Judgment :- Koshy, J. This suit is filed by M/s. Vas Pharmaceuticals (India) Limited represented by its Managing Director Vasudevan K., Panthalath, S/o. Krishna Pilla. Prayers (i) and (ii) in the plaint are as follows: (i) Restraining the defendants from causing obstruction to the removal of old rubber trees from plaint schedule property by a permanent prohibitory injunction. (ii) Restraining the defendants by means of a perpetual injunction from forcibly evicting the plaintiff and their men from the plaint schedule property and also trespassing into the plaint schedule property or in any way interfere with the peaceful enjoyment and possession of the plaint schedule property by the plaintiff.” The plaint schedule property is as follows: “The property situated at Palakkad district, Palakkad Taluk, Kadukkamkunnam amsom desom. Description: The plantation having rubber coffee, coconut, cashew nut, arecanut, tamarind, mango and nelli trees and medicinal plants. Extent: 1,300 acres of surveyed land described in the plan attached to the lease deed No.261/63 executed in favour of G.P. Nair Family Trust. Boundaries: East - Mayaparathodu and forest. South - Elaka, rubber estate bounded by Kalliyarpuzha Pilanthodu, Poovanchola and Mayapara Hills. West - Valiyapuzha. North - Forest.” It is the case of the plaintiff that the above plaint schedule property called by name ‘G.P. Nair Plantations’ was obtained on lease from Shri Kallekulangara Emoor Bhagavathi Devaswom Limited by a trust called ‘G.P. Nair Family Trust in the year 1963’ by registered lease deed No.261 of 1963. In 1993 it was transferred to the plaintiff company. According to the plaintiffs, even before leasing the land, permission was obtained for planting the land under the provisions of Madras Preservation of Private Forests Act (for short ‘MPPF Act’) and then only lease was granted and the property was made into a pucca plantation. But, the forest officials as well as fourth respondent are trying to trespass into the property and are not allowing the plaintiff to enjoy the property. With respect to the suit schedule property. Forest Department claimed that it is a private forest vested in the Government in view of the Kerala Private Forests (Vesting and Assignment) Act, 1971 (in short, ‘Vesting Act’) with effect from 10th May, 1971. According to the Forest Department the land is covered by the MPPF Act. Hence, the property is a ‘private forest’ as defined under section 2 (a) of the Vesting Act. According to the Forest Department the land is covered by the MPPF Act. Hence, the property is a ‘private forest’ as defined under section 2 (a) of the Vesting Act. It is also averred that the said property is also notified as vested forest by a notification after demarcating the property as provided under section 6. According to the plaintiff, the lease in favour of G.P. Nair Family Trust was cancelled by the Government and that was confirmed by this court and special leave petitioner filed before the Supreme Court was also dismissed. But, possession remained with G.P. Nair Family Trust as compensation for planting ordered to be paid was not paid by the Devaswom so far. Whether be the contentions, the Forest Department made a claim that this land is vested with the Government and started proceedings to evict the occupants of the land. Therefore, various applications were filed before the Forest Tribunal by the G.P. Nair Family Trust, Emoor Bhagavathi Devaswom and two companies claiming to be assignees to the land by the Tribunal. O.A.No.41 of 1993 is filed by Vasco Rubber and Tyre Co. (P) Ltd. represented by the fourth defendant in the suit for declaring that the land in question is not a vested forest under the Vesting Act as it was a cultivating land before the appointed day, that is, 10th may, 1971. The details of the above applications are as follows: Case Number Filed by I.A. 94/92 - G.P. Nair Family Trust I.A. 16/93 - Emoor Bhagavathy Devaswom I.A. 41/93 - Vasco Rubber & Tyre Co. (P) Ltd. and V.K. Sreenivasan I.A. 46/93 - Vasco Metals & Steels Pvt. Ltd. and three others. Under section 8 of the Vesting Act, if any dispute arises as to whether any land is a private forest or not, the person who claims that the land is not a private forest has to apply to the Forest Tribunal within the time stipulated in the section. Petitioner did not file any application under section 8 of the Vesting Act questioning the claim of the forest officials that it is a ‘private forest’. Plaintiff herein filed an application before the Forest Tribunal for getting himself impleaded in O.A.No.94/92. When that was dismissed, the plaintiff filed a writ petition which is numbered as O.P.No.27317 of 2001. It is still pending before this court. Plaintiff herein filed an application before the Forest Tribunal for getting himself impleaded in O.A.No.94/92. When that was dismissed, the plaintiff filed a writ petition which is numbered as O.P.No.27317 of 2001. It is still pending before this court. Fifth respondent in the O.P. is descried as “V.K. Sreenivasan, S/o. Kunju Velappan, Velampath Veedu, Kaliyara Bunglow, Kaliyara Estate, Padinjare Muri, Malapuzha village, Palakkad”. The O.As. were disposed holding that 21 hectares of property is not forest and it can be restored to Devaswom and balance portion is vested with the Government, Forest Tribunal also found that since lease was cancelled in 1966 ‘G.P. Nair Family Trust’ and all other alleged assignees are trespassers and they cannot claim any right over the property. Here, O.A.No.16 of 1993 filed by the Devaswom was allowed to the extent of 21 hectares of land. O.A.Nos.94 of 1992 and 41 and 46 of 1993 were dismissed. Appeals wee filed and appeals are pending before this Court. Plaintiff filed an impleading petition on 27-10-2005 as I.A.No.3270 of 2005 in M.F.A.No.672 of 2003 filed from O.A.No.41 of 1993 for getting himself impleaded. That is also pending. In the impleading petition it is specifically stated that the plaintiff company was a party in M.F.A.No.541 of 1997. It is also stated by the plaintiff in the above impleading petition that material point to be decided in the O.A. and the M.F.A. is whether the land is private forest vested Government as on 1-7-1991 or not. At paragraph 2 it is stated as follows: “The material point to be decided in the case is whether the property scheduled in O.A.No.41 of 1993 is a private forest vested in the Government as on 11-5-1971.” Further, at paragraph 10 of the impleading petition, it was further contended as follows: “…. The subject matter of the present M.F.A. and the original petition which is pending before this Honourable Court is one and the same. Therefore, whatever decision by this Honourable Court will directly affect the claim of the petitioner company and not anybody else.” So, it is seen that the disputed property in M.F.As. are the same property which is the subject-matter of the suit. 2. Therefore, whatever decision by this Honourable Court will directly affect the claim of the petitioner company and not anybody else.” So, it is seen that the disputed property in M.F.As. are the same property which is the subject-matter of the suit. 2. In this suit filed during the pendency of the appeal before this Court, knowing fully well the contentions of Forest Department and fourth defendant and finding of the Forest Tribunal that out of 1300 acres claimed, except 21 hectares are vested forest, plaintiff obtained in interim injunction from the Munsiff’s Court at Ernakulam. The defendants were Government and Forest officers apart from Shri V.K. Sreenivasan who filed O.A.No.41 of 1993. First petitioner in the above O.A. is described as “Vasco Rubber and Tyre Co. (P) Ltd. represented by its Managing Director V.K. Sreenivasan, Regd. Office at Kalliara Bunglow, Kalliara Estate, Padinhare Muri, Akamalavaram, Malapuzha-1 village, Palakkad Taluk, P.O. Malapuzha Dam, Regional Administrative Office at 35/200, Kalathiparambil Road, Kochi 16. “It is true that in O.A.No.41 of 1993, it is stated that the company has got administrative office at Kalathiparambil Road, Cochin – 682016. Sreenivasan was the second petitioner in O.A.No.41 of 1993 in the personal capacity. He is also supplementary respondent in O.A.No.94/92 and other O.As. In the present plaint his address is shown as V.K. Sreenivasan, S/o. late Kunjuvelappan, Velambath House, 35/2000, Kalathiparambil Road, Kochi – 16. This address is shown as the address of fourth defendant to appear that civil court in Ernakulam has jurisdiction though property is situated in Palakkad district. The following relief was granted by the learned Munsiff in the injunction order dated 12-4-2006: “A temporary prohibitory injunction order is passed restraining the respondents from obstructing the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule property by the petitioner and from causing any obstruction to the removal of rubber trees from the property till the disposal of the suit.” An appeal was filed before the District Court against the injunction order. Since the M.F.As. were posted in the hearing list, the Special Government Pleader filed an application in M.F.A.No.75 of 2004 calling upon the suit before this Court (I.A.No.1289 of 2006 in M.F.A.No.75 of 2004) contending that by getting the above injunction, the vested forests area is trying to be encroached upon. We have called the suit before this Court and posted the case for hearing regarding the maintainability of the suit. We have called the suit before this Court and posted the case for hearing regarding the maintainability of the suit. The matter was heard in detail. 3. Following facts are also necessary to consider the maintainability of the suit. The plaintiff in this case has filed O.S.No.363 of 1999 before the Sub Court, Palakkad for similar relief. Government and Forest officers are the defendants therein though Sri. V.K. Sreenivasan was not a party. Schedule of properties mentioned therein is also the same schedule of properties mentioned in O.S.No.363 of 1999 which is as follows: “The property situated at Palakkad district, Palakkad Taluk, Kadukkamkunnam amsom desom. Description: The plantation having rubber, coffee, coconut, cashew nut, arecanut, tamarind, mango and nelli trees and medicinal plants. Extent: 1,300 acres of surveyed land. Boundaries: East - Mayaparathodu and forest. South – Elaka rubber estate bounded by Kalliyarpuzha Pilanthodu, Poovanchola and Mayapara Hills. West - Valiyapuzha. North - Forest.” No injunction was granted and the suit is still pending. Another suit O.s.No.839 of 1999 was filed before the Munsiff’s Court, Palakkad regarding the same property. It was transferred to the Sub Court, Palakad and re-numbered as O.S.NO.129 of 2004 and that is also pending. In the present suit, nothing is mentioned about these pending suits in the Palakkad courts or Forest Tribunal proceedings or appeals or his impleading petition filed before this court. However, it is averred in the plaint as follows: “But on 6-11-1998 the third defendant and his subordinates attempted to trespass into the plaint schedule property and started to prevent the workers of the plaintiff from doing their agricultural activities in the property and tried to evict the plaintiff and its men forcibly from the plaintiff schedule property. The aforesaid attempt of the third defendant and their subordinates were made futile by resistance of the plaintiff’s workers. In the year 1998 plaintiff filed an injunction suit against Forest Officials and some of these defendants obstructing the peaceful possession and management of the plaintiff and Commission was taken out in that case. The Advocate Commissioner reported that G.P. Nair Plantation is in absolute possession of and enjoyment of the plaintiff company over the entire plantation. Later respondents did not obstruct the possession and enjoyment of plaintiff. Hence that suit has become infructuous. On enquiry. The Advocate Commissioner reported that G.P. Nair Plantation is in absolute possession of and enjoyment of the plaintiff company over the entire plantation. Later respondents did not obstruct the possession and enjoyment of plaintiff. Hence that suit has become infructuous. On enquiry. The 2nd and 3rd defendants claimed that the plaint schedule property is a private forest.” So, the suit O.S.No.129 of 2004 (O.S.No.835 of 2001) and O.S.No.363 of 1999 filed in Palakkad court and Forest Tribunal proceedings and findings were suppressed. 4. The contention of the Special Government Pleader (Forests) is that when Forest Department makes a claim and the matter was already adjudicated by the Forest Tribunal, the civil court has no jurisdiction to consider the question whether the land in question is private forest vested in the Government or not. Under section 6 of the Vesting Act, private forests vested is deemed to be reserved forest. Therefore, with regard to vested forest, a civil suit cannot be filed for injunction against forest officials. If plaintiff has a case that it is not a private forest, his remedy is to approach the Forest Tribunal under section 8 of the Vesting Act. Of course, plaintiff has a contention that the area was not notified as a private forest. For vesting of the forest, publication of notification is not necessary, but, it is automatic. If any person has got objection that it is not a private forest, he has to approach the Forest Tribunal in view of the Full Bench decision reported in Bhargavi Amma v. State of Kerala (1997 (2) KLT 513 FB). Section 13 of the Kerala Private Forests (Vesting and Assignment) Act is as follows: “Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no civil court have jurisdiction to decide or deal with any question or to determine any matter which is by or under this Act, required to be decided or dealt with or to be determined by the Tribunal, the custodian or any other officer.” The Full Bench in Bhargavi Amma’s case held that whether there is notification or not, any question regarding ‘private forest’ claimed as such by the Forest Department as vested forest can be decided only by the Forest Tribunal. Impleading petitions filed in the O.A. and in the M.F.A. as well as in O.P.No.27317 of 2001 show that the plaintiff was aware of the pendency of the M.F.A. and disposed of the O.As. Therefore, filing of the plaint is not only without jurisdiction, but also mala fide suppressing the material facts. 5. We are also of the view that suit with respect to the scheduled property situated at Palakkad cannot be filed at Ernakulam due to lack of territorial jurisdiction in view of the mandate of section 16 of the code Civil Procedure. The suit was filed in Ernakulam district making the fourth defendant with an address in Ernakulam and contending that under section 20 since one of the defendants is residing within the jurisdiction of the Ernakulam court and suit can be filed at Ernakulam. Fourth defendant denied the allegation that he is residing at Ernakulam. But, as earlier stated in the O.As. and even in the writ petition filed by the plaintiff, it is stated that fourth defendant is residing at Palakkad and Cochin address is only an office address. Apart from the above, the property 1300 acres involved in the suit is admittedly situated in Palakkad district. In this connection, we refer to section 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure which is as follows: “16. Suits to be instituted where subject-matter situate:- Subject to the pecuniary or other limitations prescribed by any law, suits – (a) for the recovery of immovable property with or without rent or profits. (b) for the partition of immovable property. (c) for foreclosure, sale or redemption in the case of a mortgage of or charge upon immovable property. (d) for the determination of any other right to or interest in immovable property. (e) for compensation for wrong to immovable property. (b) for the partition of immovable property. (c) for foreclosure, sale or redemption in the case of a mortgage of or charge upon immovable property. (d) for the determination of any other right to or interest in immovable property. (e) for compensation for wrong to immovable property. (f) for the recover of movable property actually under distraint or attachment, shall be instituted in the court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the property is situate: Provided that a suit to obtain relief respecting, or compensation for wrong to, immovable property held by or on behalf of the defendant may, where the relief sought can be entirely obtained through his personal obedience, be instituted either in the court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the property is situate, or in the court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the defendant actually and voluntarily resides, carries on business, or personally works for gain. Explanation:- In this section “property” means property situate in India.” 6. In view of section 16(d), it can be seen that for determination of any right or interest of immovable property, the suit should be filed in the local courts in whose jurisdiction the property is situated. In this connection, we also refer to the decision in Om Prakash v. Anar Singh (AIR 1973 Allahabad 555) wherein it is held as follows: “A relief for injunction flows from and depends upon the existence of rights in property. The right may arise from the title resting on an interest in the property or from title based on possession of the plaintiff. Relief of injunction is of the nature of a consequential relief depending either on title or possession. Where possession is to be protected, the relief will depend normally on the possessory right or title of the plaintiff to hold the property. In the present case, the relief of injunction depends upon the right of the plaintiff to hold the property undisturbed by the defendants. Where possession is to be protected, the relief will depend normally on the possessory right or title of the plaintiff to hold the property. In the present case, the relief of injunction depends upon the right of the plaintiff to hold the property undisturbed by the defendants. The court cannot grant the relief of injunction unless the court makes a determination of the plaintiff’s right to hold and enjoy the property without being disturbed by the defendant.” It was further held: “A suit for injunction in respect of an immovable property can therefore be no exception for the applicability of section 16 (d) C.P.C. and has to be instituted in the court in whose territorial jurisdiction the property lies.” Calcutta High Court in Administrator General of West Bengal v. Sulajini Debi and others (A.I.R. 1962 Cal. 616) held that a suit for the determination of any other right to or interest in immovable property prescribed under section 16 (d) must be instituted in the court within the local limits of whose original jurisdiction the property is situate. It was repeatedly held by various courts that suits claiming some right or interest over immovable property can be filed only at the place where suit schedule property is situated in view of section 16 (d) CPC. (See Nizzar ali v. Mokand Ali – AIR 1932 PC 172 at 178, Mt. Gauhar Jehan Begum v. Mt. Imteyaz Jehan Begum and others – AIR (35) 1948 Pat. 384, Prabhasini Dutta v. Nripendra Nath Sinha – (28) AIR 1941 Cal. 363, Sri Rajah Nayani Venkata Ranga Rao Bahadur Zamindar Garu v. Sri Rajah Tadakamalla Sita Ramachandra Rao Bahadur Zamindar Garu – (AIR 1941 Madras (91). Section 20 is a residuary section and can only cases not decided by sections 5 to 19. Section 20 is applicable only to cases where sections 15 to 19 are not applicable as section 20 starts with the words “Subject to the limitations aforesaid…..” 7. Hon’ble Supreme Court in Narshad Chiman Lal Modi v. DLF Universal Ltd. and another (AIR 2005 SC 4446), after analyzing plethora of decisions explained the effect of sections 15 to 20 of CPC as follows: “13. Now, sections 15 to 20 of the Code contain detailed provisions relating to jurisdiction of courts. They regulate forum for institution of suits. Hon’ble Supreme Court in Narshad Chiman Lal Modi v. DLF Universal Ltd. and another (AIR 2005 SC 4446), after analyzing plethora of decisions explained the effect of sections 15 to 20 of CPC as follows: “13. Now, sections 15 to 20 of the Code contain detailed provisions relating to jurisdiction of courts. They regulate forum for institution of suits. They deal with the matters of domestic concern and provide for the multitude of suits which can be brought in different courts. Section 15 requires the suitor to institute a suit in the court of the lowest grade competent to try it. Section 16 enacts that the suits for recovery of immovable property, or for partition of immovable property, or for foreclosure, sale or redemption of mortgage property, or for determination of any other right or interest in immovable property, or for compensation for wrong to immovable property shall be instituted in the court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the property is situate. Proviso to section 16 declares that where the relief sought can be obtained through the personal obedience of the defendant, the suit can be instituted either in the court within whose jurisdiction the property is situate or in the court where the defendant actually or voluntarily resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain. Section 17 supplements section 16 and is virtually another proviso to that section. It deals with those cases where immovable property is situate within the jurisdiction of different courts. Section 18 applies where local limits of jurisdiction of different courts is uncertain. Section 19 is a special provision and applies to suits for compensation for wrongs to a person or to movable property. Section 20 is a residuary property. Section 20 is a residuary section and covers all those cases not dealt with or covered by sections 15 to 19. 14. Section 16 thus recognizes a well established principle that actions against res or property should be brought in the forum where such res is situate. A court within whose territorial jurisdiction the property is not situate has no power to deal with and decide the rights or interests in such property. 14. Section 16 thus recognizes a well established principle that actions against res or property should be brought in the forum where such res is situate. A court within whose territorial jurisdiction the property is not situate has no power to deal with and decide the rights or interests in such property. In other words a court has no jurisdiction over a dispute in which it cannot give an effective judgment.” The Apex Court also held in the above decision following Hakam Singh v. Ganon (India) Ltd. (AIR 1971 SC 740) that even if parties agree, sits cannot be filed claiming rights in respect of immovable property in a court where the immovable property is not situated as “it is not open to the parties by agreement to confer by their agreement jurisdiction on a court which it does not possess under the Code”. But, the position would have been different “where two courts or more have under the Code of Civil Procedure jurisdiction to try a suit or proceeding on agreement between the parties that the dispute between them shall be tried in one of such courts is not contrary to public policy.” 8. In this case, since the disputed property is situated at Palakkad district, the suit can be filed only at Palakkad. By filing the suit, the petitioner wants to establish that the plaintiff is having title and possession over the property situated in Palakkad district and defendants shall be prevented from interfering in his right. He himself filed suits with the similar reliefs in Palakkad district for the very same property, but failed to get an interim injunction. It shows that he was aware that the suit had to be filed in Palakkad district itself. Petitioner has suppressed the earlier suit to obtain an injunction order. It is the contention of the plaintiff in the present suit that the defendants are having the assistance of the entire administrative machinery (it applies to defendants 1 to 3, that is, Government and forest officials), the plaintiff will not be able to successfully prove the highhandedness of the defendants. It is the contention of the plaintiff in the present suit that the defendants are having the assistance of the entire administrative machinery (it applies to defendants 1 to 3, that is, Government and forest officials), the plaintiff will not be able to successfully prove the highhandedness of the defendants. Therefore, it is highly necessary that defendants are restrained by means of perpetual injunction from evicting the plaintiff forcibly from the plaint schedule property and also from trespassing into the plaint schedule property and, in any way, interfering with the peaceful possession, enjoyment, custody and management of the plaint schedule property by the plaintiff and cut and remove the old rubber trees and replant the estate (See paragraph 16 of the plaint). Forest offices and State are defendants in O.S.No.831 of 1999 pending before the Sub Court, Palakkad. Reliefs claimed in the above plaint and in this suit against the above defendants are one and the same. Allegations against the fourth defendant was that though one Kuruvilla, fourth defendant, has made an attempt to trespass into the property (See: Paragraph 18 of the plaint). The said Kuruvilla is the third defendant in O.S.No.835 of 2001 (now O.S.No.129 of 2004) pending in the Palakkad court filed by the very same plaintiff. These facts clearly show that knowing fully well that jurisdiction of the court is at Palakkad and having failed to get an interim injunction in these suits, this suit was mala fide filed in Ernakulam district making fourth defendant as a party with Ernakulam address suppressing necessary facts. This is apart from the knowledge of the plaintiff regarding the finding of the Forest Tribunal that major portion of the suit property is vested forest. All these facts would show that the suit was filed mala fide for getting an interim injunction. The civil court at Ernakulam has total lack of jurisdiction to deal with the subject matter of the suit. It is a matter of grave concern that even though question of jurisdiction was raised by the defendant, that issue was dealt in a cursory manner. In the above circumstances, we are of the view that the suit is not maintainable. It is clearly an abuse of the process of the court. It is a matter of grave concern that even though question of jurisdiction was raised by the defendant, that issue was dealt in a cursory manner. In the above circumstances, we are of the view that the suit is not maintainable. It is clearly an abuse of the process of the court. Therefore, the suit is dismissed with cost of Rs.25,000/- as exemplary cost and it should be paid to the Forest Department for the upkeep of the forest wealth in our State.