Research › Search › Judgment

Andhra High Court · body

2006 DIGILAW 589 (AP)

National Insurance Company Limited, Ameerpet Branch, Hyderabad v. M. Jagan Mohan

2006-04-28

L.NARASIMHA REDDY

body2006
JUDGMENT This C.M.A. is filed under Rule 1 of order 43, read with Section 105 C.P.C., against an order dated 3-5-2005, passed by the I Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Secunderabad, in I.A. No.2913 of 2004 in O.P.No.161 of 2002. 2. The 1st respondent filed O.P., claiming that on 19-5-2002, he proceeded on his scooter bearing No.AP-28C-5518 to Ryotu bazaar at Erragadda, abutting National Highway No.9, and when he was returning, a 7-Seater auto bearing No.AP-13W-4395, came in a rash and negligent manner and hit the scooter. He stated that he received grievous injuries and was shifted to Gandhi Hospital, for treatment. He claimed a sum of Rs.1,50,000/-, towards compensation. The accident vehicle is owned by the 2nd respondent and insured with the appellant. Both of them were set ex parte, and ultimately, through an ex parte order dated 6-11-2003, the Tribunal awarded a sum of Rs.1,50,000/-. 3. The appellant herein filed an application, to set aside the ex parte order dated 6-11-2003. Since there was delay in presentation of the application, it filed I.A.No.2913 of 2004, under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The application was dismissed, through order dated 3-5-2005. 4. Sri T. Mahender Rao, learned counsel for the appellant, submits that the appellant could not participate in the proceedings before the Tribunal, on account of communication gap, and the delay occurred on account of the fact that the factum of filing of O.P. was not informed to him by the concerned officials in the company. He stated that as soon as the appellant came to know about the ex parte decree, steps were taken to get it set aside, and that the delay is neither wilful nor wanton. 5. Sri C. Butchi Reddy, learned counsel for, the 1st respondent, submits that the appellant was served with summons in the O.P., and despite the same, it did not take any action to contest the matter. He submits that the Tribunal was left with no alternative, except to pass the ex parte order. He raises an objection as to the maintainability of the C.M.A., against an order dismissing the application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 6. Learned counsel for the 1st respondent resisted the C.M.A, on the ground of maintainability. He submits that the Tribunal was left with no alternative, except to pass the ex parte order. He raises an objection as to the maintainability of the C.M.A., against an order dismissing the application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 6. Learned counsel for the 1st respondent resisted the C.M.A, on the ground of maintainability. He submits that an appeal under Order 43 Rule 1 C.P.C. can be maintained, only against an order passed in an application filed under Order 9 Rule 13 C. P.C., and no such appeal can be maintained against an order refusing to condone the delay in filing an application to set aside the ex parte decree or order. 7. It is true that Order 43 Rule 1 C.P.C., provides for an appeal, against an order passed under Order9 Rule 13, in the context of setting aside the ex parte decrees. Where such application is filed with delay, it becomes necessary to file an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Viewed in isolation, the order passed in an application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, can be assailed only by filing a revision, be it under Section 115 C.P.C. or under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Where, however, the dismissal had the effect of rejection of application filed under Order 9 Rule 13, it becomes permissible for the aggrieved party to avail the remedy of appeal under Order43 Rule 1 C.P.C. There is support, though not absolute, fort his proposition, in the judgment rendered by the Supreme Court in M/s. Essar Constructions v. N.P.Rama Krishna Reddy1. In Babumiyam v. K. Seetharamayya2 a Division Bench of this Court maintained distinction between the order refusing to condone delay, on the one hand, and the resultant dismissal of O.P. or appeal, as the case may be, on the other hand. In the instant case, though what is challenged is the order passed in an application filed under Section 5, for all practical purposes, it is the resultant order of dismissal of the application filed under Order 9 Rule 13 C.P.C, that becomes material. Obviously, because no separate order was passed by the Tribunal in this regard, the appellant filed the C.MA against the order in an application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Hence, it can be treated as maintainable. 8. Obviously, because no separate order was passed by the Tribunal in this regard, the appellant filed the C.MA against the order in an application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Hence, it can be treated as maintainable. 8. The Tribunal rejected the application to condone delay of 385 days. It is no doubt true that the appellant was served with notice in the O.P. However, a plea was raised to the effect that the factum of filing of the O.P. was not brought to the notice of the Divisional Office, though the record discloses that summons were received at the Branch Office. Having regard to the frequency with which the matters are filed against it, the appellant had centralized its activities, in this regard, at the Divisional Offices. Service of summons in the Branch Office would no doubt constitute compliance, but if the communication did not reach the concerned section or agency in the office, and if the same has resulted in non prosecution of the matter, it cannot be said that there was any deliberate omission, on the part of the appellant, in prosecuting the matter. In view of the vast expansion of the activities and pursuit in all the claims, accidental omission in one stray case, cannot be treated as deliberate, or wilful omission, to prosecute the matter. 9. There is another factor, which prompts this court to provide an opportunity to the appellant herein, to participate in the proceedings. Having set the appellant and the 2nd respondent herein ex parte, the Tribunal proceeded to pass an award for the entire amount claimed by the 1st respondent, on the sole ground that the respondents in the O.P. were set ex parte. The actual ad judicatory part of the order reads as under: "Exs.A-1 to A-8 are marked. Heard. Petitioners claim is found to be proved. Petition is allowed with costs" This has resulted in awarding a sum of Rs.1,50,000/-, as compensation, with interest at 9%. Even assuming that there was no resistance by the owner of the vehicle or the insurer, it was obligatory on the part of the Tribunal, to analyze as to what exactly was the nature of injuries, what are the respective amounts to be awarded towards pain and suffering, loss of earnings, expenditure incurred for treatment etc. Even assuming that there was no resistance by the owner of the vehicle or the insurer, it was obligatory on the part of the Tribunal, to analyze as to what exactly was the nature of injuries, what are the respective amounts to be awarded towards pain and suffering, loss of earnings, expenditure incurred for treatment etc. The mere fact that the respondents in an O.P. remained ex parte, does not enable the Tribunal to award the claim as prayed for, without satisfying itself, as to the various factors indicated above. 10. For the foregoing reasons, the C.M.A. is allowed, and the order under appeal is set aside. To avoid further delay and complications in the matter, I.A.No.2913 of 2004, and the application filed underOrder9 Rule 13 C.P.C. are allowed. The ex parte order dated 6-11-2003 shall stand set aside. The Tribunal shall dispose of the O.P., afresh, after giving an opportunity to the appellant herein. 11. The appellant had deposited half of the amount awarded by the Tribunal, through the ex parte order. The 151 respondent shall be entitled to withdraw a sum of Rs.50,000/- (fifty thousand), without furnishing any security, and the balance shall remain to the credit of the O.P., till it is disposed of. The withdrawal of the amount by the 151 respondent shall be subject to the outcome of the O.P. 12. There shall be no order as to costs.