JUDGMENT I.A. Ansari, J. 1. This is the third round of writ petitions, which challenge the legality and fairness of the selection process, undertaken and conducted by the Respondents/authorities concerned, for the purpose of making appointments to thirty two numbers of Assistant Enforcement Inspector and thirty two numbers of Assistant Enforcement Checker under the Department of Transport, Govt. of Assam. Since all these writ petitions arise out of the same selection process, all the writ petitions are closely inter-linked and since the decision in any of these writ petitions, would affect the outcome of the other writ petitions, all these writ petitions have been, on the request made by the learned Counsel for the parties, heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment and order. 2. Before I come to the facts of the individual writ petitions, let me point out some salient facts, which are undisputed and common to all the writ petitions. These facts are set out, in brief, as follows: (i) By various orders passed, in the year 2001, by the Department of Transport, Govt. of Assam, as many as 17 persons were given appointment as ad hoc Enforcement Checkers and Assistant Enforcement Inspectors. By an employment notice, dated 19.7.2001, issued by the Government of Assam, Department of Labour and Enforcement, a selection process was initiated for appointment to the posts of Assistant Enforcement Inspectors and Enforcement Checkers in the Department of Transport, Govt. of Assam. Pursuant to this employment notice, a written examination was held on 3.2.2002. This was followed by a viva voce test, which commenced on 25.11.2002. Following the selection process, so held, requisite orders appointing 32 number of Assistant Enforcement Inspectors and 32 number of Enforcement Checkers were made on 25.1.2003. The entire selection process, leading to as many as 64 appointments aforementioned, came to be challenged by a number of writ petitions including a Public Interest Litigation, the Chief grievances of the Petitioners being that there were large scale irregularities and use of unfair means in the selection process, some of the candidates had already been furnished question papers in advance, mobile phones were allowed to be used inside the examination hall and the list of the candidates was more or less pre-selected. As these writ petitions were, eventually, dismissed, the matter was carried to the Supreme Court by way of Civil Appeal Nos. As these writ petitions were, eventually, dismissed, the matter was carried to the Supreme Court by way of Civil Appeal Nos. 6093, 6086 and 6098 of 2003. When these appeals came up, on 8.8.2003, for orders, the Apex Court, in keeping with the decision of the State Government to hold fresh examination for the posts aforementioned, set aside the entire selection process leading to the appointments aforementioned with directions that prior to holding of the examination, advertisement must be published in local newspapers throughout the State indicating therein the eligibility criteria for selection. The Apex Court also directed that ad hoc appointees would continue to hold, which they were occupying so far, the posts, in question, till regular appointments were made without, however, creating any equitable right in favour of the ad hoc appointees. The Apex Court, however, made it clear that if the ad hoc appointees wished to be regularly appointed, they must sit for the examination and if they are successful, they should be called for viva voce test. (ii). Thereafter, the Assam Transport Service Rules, 2003, (in short, 'the Rules of 2003') was framed in exercise of powers conferred under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India regulating recruitments and conditions of service of persons appointed to the Assam Transport Service and the same came into effect from 10.10.2003. An Examination Committee was constituted, on 4.11.2003, purportedly under the provisions of the Rules of 2003 for the purpose of selecting the candidates for the said two sets of posts, namely, Assistant Enforcement Inspectors and Enforcement Checkers and this was followed by an advertisement published, on 21.12.2003, inviting applications for the 64 posts aforementioned. This advertisement was further followed by a written test held on 26.6.2004. Thereafter, on 18.12.2004, a Selection Committee was constituted for conducting the selection process. The legality and fairness of this selection process came to be challenged, on 1.4.2005, by the ad hoc appointees in a writ petition, which gave rise to WP (C) No. 2594/2005. An interim direction was passed, on 1.4.2005, in WP (C) No. 2594/2005, prohibiting publication of the result of the written test. This interim direction was subsequently modified, on 13.4.2005, permitting result of the written examination to be declared and also granting leave to the authorities concerned to hold viva voce tests. An interim direction was passed, on 1.4.2005, in WP (C) No. 2594/2005, prohibiting publication of the result of the written test. This interim direction was subsequently modified, on 13.4.2005, permitting result of the written examination to be declared and also granting leave to the authorities concerned to hold viva voce tests. While so granting leave, the Court restrained the Respondents/authorities concerned from publishing final select list/merit list of the candidates. Pursuant to the interim directions passed on 13.4.2005, a list of candidates selected for viva voce test was published and the viva voce tests were held on different dates with effect from 27.5.2005 to 7.6.2006. The entire selection process also came to be challenged in a writ petition filed by those, who were not ad hoc appointees, but were fresh candidates. This writ petition gave rise to WP (C) No. 5033/2004. (iii) On finding that the Selection Committee, constituted vide order, dated 18.12.2004, aforementioned had not been conceived by, or authorized under, the Rules of 2003, the Court concluded that the written examination had been conducted without the Selection Board having been brought into existence, though for conducting of a valid selection process, a Selection Board, has envisaged under the Rules of 2003, was mandatory. This having not been done, the entire selection process was, according to the court, contrary to the provisions of the Rules of 2003 and the same, therefore, stood vitiated for non-compliance of the mandatory requirement of the Rules of 2003. For the conclusions, so reached, the Court set aside the entire selection process held pursuant to the advertisement, dated 21.12.2003, aforementioned. (iv). Thereafter, the third process of selection for filling up of the thirty-two posts of Assistant Enforcement Inspector and thirty-two posts of Enforcement Checker commenced with an advertisement published on 30.7.2005. The All Assam Unemployed Youth Organization, an association of the unemployed educated youth in Assam, challenged the said advertisement, dated 30.7.2005, on, primarily, two grounds, namely, that enough time had not been given for making applications by the candidates and that the requirement of making payment of Rs. 50/- as application fee was contrary to the Government's own decision taken as far back as on 3.8.1989, which had dispensed with the requirement of payment of application fees, while making application for employment under the State Government by unemployed youth. This writ petition gave rise to WP (C) No. 5880/2005. 50/- as application fee was contrary to the Government's own decision taken as far back as on 3.8.1989, which had dispensed with the requirement of payment of application fees, while making application for employment under the State Government by unemployed youth. This writ petition gave rise to WP (C) No. 5880/2005. This writ petition was disposed of on 19.8.2005, when a submission was made, on behalf of the Respondents/authorities concerned, that the last date for submission of the application had been extended up to 30.8.2005 and that the requirement of making payment of application fees had already been waived. Pursuant to the advertisement, dated 30.7.2005, a large number of applications were submitted by the candidates including the ad hoc appointees aforementioned. Following the advertisement aforementioned, the written examination was scheduled to be held on 25.09.2005; but before the written examination could be held, two writ petitions were filed before this Court, one by the ad hoc appointees aforementioned, this writ petition having been filed on 22.9.2005 and the other one by the All Assam Unemployed Youth Association, the same having been filed on 15.9.2005. While the former writ petition came to be registered as WP (C) No. 6839/2005, the later one was registered as WP (C) No. 6602/2005. (v). While issuing notice of motion, in WP (C) No. 6602/2005, on 21.9.2005, the Court passed an interim direction to the effect that the selection made pursuant to the advertisement, dated 30.7.2005, aforementioned, shall be subject to the out-come of the writ petition. In WP (C) No. 6839/2005, the Court, while issuing notice of motion, on 23.9.2005, allowed the Respondents concerned to proceed with the process of selection and hold both written examination as well as viva voce test as scheduled, but not to publish the result of the final selection without prior leave of the Court. Following the interim directions, so given, written test as well as viva voce have already been concluded. As the official Respondents concerned sought for permission to publish the results of the selection process, the writ petitions were taken up for hearing and the writ petitions have been accordingly heard. 3. In the background of the facts and circumstances mentioned hereinabove, let me, now, set out, in brief, the case of the writ Petitioners in the four writ petitions, which have been heard. WP (O 6839/2005 4. While in this writ petition, the writ Petitioner Nos. 3. In the background of the facts and circumstances mentioned hereinabove, let me, now, set out, in brief, the case of the writ Petitioners in the four writ petitions, which have been heard. WP (O 6839/2005 4. While in this writ petition, the writ Petitioner Nos. 1 to 7 are ad hoc appointees as Assistant Enforcement Inspectors, the Petitioner Nos. 8 to 16 are ad hoc appointees as Enforcement Checkers. The grievances of these two categories of ad hoc appointees, as expressed in the writ petition, are common. These Petitioners challenge the entire selection process on the following five grounds: (i) Since the selection process was initiated with the publication of the notice, dated 19.7.2001, inviting applications for appointment to the said 32 posts of Assistant Enforcement Inspector and 32 posts of Enforcement Checker, the subsequent selection process ought to have been kept confined with those persons, who were eligible to participate in the selection process, when selection process commenced with the publication of the notice, dated 19.7.2001, aforementioned, particularly, when the subsequent selection processes held, in this regard, including the one, which is the subject-matter of controversy in the present writ petition, are not fresh selection processes, but are, as a matter of fact, continuation of the first selection process, which commenced in the year 2001 as already indicated hereinbefore. By opening the scope of competition to those candidates, who became qualified in the year 2002 or thereafter, the authorities have placed the candidates, who had appeared for selection in the year 2001, including these Petitioners at a disadvantageous position. (ii) As the selection process relates to the vacancies, which were sought to be filled up in the year 2001, the Rules of 2003, which came into force with effect from 10.10.2003, cannot be resorted to and in this view of the matter, the selection procedure having been initiated and conducted, in the year 2005, by publication of the latest advertisement, dated 30.7.2005, under the Rules of 2003, is not sustainable in law. When the selection procedure was initiated with the publication of the notice on 19.7.2001, the Assam Transport Services Rules 1983 (in short, 'the Rules of 1983') and the Assam Transport Services (Recruitment and Promotion) to the posts of Assistant Enforcement Inspectors Orders, 1990, (in short, 'the Service Orders of 1990') were in force and, hence, the provisions of the Rules of 1983 and of the Service Orders of 1990 were applicable to the selection procedure. In short, the recruitment procedure ought to have been in accordance with the Rules, which were in force at the time, when the vacancies arose or when the selection process was initiated. In such circumstances, the Rules of 1983 read with the Service Order of 1990 would regulate the selection process and not the Rules of 2003. (iii) By not framing any definite scheme, as envisaged under Rule 6(1)(c) of the Rules of 2003, the Respondents/authorities concerned have assumed unfettered and unbridled power to conduct examination in any manner as they desired. In the absence of any definite scheme as aforesaid, the entire selection process is illegal and cannot be sustained. (iv) According to these writ Petitioners, as many as 25 candidates, (whose names have been furnished by way of a list by these writ Petitioners) are pre-selected candidates. In order to enable the Respondents/authorities concerned to select candidates of their own choice, a number of illegalities and use of unfair means were resorted to in conducting the written examination and viva voce. For example, the question papers were already available in the market before the written test was conducted. In support of this allegation a photostat of the question paper has been annexed. Two officers, namely, S.R. Mannan, who is a Motor Vehicle Inspector and Kamal Das, who is an Enforcement Inspector and whose names had also figured earlier as persons, who had taken part in manipulating the first selection process (which had, eventually, been set aside) have been illegally involved in the present selection process too, though they do not form part of the selection board. These two officers had gone to Delhi by Jet Airways Flight No. GW 601, on 5.9.2005, to get the question papers printed and that they have submitted bills claiming travelling allowance for the said purpose. Similarly, one Billal Hussain was a candidate as well as an invigilator. These two officers had gone to Delhi by Jet Airways Flight No. GW 601, on 5.9.2005, to get the question papers printed and that they have submitted bills claiming travelling allowance for the said purpose. Similarly, one Billal Hussain was a candidate as well as an invigilator. From many of the examination centers, reports have been received that the question papers were found missing. These are indicative of the fact that no fair selection process was adopted and followed by the Respondents/authorities concerned. Even in the viva voce test, the District Transport Officers, who had not formed part of the selection board, had interviewed the candidates. An enquiry by an independent agency, such as, the Central Bureau of Investigation needs to be directed by this Court so as to restore the confidence of the people in the selection process. (v) A number of news-items have been published, in various news-papers, reflecting that a list of 26 candidates has already been finalized and large-scale bribes have been paid to the Respondents/authorities concerned. In fact, one of the newspapers has reported a news item that one of the candidates, who had paid bribe and was furnished question papers, has himself come out to report the matter to the newspapers. WP (C) Nos. 6602/2005 and 7175/2005 5. Both these writ petitions pose challenge to the entire selection procedure, conducted in the year 2005, on more or less similar grounds and these grounds are as follows: (i) Though Clause 14(b) of the advertisement, dated 30.7.2005, specifically stated that three copies of recent passport size photographs, duly signed by the candidates, must be submitted along with the application form, the admit cards, which were issued, did not have the photographs of the candidates concerned affixed thereon. The omission to fix the photographs, on the admit cards, were really aimed at allowing the dummy candidates to participate in the written as well as viva voce tests. Dummy candidates did appear in many of the examination centers and the identity of the dummy candidates was never verified by the invigilators. Mobile phones were used inside the examination halls. Answers were supplied from outside and were handed over to the selected candidates. Question-answer scripts were taken out from the examination halls, brought back duly filled up and, then, the answers were read out in the examination halls. Mobile phones were used inside the examination halls. Answers were supplied from outside and were handed over to the selected candidates. Question-answer scripts were taken out from the examination halls, brought back duly filled up and, then, the answers were read out in the examination halls. (ii) Question papers were leaked out well in advance; but this came to light after the examination was over. WP(C) No. 6839/2005 clearly describes how the question papers were found available in the market. 6. Since all these four writ petitions have been heard together and the allegations and counter-allegations, made in the various writ petitions, have almost merged together, let me, now, furnish, hereinbelow and in brief, the case of the Respondents/authorities concerned: (i) The opening of the selection procedure to everyone, whoever became, on 30.3.2005, eligible, in terms of the Rules of 2003, to apply, in terms of the advertisement, in question, was not illegal. A selection process, such as, the present one, is a search for talent and it was not illegal, on the part of the Respondents/authorities concerned, to allow those, who had become eligible on the date of inviting of the applications (i.e. on 30.7.2005), to participate in the selection process. The invitation for application, so published, was legal, reasonable, non-arbitrary, just and fair. (ii) It is not the pleaded case of the writ Petitioners that the Rules of 2003 were not applicable to the selection process. This High Court, while disposing of WP (C) Nos. 2594/2005 and 5033/2004, on 19.7.2005, did not hold that the Rules of 2003 were not applicable. Far from this, the resort to Rules of 2003 was held to be correct and the Court interfered with the selection process only because of the fact the Examination Committee had been constituted, on 4.11.2003, not in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of 2003, particularly, in terms of Rule 6 thereof. Far from this, the resort to Rules of 2003 was held to be correct and the Court interfered with the selection process only because of the fact the Examination Committee had been constituted, on 4.11.2003, not in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of 2003, particularly, in terms of Rule 6 thereof. In the face of the decision of this Court rendered on 19.7.2005, as indicated hereinbefore and in the absence of any specific plea by the Petitioners that the Rules of 2003 were inapplicable to the present selection process, the ground on which the selection process stands challenged is wholly untenable in law, particularly, when the Rules of 1983 and the Service Order of 1990 did not even prescribe the eligibility criteria or qualifications for recruitment to the posts of Assistant Enforcement Inspectors and Enforcement Checkers and it is only under the Rules of 2003 that the qualifications for recruitment to the said two sets of posts have been embodied. (iii) The scheme, as envisaged under Rule 6(1)(c) of the Rules of 2003, was, indeed, framed and the examination has been accordingly conducted without even slightest of manipulation or unfairness. As regards the non-fixing of photographs on the admit cards, what may be noted is that Clause (6) of the Admit Card categorically stipulates that each candidate shall bring with him an authentic photo identity card duly attested by a gazetted officer. Adequate means were adopted to ensure a free and fair examination and the allegations made by the Petitioners that dummy candidate appeared are wholly baseless, particularly, when the Petitioners have not been able to cite any specific case of a dummy candidate having participated in the written or viva voce test. Since the Petitioners allege that the dummy candidates had appeared, it is within their knowledge as to who the dummy candidates were and it is, therefore, their duty to prove the correctness of the allegations, which they have so made. The Respondents/authorities concerned have adopted all precautions so as to prevent resort to unfair means. In none of the earlier two selection processes, interference of the Court was on any specific finding that there was any unfair means adopted, while holding the selection test. The Respondents/authorities concerned have adopted all precautions so as to prevent resort to unfair means. In none of the earlier two selection processes, interference of the Court was on any specific finding that there was any unfair means adopted, while holding the selection test. With regard to the selection, which took place, pursuant to the advertisement, published in the year 2001, it is the State Government, which had come forward to hold fresh selection test and it was on account of such a stand taken by the Government that the Apex Court had set aside the selection process and directed holding of fresh selection test. Similarly, in the subsequent writ petition, wherein challenge to the second selection test, which were conducted in the year 2002, the interference of the Court was not on account of the ground of unfair means having been adopted, but on the ground that selection board in terms of the relevant provisions of Rules of 2003 had not been constituted. It is, therefore, incorrect to contend that earlier selection processes were interfered with by the Courts, because of manipulation and unfair selection tests conducted by the Respondents/authorities concerned. At none of the examination centers, any unfair means have been adopted and no specific instance has been cited by the Petitioners. (iv) There is no favourite candidate of the Respondents/authorities concerned and no select list, as alleged, has been prepared. In the advertisement, dated 30.7.2005, candidates were directed to produce three copies of the photographs with their names written on the backside and submit the same along with their applications. These photographs were very much available for cross-verification with the photographs produced by the candidates at the time of written examination and viva voce test. Not a single case of dummy candidate, having appeared at the time of written test, has been specifically brought to the notice of the Respondents/authorities concerned. Kamal Das and S.R. Mannan were not involved in the selection process and they were attending their duties on 5.9.2005. A certificate issued, in this regard, by the Controlling Officer is also submitted as a corroborating material. (v) As regard the allegations of leakage of question papers, it is worth noticing that some of the candidates left the examination halls without submitting their answer scripts along with the question papers. For such illegalities committed, steps have been taken by lodging FIRs naming the candidate(s) concerned. (v) As regard the allegations of leakage of question papers, it is worth noticing that some of the candidates left the examination halls without submitting their answer scripts along with the question papers. For such illegalities committed, steps have been taken by lodging FIRs naming the candidate(s) concerned. The Respondents/authorities concerned have verified the serial number of the question-cum-answer script, which has been relied upon by the Petitioners in WP (C) No. 6839/2005 and it has been found that this question paper relates to Sibsagar center, where the invigilator, on duty, had duly reported about the fact that the question paper along with its answer script was missing and appropriate action, in this regard, has already been initiated by the authorities concerned. When the writ Petitioners have become aware of the leakage of the question papers and have also managed to obtain a copy thereof, it is their duty to disclose to the Court the source from where they have obtained the question paper and answer script, in question. In the advertisement, dated 30.7.2005, aforementioned, it was specifically mentioned in Clause (16) that the eligible candidates, who had already applied for the post of Assistant Enforcement Inspector and Enforcement Checker (including the ad hoc Assistant Enforcement Inspectors and Enforcement Checkers) pursuant to the last advertisement, dated 21.12.2004, need not apply afresh. Billal Hussain aforementioned was one of the candidates, who had applied earlier in pursuance of the advertisement, dated 21.12.2004. However, Billal Hussain informed the authorities concerned that he would not appear in the examination any longer and upon due verification of the said fact by the authorities concerned, he was deputed not as an invigilator, but one of the helping hand in conducting the written examination. Billal Hussain did not appear as a candidate in the written examination, in question, and he did not, at the same time, was an invigilator. None of the District Transport Officers had interviewed any of the candidates in the viva voce. The various allegations made by the writ Petitioners are attempt to malign the selection process and to get the same set aside by, if necessary, creating false and fabricated news-items. None of the District Transport Officers had interviewed any of the candidates in the viva voce. The various allegations made by the writ Petitioners are attempt to malign the selection process and to get the same set aside by, if necessary, creating false and fabricated news-items. (vi) The candidates, who are allegedly pre-selected were necessary parties for meaningful and effective disposal of the writ petitions and the present writ petitions having not been made the alleged pre-selected candidates parties to the writ petitions, must fail due to non-joinder of necessary parties. 7. I have heard Mr. P.K. Goswami learned Senior counsel, Mr. I. Choudhury, learned Counsel, Mr. A.M. Bujarbaruah, learned Counsel, Dr. B. Ahmed, learned Counsel and Mr. B.D. Konwar, learned Counsel, appearing on behalf of the Petitioners. I have also heard Mr. H. Roy, learned Senior counsel, appearing on behalf of the official/State Respondents. 8. On the basis of the respective cases set up by the parties concerned, the pleadings on record and the submissions made at the time of hearing, there are, broadly speaking, four distinct points of controversy, which arise for determination, in the present set of writ petitions, these four points being as follows: (i) Whether the selection procedure ought to have remained and ought to have been kept confined, within those, who were eligible and qualified for selection to the posts of Assistant Enforcement Inspector and Enforcement Checker in the year 2001? (ii) Whether the provisions of the recruitment rules, prevailing at the time of initiation of the selection process, ought to have been resorted to for the purpose of making the selections and not the amended recruitment rules and/or the Rules of 2003? (iii) Whether the writ petitions suffer from non-joinder of necessary parties? (iv) Whether a scheme for conducting the selection process, as envisaged under the Rules of 2003 was prepared and/or any infirmity in this regard has led to an invalid and/or unfair selection process? (v) Whether the question papers were leaked out to some of the candidates and whether unfair means were adopted by some chosen candidates and also by the authorities/Respondents, who were entrusted with the responsibility of holding and conducting the selection process? (vi) Whether the selections, eventually, made are fair and legal? (vii) To what reliefs, if any, the parties are entitled? 9. (vi) Whether the selections, eventually, made are fair and legal? (vii) To what reliefs, if any, the parties are entitled? 9. Let me take the points fixed for determination in these set of writ petitions in the following order: Point No. (i) (i) Whether the selection procedure ought to have remained and ought to have been kept confined, within those, who were eligible and qualified for selection to the posts of Assistant Enforcement Inspector and Enforcement Checker in the year 2001? SUBMISSIONS: 10. Appearing on behalf of the Petitioners, in WP (C) No. 6839/2005, Mr. P.K. Goswami, learned Senior counsel, has submitted that in the case at hand, the selection process was, originally, initiated in the year 2001 and the present selection being a continuation of the earlier selection process, the same ought to have been kept confined within those persons, who were eligible, in the year 2001, to participate in the selection process; and, more so, when the two earlier selection processes were interfered with by the Courts and the selection processes have remained limited to the very vacancies for which the selection process had commenced in the year 2001. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, the candidates, who were not eligible to participate in the selection process, held in the year 2001, cannot be held eligible to participate in the subsequent selection processes. In these circumstances, contends Mr. Goswami, if the zone of eligibility criteria is widened by including those, who became qualified to participate in the selection process in the subsequent years, it would expose the candidates, who had appeared, in the selection process, in the year 2001, to unfair and unreasonable competitions arbitrarily marring and adversely affecting thereby the probability of their being selected. 11. Mr. Goswami has also submitted that the relevant rules of recruitment contemplate filling up of year-wise vacancies by requiring the authorities concerned to assess the number of vacancies to be filled up at the beginning of each year, in these circumstances, points out Mr. Gowami, when the vacancies had been advertised and the selection process were initiated, those, who attained the eligibility criteria in the subsequent years, were not even eligible either in age or by qualification in the year 2001 and, hence, these candidates, who later on, attained the eligibility criteria, could not have been allowed to appear in the selection process. Gowami, when the vacancies had been advertised and the selection process were initiated, those, who attained the eligibility criteria in the subsequent years, were not even eligible either in age or by qualification in the year 2001 and, hence, these candidates, who later on, attained the eligibility criteria, could not have been allowed to appear in the selection process. Support for the submissions, so made by Mr. Goswami, is sought to be derived from Union of India v. N.R. Banerjee and Ors. reported in 1997 (9) SCC 287 , Union of India v. Bipinchandra Hiralal Shah, reported in 1996 (6) SCC 721 , Moli Tatu and Anr. v. State of Arunachal Pradesh, reported in 2003 (2) GLT 371, Jacob M. Puthuparambil v. Kerala Water Authority and Ors., reported in 1991 (1) SCC 28 and B.L. Gupta and Ors. v. MCD, reported in 1998 (9) SCC 223 . 12. Controverting the above submissions made on behalf of the writ Petitioners, Mr. H. Roy, learned Senior counsel, appearing for the official/State Respondents, has submitted that the directions given by the Apex Court in its order, dated 4.8.2003, were to hold a fresh selection for appointment to the posts of Assistant Enforcement Inspector and Enforcement Checker and the Apex Court, points out Mr. H. Roy, clearly directed, in the present case, that the advertisement shall be published in local newspapers throughout the State indicating therein the eligibility criteria for the selection and that the ad hoc appointees would remain at liberty to appear in the fresh selection process. These directions make it clear, submits Mr. Roy that the Apex Court had ordered for open selection from open market and did not direct that the selection process shall remain a restricted one. In these circumstances, further points out Mr. Roy, when the selection processes had to be reinitiated after the same had been interfered with twice, the selection was rightly left open to every person, who, on the day of the advertisement published on 30.7.2005, became eligible to participate in the selection process held in terms of the advertisement, dated 30.7.2005, aforementioned. Such a selection process, according to Mr. Roy, being consistent with the provisions of the Constitution of India, particularly, Article 16 thereof, cannot be said to be unfair or unreasonable. The selection process, such as the present one, contends Mr. Such a selection process, according to Mr. Roy, being consistent with the provisions of the Constitution of India, particularly, Article 16 thereof, cannot be said to be unfair or unreasonable. The selection process, such as the present one, contends Mr. H. Roy, is an open competition on merit and such a competition cannot be kept confined to only those persons, who were eligible in the year 2001. A selection process, insists Mr. Roy, is a search for talent and this search cannot be unreasonably restricted by confining the selection process within those persons, who were eligible 5 years ago and it would be unfair to deny to those, who became eligible in the year 2005, an opportunity to participate in the fresh selection process. 13. It is also pointed out by Mr. H. Roy that the authorities, which Mr. Goswami has relied upon, relate to promotion and cannot, therefore, be applied to cases, wherein questions for making direct recruitments and not promotions are raised. None of the decisions, which Mr. Goswami has relied upon, is, insists Mr. Roy, relevant inasmuch as none of these decisions relate to direct recruitment. Heavily relying upon the decision in J & K Public Service Commission and Ors. v. Dr. Narinder Mohan and Ors., reported in 1994 (2) SCC 630 , Mr. Roy submits that the chain system of recruitment, by notifying each year's vacancies separately, has not been approved by the Apex Court and in the face of the law laid down in Dr. Narendra Mohan (supra), it was within the powers-of the Respondents/authorities concerned to keep open the recruitment process to all such persons, who were eligible on 30.7.2005, when the advertisement, in question, was published. 14. Repelling the above submissions made on behalf of the Respondents/authorities concerned. Mr. Goswami has submitted that in the light of the decision in Dr. Narendra Mohan (supra), it is clear that the Government may hold recruitment process every year for filling up of the vacancies, which may arise every year, or the Government may choose to club all the vacancies of a number of years together or club some of such vacancies together and hold a selection process. Narendra Mohan (supra), it is clear that the Government may hold recruitment process every year for filling up of the vacancies, which may arise every year, or the Government may choose to club all the vacancies of a number of years together or club some of such vacancies together and hold a selection process. In such selection process, all those, who are qualified or eligible to participate on the day, when the applications are invited by making advertisement, shall be entitled to participate; but in a case, where a selection process has already been initiated and the same has been interfered with by the court and the selection process is, then, directed to be held afresh, such a selection process cannot be regarded as a new selection process, particularly, when the vacancies remain, as in the present case, limited to the very number of vacancies for which the selection had, originally, been held. In a selection process, such as the present one, reiterates Mr. Goswami, only those, who were qualified on the day, when the selection process was originally initiated, shall be entitled to participate. DISCUSSION 15. In short, while it is submitted, on behalf of the writ Petitioners, that the selection process, which had commenced with the publication of the advertisement on 30.7.2005, is not a new one and the same is, in fact, a continuation of the earlier selection process and, hence, only those persons, who were eligible to participate in the selection process, in the year 2001 (and to be precise on 19.7.2001, when the selection process was originally initiated) ought to have been allowed to participate, the contention of the Respondents/authorities concerned is that the present selection process is a fresh one and such selection process cannot be kept confined within those, who were eligible in the year 2001, and, hence, those, who became eligible subsequently and, particularly, in terms of the advertisement, dated 30.7.2005, aforementioned, could not have been excluded from the purview of the consideration, for, the present selection process is aimed at selecting the best from the open market, it is a search for talent and if better and more meritorious candidates are available, there is no reason why they should not be allowed to participate in the selection process. 16. 16. Similarly, while it is also contended, on behalf of the Petitioners, that at the time, when the selection process was initiated in the year 2001, the recruitment to the posts of Assistant Enforcement Inspector and Enforcement Checker were governed by the Rules of 1983 and the Service Order of 1990 and, hence, resort to the Rules of 2003 for the purpose of making recruitments to the posts aforementioned could not have been legally taken, the contention of the Respondent is that neither the Rules of 1983 nor the Service Order of 1990 embody the requisite eligibility criteria for direct recruitment to the posts aforementioned nor did the Rules of 1983 and/or the Service Order of 1990 embody the procedure for recruitment to the said posts and, hence, in these circumstances, the resort to the Rules of 2003 was perfectly justified. 17. Let me, now, ascertain the correctness or otherwise of the rival submissions made before me on behalf of the parties. While considering these rival submissions, what needs to be borne in mind is that though the employment of a Government employee and the employment of a person, in a private sector, is, originally, contractual in nature, what distinguishes a Government servant from others is that a Government employee acquires, on his appointment to a Government office, a status. As a result of this status, which he acquires, his service conditions are determined on the basis of the provisions of the Constitution and the relevant statutes. In consequence thereof, a Government servant's rights and obligations can be determined by the statutory or the constitutional authority concerned and for such exercise of powers, the authority concerned does not, unlike the case of a private employee, require consent from the Government employee concerned. In other words, Government can alter terms and conditions of its employees unilaterally, though, in practice, such alteration may face protest from the employees concerned. This does not, however, mean, I must has tern to add, that the consent of the Government employee is a condition precedent for changing the terms and conditions of his service by the statutory or constitutional authority in terms of the provisions of the relevant statutes and/or the Constitution. The reference, in this regard, may be made to State of Jammu & Kashmir v. T.N. Khosa AIR 1974 SC 1 . The reference, in this regard, may be made to State of Jammu & Kashmir v. T.N. Khosa AIR 1974 SC 1 . In T.N. Khosa (supra), the Apex Court held thus: It is well-settled that though employment under the Government like that under any other master may have a contractual origin, the Government servant acquires a "status" on appointment to his office. As a result, his rights and obligations are liable to be determined under statutory or constitutional authority, which for its exercise requires no reciprocal consent. The Government can alter the terms and conditions of its employees unilaterally and though in modern times consensus in matters relating to public services is often attempted to be achieved, consent is not a pre-condition of the validity of rules of service, the contractual origin of the service notwithstanding. 18. From what has been observed in T.N. Khosa (supra), it clearly transpires that the service conditions of a Government employee can be changed by making changes in the relevant statutes or rules by the statutory or constitutional authority concerned in terms of the statute and/or the Constitution. This power to alter conditions of service, undoubtedly, includes the power to alter the conditions of service with retrospective effect. Such a broadly stated position of law governing the status of a Government employee is, however, subject to the condition that the benefits acquired with regard to the conditions of service, by virtue of the relevant existing statutory or constitutional provisions, cannot, with retrospective effect, be taken away, abridged or withdrawn by amending the statute concerned and/or the Constitution nor can such amendments be allowed if such amendment is arbitrary, discriminatory, unreasonable or violative of Article 14 and 16 inasmuch as by acquiring such benefit, the employee is vested with a right and such a right cannot be taken away by a mere change in the statute or the rules with retrospective effect. While considering this aspect of the matter, the observations of the Apex Court, in Tushar Ranjan Mohanty v. Union of India, reported in (1994) 5 SCC 450 , may be referred to, and borne in mind, which run as follows: 12. In T.R. Kapur v. State of Haryana 1986 Supp. While considering this aspect of the matter, the observations of the Apex Court, in Tushar Ranjan Mohanty v. Union of India, reported in (1994) 5 SCC 450 , may be referred to, and borne in mind, which run as follows: 12. In T.R. Kapur v. State of Haryana 1986 Supp. SCC 584 : 1987 2 ATC 595 : 1987 1 SCR 584 , three Petitioners T.R. Kapur, Mahinder Singh and V.D. Grover, who were diploma holders, were working as Sub-Divisional Officers on regular basis under the unamended Rule 6(b) of the Punjab Service of Engineers, Class I, Public Works Department (Irrigation Branch) Rules, 1964. They were eligible for promotion as Executive Engineers in Class I service despite the fact that they did not possess a degree in engineering. By the notification dated 22.6.1984, Rule 6(b) was amended and it was provided that a degree in engineering was an essential qualification for promotion of Assistant Engineers (Irrigation Branch) to Class I service and thereby the Petitioners were rendered ineligible for promotion to the post of Executive Engineer in Class I service. The amendment was challenged in this Court by way of a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. This Court came to the conclusion that the retrospective effect given to the amendment was violative of Articles 14 and16 of the Constitution of India on the following reasoning:(SCC p. 595, Para 16) It is well settled that the power to frame rules to regulate the conditions of service under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution carries with it the power to amend or alter the rules with a retrospective effect : B. S. Vadera v. Union of India (1968) 3 SCR 575 : AIR 1969 SC 118 : (1970) 1 LLJ 449, Raj Kumar v. Union of India (1975)4 SCC 13 : 1975 SCC (L&S) 198 : (1975) 3 SCR 963 , K. Nagraj v. State of A.P. (1985) 1 SCC 523 : 1985 SCC (L&S) 280 and State of J&K v. Triloki Nath Khosa (1974) 1 SCC 19 : 1974 SCC (L&S) 49 : (1974) 1 SCR 771 . It is equally well-settled that any rule which affects the right of a person to be considered for promotion is a condition of service although mere chances of promotion may not be. It is equally well-settled that any rule which affects the right of a person to be considered for promotion is a condition of service although mere chances of promotion may not be. It may further be stated that an authority competent to lay down qualifications for promotion, is also competent to change the qualifications. The rule defining qualifications and suitability for promotion are conditions of service and they can be changed retrospectively. This rule is however subject to a well-recognised principle that the benefits acquired under the existing rules cannot be taken away by an amendment with retrospective effect, that is to say, there is no power to make such a rule under the proviso to Article 309 which affects or impairs vested rights. 13. Finally this Court considered the effect of retrospective legislation on the vested rights of the affected persons in P.D. Aggarwal v. State of U.P. (1987) 3 SCC 622 : 1987 SCC (L&S) 310 : (1987) 4 ATC 272 under the U.P. Service of Engineers (Buildings & Roads Branch) Class II Rules, 1936, the Assistant Engineers substantively appointed against temporary vacancies became members of the service and were entitled to seniority on the basis of continuous length of service. The Rules were amended in the years 1969 and 1971 wherein it was provided that the Assistant Engineers would only become members when they are selected and appointed against the quota meant for them and their seniority would be determined only from the date of order of appointment in substantive vacancies. These amendments were made with retrospective effect thereby taking away the vested rights of the Assistant Engineers appointed against temporary posts. The High Court held the retrospective amendment of the rules to be arbitrary and unconstitutional. This Court upheld the judgment of the High Court on the following reasoning : (SCCp. 637, Para 16; p. 638, Para 18; p. 639, Para 18). It has been urged that Government has the power to amend rules retrospectively and such rules are quite valid. Several decisions have been cited of this Court at the bar. Undoubtedly, the Government has got the power under proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution to make rules and amend the rules giving retrospective effect. It has been urged that Government has the power to amend rules retrospectively and such rules are quite valid. Several decisions have been cited of this Court at the bar. Undoubtedly, the Government has got the power under proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution to make rules and amend the rules giving retrospective effect. Nevertheless, such retrospective amendments cannot take away the vested rights and the amendments must be reasonable, not arbitrary or discriminatory violating Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution...As has been stated hereinbefore, the Assistant Engineers who have already become members of the Service on being appointed substantively against temporary posts have already acquired the benefit of 1936 Rules for having their seniority computed from the date of their becoming member of the service. 1969 and 1971 Amended Rules take away this right of these temporary Assistant Engineers by expressly providing that those Assistant Engineers, who are selected and appointed in permanent vacancies against 50 per cent quota provided by Rule 6 of the Amended 1969 Rules will only be considered for the purpose of computation of seniority from the date of their appointment against permanent vacancies. Therefore the temporary Assistant Engineers which are not only deprived of the right that accrued to them in the matter of determination of their seniority but they are driven to a very peculiar position inasmuch as they are to wait until they are selected and appointed against permanent vacancies in the quota set up for this purpose by the amended Rule 6. These amendments are not only disadvantageous to the future recruits against temporary vacancies but they were made applicable retrospectively from 1.3.1962 even to existing officers recruited against temporary vacancies through Public Service Commission. As has been stated hereinbefore that the Government has power to make retrospective amendments to the Rules but if the Rules purport to take away the vested rights and are arbitrary and not reasonable then such retrospective amendments are subject to judicial scrutiny of they have infringed Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. 19. From a microscopic reading of the law laid down in Tushar Ranjan Mohanty (supra), it becomes evident that the power to frame rules to regulate conditions of service under the provisions of Article309 carries with it the power to amend or alter the rule with retrospective effect. 19. From a microscopic reading of the law laid down in Tushar Ranjan Mohanty (supra), it becomes evident that the power to frame rules to regulate conditions of service under the provisions of Article309 carries with it the power to amend or alter the rule with retrospective effect. This rule is, however, subject to well recognized principle that the benefit acquired under the existing rule or a right vested in a Government employee under the existing rules cannot be taken away by amending the rules with retrospective effect, for, there is no power under the proviso to Article 309 enabling the Government to make rule in a manner so as to take away or impair an accrued or vested right. 20. That the conditions of service can be amended even with the retrospective effect is too well settled to be doubted. In the case of K. Nagraj and Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh AIR 1985 SC 551 , the Apex Court has made clear that such a power flows to the Government under the proviso to Article 309 read with Article 313 of the Constitution and that the power so conferred on the Government is legislative in character and this power is distinguishable from an ordinary rulemaking power. I may, for the sake of brevity, refer to some observations made, in this regard, in K. Nagraj (supra), which read thus: It is well-settled that the service rules can be as much emended, as they can be made, under the proviso to Article 309 and that, the power to amend these rules carries with it the power to amend them retrospectively. The power conferred by the proviso to Article 309 is of a legislative character and is to be distinguished form an ordinary rule-making power. The power to legislate is of a plenary nature within the field demarcated by the Constitution and it includes the power to legislate retrospectively. Therefore, the amendment made to the Fundamental Rules in the exercise of power conferred by Article309, by which the proviso to Rule 2 was deleted retrospectively, was a valid exercise of legislative power. The rules and amendments made under the proviso to Article 309 can be altered or repealed by the Legislature but until that is done, the exercise of the power cannot be challenged as lacking in authority. The rules and amendments made under the proviso to Article 309 can be altered or repealed by the Legislature but until that is done, the exercise of the power cannot be challenged as lacking in authority. (See B.S. Vadera v. Union of India (1968) 3 SCR 575 , 582-85 : AIR 1969 SC 118 : 1969 Lab IC 100 : (1970) 1 LLJ 499 ; Raj Kumar v. Union of India (1975) 3 SCR 963 , 965 : (1975) 4 SCC 13 , 14 : 1975 SCC (L&S) 198, 199 : AIR 1975 SC 1116 : 1975 Lab IC 669 : (1975) 1 SLR 774. 21. What logically follows from the above discussion is that unlike an employee in a private sector, a Government employee's terms and conditions of service are governed by the relevant statutes, rules and provisions of the Constitution. Such conditions of service can be changed by the constitutional or statutory authority concerned unilaterally. Such a change can even be made with retrospective effect; but benefits acquired or a right, which has accrued or comes to be vested in a Government employee by virtue of the existing rules, cannot be impaired, far less, taken away by amending the conditions of service with retrospective effect. Whether an amendment, with retrospective effect, has taken away an accrued or vested right is, however, essentially a mixed question of fact and law and can be determined on the basis of the facts of a given case. Reference may also be made to Malin Kanta Paul v. State of Tripura, reported in 2004 (3) GLT 56. 22. The decisions in Union of India v. N.R. Banerjee and Ors., reported in 1997 (9) SCC 287 , Union of India v. Bipinchandra Hiralal Shah, reported in 1996 (6) SCC 721 , Moli Tatu and Anr. v. State of Arunachal Pradesh and Ors., reported in 2003 (2) GLT 371, Jacob M. Puthuparambil v. Kerala Water Authority and Ors., reported in 1991 (1) SCC 28 and B.L. Gupta and Ors. v. MCD, reported in 1998 (9) SCC 223 , which Mr. Goswami relies upon, are, as correctly pointed out by Mr. H. Roy, decisions, which relate to promotion and not direct recruitments. v. MCD, reported in 1998 (9) SCC 223 , which Mr. Goswami relies upon, are, as correctly pointed out by Mr. H. Roy, decisions, which relate to promotion and not direct recruitments. What is, however, essential to note is that it is no longer res integra that to be considered for promotion is a fundamental right and cannot be denied to a Government employee if he is eligible, he falls within the zone of consideration and if a decision to fill up the promotional post by making promotion is taken. It is also no longer res integra that a person's promotion has to be considered in terms of the Recruitment Rules, which were in existence at the time, when the employee concerned became eligible for such consideration? The reason is that on fulfilling the eligibility criteria for promotion, the employee concerned acquires a right to be considered for promotion, whenever he falls within the zone of consideration or whenever the Government decides to fill up the promotional post by making promotion. Such a right, which comes to be acquired by a Government employee or comes to be vested in a Government employee, cannot be denied by subsequent changes made in the recruitment rules unless the recruitment rules are amended retrospectively so as to take away the acquired or vested rights of being considered for promotion by such a Government employee. 23. Let us, now, assume, for instance, that in a given recruitment rules, the minimum qualifying period of service is three years in the grade of Assistant Engineer for promotion to the post of Executive Engineer. A person, 'X', who comes to be appointed as an Assistant Engineer, on 31.1.2001, would, under such set of recruitment rules, become eligible for consideration for promotion to the post of Executive Engineer on 1st of January, 2004. There is another person, say 'Y', who is appointed as an Assistant Executive Engineer on 31.1.2002. This employee, i.e., 'Y' would become eligible for consideration for promotion as an Executive Engineer in terms of such recruitment rules, on 1st of February, 2005. There is another person, say 'Y', who is appointed as an Assistant Executive Engineer on 31.1.2002. This employee, i.e., 'Y' would become eligible for consideration for promotion as an Executive Engineer in terms of such recruitment rules, on 1st of February, 2005. Let us, now, assume, for a moment, that the Government did not fill up the promotional post of the Executive Engineer in the year 2004-05 and, in the meanwhile, on 31.12.2004, the recruitment rules are amended and the minimum qualifying period of service to be rendered by an Assistant Executive Engineer for promotion to the post of Executive Engineer is made 5 years with effect from 31.12.2004. Can, in such circumstances, 'X' and 'Y' be said to stand on the same footing as far as eligibility criteria for promotion are concerned? The answer to this question has to be in the negative inasmuch as 'X' and 'Y' cannot be said to stand on the same footing, for, when the recruitment rules came to be amended, on 31.12.2004, by making 5 years of service in the post of Assistant Executive Engineer as the qualifying period of service for the purpose of promotion to the post of Executive Engineer, 'X' had already fulfilled the eligibility criteria for promotion to the post of Executive Engineer under the old recruitment rules and the amendment of the rules being prospective in nature, 'X's right to be considered for promotion, in terms of the old rules, cannot be deemed to have been taken away by the amendment of the rules, which came into effect on 31.12.2004; but so far as 'Y' is concerned, his right to be considered for promotion, in terms of the old rules, had not matured, when the rules came to be amended on 31.12.2004 and he ('Y'), having not acquired any right for consideration of promotion till 31.12.2004, his right to be considered for promotion would be governed by the amended rules. It is based on this concept that a person's promotion has to be considered in terms of the rules, which were in existence at the time, when he had become eligible for consideration for promotion. It is based on this concept that a person's promotion has to be considered in terms of the rules, which were in existence at the time, when he had become eligible for consideration for promotion. Embedded, in this principle, is an acknowledgement of the fact that though the Government has the authority to change the recruitment rules, the fact remains that the acquired or vested rights of a person, who may even be a Government employee, cannot be taken away except by making rules with retrospective effect provided that such rules are not, as held in T.N. Khosa (supra), Tushar Ranjan Mohanty (supra) and K. Nagraj (supra), arbitrary and unreasonable. 24. The question, therefore, is as to whether the above principle, which, primarily, governs promotion, can be extended to a process of direct recruitment. In this regard, what needs to be noted, in the light of the decision in Dr. Narendra Mohan (supra), which Mr. Roy refers to, and rely upon, is that the Government need not notify the vacancies as soon as the vacancies arise and it is possible for the Government to hold a selection process for a number of vacancies, which might have been accumulated. When the Government decides to fill up the vacancies, which might have arisen and initiates the process for filling up of the same, the recruitment cannot be kept confined to the eligible candidates for respective year of vacancies and that when the Government initiates the process of filling up of such vacancies, the candidates, who are eligible on the date of the advertisement, can participate in the selection process and they cannot be denied the right to participate in such a selection process, for, such a denial would offend Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. The decision, in Dr. Narendra Mohan (supra), thus, squarely applies to cases, where a recruitment process had not been initiated. However, in a case, wherein a recruitment process was initiated and the selection process is completed; but the recruitment is interfered with by court on the ground of unfairness in the selection process, can the candidates, who had participated in such a selection process, be treated eligible to participate in the subsequent selection process? The answer to this question is not very difficult to seek. 25. The answer to this question is not very difficult to seek. 25. Let us assume that a candidate, who has been unfairly dealt with, challenges the selection process and the court, on finding that the selection process was really unfair, interferes with the selection process and directs the selection process to be held afresh; can a candidate, who had challenged the selection process, be allowed to participate in the new selection process. Ordinarily and unless the law excludes such a candidate from the purview of the selection process, there is no reason why the candidate, who had challenged the selection process, should not be held entitled to participate in such a selection process. In fact, the selection process, which the court orders to be held afresh, in such a case, is not a new selection process, but a continuation of a selection process, which had already been undertaken and proceeded with, but had to be interfered with by the court. If a candidate, who had been unfairly dealt with and who had got the selection process set aside, is not given the relief to participate in the selection process, which is held as a result of setting aside of the earlier selection process, no candidate would, ordinarily, be interested in challenging the fairness of a selection process. Unless, therefore, the eligibility criteria are changed with retrospective effect, the person, who had participated in the earlier selection process, acquires a right and can, as a matter of right, appear in the subsequent selection process, which is not, strictly speaking, a new selection process irrespective of the fact as to when the subsequent selection takes place. 26. Similarly, let us assume that a public appointment is made confidentially and persons, who are eligible for appointment, challenge the selection process on the ground that there was no adequate publicity for making such a recruitment and the court, on being satisfied that the grievances are genuine, interferes with the recruitment and directs the recruitment process to be held afresh. Can, in such a selection process, the persons, who had challenged the selection, participate? Can, in such a selection process, the persons, who had challenged the selection, participate? Here again, unless specifically excluded by some law, the persons, who were eligible to participate in the earlier selection process and who had challenged the legality of the earlier selection process, shall remain eligible to participate in the fresh selection process, for, the fresh selection process is really nothing, but continuation of the earlier selection process. 27. Let us, now, assume, for a moment, that the maximum age limit for a given post is 30 years and the person, who had not been able to participate in such a selection process for lack of information and who got the selection process or appointment set aside by the court, becomes overaged by the time the selection process or the recruitment, as the case may be, comes to be set aside. As the new selection process, which is held, is nothing, but a continuation of the original selection process, the person, who had challenged the selection process or the recruitment, at the time, when the selection process had, initially, taken place or the recruitment was, initially, made, cannot be denied the right to appear in the subsequent selection process if he was eligible to participate in the earlier selection process or the recruitment test, which, eventually, came to be set aside. 28. Logically, therefore, the candidate, who challenges such a selection process, must be deemed to have acquired a right to participate in the subsequent selection process. Can such a person's right to be considered for selection exclude from consideration those, who were not qualified on the date, when the selection process was, originally, initiated. Though law may not always be logic, yet when a candidate, 'X', acquires a right to participate in a selection process, it would necessarily exclude from consideration 'Y', who might not have been eligible for consideration for such recruitment, when the process for selection was initiated. 'X's right would logically, therefore, exclude 'Y' from participating in the fresh selection process and' Y' cannot be said to have any vested right to appear in the subsequent selection process, for, 4 Y' was not eligible to appear, in the selection process, which had to be interfered with by the court. The same principle can be extended to the case of educational qualification. The same principle can be extended to the case of educational qualification. Let us assume, for a moment, that for a certain post, the minimum eligibility criteria included obtaining of 50% marks in the Higher Secondary Leaving Examination and in terms of these recruitments rules, the selection process was held in the year 1999 and this selection process came to be challenged by someone, such as, 'X', on the ground that there was no requisite publicity for recruitment and the court, eventually, interfered with such selection process in the year 2005. It cannot, in such a case, be said that 'X', who was eligible for consideration in the year 1999, would be disqualified from appearing in the year 2005, merely because the eligibility criteria has been changed to obtaining minimum qualifying mark of 50% to 55% in Higher Secondary Examination unless the amendment in the recruitment rules changing the eligibility criterion from 50% to 55% is made retrospective in nature. In other words, unless the amendment in the recruitment rules changing the eligibility criterion from 50% to 55% is made retrospective in nature, 'X', who was eligible under the old recruitment rules, would remain eligible to appear, when the subsequent selection process took place in the year 2005. Such a right of 'X' would automatically exclude from consideration all those persons, who were not eligible to participate in the selection process, when the same was initiated in the year 1999. 29. True it is, as contended by Mr. H. Roy, that recruitment to Government employment must be from open market and selection process is nothing, but a search for talent. Such open market shall, however, remain confined within and limited to, those, who were eligible at the time, when the selection process was initiated. By roping in or allowing those, who were not eligible in the year 1999, the Government would be opening an unfair and unreasonable competition. It will be illogical and incongruent to say that though 'X', who was eligible to participate in the year 1999 and who has become overaged, is, notwithstanding the age bar, still entitled to participate in the subsequent selection process, yet those, who were ineligible at the time, when the selection process took place in the year 1999, shall nevertheless be treated as eligible in the year 2005. If those, who were not eligible in 1999 and become eligible in 2005, are said to have a right to appear in the subsequent selection process, it will be illogical to say that those, who had participated in the selection process in the year 1999, or one, who was eligible to participate in the selection process in the year 1999, still remains eligible to participate in the subsequent selection process notwithstanding the change in the eligibility criterion from the minimum qualifying marks of 50% to 55%. 30. In the case at hand, therefore, the selection process, which came to be re-started with the advertisement published, on 30.7.2005, was not really a new selection process, but was a continuation of the selection process, which had commenced with the-publication of the advertisement, way back on 19.7.2001. In this selection process, those, who were eligible to participate in recruitment process on 19.7.2001, shall only be eligible to participate. The zone of consideration for recruitment ought to have, therefore, been kept confined within those persons, who were eligible to participate, when the advertisement in this regard, was published on 19.7.200 Having expanded the zone of consideration to embrace those, who were not even eligible for consideration in terms of the advertisement on 19.7.2001, the Government must be held to have offended Article 14 and 16, for, such a selection process, as has been adhered to in the present case, is nothing, but arbitrary. 31. The issue, in question, can be examined from yet another angle. Let us assume that a selection process for recruitment to a certain number of posts took place in the year 1998. In the selection test, so held, the minimum educational qualification was successful completion of HSSLC examination. In the selection test, so held, "X" was a candidate, who had participated, but was not selected and "Y" was a person, who was, due to lack of proper publicity, did not come to know about the selection test. In the selection test, so held, the minimum educational qualification was successful completion of HSSLC examination. In the selection test, so held, "X" was a candidate, who had participated, but was not selected and "Y" was a person, who was, due to lack of proper publicity, did not come to know about the selection test. Both "X" and "Y" challenged the selection, the case of "X" being that the selection test suffered from manipulation and unfair practices and he was deliberately, illegally and unjustifiably denied selection; whereas the case of "Y" was that with ulterior motive, there was no adequate publicity and he had not come to know about the selection test and could not, therefore, appear in the selection test and because of such inadequate publicity, the selection made cannot be sustained. Assuming that on being satisfied that the entire selection process suffered from manipulation, the court, sometime in the year 2003, sets aside the entire selection process and directs a fresh selection process to be initiated by giving adequate publicity thereto. In terms of the directions of the court, so given, a fresh selection process commenced in the year 2004; but before the selection test was so held afresh, the minimum educational qualification for appointment to the posts concerned is made a Bachelors degree in Arts, Science or Commerce and in the selection process, held in the year 2004, one of the candidates, namely, 'Z' is a graduate and is, in terms of the amended recruitment rules, eligible to participate in the newly held selection process. 32. The question would, now, be as to whether "X", "Y" and "Z", who fall in three different categories, can participate in the selection test, which is held in the year 2004, "X" being a person, who was a candidate in the selection test held in the year 1998, but is, now, not eligible, for, he is not a graduate in terms of the amended recruitment rules; "Y", who, though eligible earlier, could not appear in the earlier selection process as indicated hereinbefore, but who has, now, been made ineligible in terms of the recruitment rules, for, he ('Y') too is not a graduate and "Z", who, being a graduate, is eligible in terms of the amended recruitment rules. If the amendment of the recruitment rules changing the minimum educational qualification for selection from HSSLC examination to Bachelors Degree is prospective in nature, then, in such a situation, would "X" and "Y" be able to appear in the selection test? Since the change in the recruitment rules is prospective in nature and the selection test to be held in the year 2004 was merely a continuation of the selection test, which was already held in the year 1998, it would be reasonable to hold that the minimum educational qualification prescribed in the pre-amended recruit men rules would apply even to the selection process, which is re-started in the year 2004, meaning thereby that the minimum educational qualification for the tests to held in 2004 would still remain the passing of the HSSLC examination. In such circumstances, "X" and "Y" both would be eligible to participate in the selection test, for, they were the ones, whose challenge to the selection test, led to the setting aside of the entire selection procedure. In such circumstances "Z", who was not even eligible, when the selection test was held in the year 1998 and who passed the HSSLC examination, say in the year 2000 and became a graduate in the year 2003, cannot appear, for, he was not within the zone of eligibility criteria, when the selection test was, originally, held in the year 1998. It would be unjust to exclude "X" and "Y" from the selection process by holding that the minimum educational qualification under the amended rules in Bachelors Degree. The logical conclusion, therefore, would be that those, who were eligible to participate in the selection process in the year 1998, would only be eligible to participate in the selection process, which may be held in the year 2004. 33. In the case at hand, when the posts, in question, were created in the year 2001, the Assam Transport Rules, 1983 and the Assam Transport Services (Recruitment and Promotion to the post of Assistant Enforcement Inspector) Orders, 1990, were, admittedly, in force. Neither the Assam Service Rules, 1983, nor the Assam Transport Services (Recruitment and Promotion to the post of Assistant Enforcement Inspector) Orders, 1990, prescribed the minimum educational qualification and/or age for direct recruitment to the posts of Assistant Enforcement Inspector and Enforcement Checker. Neither the Assam Service Rules, 1983, nor the Assam Transport Services (Recruitment and Promotion to the post of Assistant Enforcement Inspector) Orders, 1990, prescribed the minimum educational qualification and/or age for direct recruitment to the posts of Assistant Enforcement Inspector and Enforcement Checker. In such circumstances, the employment notice, dated 19.7.2001, was issued by the Government of Assam, Department of Labour and Enforcement, informing all concerned that the qualification for selection to the posts of Assistant Enforcement Inspector is HSSLC/equivalent certificate holders and for the posts of Enforcement Checker, HSLC/equivalent certificate holders. What is, now, worth noticing is that the existence of the statutory rules is not a condition precedent for appointment. Since the executive power of the State is co-extensive with its legislative power, the State can create, under Article 162, civil posts and fill them up according to the executive instructions, the condition precedent however, being that the executive instructions must be consistent with Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Considered thus, it is clear that the employment notice, dated 19.7.2001, aforementioned was legally permissible and the selection tests could have been held in terms of the eligibility criteria fixed in the said notice. 34. The question, therefore, is as to whether with the coming into force of the Rules of 2003, the selection test, in the year 2005, could have been held in terms of the qualifications prescribed in respect of education, age and height in the employment notice, dated 19.7.2001, aforementioned? Ordinarily, once the statutory rules have been made, the appointment shall be only in accordance with the statutory rules. Executive instructions issued shall succumb to the statutory rules and though the executive instructions can fill up the gaps, such instruction, cannot and should not supplant the law, but may only supplement the law. However, if a process of selection already commences in terms of the Executive Instructions, the subsequent statutory rules introducing any amendment in the process of selection would not be applied retrospectively unless the recruitment rules are retrospective in nature. This aspect of law becomes abundantly clear if one carefully reads the decision in P. Mahendran and Ors. v. State of Karnataka and Ors. reported in (1990) 1 SCC 411 . This aspect of law becomes abundantly clear if one carefully reads the decision in P. Mahendran and Ors. v. State of Karnataka and Ors. reported in (1990) 1 SCC 411 . This case of P. Mahendran (supra) is not a case, let me clarify, at the very out set, of appointment and promotion, but is a case of direct recruitment to the posts of Motor Vehicle Inspector. In this case, on 20th September, 1983, Karnataka Public Service Commission issued an advertisement inviting applications for filling up of 56 posts of Motor Vehicle Inspector. The number was, later on, increased to 102 posts, the advertisement having specified that the selection shall be made in accordance with the recruitment Rules, 1976 and the minimum educational qualification for selection being holder of diploma in automobile engineering or mechanical engineering. The Public Service Commission (in short, 'the Commission') issued letters for interview; but it refused to interview some candidates, who were competing for selection against the reserved posts, meant for 'local candidates', on the ground that they were not to be treated as 'local candidates'. On being so refused to be interviewed, the candidates, who were denied to be interviewed, filed writ petitions in the High Court of Karnataka and obtained stay orders. Later on, however, interim orders were modified permitting making of selection and appointment with the rider attached thereto that the selection and appointment would be subject to the outcome of the writ petition. Thereafter, the Commission resumed the interview and, having completed the selection process, published the result. In the meanwhile, however, the recruitment rules were amended and the qualification required for appointment to the post of Motor Vehicle Inspector was made holders of diploma in automobile engineering. In effect, thus, unlike the recruitment rules of 1976, the diploma holders in mechanical engineering stood disqualified from being appointed to the posts aforementioned. In such situation, the Apex Court observed as follows: 4...In view of these facts the sole question for consideration is as to whether the amendment made in the rules on May 14, 1987 rendered the selection illegal. Admittedly in the Rules do not contain any provision enforcing the amended Rules with retrospective effect. In the absence of any express provision contained in the amending Rules it must be held to be prospective in nature. Admittedly in the Rules do not contain any provision enforcing the amended Rules with retrospective effect. In the absence of any express provision contained in the amending Rules it must be held to be prospective in nature. The Rules which are prospective in nature cannot take away or impair the right of candidate holding Diploma in Mechanical Engineering as on the date of making appointment as well as on the date of scrutiny by the Commission they were qualified for selection and appointment. In fact the entire selection in the normal course would have been finalised much before the amendment of Rules, but for the interim orders of the High Court. 5. It is well settled rule of construction that every statute or statutory rule is prospective unless it is expressly or by necessary implications made to have retrospective effect. Unless there are words in the statute or in the Rule showing the intention to affect existing rights the rule must be held to be prospective. If a rule is expressed in language which is fairly capable of either interpretation it ought to be construed as prospective only... 7. In view of the above the Appellants' selection and appointment could not be held as illegal as the process of selection had commenced in 1983 which had to be completed in accordance with law as lit stood at the commencement of the selection. The amended Rule could not applied to invalidate the selection made by the Commission, Strangely the Tribunal did not follow the latest authority of this Court laid down in Calton case (1983) 3 SCC 33 : 1983 SCC (L&S) 356, on the ground that the view taken in that case was contrary to the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in State of Andhra Pradesh v. T. Ramakrishna Rao (1972) 4 SCC 830 . We have carefully considered the decision by we do not find anything therein contrary to the view taken in Calton case (1983) 3 SCC 33 : 1983 SCC (L&S) 356. 8...A Constitution Court held that since Rule 5 as it stood in 1968 had been declared void the advertisement issued by the Commission inviting applications and all proceedings taken by the Commission including the examination held thereunder was rendered void. 8...A Constitution Court held that since Rule 5 as it stood in 1968 had been declared void the advertisement issued by the Commission inviting applications and all proceedings taken by the Commission including the examination held thereunder was rendered void. In this context this Court made observation that those candidates who had made applications in 1968 had not acquired any right as their applications had been made under a rule which had been declared invalid. The court further held that in the facts of that case the question whether amended Rule 5 was retrospective or prospective did not arise. 9. The above observations as relied by the Tribunal do not apply to the facts of the instant case as the advertisement issued by the Commission on September 28, 1983 was in accordance with the Recruitment Rule of 1976 validity of those Rules was not in question. The rule prescribing qualification was amended after four years of the advertisement, therefore the laying laid down in Ramakrishna Rao case (1972) 4 SCC 830 does not apply. The Tribunal committed error in ignoring the law laid down in Calton case (1983) 3 SCC 33 : 1983 SCC (L&S) 356 by placing reliance on the observations of this Court in Ramakrishna Rao case (1972) 4 SCC 830 . In our view the principles laid down in Calton case (1983) 3 SCC 33 : 1983 SCC (L&S) 356 are fully applicable to the instant case. 11...Thus, the observations made by this Court as quoted earlier were made in the special facts and circumstances of the case, which do not apply to the facts of the instant case...but a right is created in his favour for being considered for the post in accordance with the terms and conditions of the advertisement and the existing recruitment rules. If a candidate applies for a post in response to advertisement issued by Public Service Commission in accordance with recruitment Rules he acquires right to be considered for selection in accordance with the then existing Rules. This right cannot be affected by amendment of any rule unless the amending rule is retrospective in nature. In the instant case the Commission had acted in accordance with the then existing rules and there is no dispute that the Appellants were eligible for appointment, their selection was not in violation of the recruitment Rules. This right cannot be affected by amendment of any rule unless the amending rule is retrospective in nature. In the instant case the Commission had acted in accordance with the then existing rules and there is no dispute that the Appellants were eligible for appointment, their selection was not in violation of the recruitment Rules. The Tribunal in our opinion was in error in setting aside the select list prepared by the Commission. 35. From what has been laid down in P. Mahendran (supra), it clearly emerges that though a candidate does not get any right to be appointed to the posts, which he, in terms of an advertisement, applies for, the fact remains that a right is, indeed, created in his favour to be considered for selection to the posts in accordance with the terms and conditions of the advertisement and the extent recruitment rules. This right cannot be denied by amending the rules unless the amendment of the rule is retrospective in nature. 36. The fall-out of the above observations made in P. Mahendran (supra) is that the Petitioners concerned and all those persons, who had participated in the selection tests, pursuant to the employment notice, dated 19.7.2001, aforementioned and/or were eligible, on that day, remain entitled to be considered for selection and appointment in terms of the conditions prescribed in the advertisement, dated 19.7.2001 and they must be allowed to participate in the selection process, which is subsequently held. In short, thus, the candidates, who had participated in the selection process, held pursuant to the employment notice, dated 19.7.2001 aforementioned and/or who were eligible for selection, in terms of the said employment notice, continued to remain eligible to participate in the selection process in the year 2005, when the latest selection process was held in pursuance of the advertisement, dated 30.7.2005. 37. In view of the fact that a right is, thus, vested in all those persons, who had either participated in the first selection process or were eligible to participate in the said selection process, their right to participate in the selection process would necessarily exclude from consideration 'those, who were ineligible to participate in the selection process, when the employment notice, dated 19.7.2001, aforementioned was published or who became eligible subsequent to the employment notice, dated 19.7.2001, aforementioned. 38. 38. The net result of the discussion held above is that the State Respondents committed serious irregularity by allowing to participate in the selection process, held in the year 2005, not only those, who were eligible to participate in the selection process in terms of the advertisement, published on 19.7.2001 aforementioned, but also permitting those, who became eligible to participate in the selection process subsequent to 19.7.2001, i.e., the date of publication of the initial advertisement. To put it differently, the Respondents could not have allowed anyone, who was not eligible to participate in the selection process for appointment to the post of Assistant Enforcement Inspectors and Enforcement Checker on 19.7.2001. Considered thus, it is clear that the selection test held in the year 2005 and which forms the subject-matter of challenge, in the present writ petitions, is illegal and cannot, but be interfered with by this Court. 39. It is trite that every administrative process must take into consideration all relevant factors and must exclude from consideration all irrelevant factors. In the case at hand, however, neither the pleadings of the Respondents nor the records produced by them indicate that the Respondents/authorities concerned paid any attention to the question as to who shall be the persons eligible to participate in the selection process, which commenced anew. In a situation, such as the present one, there can be no escape from the conclusion that the decision to include, in the selection tests, even those persons, who were not eligible for selection, when the process of selection was, originally, initiated by the advertisement, dated 19.7.2001, suffers from complete non-application of mind and the same is bad in law and cannot be allowed to survive, for, non-interference with such a process of selection would cause serious prejudice to those, who were eligible to participate in the selection process. The point No. (i) shall stand answered accordingly. Point No. (ii) (ii) Whether the provision of recruitment rules prevailing at the time of initiation of the selection procedure shall govern the filed and not the amended recruitment rules and/or the Rules of 2003? Submissions 40. While dealing with point No. (ii), it is pertinent to note that it has been pointed out by Mr. Point No. (ii) (ii) Whether the provision of recruitment rules prevailing at the time of initiation of the selection procedure shall govern the filed and not the amended recruitment rules and/or the Rules of 2003? Submissions 40. While dealing with point No. (ii), it is pertinent to note that it has been pointed out by Mr. Goswami, learned Senior counsel, that in the year 2001, when the process of selection was initiated, the Rules of 1983 and the Service Order of 1990 were in force and the provisions of those Rules and the Service Order were applicable to the selection process. It is also pointed out by Mr. Goswami that the Rules of 2003 came into force with effect from 10.10.2003, the advertisement for the second round of selection was published on 21.12.2003 and the advertisement for the third round of selection was published on 30.7.2005. In short, thus, when the selection process was, originally, initiated, in the year 2001, the Rules of 2003, not being in existence, could not have been resorted to, for, the selection process, having been initiated, in the year 2001, ought to have concluded in terms of the Rules of 1983 and Service Order of 1990 and not under the Rules of 2003. In other words, as the selection process commenced in the year 2001, the Respondents/authorities concerned ought to have conducted, according to Mr. Goswami, the entire selection in terms of the Rules of 1983 read with the Service Order of 1990 and recourse to the selection procedure, prescribed under the Rules of 2003, ought not to have been taken. Reliance, in support of these submission is placed by Mr. Goswami on the cases of B.L. Gupta and Anr. v. M.C.D. reported in (1998) 9 SCC223, P. Mahendran and Ors. v. State of Karnataka and Ors. reported in (1990) 1 SCC 411 AIR 1998 Supp. SCC 740 and Secretary, A.P. Public Service Commission v. B. Swapna and Ors. reported in (2005) 4 SCC 154 . 41. Countering the above submissions made on behalf of the Petitioners, Mr. v. M.C.D. reported in (1998) 9 SCC223, P. Mahendran and Ors. v. State of Karnataka and Ors. reported in (1990) 1 SCC 411 AIR 1998 Supp. SCC 740 and Secretary, A.P. Public Service Commission v. B. Swapna and Ors. reported in (2005) 4 SCC 154 . 41. Countering the above submissions made on behalf of the Petitioners, Mr. H. Roy, learned Senior counsel, appearing for the Respondents, has submitted that it is not the pleaded case of the writ Petitioners that the Rules of 1983 read with Service Order of 1990 shall govern the present selection procedure and, hence, the writ Petitioners have no right to claim that the selection and appointment ought to have been made in terms of the Rules of 1983 read with Service Order of 1990 and not in terms of the Rules of 2003. In support of his submissions, Mr. H. Roy, learned Senior counsel, refers to Bharat Singh v. State of Haryana reported in 1955 (4) SCC 534 and Rani Laxmibai Kshetriya v. C.B. Kapoor reported in 1998 (7) SCC 469 . It is also submitted by Mr. H. Roy, learned Senior counsel, that in the Rules of 1983 and/or the Service Order of 1990, there is no provision for direct recruitment to the posts of Assistant Enforcement Inspector and Enforcement Checker. In fact, points out Mr. Roy, the Rules of 1983 and/or the Service Order of 1990 did not even mention the posts of Enforcement Checker and/or the procedure for making recruitment thereto. In such circumstances, contends Mr. Roy, the Rules of 2003 were wholly applicable, particularly, because it would be impossible to apply the Rules of 1983 and/or the Service Order of 1990 for carrying out the present selection process, when the Rules of 1983 and the Service Order of 1990 do not lay down the eligibility criteria and also the procedure for making appointments to the categories of the posts aforementioned. 42. It is pointed out by Mr. 42. It is pointed out by Mr. H. Roy, learned Senior counsel, that the second selection process, which was initiated with the issuance of the advertisement, dated 21.12.2003, was interfered with by this Court and this Court, vide its order, dated 19.7.2005, set aside the said selection process on the ground that the selection had been conducted by an Examination Committee and not by the Selection Board, though the Examination Committee was foreign to the scheme of the selection procedure incorporated in the recruitment Rules of 2003. It is further pointed out by Mr. Roy that while interfering with the earlier selection process, the Court held that Rule 6, which speaks of Constitution of the Selection Board, incorporates a principle, which seeks to achieve known and fixed parameters of conduct by public bodies in the matter of recruitment of public services and in this decision, it was also held that it is the Selection Board under the Rules of 2003, which is the duly constituted authority to hold the selection. This decision, points out Mr. Roy, has not been challenged by the present Petitioners and, hence, these findings in the judgment, dated 19.7.2005, are binding on the present Petitioners too. 43. Objecting to the submissions made on behalf of the Respondents concerned, Mr. Goswami has submitted that in the affidavit-in-reply, in the present case, the writ Petitioners have clearly taken the plea that the selection ought to have been proceeded with in terms of the Rules of 1983 read with Service Order of 1990 and not in terms of the Rules of 2003. In such circumstances, it cannot be contended, points out Mr. Goswami, that it is not the pleaded case of the Petitioners that the Rules of 2003 are inapplicable to the present selection process. Mr. Goswami seeks to derive strength for the submissions so made by him from the decisions in Sri Subramania Desika Gnanasambanda Pandarasannidi v. State of Madras and Anr. AIR 1965 SC 1578 . As regards the decision rendered, on 19.7.2005, in WP (C) No. 2594/2005, Mr. Mr. Goswami seeks to derive strength for the submissions so made by him from the decisions in Sri Subramania Desika Gnanasambanda Pandarasannidi v. State of Madras and Anr. AIR 1965 SC 1578 . As regards the decision rendered, on 19.7.2005, in WP (C) No. 2594/2005, Mr. Goswami submits that the Petitioners, in the present case, i.e. in WP (C) No. 6839/2005, are different from the Petitioners in WP (C) No. 2594/2005 and in such circumstances, it is still open to the present Petitioners to contend that the Rules of 2003 cannot be resorted to for the purpose of making recruitment to the posts, in question. Discussion 44. While dealing with the submissions made above by learned Counsel for the parties appearing before me, what may be noted is that in WP (C) No. 2594/2005, the Court interfered with the selection procedure on the ground that the Examination Committee, which was constituted for the purpose of holding the entire selection process, was alien to the scheme of the Rules of 2003 and that it is, under Rule 6 of Rules of 2003, the Selection Board, which is the competent authority to make the selection. The Court further directed that the selection tests be held by the Selection Board accordingly. Though the Petitioners were not parties to WP (C) No. 2594/2005, the fact remains that they had participated in the said selection process and they have not objected to the penultimate directions, which were issued in WP (C) No. 2594/2005. Considered thus, it is not open to the Petitioners, now, to contend that the Rules of 2003 cannot be resorted to for the purpose of holding the selection tests. 45. Coupled with the above, what is of immense importance to note is that recruitment rules consist of, broadly speaking, two parts, namely, the conditions of recruitment and the conditions of services. While conditions of recruitment, generally, remain rigid, the conditions of service may be modified or changed if the rules so permit. 46. 45. Coupled with the above, what is of immense importance to note is that recruitment rules consist of, broadly speaking, two parts, namely, the conditions of recruitment and the conditions of services. While conditions of recruitment, generally, remain rigid, the conditions of service may be modified or changed if the rules so permit. 46. In the case at hand, what is of utmost importance to note is that the eligibility criteria for selection shall remain, as already discussed above, in accordance with the advertisement, dated 19.7.2001; but in view of the fact that the Rules of 1983 as well as the Service Order of 1990 do not embody the procedure for making selection to the posts, in question, the Respondents/authorities concerned cannot be said to be debarred from taking recourse to the provisions of Rules of 2003 for the purpose of conducting a fair and transparent selection process. Had the prescribed criteria for recruitment been altered on taking resort to the Rules of 2003, the situation would have been, perhaps, a little different. In view of the fact that the prescribed criteria for selection remain the same as on the date, when the advertisement, in this regard, was published on 19.7.2001, the fact that resort to the Rules of 2003 has been taken, for the purpose of making a transparent and fair selection process, cannot be objected to, for, the procedure for selection is different from the conditions of recruitment. For instance, at the time, when a selection procedure is initiated, the process for selection may be setting up of question papers in narrative form, but, subsequently, the question papers may be set in objective form. Such a change in the procedure cannot be objected to. Similarly, if in a given case, recruitment, to be conducted in terms of a given set of rules, conceives making of selection through a Selection Committee and, subsequently, the Recruitment Rules are amended providing for selection through Public Service Commission, the mere fact that in place of the Selection Board, Public Service Commission would be holding the selection test cannot be made a ground for interference, particularly, in a case, such as, the present one, where the earlier Recruitment Rules and/or the Service Order of 1990 did not lay down any specific procedure for selection or the mechanism for selection. 47. 47. In the case at hand, when there is no dispute that the Rules of 1983 read with the Service Order of 1990 prescribe no specific scheme or procedure for holding the selection test or for making recruitment to the posts of Assistant Enforcement Inspector and/or Enforcement Checker and do not provide for any specific procedure for selection, taking of resort to the Rules of 2003 for the purpose of choosing the procedure for selection cannot be said to be illegal or void. When the Rules of 1983 read with Service Order of 1990 do not prescribe any specific procedure for recruitment to the posts of Assistant Enforcement Inspector and Enforcement Checker and when the Rules of 2003 provide for a fair and transparent system of recruitment to the said posts, recourse to the provisions of the Rules of 2003 for conducting the selection process, in the absence of any cogent materials indicating prejudice caused to the Petitioners or likely to be caused to the Petitioners, cannot be interfered. The point No. (ii) is, therefore, answered accordingly. Point Nos. (iv) and (v). (iv) Whether a scheme for conducting the selection process, as envisaged under the Rules of 2003 was prepared and/or any infirmity in this regard has led to an invalid and/or unfair selection process? (v) Whether the question papers were leaked out to some of the candidates and whether unfair means were adopted by some chosen candidates and also by the authorities/Respondents, who were entrusted with the responsibility of holding and conducting the selection process? Discussion on point Nos. (iv) and (v) 48. Since point numbers (iv) and (v) are closely inter-locked, both these points are taken up for discussion and decision together. 49. While considering point numbers (iv) and (v), what needs to be noted is that the Petitioners submit that though three copies of recent passport size photographs, duly attested by the candidate, were directed to be submitted along with each application form, admit cards, which were, eventually, issued, for the purpose of written test, to the candidates do not have the photographs of the candidates affixed on the admit card. This omission, according to the writ Petitioners, was aimed at allowing dummy candidates to participate in the written as well as viva voce test. This omission, according to the writ Petitioners, was aimed at allowing dummy candidates to participate in the written as well as viva voce test. This apart, according to the writ Petitioners, dummy candidates (i.e., persons impersonating as candidates) did appear in many of the examination centers and the identity of the dummy candidates was never verified by the invigilators. If these grievances of the writ Petitioners are taken to their logical conclusion, it becomes transparent that according to the writ Petitioners' knowledge or information, dummy candidates did appear in many of the examination centers. The writ Petitioners have, however, not given even a single instance of a dummy candidates having appeared in the written or viva voce test. 50. In fact, even when the Respondents contended, in their affidavit, that the writ Petitioners ought to have furnished such particulars, which would have shown or helped in tracing out the dummy candidate, the writ Petitioners have remained completely silent. In order to enable one to say that a dummy candidate had appeared, it would, but be natural to infer that the person, making such allegations is aware of the instances of the dummy candidates having appeared. Hence, the Petitioners, who allege that dummy candidates did appear in many of the examination centers, ought to have given, at least, some particulars of those candidates on whose behalf dummy candidates had appeared. No such particulars have, however, been furnished by the writ Petitioners. In these circumstances, the allegations made to the effect that dummy candidates had appeared in the written or viva voce test cannot, but be termed as wild and unfounded allegations. Since the writ Petitioners have not given a single, specific and concrete instance of a dummy candidate having appeared, no enquiry, in this regard, need be directed to be made by any impartial agency. 51. It is also alleged by the writ Petitioners that mobile phones were used in the examination halls, answers were supplied from outside the examination centers and question-answer scripts were taken out from the examination halls, brought back duly filled in and, then, answers were read out in the examination halls. The allegations, so made by the writ Petitioners, indicate that a large number of such irregularities had taken place. The allegations, so made by the writ Petitioners, indicate that a large number of such irregularities had taken place. If these allegations were really true, nothing prevented the writ Petitioners from giving any specific instance or particulars to indicate as to which candidate had used mobile phone or received answers or received duly filled answer script and/or received answers from someone outside the examination center. If such allegations, which are wholly unsupported by any material particular, are made basis for interference with a selection process and/or made a basis for holding of enquiry, no selection process would ever be completed, for, it would be very easy for those, who are unable to succeed in a selection process, to make wild allegations that mobile phones were used inside the examination halls, answers were supplied from outside the examination centers and/or that the question-answer scripts were taken out from the examination halls, brought back duly filled up and, then, answers were read out in the examination halls. In short, on the basis of such allegations too, neither the selection process can be interfered with nor can any enquiry be directed. 52. Let me, now, turn to the allegation that the question papers were leaked out well in advance and that the question papers were found available in the market. While considering this aspect of the accusations made by the writ Petitioners, what is of utmost importance to note is that the Petitioners, in WP (C) No. 6839/2005, have given a photostat of a question paper to show that the question papers were easily available in the market. What is, however, extremely important to note is that the writ Petitioners are completely silent as to how they happened to come into possession of the question-paper. As against this, the State Respondents have pointed out that the photostat of the question-paper, which has been furnished by these writ Petitioners, was a question-paper, which was issued to Sibsagar center and that the invigilator on duty, at the said center, has duly reported about the fact that the question-paper, in question, along with its answer script was missing and that on being so informed, the Respondents/authorities concerned have initiated appropriate action in this regard. 53. 53. In view of the fact that the said question-paper was, admittedly, issued to Sibsagar center and there is also no real dispute that the invigilator, on duty, did report about the fact that the question-paper along with answer script was found missing, it was the bounden duty of the writ Petitioners to make it clear as to when and how they happened to come into possession of the question-paper, in question, which has been produced, in the Court, by the writ Petitioners. If an accusation, such as the present one, is given credence merely on production of a photostat of a question-paper, the consequence would be frightfully dangerous in future, for, it would not be impossible for the candidates, who may not like the selection process to come to its logical conclusion, to ensure that one of the question-papers is removed, taken away from the examination center and a copy of such question-paper be produced before the Court to show that the question-papers were easily available in the market, particularly, when the present one is a case, wherein some of the writ Petitioners are ad hoc appointees and their ad hoc appointment depends on conclusion of the selection process. Mr. H. Roy, learned Senior counsel, has considerable force, when the submits that this Court may bear in mind that it is in the interest of the ad hoc appointees to continue with their appointment and they may fight tooth and nail, either directly or indirectly, to ensure that the selection process never see any concluded result. In the face of the fact that the delay in the conclusion of the selection process would, undoubtedly benefit the ad hoc appointees, very clear case needs to be made out by the aggrieved candidates to enable this Court to interfere with the selection process. In fact, to enable this Court to interfere with the accusation of leakage of question-papers, the writ Petitioners ought to have convincingly explained as to how they happened to have come into possession of the alleged leaked out question-paper. In this regard, nothing could be clearly submitted, on behalf of the writ Petitioners, as to how the writ Petitioners had come into possession of the question-paper, in question, and merely rested his argument by saying that such question-papers were easily available in the market. In this regard, nothing could be clearly submitted, on behalf of the writ Petitioners, as to how the writ Petitioners had come into possession of the question-paper, in question, and merely rested his argument by saying that such question-papers were easily available in the market. In the face of the escapist attitude of the writ Petitioners and their hesitation to boldly and clearly reveal before this Court as to how they happened to come into possession of a photostat question-paper, no credence can be given to such accusations, when the State Respondents have given plausible and convincing reasons as to how the question-paper, in question, made its way out from inside the Sibsagar center. 54. It is one of the grounds of challenge to the fairness of the selection process that one Billal Ahmed, who was a candidate, was also made an invigilator. In this regard, the State Respondents have clarified that while issuing the advertisement, dated 30.7.2005, it had been made clear that the candidates, who had already applied, need not, once again, apply and Billal Ahmed, who was a candidate earlier, would have, in terms of this advertisement, entitled to appear in the subsequent selection process; but Billal Ahmed informed the Respondents/authorities concerned that he would not appear as a candidate in the examination and it was, for this reason, that Billal Ahmed was, according to the State Respondents, assigned some duties, though not as an invigilator at an examination center. The explanation, so offered by the State Respondents, has not been contradicted by the writ Petitioners. Though the issue so raised cannot be carried any further, what may be pointed out is that Billal Ahmed ought not to have been, in all fairness, associated with the selection test inasmuch as he was, in the past, one of the candidates. In order to make the selection process fair and transparent, none, who had any kind of interest in the selection process even in the past, ought to have been associated with the selection process. 55. Now, turning to the accusations of the writ Petitioners that S.R. Mannan and Kamal Das have been associated with the selection process, it may be noted that the Respondents/authorities concerned have denied, on oath, that S.R. Mannan and Kamal Das had been involved in the selection process. In support of this contention, they have also produced the relevant records. 55. Now, turning to the accusations of the writ Petitioners that S.R. Mannan and Kamal Das have been associated with the selection process, it may be noted that the Respondents/authorities concerned have denied, on oath, that S.R. Mannan and Kamal Das had been involved in the selection process. In support of this contention, they have also produced the relevant records. There is absolutely no material on record to show that S.R. Mannan and Kamal Das played any role in the latest selection process. 56. Though it has been pointed out by Mr. P.K. Goswami, learned Senior counsel, that S.R. Mannan and Kamal Das have not filled any affidavit despite the fact that they have been made parties to the writ petitions, the fact remains that S.R. Mannan and Kamal Das worked under the Transport Department and when the Respondents/authorities concerned, running the Transport Department, have stated that these persons were not involved in the selection process and when there is no specific material indicating that the said two persons had played any role in either getting the question-papers printed or in bringing the same to Guwahati, such an accusation cannot be made a ground for interference with the selection process or for directing any enquiry to be held in this regard. It is also worth noticing that the writ Petitioners have furnished ticket numbers of a given date to show that on that day, S.R. Mannan and Kamal Das had gone to Delhi to get the question-papers printed. This accusation has also been denied by the State Respondents. Even assuming that S.R. Mannan and Kamal Das had gone to Delhi, the fact remains that there is not even an iota of material on record to show that S.R. Mannan and Kamal Das had gone to Delhi to get the question-papers printed. 57. The further accusation of the writ Petitioners is that the DTOs had interviewed the candidates in the viva voce test. The Respondents have denied this accusation and I do not find that there is any specific material on record to show that the DTOs, in general, had interviewed the candidates in the viva voce test. In such a situation, I am firmly of the view that neither any interference with the selection process nor any enquiry in such circumstances is warranted. 58. In such a situation, I am firmly of the view that neither any interference with the selection process nor any enquiry in such circumstances is warranted. 58. Because of what have been discussed and pointed out above, I do not find any reasons to hold that the materials on record are sufficient to probablise far less prove that question papers were leaked out to some of the candidates, unfair means were adopted by some chosen candidates and/or by the Respondents/authorities concerned. For the conclusion, so reached, I answer point No. (v) in the negative. 59. By filing a miscellaneous application, which has given rise to Misc. Case No. 114/2006, the writ Petitioners have brought on record a news report that a candidate has claimed that he had been furnished with answer scripts. While considering this plea of the writ Petitioners, it is of immense importance to note that the candidate, who was allegedly furnished with the question paper, in advance, has not been selected. Any candidate, who fails in a selection test, can always make an accusation that he had been furnished with the question paper. In the absence of any question paper having been produced by such a candidate, making of such allegations cannot, but be treated as wild accusation and such accusation cannot be made a basis for interference with the selection process. 60. Though great stress has been laid by Mr. P.K. Goswami, learned Senior counsel, that the Rules of 2003 envisage preparing of a scheme for conducting the selection test and no such scheme was prepared in the present, what is important to note is that a mere failure to frame a scheme in the absence of any other material showing that the omission to frame a specific scheme for conducting selection test has affected the fairness of the selection process, the question so raised remains academic and cannot, therefore, be made use of to interfere with the selection process The point No. (iv) stands answered accordingly. Point No. (iii). (iii) Whether the writ petitions suffer from non-joinder of necessary parties? Discussion on Point No. (iii) 61. While considering point No. (iii), it is necessary to recall that it is the case of the Petitioners, in general, that the entire selection process has been manipulated in order to, eventually, select some chosen candidates. Point No. (iii). (iii) Whether the writ petitions suffer from non-joinder of necessary parties? Discussion on Point No. (iii) 61. While considering point No. (iii), it is necessary to recall that it is the case of the Petitioners, in general, that the entire selection process has been manipulated in order to, eventually, select some chosen candidates. In fact, in WP (C) No. 6839/2005, the writ Petitioners have even claimed to have gathered a list of pre-selected candidates. Since the allegations so made are specific in nature, it is quite clear that the writ Petitioners ought to have made the allegedly pre-selected candidates as parties to the writ petitions inasmuch as it is not possible, in the absence of those persons, who are alleged to have been pre-selected, to determine the correctness or veracity of the allegations so made, for, it would be against the principles of natural justice to make any comment on the veracity or otherwise of the allegations that a list of preselected candidate has already been prepared by the Respondents/authorities concerned. However, instead of dismissing the writ petitions for non-joinder of necessary parties, I have closely examined the pleadings of the parties, the materials placed on record and also the records of the selection process maintained by the Respondents/authorities concerned, but I find nothing indicating that any candidate stood pre-selected. The point No. (iii) shall stand answered accordingly. Point Nos. (vi) and (vii) (vi) Whether the selections, eventually, made are fair and legal? (vii) To what reliefs, if any, the parties are entitled? 62. Though I have found no material to hold that the selection process conducted by the Respondents/authorities concerned, in the present case, suffer from any manipulation or unfairness, the conclusions reached, while discussing point No. (i), leave me with no option, but to hold that the selection process, which is under challenge in the present set of writ petitions, suffer from incurable legal infirmity and this infirmity vitiates the entire selection process. 63. In the result and for the reasons, as a whole, discussed above, the selection process held, pursuant to the advertisement, dated 30.7.2005, aforementioned, is hereby set aside and quashed in its entirety and the Respondents/authorities concerned are hereby directed to conduct a fresh selection process in accordance with law. 64. With the above observations and directions, all these four writ petitions shall stand disposed of. 65. 64. With the above observations and directions, all these four writ petitions shall stand disposed of. 65. However, there shall be no order as to costs.