P.W.1 took place after 2 (two) days of the alleged occurrence, quite possible it was for the doctor not to have found any incriminating material on conducting microscopic examination of the vaginal swab of P.W.1. The doctor has, however, made it clear, in his cross-examination, that the injury found on the shoulder of R was not caused by itching. Though P.W.11 (doctor) has opined that R might have been subjected to rape and even if one ignores his opinion, the fact remains that the findings of P.W.11 have remained unchallenged and undisputed. This apart, we see no reason to doubt the veracity or correctness of the findings of P.W. 11. In such circumstances, it is clear from the evidence of P.W. 11 that he had found, on the shoulder of R (P.W.1), an abrasion and multiple abrasions on the right lateral part of her abdomen. These findings lend credible corroboration to the evidence of P.W. 1 that force was applied on her abdominal area. As the medical examination of P.W. 1 lends support to the evidence of P.W.1 it further strengthens the inference that the evidence given by P.W.1 was true and reliable. 15. It has been submitted, at the time of hearing of the present appeal, on behalf of the accused-appellants, that the witnesses, examined by the prosecution, have not proven that P.W.1 had reported the alleged occurrence to any one promptly after the occurrence and there is, thus, according the learned Counsel for the appellants, no convincing explanation for the delay, which has crept in lodging the report with the police. 16. While considering the above aspect of appellants' case, it is of utmost importance to re-call, as we have already pointed out above, that when P.W.1 was under cross-examination by the defence, her assertion that (i) she had informed the elders, in the village, about the occurrence after the accused had left her house at about 4 a.m. (ii) that she had fallen ill, because of the rape committed on her and (iii) that as the elders in the village did not give her justice, she informed the police after two days of the occurrence have all gone unchallenged and undisputed by the defence. When we keep in mind the fact that P.W.1 was a woman, who used to earn her livelihood by rendering domestic help at various houses in the village, and she was, admittedly, a poor widow, it was quite natural for her to report the matter to the elders in her village and expect them to do justice to her; but when the elders failed, she reported the matter to the police and that the process of awaiting justice, at the hands of her elders. In the village, coupled with the fact that she had fallen ill, due to the rape committed by her, the lodging of the information with the police was delayed by 2 (two) days. We do not, in the face of these uncontroverted facts, see any reason to doubt the veracity of the evidence given by P.W.1 as regards the delay in lodging the FIR with the police, particularly, when her evidence offering the explanation for the delay in lodging of the F.I.R. has remained unscathed. 17. On the question of delay in lodging of the First Information Report, it has also been pointed out, on behalf of the accused-appellants, that P.W.2, who was landlord of P.W.1, and P.W.3 who was a co-tenant of P.W.1, have not supported the case of P.W.1 that they had been reported about the alleged occurrence by P.W.1. It is, no doubt, true that while P.W.2 had admitted that at the relevant point of time, P.W.1 used to live in his house as a tenant and the accused are known to him, he has denied that he knew anything about the occurrence. The prosecution has, however, confirmed from the Investigating Officer that in his statement recorded by police, P.W.2 had stated that he had been reported by P.W.1 with tears in her eyes, in the morning of the day following the occurrence, about the rape committed on her. This witness also stated before the police that he had noticed swelling on the face of P.W.1 and her blouse was torn. This witness also stated before the police that he had noticed swelling on the face of P.W.1 and her blouse was torn. Though the previous statements of P.W.2 made to the police are not substantive piece of evidence and his previous statements made to the police cannot be described as true, when he (P.W.2) does not, at the trial, stand by his previous statement to the police, the fact remains that in the light of what this witness (P.W.2) had stated before the police, his assertion, at the trial, that he knows nothing about the occurrence makes him, at least, an unreliable witness, for, his evidence given in the Court is contradicted by his previous statement made to the police. A witness, such as P.W.2, who is himself unreliable, cannot be taken to have impeached or shaken the credibility of the evidence of P.W.1, who has withstood well the test of cross-examination. 18. As regards P.W.3, who was one of the tenants, at the relevant time, in the house of P.W.2, it is noteworthy that P.W.3 has deposed that though he had heard about the rape having been committed on R by some miscreants in her room, he does not remember from whom he had so learnt about the occurrence and that he has also forgotten the names of the miscreants. There is, however, no dispute that P.W.3 is also from village Ganki, where the occurrence had taken place. When the occurrence of rape, true or false, had become public and when the police had been informed about the names of the accused, the ignorance expressed by P.W.3 that he has forgotten even the names of the miscreants, who had allegedly committed rape on R, cannot be readily believed in or relied upon. This apart, even this witness's statement, recorded by the police, reflects that he had stated before the police that he had heard conversation of some persons from the room of R and that he had also learnt about the alleged occurrence. Same as the case of P.W.2, while the previous statement of P.W.3 is not substantive evidence, what, undoubtedly, the previous statement of P.W.3 shows is that this witness too is not a reliable witness, for, his evidence stands contradicted entirely by his previous statement made to the police. Same as the case of P.W.2, while the previous statement of P.W.3 is not substantive evidence, what, undoubtedly, the previous statement of P.W.3 shows is that this witness too is not a reliable witness, for, his evidence stands contradicted entirely by his previous statement made to the police. Similar is the state of the quality of the evidence of P.W.6 and P.W.7, for, the ignorance expressed by these two witnesses about the occurrence and also about the names of the miscreants, which had surfaced, at and around the time of the alleged occurrence, in contradicted by their previous statements made to the police. 19. In short, when P.W.2, P.W.3, P.W.6 and P.W.7 are themselves noticeably unreliable witnesses, their evidence cannot be taken to have impeached, or caused any dent to, the evidence of P.W.1, who has withstood well the test of cross-examination and whose evidence, as already indicated above, remains entirely unshaken and receives support from the medical evidence on record. 20. We may also point out that though there is evidence given by the Investigating Officer to the effect that accused Shyamal Sutradhar and accused Anil Sarkar had absconded, we do not take these incriminating pieces of the evidence on record against the accused-appellants, for, we notice that the learned trial Court had not put any question, while the accused-appellants were being examined under Section 313, Cr.P.C on this aspect of the prosecution's case. 21. Notwithstanding, however, the fact that we keep excluded from the purview of our consideration the evidence adduced by the prosecution to show that the accused-appellants has absconded, the wholly unshaken, simple, natural, consistent and coherent evidence of P.W.1 leave no room for doubt that her evidence is entirely reliable. Moreover, we have to be conscious of the fact that R is a maid-servant and being mother of a son, who was 12 years old, she would not, ordinarily, tarnish her image by making false accusation of rape having been committed on her. Moreover, we have to be conscious of the fact that R is a maid-servant and being mother of a son, who was 12 years old, she would not, ordinarily, tarnish her image by making false accusation of rape having been committed on her. Though it has been agitated, on behalf of the accused-appellants, that the accused have been implicated in totally false accusation of rape in order to put pressure on them not to take action against R's son, who had, according to the defence, stolen away the timber of the accused, what is impossible to ignore is that there is not even an iota of evidence on record indicating that the son of R was really involved in any occurrence of theft and/or that any complaint had been lodged or made against him or against R by any of the four accused persons to anyone in their village or to the police or to any magistrate. In such circumstances, the plea of the accused that they had gone to the house of R (P.W.1) looking for her son cannot be held to have been probabilised far less proved. 22. The effect of what has been pointed out above is that the defence admits that R (i.e. P.W.1) used to live as a tenant in a house along with her son, the accused above-named did go to her house at about 12 o'clock at night on 20-8-1991, they did go inside her house and they remained at her house till about 4 a.m. and, soon after they had left, R did report to her landlord and other elders, in the village, that the accused named by her had committed rape on her; but nothing was done by the co-villagers of R, who was merely a maid-servant, working at various houses, and she, then, lodged a report with the police alleging commission of rape on her by the accused persons aforementioned. What also cannot be lost sight of is the fact that the accused alleged that Rs. What also cannot be lost sight of is the fact that the accused alleged that Rs. 12 year old son had stolen away their timber and it was with the complaint of theft of timber and looking for R's son that they had gone to the house of R. There is, however, no supporting materials indicating that the accused had made any complaint to any one in the village or to the police alleging that their timber had been stolen away by R's son nor is there any evidence to show that R's son had stolen away any timber belonging to the accused. That apart, there is no explanation, either offered by the accused or discernible from the evidence on record, as to why the accused had remained at the house of R till about 4 o'clock at night on 20th of August, 1991. 23. It has been pointed out by Mr. P.K. Biswas, learned Counsel for the accused-appellants, that the learned trial Court did not permit the defence to recall P.Ws.14 and 11 for further cross-examination. While considering this aspect of the grievance of the accused-appellants, we need to point out that when P.W.1 had already been subjected to cross-examination, the defence could not have been allowed another opportunity of cross-examining her without sufficient cause. In this regard, no satisfactory reason had been assigned by the defence to show that they had not been given adequate and effective opportunity to cross-examine P.W.1. As far as P.W.4 is concerned, she deposed nothing against the accused and no reason was assigned by the defence as to why they wanted to recall her as a witness for cross-examination. Coming to P.W.11 (doctor), we must point out that he too had been subjected to cross-examination by the defence, his findings were not in dispute and, hence, there was no cogent reason for recalling him for further cross-examination by the defence. Even at the time of hearing of the present appeal, no convincing reason could be assigned, on behalf of the accused-appellants, to show as to why the witnesses aforementioned ought to have been recalled. Situated thus, we find no force in the submission, now, made on behalf of the accused-appellants, that the learned trial Court ought have recalled the witnesses aforementioned for their cross-examination by the defence. 24. Situated thus, we find no force in the submission, now, made on behalf of the accused-appellants, that the learned trial Court ought have recalled the witnesses aforementioned for their cross-examination by the defence. 24. What crystallizes from the above discussion of the evidence on record is that the testimony of P. W. 1 coupled with the medical evidence on record and the fact that no existing animosity between P.W.1 and the accused could be shown to have ever existed, the evidence of P.W.1, which has remained unshaken and is entirely believable, prove, beyond all reasonable doubt, that the accused-appellants along with the co-accused aforementioned did subject P.W.1 to forcible sexual intercourse and thereby committed offence of gang rape punishable under Section 376(2)(g) of the I.P.C. 25. Because of what have been pointed out above, we find absolutely no merit in this appeal. 26. In the result and for the reasons discussed above, this appeal fails and the same shall accordingly stand dismissed. 27. Send down the records. Appeal dismissed