Judgment :- Abdul Gafoor, J. The petitioner did not succeed in assailing the order of dismissal from service before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench. The tribunal dismissed is original application as per Ext. P10. Therefore, this writ petition. 2. The prime contention raised by the petitioner is based on the decision of the Apex court reported in G.M. Tank V. State of Gujarat and others {2006 (5) S.C.C. 446}. Relying on this decision, it is contended that for exactly the same charges framed in the disciplinary proceedings, he had been prosecuted in C.C. No. 352/99 on the file of the Judicial Magistrate of the First Class, Ernakulam and he was acquitted. The evidence adduced in both the proceedings is exactly the same. Therefore, as the charges and evidence forming part in both the cases are one and the same, the finding by the criminal court ought to have been accepted and the finding of misconduct and consequential dismissal order were to be vacated. 3. It is further submitted that there was flagrant violation of Rule 14(18) of the Central Civil services (Classification, Control and Appeals) Rules, 1965 insofar as before finalisation of the inquiry proceedings, the Inquiry authority did not examine as to the circumstances appearing against him in the enquiry. A mere asking whether there was satisfaction with the inquiry was not sufficient. In support of this contention, the decision reported in Dena Bank and Others V. Shakuntala Madhavan {ILR 1999 (1) Kerala 396} is relied on. 4. It is his further contention that 8 pieces of documents specifically requested in Ext. P14 to be supplied to him had never been given to him. This has prejudiced him to effectively defend himself. He further contends that there was no evidence on record, according to him, to fasten guilt and thus to impose a penalty. 5. It is true that the Apex court in G.M. Tank’s case has held as follows: “The judgments relied on by the learned counsel appearing for the respondents are distinguishable on facts and on law. In this case, the departmental proceedings and the criminal case are based on identical and similar set of facts and the charge in a departmental case against the appellant and the chare before the criminal court are one and the same. In this case, the departmental proceedings and the criminal case are based on identical and similar set of facts and the charge in a departmental case against the appellant and the chare before the criminal court are one and the same. It is true that the nature of charge in the departmental proceedings and in the criminal case is grave. The nature of the case launched against him during inquiry and investigation and as reflected in the charge-sheet, factors mentioned are one and the same. In other words, charges, evidence, witnesses and circumstances are one and the same. In the present case, criminal and departmental proceedings have already noticed or granted on the same set of facts, namely, raid conducted at the appellant’s residence, recovery of articles there from. The Investigating Officer Mr. V.B. Ravel and other departmental witnesses were the only witnesses examined by the inquiry officer who by relying upon their statement came to the conclusion that the charges were established against the appellant. The same witnesses were examined in the criminal case and the criminal court on the examination came to the conclusion that the prosecution has not proved the guilt alleged against the appellant beyond any reasonable doubt and acquitted the appellant by its judicial pronouncement with the finding that the chare has not been proved. It is also to be noticed that the judicial pronouncement was made after a regular trial and on hot contest. Under these circumstances, it would be unjust and unfair and rather oppressive to allow the findings recorded in the departmental proceedings to stand.” 6. In order to apply this dictum, the charges on which the delinquent had been proceeded against in the disciplinary action and the charges framed in the criminal case in respect of the incident shall be the same and the evidence on record shall also be the same. Then alone the finding of the criminal court can have relevance in the imposition of penalty or confirming the penalty. 7. The charges framed against the delinquent/petitioner, during the departmental proceedings, were as follows: “ARTICLE I: That the said Shri KB Babu, while functioning as Storekeeper in storehouse 24 did misappropriate 12 KL LSHSD by diverting on the way on 07, March 95. 7. The charges framed against the delinquent/petitioner, during the departmental proceedings, were as follows: “ARTICLE I: That the said Shri KB Babu, while functioning as Storekeeper in storehouse 24 did misappropriate 12 KL LSHSD by diverting on the way on 07, March 95. The said act of Shri KB Babu, storekeeper is unbecoming of a government servant within the meaning of Rule 3(1) (iii) of Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964. ARTICLE II: That during the aforesaid period and while functioning in the aforesaid office, the said Shri KB Babu, storekeeper had misappropriated 4 KL LSHSD by off loading it in the diesel tank of Naval store depot, Kochi pump. The said act of Shri KB Babu, Storekeeper is unbecoming of a government servant within the meaning of Rule 3(1) (iii) of Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964. ARTICLE III: That during the aforesaid period and while functioning in the aforesaid office, the said Shri KB Babu, Storekeeper failed to Keep proper records of the lorry receipt and signed the Marine delivery Receipts without checking the lorry receipts. The said act of Shri KB Babu, Storekeeper is unbecoming of government servant within the Rule 3(1) (iii) of Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964. ARTICLE IV: That during the aforesaid period and while functioning in the aforesaid office, the said Shri KB Babu, Storekeeper did adulterate stock of HSD held in petrol pump with 4000 litres of LSHSD meant for Indian Navy ships on 08 Mar 95 in collusion with Shri VV Jacob, Senior Storekeeper. The said act of Shri KB Babu, Storekeeper is unbecoming of a government servant within the Rule 3(1) (iii) of Central Civil Services (Conduct) rules, 1964.” 8. The judgment of the criminal court is produced as Ext. P23. The charge in the criminal court as discernible therefrom was as follows: “The case of the prosecution in brief is as follows: Accused Nos. 1 and 2 are the person directly controlling the oil exchange of IOC and Naval Base. Accused Nos. 1 and 2 were the employees of Naval base. The transportation of oil from IOC to Naval Base was conducted through the lorry bearing No. KL 7-D 187 wherein accused Nos. 3 was the driver and accused No. 4 was the cleaner. On 7-3-95, 12 K.L. LSHSD taken from IOC by Virtue of delivery challan No. 61707 was disposed in furtherance of conspiracy by accused Nos. The transportation of oil from IOC to Naval Base was conducted through the lorry bearing No. KL 7-D 187 wherein accused Nos. 3 was the driver and accused No. 4 was the cleaner. On 7-3-95, 12 K.L. LSHSD taken from IOC by Virtue of delivery challan No. 61707 was disposed in furtherance of conspiracy by accused Nos. 1 and 2 against the violation of their duties and with the intent to make money for their own gain and the 4th accused sold 12 KL of LSHSD to the petrol pump near Angamali which is under the supervision of accused No. 5 and ownership of accused no. 6 for an amount of Rs.60,000/-and accused Nos. 1 to 4 equally shared the amount for their own gain. First and 2nd accused being government servants and employees of Naval Base illegally disposed the diesel by fabricating marine delivery receipt and committed breach of trust and it caused loss of Rs. 1,00,000/- to Naval Base. Thus they committed the offence. A cursory reading of these two reveals that the charges the petitioner faced in these cases are not similar. The charge before the criminal court was in relation to the criminal breach of trust; and the conspiracy that had been hatched to commit criminal breach of trust; whereas the charges in relation to the departmental proceedings were misappropriation and mishandling of articles in the capacity as Storekeeper, the conduct unbecoming of a government servant and not properly verifying the marine delivery receipts viz. lorry receipts and the articles in the store, of which he was the storekeeper. Necessarily, when the charges are thus different, merely because both were in respect of the store articles handled by him, the dictum in G.M. Tank case cannot be applied in the fact-frame of this case. G.M. Tank case was one were the delinquent had been proceeded against departmentally for amazing wealth disproportionate to his income and simultaneously prosecuted alleging offence punishable under Section 5(1) (e) read with section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption, 1988 for the very same charge of amazing disproportionate wealth as compared to his income. The amount mentioned in both the sets charges were one and the same viz., Rs.2,54,180.00. So, the dictum in G.M. Tank case rests much upon the facts revealed there and therefore, does not apply to this case. 9. The amount mentioned in both the sets charges were one and the same viz., Rs.2,54,180.00. So, the dictum in G.M. Tank case rests much upon the facts revealed there and therefore, does not apply to this case. 9. Of course, Sub-rule (18) of Rule 14 of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, Provides that the inquiring authority may, after the government servant closes his case, and shall, if the government servant has not examined himself, generally question him on the circumstances appearing against him in the evidence for the purpose of enabling the government servant to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him. This contention is not seen taken up at the initial stage, in his submission made to the disciplinary authority, when the inquiry report was furnished to him. Nothing of that sort is brought to our notice. Of course, such a contention had been taken in the memorandum of appeal after the penalty had been imposed. It had been duly adverted to by the appellate authority who found that contention was not justified going by the minutes of the inquiry and the question Nos. 335 to 337 in the inquiry proceedings. It is submitted on behalf of the petitioner that such questions were only with regard to the propriety and the satisfactory nature of the inquiry and not with regard to anything relating to the circumstances appearing against him in the inquiry. According to him, infraction of that provision amounts to violation of the principles of natural justice. 10. The procedure in Sub Rule 18 of rule 14 being not an inevitable component of the essential opportunity of hearing in a disciplinary proceedings, it is incumbent on the delinquent to show and demonstrate as to the prejudice caused by reason of that infraction, if at all there is. 11. The application of the principles of natural justice intends to prevent an authority vested with power from acting arbitrarily affecting the rights of others. No better instruments has been devised for assuring to give a person in jeopardy an opportunity to meet the case against him. There has been, since the judgment of Lord Reid in Ridge v. Baldwin {1963 (2) All.E.R. 66}, considerable fluctuation of judicial opinion as to the degree of strictness with which the rules of natural justice are to be extended. There has been, since the judgment of Lord Reid in Ridge v. Baldwin {1963 (2) All.E.R. 66}, considerable fluctuation of judicial opinion as to the degree of strictness with which the rules of natural justice are to be extended. The cardinal point to be considered in every case alleging violation of the principles of natural justice is whether the incumbent did have a reasonable opportunity of presenting his case. The earlier view taken in S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan {1980 (4) S.C.C. 379} by Chennappa Reddy, J. was the principles of natural justice know no exclusionary rule and non-observance of natural justice itself is a prejudice and proof of any other independent prejudice was unnecessary. In K.G. Tripathi v. State Bank of India {1984 (1) S.C.C. 43} it was laid down that not mere violation of natural justice, but de facto prejudice other than non-issuance of notice had to be proved. In State Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma {1996 (3) S.C.C. 364} the Supreme found that: “In respect of procedural provisions other than of a fundamental nature, the theory of substantial compliance would be available. In such cases, complaint/objection on this score have to be judged on the touchstone of prejudice, as explained later in this judgment. In other words, the test is: all things taken together whether the delinquent officer/employee had or did not have a fair hearing”. And that: “It would not be correct-in the light of the above decisions to say that for any and every violation of a facet of natural justice or of a rule incorporating such facet, the order passed is altogether void and ought to be set aside without further inquiry. In our opinion, the approach and test adopted in B. Karunakar (1993) 4 SCC 727) should govern all cases where the complaint is not that there was no hearing (no notice, no opportunity and no hearing) but one of not affording a proper hearing (i.e., adequate or a full hearing) or of violation of a procedural rule or requirement governing the enquiry; the complaint should be examined on the touchstone of prejudice as aforesaid”. 12. 12. Nothing this and the ruling in Rajendra Singh v. State of M.P. {1996 (5) S.C.C. 460, it has been held in Alighar Muslim University v. Mansoor Ali Khan {2000 (7) SCC 529} that the principle that: “In addition to breach of natural justice, prejudice must also be proved has been developed in several cases” And that, since then the Apex Court has been consistently applying the principles of prejudice. Because, there is no such thing as a merely technical infringement of natural justice. As noticed in S.K. Sharma, there is distinction between ‘no hearing’ and ‘no adequate hearing’ or ‘no opportunity’ and ‘no adequate opportunity’, e.g. Dismissal of a person without hearing and dismissal without furnishing copy of the report or without due opportunity to cross-examine a witness. The former comes within ‘no opportunity’ and therefore, invalid or void. The latter comes only in the violation of a facet of the rules of natural justice. Then the sustainability of the order has to be tested on the touchstone of prejudice. 13. Viewed in that angle, it cannot be said that violation of a rule insisting for a facet of natural justice will result in declaring the order void. The approach and test adopted by the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in B. Karunakar (1993) 4 SCC 727) should govern such cases. Where the complaint is not that there was ‘no opportunity’ and ‘no hearing’, but one of ‘not affording a proper hearing’ or ‘violation of a facet of natural justice’, the person complaining must show causation of a prejudice as against him by reason of such violation. In such situation, the extent of prejudice suffered shall be the basis for the decision of the Court. 14. As put it by Clive Lewis: “The fact that the applicant has suffered no prejudice as a result of the error complained of may be a reason for refusing him relief. It is necessary to keep in mind the purpose of the public law principle that has technically been violated, and ask whether that underlying purpose has in any event been achieved in the circumstances of the case. If so, the courts may decide that the breach has caused no injustice or prejudice and there is no need to grant relief”. It is necessary to keep in mind the purpose of the public law principle that has technically been violated, and ask whether that underlying purpose has in any event been achieved in the circumstances of the case. If so, the courts may decide that the breach has caused no injustice or prejudice and there is no need to grant relief”. {Judicial Remedies in Public Law Sweet & Maxwell} This is only a restatement of the principle laid down by Lord Wilberforce in Malloch v. Aberdeen corporation {1971 (2) All E.R. 1272} as follows: “A breach of procedure, whether called a failure of natural justice, or an essential administrative fault, cannot give him a remedy in the courts, unless behind it there is something of substance which has been lost by the failure”. In a given case alleging such violation, he has “also to show that he was seriously prejudiced thereby” {See Sohan Lal Gupta v. Asha Devi Gupta [2003 (7) SCC 492] 15. No such prejudice, if at all any, had been averred before the tribunal below or urged before us. Therefore, the alleged violation, even if accepted, in the absence of prejudice shown, cannot result in invalidating the order imposing penalty. 16. Moreover, he did not point out this aspect to the disciplinary authority when he was given notice of the penalty. It was an apt opportunity to mention it. Anyhow, when pointed out in appeal, the Appellate authority found that there was no such violation in the light of questions Nos.335 to 337 put to the delinquent by the Inquiry Officer. He could have pointed out his objection to the inquiry proceedings at that time. He did not do so. So, it cannot be said that there was any violation, in effect, as alleged. The decision in Dena Bank’s case cannot have, therefore, any application to the fact frame and the pleadings in this case. 17. The charge sheet contained annexures including the documentary evidence to be relied on during the inquiry and the witnesses to be examined. In Annexure 14 produced before the tribunal below what the petitioner had asked the Inquiry Officer was to provide him with certain documents. There is no such provision in the Rules enabling the disciplinary authority or inquiring authority to provide the delinquent with copies of documents. In Annexure 14 produced before the tribunal below what the petitioner had asked the Inquiry Officer was to provide him with certain documents. There is no such provision in the Rules enabling the disciplinary authority or inquiring authority to provide the delinquent with copies of documents. The opportunity asked by the delinquent in respect of the documents is to peruse the same and if necessary to take extract for the purpose of defending himself. He has no case that he was not allowed to peruse the documents. Therefore, it cannot be stated that the Inquiry Officer has erred while rejecting the submission made in Ext.P.14 that he may be provided with documents. 18. Moreover, if at all any document not already on record had been necessary, he could have asked the Inquiry officer, for causing it to be produced by the disciplinary authority. That had never been done by the petitioner. 19. Moreover, the finding of guilt is based on the documents produced during the inquiry. Acceptability of the said documents had never been in question. 20. In such circumstances, the tribunal had not erred in dismissing the application filed before it challenging imposition of the penalty of dismissal of the petitioner from service. Writ Petition fails, dismissed.