( 1 ) AS in all the petitions, common questions arise for consideration and facts are also more or less interconnected, they are being considered by this common judgment. ( 2 ) SPECIAL Civil Application No. 6757 of 1998 is preferred by the 101 petitioners who are doing their business in the shops constructed over the land of the Corporation at Station-Godi Road near ST Bus Depot in Vadodara city. The reliefs prayed in the said petitions are to quash and set aside the notices issued in the year 1998 (Annexure-I) by the Corporation for vacating and to handover the possession within the period of 30 days. The petitioners have prayed to hold and declare that the action of the respondent Corporation in issuing the said notices is illegal, arbitrary, unjust and violative of the provisions of Article 14 and 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution. The said petitioners have also prayed to issue appropriate writ directing the respondents not to evict the petitioners from the respective shops occupied by them without following the due process of law. ( 3 ) SPECIAL Civil Application No. 6706 of 1998 is preferred by the similarly situated shops/cabin occupiers at Station-Godi Road near S. T. Bus Depot, Vadodara City. However, qua the said petitioners, no notices were issued like petitioners of Special Civil Application No. 6753 of 1998, but it appears that apprehending the eviction at par with the other similarly situated persons, who are shop holders on the same line, the present petition is preferred by 34 persons for the relief inter alia directing the respondent Corporation, not to remove the cabins of the petitioners situated on Station-Godi road and it is further prayed that the respondents be directed not to disturb or obstruct the petitioners from carrying on their respective business in the aforesaid place without following due process of law. ( 4 ) SPECIAL Civil Application No. 6889 of 1998 is preferred by 3 persons having their business opposite to Natraj Cinema and it is the case of such petitioners that the land was allotted to the petitioners as an alternative site in view of the vacating of the place near Godi Road on account of widening of the road, where earlier, the shops were allotted to the petitioners for their representative in interest as existed earlier. The prayers made in the petitions are to declare that the Corporation has no right to remove/demolish the petitioners cabin situated opposite to Natraj Cinema as the petitioners are in lawful occupation and tenant of Vadodara Municipal Corporation. ( 5 ) SPECIAL Civil Application No. 6900 of 1998 is preferred by the petitioners occupying the place opposite to the District Panchayat, Pathik Bhavan, Near Godi Jhapa, Vadodara and the case of the petitioners further appears to be that, since last 20 years, the petitioners are occupying the place of business and were alloted existing site in the year 1977. It has been alleged by the petitioners in the petition that the petitioners have not received any notice from the Corporation, but similarly situated persons like the petitioners have received notices and similarly situated persons have also approached to this Court and therefore, upon the apprehending actions, the petitioners have approached to this Court by preferring the present petition. The prayers made in the petition are that this Court may declare that the respondent Corporation has no right to remove/demolish the petitioners cabin situated opposite to Jilla Panchayat Guest House and the petitioners are in legal occupation and tenants of Vadodara Municipal Panchayat. ( 6 ) SPECIAL Civil Application No. 7101 of 1998 is preferred by the petitioner who is having occupation of the shop No. 62 situated on the same line at par with the petitioners of Special Civil Application No. 6753 of 1993 and others on Station-Godi Road and upon the Corporation having issued the notice dated 13. 08. 1998 to the petitioner to vacate the shop and to handover the possession within the period of 30 days, the petitioner has approached to this Court for the relief inter alia to quash the notice/order issued by the Corporation to declare the action of the Corporation in issuing the said notice as illegal, arbitrary, unjust and violative of Articles 14 and 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution of India. ( 7 ) I have heard the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners, Mr. N. K. Majmudar with Mr. P. R. Thakkar, Mr. B. T. Rao and Mr. Pahwa and I have also heard Mr. P. G. Desai, learned Counsel appearing for the Corporation and the Officer of the Corporation in all the matters. ( 8 ) THE first contention raised on behalf of some of the petitioners by Mr. N. K. Majmudar with Mr. P. R. Thakkar, Mr. B. T. Rao and Mr. Pahwa and I have also heard Mr. P. G. Desai, learned Counsel appearing for the Corporation and the Officer of the Corporation in all the matters. ( 8 ) THE first contention raised on behalf of some of the petitioners by Mr. Majmudar with Mr. Thakkar, the learned Counsel is that the petitioners are the tenants of the Corporation and they cannot be termed as licencee. It is further submitted that if the status of the petitioners is as of tenants, it is required for the Corporation to follow the procedure for eviction as required under the law and by issuance of a mere notice, the petitioners cannot be evicted from the land in question. It was alternatively submitted on behalf of the petitioners that even if the status of the petitioners is treated as that of licencee, the petitioners are not the encroachers over the public property and if the licencees are to be evicted from the property in question, then also the principles of natural justice are required to be followed by the Corporation and in the present case no opportunity of hearing has been given and straightaway the notices are issued for eviction and, therefore, the action is illegal. Mr. Majmudar, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners also submitted that qua the petitioners of SCA No. 6706 of 1998 even notices are not issued and, therefore, the action of eviction is illegal and deserves to be quashed by this Court. ( 9 ) THE petitioners have produced the copy of the allotment order dated 16. 6. 1996 so far as they relates to the cabins situated at Godi Road and the copy thereof is produced in the compilation of SCA No. 6706 of 1998 at Annexure "d". Such is the allotment order/letter for all other petitioners. The order itself provides for parvana " licence and the payment of parvana fees " licence fees. 6. 1996 so far as they relates to the cabins situated at Godi Road and the copy thereof is produced in the compilation of SCA No. 6706 of 1998 at Annexure "d". Such is the allotment order/letter for all other petitioners. The order itself provides for parvana " licence and the payment of parvana fees " licence fees. The petitioners are the persons, who have accepted the order and thereafter they acted upon the order and, therefore, when the allotment is on licence basis and on payment of licence fees, it does not lie in the mouth of the petitioners to contend that the petitioners are allotted land on rental basis or as tenants or as lessees, nor can such contention be accepted on the face of express stipulation of the order for allotment letter/order to the petitioners. Merely because in some of the receipts, which are produced by some of the petitioners, the language used is rent, would not alter the basic character of the relationship of Corporation as licensor and the petitioners or allottees as licencees and, therefore, the contention of the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners that the petitioners are allotted the land over which the cabins are constructed on lease basis or as tenants is ex-facie misconceived and deserves to be rejected outright. ( 10 ) IF the matter is to be considered on the basis that the petitioners were allotted space on licence basis, then, perusal of the conditions provided in the order dated 16. 6. 1996 shows that vide Condition No. 10 it has been expressly provided that the Scheme approved by the Apex Court for hawking and non-hawking zones will be required to be implemented and in future if shifting is to be made to other place or the licence is cancelled, the possession will be handed over by vacating the same. Further vide Condition No. 12, it has been provided that whenever the land under licence is required by the Municipal Corporation in public interest, the same will be vacated without raising any dispute and no compensation or damages shall be claimed, nor any suit shall be brought in the Civil Court or other Courts or any injunction shall be obtained. Further vide Condition No. 12, it has been provided that whenever the land under licence is required by the Municipal Corporation in public interest, the same will be vacated without raising any dispute and no compensation or damages shall be claimed, nor any suit shall be brought in the Civil Court or other Courts or any injunction shall be obtained. Therefore, if the aforesaid two conditions are taken into consideration, it does not provide for any right which is sought to be asserted on behalf of the petitioners in capacity as the licencee that the opportunity must be given to the petitioners even before exercise of the power by the Corporation either for requisitioning the land for public interest or for directing to shift in view of the implementation of the Scheme approved by the Apex Court for hawking and non-hawking zones in the city of Vadodara. At this stage, it would be worthwhile to refer to the decision of this Court (Coram: R. K. Abichandani, J.-as he then was) in the case of Paman Bhobhrajmal Navlani v. Dy. Municipal Commissioner, Vadodara and Others", reported in 1997 (3) GLR, 2431, where more or less similar questions arose before the Court for consideration and similar contentions were raised as they are raised in the present petitions by the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners. This Court, so far as the city of Vadodara is concerned, in view of the Scheme of hawking and non-hawking zones pursuant to the orders of the Hon ble Supreme Court, observed at paragraphs 17 and 18, inter alia, as under:"17. There is no dispute about the fact that the Scheme of Hawking zone and Non-Hawking zone has been framed by the Baroda Municipal Corporation pursuant to the orders of the Supreme Court made on 2. 5. 86 in writ petition No. 657/86 and other cognate matters. From that order is reproduced hereinabove, it is clear that an undertaking was required to be given before the Court for removal of hand-carts, gallas, cabins etc. That was made subject to clause 2 of the order. Under clause 2 liberty to adopt appropriate proceedings was granted in respect of locations of areas or places in the trading zones, where the petitioners and other hawkers were to be permitted to carry on their business or trade in the final scheme. That was made subject to clause 2 of the order. Under clause 2 liberty to adopt appropriate proceedings was granted in respect of locations of areas or places in the trading zones, where the petitioners and other hawkers were to be permitted to carry on their business or trade in the final scheme. An opportunity was required to be given to the petitioners to make their representations while fixing the Hawking and Non-Hawking zones in the final scheme and the Municipal Corporation of Baroda was directed to fix such zones expeditiously. Accordingly, the scheme was framed and was approved by a Division bench of this Court (A. M. Ahmadi and P. M. Chauhan,jj.) on 5th August, 1988. The Hon ble Supreme Court when pointed out that a suit was being proceeded with in Baroda Court, in SLP 5465/89 on 3. 5. 89 vacated the order of interim injunction granted by the Civil Court and dismissed the suit observing that approaching the Civil Court was an attempt to thwart the scheme and amounted to abuse of the process of the Court. It is therefore clear that the Scheme which has been framed as per the directions of Hon ble the Supreme Court would prevail over any inconsistent order that may be passed by any inferior Court. It is clear that the decision of the Supreme Court directing the scheme to be framed was not confined to some individual hawkers only, but it was a direction on the Municipal Corporation to frame a scheme for the whole city demarcating the Hawking and Non-hawking zones, which was required to be implemented. The decision of the Supreme Court giving such directions was therefore, clearly a decision in rem binding on all hawkers of the city and the petitioners who were not party before the Supreme Court cannot claim to be exempt from the Scheme on the ground that the Scheme would bind only the parties which were before the Supreme Court. Admittedly, as stated in the scheme in the report which is incorporated therein, notices were issued inviting suggestions, representations from the interested parties. Notice dated 22nd March, 1987 was issued in Newspapers inviting the general public and hawkers to give their statements, suggestions and objections for formulation of the hawking and non-hawking zones. All these petitioners had therefore, ample opportunity to put forth their case before Mr. Notice dated 22nd March, 1987 was issued in Newspapers inviting the general public and hawkers to give their statements, suggestions and objections for formulation of the hawking and non-hawking zones. All these petitioners had therefore, ample opportunity to put forth their case before Mr. M. K. Desai, who was appointed to prepare the scheme. In the report, there is a clear reference to the fact that in the city of Baroda, the hawkers do their business in roving hand cart, cabins, stationary hand-carts etc. The Scheme was intended to cover not only hand larries, which were moving or stationary, but also cabins. In the judgement of this High Court in Gulam Ali s case (supra) in which the direction was initially given to frame the Scheme the word `hawker was used to collectively refer larriwallas, gallawalas (i. e. cabin and stall holders) as stated in para 2 of the judgement. The word cabins occurs even in the decision of the Supreme Court in which directions were given to frame the scheme. There is therefore absolutely no substance in the contention canvassed on behalf of the petitioners that the scheme was not intended to cover persons who were not parties before the Supreme Court or persons who were having cabins at these places. It cannot be said that the scheme was confined only to hand-larries and was not applicable to cabins at these places. (Emphasis supplied)18. In view of the fact that the Scheme was framed under the directions of the Supreme Court, it is clear that any decree or order of a Civil Court including an injunction which runs contrary to the Scheme sanctioned by the Supreme Court would be of no avail to the petitioners who claim the benefit of such Court order. Apart from this, it would be clear from the orders of the subordinate Courts on which reliance is placed that the Corporations power to take action in accordance with law is not at all affected. In the appellate decision of the Baroda Court (Regular Civil Appeal Nos. 7, 8 and 9/62), it was declared by the Court on 31st August, 1963 that the Municipality could not evict those plaintiffs summarily and it was restrained from evicting them except by due process of law. In the appellate decision of the Baroda Court (Regular Civil Appeal Nos. 7, 8 and 9/62), it was declared by the Court on 31st August, 1963 that the Municipality could not evict those plaintiffs summarily and it was restrained from evicting them except by due process of law. After that decision, the said Act became from 1st April, 1966 applicable because the Baroda Municipal Corporation was constituted from that date and the provisions of Section 231 became applicable under which the Commissioner could have exercised his power. Undisputedly, in all these cases the licences stood terminated on the dates shown in the notices. The petitioners did not have any permanent right to continue in the plots which were given to them for hawking. The record shows that they were described by the Corporation as licensees. The licence fee even if it was described as rent in the receipt, would not change the nature of the licence. Under the provisions of Section 60 of the Indian Easement Act, 1882, a licence may be revoked by the grantor unless it was coupled with a transfer of property and such transfer is in force or acting upon the licence the licensee has executed work of a permanent character and incurred expenses in the execution. (Emphasis supplied ). The Appellate Court had already held in the representative Suit that the licensee had not executed any work of a permanent character and the provisions of Section 60 (a) and (b) of the Indian Easement Act, 1882 were not attracted in their favour. The Corporation therefore, could have at any time revoked these licences. As provided by Section 62 of the Indian Easement Act, a licence is deemed to be revoked in case where it has been granted for a limited period on the expiry of such period. Admittedly, the earlier licences which were given to the petitioners were to be renewed periodically and none of the petitioners possessed any valid licence at the time when impugned notices were given. Their licences had expired and that fact is clearly mentioned in the impugned notices. The petitioners therefore, hadabsoslutely no right to continue in the places where they were having cabins. Their licences had expired and that fact is clearly mentioned in the impugned notices. The petitioners therefore, hadabsoslutely no right to continue in the places where they were having cabins. ( 11 ) WHILE considering the question for exercise of the power by the Commissioner under Section 231 of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act, 1949 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"), for removal of any structure like cabins without notice, at paragraphs 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23, it was observed thus:"19. By virtue of the provision of Section 231, the Commissioner was, without notice, empowered to remove any such structure like cabin which was erected on the street. Since there was no subsisting licence, it can never be said that the cabin remained on the street with any written permission of the Commissioner. Immediately when the licence ended, the structure became an encroachment and the Commissioner could lawfully remove the same without notice under Section 231. The expression "the Commissioner may without notice, cause to be removed. . . . . " has reference only to a notice to quit which is not required as per this provision. Therefore, even without a notice to quit being issued, that is to say - even without any forewarning, the obstruction could be removed from a public street. This power is absolutely necessary because if a public street is encroached upon by placing an obstruction which may require immediate removal it may cause great damage or inconvenience to the public if prompt action is not taken under Section 231. When even a notice to quit is not required to be given by that provision, it follows that there could be no question of giving any show cause notice or hearing to such encroachers. The provisions of Section 231 therefore clearly exclude giving of any show cause notice as to why the encroachment should not be removed. (Emphasis supplied) However, having regard to the fact that even a trespasser should have an opportunity to remove himself, or his belongings on the principle of fairplay, an opportunity is to be given to remove the obstruction, but surely not on the doctrine of audi-alteram partem. 20 the provisions of Section 231 came to be considered in a recent decision of the Hon ble Supreme Court in Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation Vs. 20 the provisions of Section 231 came to be considered in a recent decision of the Hon ble Supreme Court in Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation Vs. Nawab Khan Gulab Khan ,reported in 1997 (1) G. L. H 438 and that decision is a complete answer to the contention sought to be raised on behalf of the petitioners that they may be given a hearing before removal of the encroachments. The Supreme Court observed that removal of such encroachments requires urgent action and the competent authority must ensure constant vigil on encroachment of the public places. It was observed that no one has a right to encroach the public property and claim the procedure of opportunity of hearing, which would be a tardious and time-consuming process leading to putting a premium for high-handed and unauthorised acts of encroachment and unlawful squatting. In paragraph 8 of the judgement it was held as under:-"footpath, street or pavement are public property which are intended to serve the convenience of general public. They are not laid for private purpose frustrates the very object for which they are carved out from portions of public roads. The main reason for laying out pavements is to ensure that the pedestrians are able to go about their daily affairs with a reasonable measure of safety and security. The facility, which has matured into a right of the pedestrians, cannot be set at naught by allowing encroachments to be made on the pavements. The claim of the pavement dwellers to construct huts on the pavement or road is a permanent obstruction to free passage of traffic and pedestrians safety and security. Therefore, it would be impermissible to permit or to make use of the pavement for private purpose. They should allow passing and re-passing by the pedestrians. No one has a right to make use of a public property for the private purpose without the requisite authorisation from the competent authority. It would, therefore, be but the duty of the competent authority to remove encroachments on the pavement or footpath of the public street obstructing free flow of traffic or passing or re-passing by the pedestrians. "21. No one has a right to make use of a public property for the private purpose without the requisite authorisation from the competent authority. It would, therefore, be but the duty of the competent authority to remove encroachments on the pavement or footpath of the public street obstructing free flow of traffic or passing or re-passing by the pedestrians. "21. It was further observed that if the Corporation allows settlement of encroachers for a long time for reasons best known to them, then necessarily a modicum of reasonable notice for removal, say two weeks or ten days, and its personal service on the encroachers or substituted service by fixing notice on the property is necessary. If the encroachment is not removed within the specified time, the competent authority would be at liberty to have it removed. It was held that this would meet the fairness of procedure and principle of giving opportunity to remove the encroachment voluntarily by the encroachers. The Supreme Court relied upon earlier decisions of the Court in Sadan Singh s case (J. T - 1989 3 SC 553) and Olga Tellis s case (1985) 3 SCC 545 . The petitioners cannot press in service the ratio of any decision of the High Court which may run counter to the aforesaid clear proposition of law laid down by the Supreme Court. This Court in ARC Association Vs. Jamnagar Municipal Corporation, reported in 1995 (1) G. L. H at page 586 had, in context of the provisions of Section 231 of the said Act, held that empowering the Commissioner to remove obstruction on the public street cannot be said to be an unreasonable provision and in appropriate cases the Commissioner was empowered to dispense with previous notice to persons who were likely to be affected by the proposed action. As held above, even a notice to quit is not required to be given when there is encroachment on public streets. However, if the encroacher has remained for a long period, then as held by the Supreme Court, the encroacher may be allowed ten-fifteen days time to remove the encroachment. In the instant case, the impugned notices gave 15 days time to the petitioners to remove the encroachments and clear the public streets which fall in the Non-Hawking zones. However, if the encroacher has remained for a long period, then as held by the Supreme Court, the encroacher may be allowed ten-fifteen days time to remove the encroachment. In the instant case, the impugned notices gave 15 days time to the petitioners to remove the encroachments and clear the public streets which fall in the Non-Hawking zones. The petitioners have already for a long period thwarted the implementation of the scheme and this group of petition is yet another attempt to do the same. The Hon ble the Supreme Court has already expressed its displeasure against any orders being passed by the subordinate Courts, which would have the effect of thwarting the final Scheme framed by the Baroda Municipal Corporation, as noted hereinabove. 22. The challenge against the impugned notice on the ground that it does not refer to the provisions of Section 230 or that it does not mention that the petitioners had encroached the public street by placing the cabins or that it was bad on the ground of non-applicability of mind is wholly misconceived. On perusal of the impugned notice it is clear that the Corporation had in terms stated therein that the licences of the petitioners had come to an end on the dates which are mentioned in the notices, which were in December, 1988 and March, 1989. The notices also referred to the area where the cabins/hand larries were situated. The names of the licensees and the occupants wherever the occupants are different from the original licensees have also been clearly mentioned. It is also stated in each of these notices that the places where the petitioners were having their cabins were in a Non-Hawking zone and in paragraph 7 of these notices, reference is given of such public roads mentioned in the final Scheme, which are declared as Non-Hawking zones. In the Scheme there is a detailed discussion about the reasons as to why these roads are made Non-Hawking zones. It is also mentioned in these notices that the licences had ended and that the amounts of mesne profit should be paid up. There is also reference to additional encroachment in some cases. Merely because there is requirement to pay the mesne profits for the unauthorised user of the place after the revocation of the licence, it cannot be said that any tenancy rights of the petitioners were created. There is also reference to additional encroachment in some cases. Merely because there is requirement to pay the mesne profits for the unauthorised user of the place after the revocation of the licence, it cannot be said that any tenancy rights of the petitioners were created. Even the reference to the licensee s sub-letting would not create any tenancy right in favour of the licensee. The notice contains all the material particulars that their licences having been revoked and the place occupied by them being included in the public roads which are declared to be Non-Hawking zones, they were required to remove the encroachments. This power was obviously relatable to the provisions of Section 231 of the said Act and mere non-reference of that statutory provision in the notices can never invalidate them. The entire Scheme pertains to the declaration of Hawking and Non-Hawking zones and clearly refers to various public roads including the roads on which the petitioners cabins were situated. Mr. Patel s contention that description of these cabins as "shopping centre" on page 6 of the Scheme by the authority preparing the report would entitle these petitioners to the protection which was given to Padmavati Shopping Centre Complex mentioned on the same page, is wholly misconceived. That shopping centre has reference to some building while the area where cabins are described as being a shopping centre is only a general description showing that shopping is being done there and in that context it has been, in fact, observed that it is difficult to walk on those roads and lanes. The cabins of the petitioners were therefore clearly found to be obstructing traffic on the public roads and these roads having been included in the list Annexure-"a" of the Scheme which shows areas declared as Non-Hawking zones, the petitioners cannot claim any right to continue their cabins on these roads. From the list Annexure-"a" of the Scheme it was pointed out by the learned counsel that the public roads on which the cabins of the petitioners are situated fall at serial Nos. 7, 10, 11, 16, 17 etc. From the list Annexure-"a" of the Scheme it was pointed out by the learned counsel that the public roads on which the cabins of the petitioners are situated fall at serial Nos. 7, 10, 11, 16, 17 etc. Thus, if the petitioners are allowed to continue with their cabins on these public roads, that would amount to clear violation of the directions of the Hon ble the Supreme Court approving and directing the implementation of the Scheme and showing its displeasure on any one trying to get interim orders which would thwart the Scheme. Any attempt by such persons to thwart the implementation of the said Scheme would amount to abusing the process of court. The fact that it may be done by filing a suit or a writ petition in the High Court would make no difference. Therefore, the attempt of the petitioners for claiming that the Scheme does not apply to them would only result in thwarting the Scheme, as it can never be the intention of keeping out of its purview the hawkers who are cabin holders and allowing them to create obstructions on the public roads which are included in the Non-Hawking zones. As noted above, it is clear from the provisions of the Scheme that they are intended to cover cabins also. There is reference to cabins not only in the directions of the Hon ble the Supreme Court but also in the decision of the High Court in Gulam Ali s case (supra) and at various places in the Scheme itself. In the general provisions which are made at page 21 of the Scheme it is stated that the hawkers were given licences for cabins, pitch patharas and stationary hand-carts in the past, but they now constitute an obstruction to free and smooth flow of pedestrians and vehicular traffic and therefore, they are to be removed irrespective of the fact that they are licence holders or non-licence holders. Under the `modalities , it is significant to note that there is reference to stalls and cabins in clauses 7, 18, 22 and 24 and it was clearly stipulated that no new licence shall be issued for cabins even in the Hawking zones and existing cabin licencees in the Non-Hawking zones are to be shifted first to the Hawking zones. Under the `modalities , it is significant to note that there is reference to stalls and cabins in clauses 7, 18, 22 and 24 and it was clearly stipulated that no new licence shall be issued for cabins even in the Hawking zones and existing cabin licencees in the Non-Hawking zones are to be shifted first to the Hawking zones. Thus, the petitioners cannot contend that the Scheme will not apply to cabin holders or that the cabin holders cannot be required to shift to Non-Hawking zones. The Scheme as per the direction of Hon ble the Supreme Court and as approved by a Division Bench of this Court clearly applies also to all these cabin holders who are legitimately required by the Corporation to clear out the public places so that the final Scheme can be implemented. 23. The contention that the word `hawkers will not include cabin holders can hardly be accepted. There can be hawkers who have four wheeled carts or who squat on the streets and also those who have stalls. This aspect is borne out from the decision of the Hon ble the Supreme Court in Bombay Hawkers Union Vs. Bombay Municipal Corportion reported in AIR 1985 S. C. 1206. It was observed by the Hon ble the Supreme Court in paragraph 2 of the judgement that broadly there are three types of hawkers and that there can be hawkers who have stalls. Even in Gulam Ali s case (supra) this court had included `galla or `cabin holders amongst the expression `hawkers and directed the Hawking and Non-Hawking Zones Scheme to be prepared in that context. Therefore, there is nothing unusual in calling a person who puts up a stall or cabin for selling his goods at a public place, a hawker. The petitioners were hawking their goods which were displayed in their cabins. In this view of the matter and more particularly because even these cabins are the subject matter of the final Scheme which had been approved by Hon ble the Supreme Court, there is no substance in the contention canvassed on behalf of the petitioners that these petitioners are not hawkers or that the final Scheme was not applicable to them because they were cabin holders and not hand cart holders. " ( 12 ) IT may also be recorded that against the aforesaid Judgment of the Single Bench of this Court in case of Paman Bhobhrajmal Navlani and Ors. (Supra), the matters were carried before the Division Bench of this Court by preferring Letters Patent Appeal No. 916 of 1997 and allied matters. The Division Bench of this Court (Coram : M. R. Calla, J. (as he then was) and R. R. Tripathi, J.), as per the Judgment dated 06. 08. 2001, has dismissed the Letters Patent Appeal. One of the contention raised before the Letters Patent Bench additionally on behalf of the appellants therein was that, the appellants were not parties to the earlier litigation, which came to be decided by the Hon ble Apex Court for the purpose of scheme of hawking and non-hawking zone and it was therefore contended that the scheme framed by the Apex Court was not a Judgement in rem and it did not affect the rights of the appellants who were not parties before the Apex Court. The Division Bench, while dealing with the aforesaid contention inter alia observed at para 8 (A) as under:"it may be straightway observed that the litigation was with regard to the removal of hand-carts/ larries/ gallas/ pathariwalas/ cabins/stalls etc, hawking and non-hawking zones were to be included in the final scheme and the Municipal Corporation of Baroda was directed to fix such zones. Such a direction as was issued by the Supreme Court can hardly be said to be a direction in persona, it was certainly a direction in rem covering the cases with regard to removal of hand-carts/ larries/ gallas/ pathariwalas/cabins/ stalls etc. to carry out the scheme of hawking and non-hawking zones. Several rounds of litigations had taken place in the same subject matter prior to 2nd May 1986 and it cannot be said that while issuing the directions of general nature, the Supreme Court was oblivious of the previous litigation. Not only that even after the passing of this order dated 2nd May 1986 by the Supreme Court, when the scheme was finalised and the same was challenged, such challenge failed when the matter was rejected by the Division Bench of this Court on 5th May 1988. Not only that even after the passing of this order dated 2nd May 1986 by the Supreme Court, when the scheme was finalised and the same was challenged, such challenge failed when the matter was rejected by the Division Bench of this Court on 5th May 1988. Even then the action of the Municipal Corporation in the matter of implementation of this scheme was challenged before Civil Court in the year 1989 and when the matter was taken to the Supreme Court by the Municipal Corporation of Baroda, the Supreme Court dismissed the suit itself on 3rd May 1989 and ordered that all interlocutory orders made therein shall stand dismissed and thereafter Special Civil Application No. 7396 of 1988 was rejected by the High Court on 7th Aug. 1996 and all that was ordered was that the eviction from the subject premises shall be done only in accordance with law. In teeth of the fact-situation in its entirety, it is not possible to accept the case of the appellants that such a scheme was not binding or applicable to them, merely because they were not the parties before the Supreme Court. The scheme as was prepared after the Supreme Court s order was so prepared after inviting representations /objections/suggestions from all and sundry and the challenge to it had also failed before the Division Bench of this Court on 5th May 1988. In our opinion, the learned Single Judge has rightly held that it was a case of judgment in Rem and not in Personam and the scheme was binding on all concerned including present appellants whether they were parties before the Supreme Court or not. " ( 13 ) EVEN while negativing the claim/contention raised on the basis of the area allotted to the appellants in pursuance of the order of the Civil Court and vis-a-vis, the scheme prepared in pursuance of the direction issued by the Supreme Court, and consequently for considering the questions as to whether the decree or an order under Gujarat Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1972, is required before effecting eviction, the appellate bench observed at para 8 (B) as under :" (a)Baroda Municipal Corporation was constituted w. e. f. 1st April 1966 and thereafter the Commissioner of Baroda Municipal Corporation could certainly proceed u/s. 231 of the Act. None of the appellants had or could have had a permanent right to continue on the plots which were given to them for hawking. The provisions of the Act could not be defeated so as to claim the so-called perpetual right as a tenant against the Municipal Corporation. (b) The licence to carry on trade on such plot was given only for a limited period and therefore with the expiry of the licence, the right even as a tenant on such plot automatically comes to an end rendering such parties to be liable to be evicted in accordance with due process of law. It was not a case of transfer of any plot independent of the grant of licence and mere use of the word, rent in the receipt could not mean that it was a case of lease and not the licence. Even the licence was for a limited period and after the expiry of licence period, there was no question of retaining the plot by invoking Sec. 60 (a) and 60 (b) of the Indian Easement Act, 1882 and the licence could be revoked at any time. (c) We do not find that scheme was inconsistent to any of the provisions of the Act, such scheme was finalised after inviting objections /suggestions/ representations through a general public notice, the validity of the scheme - had attained finality when the challenge to it failed before the Division Bench of this Court and therefore the orders dt. 31. 8. 1963 passed by the Extra Asstt. Judge, Baroda or the order dt. 16. 8. 1977 passed by the Civil Judge (J. D.), Baroda could be no legal impediment and there was no question of Municipal Corporation of Baroda going for a decree from Civil Court or to obtain any order under the Gujarat Public Premises (Eviction of unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1972 when the Corporation itself had ample powers to proceed under the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act and to act upon and give effect to the scheme framed in accordance with law. (d) The right to occupy the land/plot was coupled with the holding of licence to trade on the land/plot in question and therefore with the expiry of the licence the right to occupy such plot/land automatically came to an end. (d) The right to occupy the land/plot was coupled with the holding of licence to trade on the land/plot in question and therefore with the expiry of the licence the right to occupy such plot/land automatically came to an end. (e) When the scheme was framed and finalised under the Supreme Court s order dated 2nd May 1986, when the Civil Court was again approached by the holders of hand-carts /larries /gallas /pathariwalas /cabins /stalls etc. , and an injunction order was passed in Civil Suit No. 1761 of 1981 by the 6th Jt. Civil Judge (Senior Division), Baroda and the Civil Revision Application against such order was decided by the High Court on 12th April 1989, the matter was again taken to the Supreme Court by the Baroda Municipal Corporation and the Supreme Court in its order dated 3rd May 1989 while dismissing the suit itself, ordered that all interlocutory orders made therein shall stand dismissed. (f) It is, therefore, clear that the Supreme Court had kept in view the larger questions while passing the order dated 2nd May 1986 as well as the order dated 3rd May 1989 and there is no basis to say that as the scheme framed under the Supreme Court s order was not binding simply because certain appellants were not parties to the matter which was under consideration before the Supreme Court. " ( 14 ) THE Division Bench in the aforesaid decision, while dealing with the question on the alternative sites, observed at para 10 inter alia as under:"we find that in the past also, alternative sites had been offered, but there has been a dispute with regard to the place of the sites. Learned Single Judge has rightly held that the appellants cannot have a choice of the site once the hawking and non-hawking zones have been created by a scheme which was framed after the Supreme Court s order. When the alternative sites are offered, it is for the appellants to accept the offer of the alternative site or not. Mr. Tanna, learned Counsel for the respondent Corporation has very candidly stated before us that even now the respondent Corporation is ready to offer the alternative sites, but there cannot be any choice and for the purpose of alternative sites, genuine difficulty shall be considered without any favour or partiality. Mr. Tanna, learned Counsel for the respondent Corporation has very candidly stated before us that even now the respondent Corporation is ready to offer the alternative sites, but there cannot be any choice and for the purpose of alternative sites, genuine difficulty shall be considered without any favour or partiality. We, therefore, find that to give a descent finale to this decades old controversy on purely compassionate grounds as a matter of grace as candidly stated by Mr. Tanna, learned Counsel for the Corporation, suitable alternative sites be offered to the parties/appellants who have not availed the offer of alternative site so far or to any one who may not have been given such offer, but it will be the last opportunity to avail such offers in the context of the statement made by Mr. Tanna, it goes without saying that offers of alternative sites shall be made without any favour or partiality and genuine difficulty, if any, of any party shall be taken in to account. Whatever decision with regard to the alternative site is taken by the competent authority shall be conclusive. The respondents shall make the offer of such alternative sites afresh even now within a period of one month from the date of receipt of the certified copy of this order and it will be open for the concerned parties/appellants who may not have availed such offer earlier to accept or not to accept such offer now and they will convey their acceptance or otherwise with regard to such offer within a period of 15 days from the date of receipt of such offer and in case they accept the offer of alternative sites, they shall occupy the same within a period of one month thereafter and until they shift to the alternative sites within this period of one month, position as obtaining today shall not be disturbed. " ( 15 ) THEREFORE, as such, even if the petitioners are permitted to occupy the space as licencees, no right can be said as created in favour of the petitioners to permanently occupy the land. Further, as expressly provided in the conditions for allotment of the licence, the allotment was pending the finalization of the Scheme by the Apex Court for hawking and non-hawking zones and that the Scheme is, in any way, finalized. Further, as expressly provided in the conditions for allotment of the licence, the allotment was pending the finalization of the Scheme by the Apex Court for hawking and non-hawking zones and that the Scheme is, in any way, finalized. There is also express stipulation of requirement of vacating in the event the land is requisitioned by the Corporation in public interest. ( 16 ) IF the matters are examined in light of the aforesaid view of Single Bench as well as Division Bench of this Court, it appears that in view of the finalization of the Scheme approved by the Apex Court for hawking and non-hawking zones as the shops are situated in the non-hawking zone, as per the Scheme approved by the Apex Court as mentioned in the impugned notices, the land is required to be vacated and the possession is to be taken over. Therefore, if the Corporation has enforced the express stipulation of the conditions of licence, and when it is not in dispute that the Apex Court has approved the Scheme for hawking and non-hawking zones for the city of Vadodara and when it is not also in dispute that the shops are situated in non-hawking zones, the contention of the petitioners that before exercise of the power for eviction, opportunity of hearing was required to be given, cannot be accepted. ( 17 ) THE impugned notices further show that rainy water is passing below the cabins which are permitted to be constructed. It has been mentioned in the notices that there are alterations made which were not provided in the conditions of allotment. There are problems for pedestrians and traffic and, therefore, consequently the Corporation is suffering financial loss due to non-flowing of the water in the drainages. The another reference made in the notices is of the location of the area that the same is situated nearby Central ST Bus Station, where there is continuous 18-hour inflow of traffic out of 24 hours and, therefore, day-to-day it has become difficult to tackle the traffic and, therefore, the land is required and the shops are required to be removed. The power under Section 231 of the Act are invoked and 30 days time is given for vacating failing which, it has been observed that the appropriate proceedings shall be taken for eviction. The power under Section 231 of the Act are invoked and 30 days time is given for vacating failing which, it has been observed that the appropriate proceedings shall be taken for eviction. ( 18 ) THE affidavit in reply is filed on behalf of the Corporation which, inter alia, states that the Scheme is sanctioned by the Apex Court for hawking and non-hawking zones in the city of Vadodara and Scheme is also produced on record. The other aspects as mentioned in the notices are referred to, but it has been additionally stated that the Assistant Police Commissioner has intimated the Corporation that considering the day-to-day traffic, it is necessary to remove the encroachment on the road/foot-path and in the public interest the road as well as the foot-path are required to be widened. It has also been stated in the affidavit on behalf of the Corporation that the Western Railway has intimated the Corporation that for construction of new platform and for the safety of the passengers, it is necessary to remove the encroachments/shops which are existing on the road so as to permit access to the passengers, including those approaching from ST Bus Depot. It has also been stated in the affidavit in reply that the petitioners were granted permission for construction for temporary erection and the petitioners have also given undertaken that on bonafide requirement of the Corporation vacant possession will be handed over to the Corporation. ( 19 ) THE learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners have vehemently contended that the circumstances as prevailing on the date when the notices were issued for eviction can be considered and subsequent circumstances may be the letter of the Assistant Commissioner of Police or Western Railway cannot be taken into consideration by this Court and it was submitted that the same can rather be said as extraneous consideration on the part of the Corporation in evicting for getting the vacant possession of the shops in question. ( 20 ) EVEN if the contention on behalf of the petitioners is considered for the sake of examination on the basis of the contents of the impugned notices, then also there is no dispute on the point that the area over which the petitioners are permitted to occupy is a non-hawking zone as declared in the Scheme duly approved by the Apex Court. Further even in the impugned notices, the possession is requisitioned also on the ground of solving the traffic problem and the other ground of drainage lines etc. Therefore, if the Corporation has requisitioned the land on account of solving the drainage problems or on account of solving huge traffic problem, such a ground cannot be said as extraneous to the public interest. Even otherwise also it is required for the Corporation to ensure that sufficient care is taken in smooth flow of the drainage system as well as sufficient space is provided on road for smooth flow and movement of traffic. The petitioners who have expressly accepted the conditions of surrendering and/or vacating the possession in the event the land is requisitioned by the Corporation, cannot assert as of right that before the Corporation exercise the power of requisitioning of the land on the ground of alleged public interest, opportunity of hearing is required to be given to the petitioners whose status is that of licencee. As such, as observed earlier licence does not create any right in the property. Further, express condition is provided of vacating upon requisition by the Corporation. The same is also with the additional condition of not to raise the dispute for such purpose. In any case, when this Court has found that the requisition of the land by the Corporation cannot be said to be on the ground other than public interest or rather in public interest so as to make space available for solving the problem of traffic and drainage, the contention of the petitioners cannot be accepted on the ground that before arriving at the decision by the Corporation on the aspect of requirement for public interest opportunity of hearing was required to be given to the petitioners by following the principles of natural justice. Therefore, the said contention raised on behalf of the petitioners is not accepted and rejected. ( 21 ) THE learned counsel appearing for the petitioners have raised the contention that the land is not required at all for road widening. It was also submitted that even if the road is to be widened, statutory procedure is required to be followed by the Corporation, which is not followed. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners of Special Civil Application Nos. It was also submitted that even if the road is to be widened, statutory procedure is required to be followed by the Corporation, which is not followed. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners of Special Civil Application Nos. 6889 of 1998 and 6900 of 1998, additionally contended that the location of the cabin which are in occupation of the petitioners are not exactly on the main road, but are on the internal passage and such occupation is not causing any hardship to the traffic and it was also submitted by Mr. Roa that the Corporation is contemplating to take steps to evict merely because the office of the Corporation is situated in the nearby area and they want to make use of the land for parking vehicles of their own staff etc. ( 22 ) MR. Desai, learned counsel appearing for the Corporation however, submitted that the petitioners of Special Civil Application Nos. 6889 of 1998 and 6900 of 1998 are not the recognised transferee and they have made further encroachment in the area, which is not even allotted by the Corporation and he submitted that the Corporation is in need of the space inasmuch as, as per the Corporation, the whole area of station-Godi road is to be made available for smooth flow of traffic. ( 23 ) IN my view, such contention raised on behalf of the petitioners deserves to be rejected on the ground that the status of such petitioners even if accepted at best, is as that of licensee and therefore, once the license is terminated and the Corporation requires the place, the licensee who has agreed to vacate, cannot be heard to say that the requirement of the land is not in the public interest, more particularly, when this Court has found that the land requisitioned by the Corporation is for public interest. Furthermore, when the area or the station- Godi road is situated at non-hawking zone, as per the scheme framed in pursuance to the directions by the Apex Court, the area of non-hawking zone must be made available to the public at large for road purposes and as observed by the Single Bench as well as the Division Bench of this Court, irrespective of the fact that the petitioners were parties to the proceedings before the Apex Court or not, such scheme of hawking or non-hawking zone is binding to all concerned and if the Corporation has taken steps for removal, such cannot be negatived on the ground that the land is not genuinely required for traffic or for road widening or for other grounds as mentioned in the notice. It will be for the persons concerned, who approaches before the Court to establish that there is a right to occupy and if there is no interest over the land created and the one is merely a licencee and the licence is terminated that too over the space/land of public road, such person cannot be allowed to continue to occupy the space by the Court on entertaining of the grievance that the eviction is on the ground, which is not substantiated or otherwise. If the petitioners are having no right to continue to occupy, such contention cannot be entered or accepted and therefore, they are rejected. ( 24 ) IT was contended on behalf of the petitioners of Special Civil Application No. 7101 of 1998 by the learned counsel Mr. Pahwa that the petitioner is ready to vacate as and when the Corporation intimates to the petitioner that the land is required for road widening. However, the submission of Mr. Pahwa was that until the Corporation widens the road, the petitioner may be permitted to occupy. ( 25 ) IN my view, no special treatment can be given to the petitioner of Special Civil Application No. 7101 of 1998 and therefore, when the said petitioner is also similarly situated at par with the petitioners of Special Civil Application No. 6953 of 1998 and ors. , the view taken by this Court for all similarly situated person would operate and therefore, the said contention raised by Mr. Pahwa cannot be accepted. ( 26 ) MR. , the view taken by this Court for all similarly situated person would operate and therefore, the said contention raised by Mr. Pahwa cannot be accepted. ( 26 ) MR. Majmudar, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners of Special Civil Application No. 6706 of 1998 had additionally contended that petitioners of Special Civil Application No. 6706 of 1998 are not even served with notices as they are issued to petitioners of Special Civil Application No. 6753 of 1998 and therefore, he submitted that under these circumstances, such an approach on the part of the Corporation qua such petitioners can be said as illegal and arbitrary, so far as eviction is concerned. ( 27 ) THERE is no dispute on the factual position that all the petitioners including petitioners of Special Civil Application No. 6706 of 1998 are allotted space on the same terms and conditions and the location of everyone is on Station-Godi Road and the treatment given by the Corporation of termination of licence and eviction is the same. In fact, the petitioners therefore themselves preferred petition on that basis apprehending eviction at par with other similarly situated persons. Therefore, such petitioners approached this Court even prior to issuance of such notices by the Corporation. This Court had entertained the matter and had granted stay on 09. 08. 1998, i. e. before such notices received/served. In other Special Civil Application No. 6753 of 1998, on 20. 08. 1998, order was passed to issue notice and to be kept with Special Civil Application No. 6706 of 1998. Since then, all the matters are heard simultaneously. Therefore, if due to status quo ordered by this Court prior to receipt/service of notice of Corporation, the notices are not issued by the Corporation, it does not lie in the mouth of such petitioner to contend that as no notices are issued, the action is illegal, that too at the time of final hearing and when the rights of the petitioners qua land in question is examined by this Court with other similarly situated persons and this Court on merits found that the action of the Corporation of eviction is legal and valid. ( 28 ) ON behalf of the respondent Corporation, Mr. ( 28 ) ON behalf of the respondent Corporation, Mr. Desai, learned Counsel has placed on record the communication received by him from the Commissioner of the Corporation making the following declaration: (a) Those petitioners or similarly situated occupants, who are original allottee or the legal heirs of the original allottee or recognized transferees shall be considered for allotment of the alternate, equivalent space from amongst the commercial plots owned by the Corporation after receiving premium on the basis of prevailing upset value with the approval of the General Body of the Corporation. (b) The encroachers who have illegally occupied shall not be considered for alternate space. (c) While making allotment for alternate space if the Court so observes, the bar operating under Section 79d of B. P. M. C. Act, inviting offer from the public at large may not be made applicable. (d) The ownership of the alternate land which may be allotted by the Corporation shall remain with the Corporation and the super-structure shall be permitted to be constructed of cabins by the licence-holders after getting approval of the Corporation. (e) The aforesaid persons, who are to be considered for allotment of the alternate space will have to pay all outstanding dues of mesne profit to the Corporation until the date of vacating the space. (f) The alternate space, as may be allotted by the Corporation, will be required to be accepted and no choice will be available for offering other alternate plots. ( 29 ) IT may be observed that even in the case of Paman Bhobhrajmal Navlani and Ors. (Supra), while considering the question of alternate sides, at paragraph 24, it was observed as under:"the respondent Corporation has placed on record the fact that alternative sites are offered to the petitioners. All these orders under which alternative sites are offered are annexed to the affidavit in reply filed by the respondent Corporation. However, the petitioners have not approved all these alternate sites on the ground that the conditions incorporated in the offer were not acceptable to them and further the place at which they were to be shifted was not desirable. The petitioners have been offered alternate sites in the city itself. The petitioners cannot have a right to claim that they should be placed on a particular road. The petitioners can claim an alternate site only within the provisions of the final Scheme. The petitioners have been offered alternate sites in the city itself. The petitioners cannot have a right to claim that they should be placed on a particular road. The petitioners can claim an alternate site only within the provisions of the final Scheme. Hon ble the Supreme Court has while considering the question of alternate accommodation in Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation Vs. Nawab Gulam Shaikh (supra) held in paragraph 31 of the judgement that it is true that in all cases it may not be necessary as a condition for evicting of the encroacher that he should be provided an alternative accommodation at the expense of the State, which if given is likely to result in abuse of the judicial process. But no absolute principle of universal application could be laid down in this behalf and each case is required to be examined on the given special facts. It was held that: "normally the Court may not, as a rule, direct that the encroacher should be provided with an alternative accommodation before ejectment when they encroached public properties, but, as stated earlier, each case requires examination and suitable direction appropriate to the facts requires modulation. Considered from this perspective, the apprehensions of the appellant are without force. " Thus, the petitioners cannot claim any right to a particular place or to have a particular alternative site. They have been offered the alternative accommodation as detailed by the Corporation in the annexure to their affidavit-in-reply and it is stated on behalf of the Municipal Corporation that even today this offer stands. Any petitioner who may have something to say in connection with such offer can always approach the Corporation, but the petitioners have no right to continue at the place from where they are to be removed under the impugned notices on the ground that they should be first accommodated elsewhere. If the petitioners can shift to the places of allotment that would go a long way in lessening their hardships and will expedite their resettlement. Mere prolonging the litigation with a view to thwart the final Scheme which is framed for the city as is being now done, is a course which is required to be strongly deprecated in view of what the Hon ble the Supreme Court has stated in SLP No. 5465 of 1989 in the decision rendered on 3. 5. 89 mentioned hereinabove. 5. 89 mentioned hereinabove. " ( 30 ) THEREFORE, if the Corporation is considering the matter for providing of the alternate space, considering the facts and circumstances that the petitioners and other similarly situated persons were allotted space on licence basis since a long time and they have continued to occupy also for a long time and as the land is required for public purpose by the Corporation for solving the traffic problem and the flow of the water in the drainage etc. , even though the petitioners are not having any lawful right to occupy over the land in question, the Corporation can consider the matter for providing of the alternate space as declared before the Court and recorded hereinabove. Of course, such benefit of the declaration may be available to the person, who shows bonafide of filing undertaking before the Corporation that he shall vacate the space as and when requisitioned by the Corporation, at the most within a period of 15 days from the date of such intimation. The other persons, who do not fall in the category of the allottee or legal heirs of the alottee or recognized transferee would, in any case, fall outside the zone of consideration for allotment of the alternate space by the Corporation. The lawful allottee, the legal heirs of the lawful allottee or recognized transferee stand on higher footing than those who are occupying the space/shops illegally or without there being any permission for transfer by the Corporation. The Corporation has declared before the Court for considering the case of only certain class of occupiers namely; lawful allottees, legal heirs of the allottees or recognized transferees by excluding the other class of occupiers, who have occupied without there being any permission of the Corporation. Such a stand on the part of the Corporation cannot be said as unreasonable or arbitrary and the reason being that the original licence-holder had no authority or power to transfer without prior permission of the Corporation and if any person is inducted without prior permission of the Corporation he cannot assert the right to be derived by the original allottee/licence-holder or persons similarly situated therewith, if any policy is floated by the Corporation for providing alternate space. ( 31 ) THE declaration made before this Court by the Corporation further shows that the same with a view to minimise the hardship of lawful occupant by taking care to see that no undue loss is caused to the revenue of the Corporation. If the allotment of the same space is to be made of the alternative land as per the upset price which, in any case, would be fixed by the Corporation as per the valuation prevailing, the lawful occupant or similarly situated person may be in a position to occupy for running his business and as the premium is to be calculated on the basis of the upset price, which may be fixed by the Corporation, it will not cause any loss to the revenue of the Corporation and will be rather to reduce the hardship on the part of the lawful occupant. If on account of the policy decision of the Corporation alternative space is to be provided by taking into consideration the peculiar facts and circumstances of a separate class of the persons, the opportunity to the other persons may not remain as sine quo-non and the reason being that the other persons cannot be said as similarly situated with the lawful occupation as licencee. ( 32 ) THE last question arises for the consideration is the humanitarian approach on the part of the officers of the Corporation. In the event, those who are not covered as lawful allottee/legal heirs of the lawful allottee or the recognised transferee, are to be evicted. It is true that as per the provisions of the Act read with the Scheme framed in pursuance of the directions issued by the Apex Court, the Corporation has power to evict or to get the vacant possession of the land, which is forming part of non-hawking zone area. However, if some reasonable time is given for vacating or shifting by the person concerned upon giving the undertaking by him that he shall vacate upon the expiry of the period, it may reduce the hardship on the part of the person occupying and it may also result into avoiding the further complications of damage or wastage to the premises or items and goods inside the premises and the person may also have sufficient time to shift his belongings by handing over peaceful possession. It is also true that such an aspect can not be asserted as of right. ( 33 ) IN my view, unless there is extreme urgency, if such a humanitarian approach is taken by the officers who are clothed with the powers, it will not cause any serious prejudice to the administration. Therefore, if at the time when the intimation is given for vacating within a period of 10 days and during that period, if the person concerned shows bonafide of vacating or filing undertaking to the Corporation by declaration on oath to vacate within period of 3 months, such a bonafide approach on the part of the occupant can be accepted by the Corporation or the officers of the Corporation, unless there is any extreme urgency for action to be taken or the requirement of the land or the space. It is made clear that such an approach may not be required in the event, any immediate obstruction is created over the public road, or there is urgency on the part of the officers of the Corporation to remove such obstruction with a view to maintain law and order situation and/or for immediate regularisation of the traffic. Such indulgence as referred to hereinabove of granting time on humanitarian consideration can be considered only if the persons are occupying for a long period, may be five years or more. It is not that in several matter, such a long time may be granted by the Corporation. However, each case would vary from facts to facts and suffice it to say that considering the situation prevailing on the site, if some humanitarian approach is taken, the same would reduce the immediate hardship, provided of course, there is bonafide declaration on the part of the occupant to vacate. However, each case would vary from facts to facts and suffice it to say that considering the situation prevailing on the site, if some humanitarian approach is taken, the same would reduce the immediate hardship, provided of course, there is bonafide declaration on the part of the occupant to vacate. ( 34 ) IN view of the above, as the occupation is for a long period, those persons who are not falling in the category of lawful occupant/legal heirs of the lawful occupant or recognised transferee, if files the undertaking within period of four weeks from today before this Court well as the copy of the undertaking is produced before the officers of the Corporation to vacate on or before 15th December, 2006, the Corporation would give such time and if thereafter, the person concerned fails to vacate as per the declaration made in the undertaking, the Corporation can be put to the liberty of removing such persons and the possession of the space/land, which is in occupation can be taken back. ( 35 ) IN view of the aforesaid discussions and observations, the action on the part of the Corporation of evicting the petitioners from the shops/space in question, which are subject matter of the present petitions cannot be said as illegal or without authority of law. As declared and recorded hereinabove, the original allottees, legal heirs of original allottees and recognised transferee shall be considered for allotment of alternative space by the Corporation. So far as the persons occupying the shops/space other than in capacity as lawful occupant, legal heirs of lawful occupants or recognised transferees are concerned, if within a period of four weeks from today, the undertaking is filed before this Hon ble Court of not to transfer or alienate in any manner or not induct any third party and to vacate on or before 15th December, 2006, and if the copy of the undertaking is produced by the person concerned before the Corporation, the Corporation shall give time to vacate to such persons upto 15th December, 2006. It is clarified that upon failure to file such undertaking or upon non-vacating of the shops/space before 15th December, 2006, the Corporation shall be at the liberty to take action for eviction and/or removal of the shops in addition to the action for initiation of the proceedings of breach of the undertaking by the person concerned. It is clarified that upon failure to file such undertaking or upon non-vacating of the shops/space before 15th December, 2006, the Corporation shall be at the liberty to take action for eviction and/or removal of the shops in addition to the action for initiation of the proceedings of breach of the undertaking by the person concerned. ( 36 ) SUBJECT to the aforesaid observations and directions, Rule discharged in all the petitions. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. ( 37 ) MR. Majmudar, learned counsel for the petitioners prayed that the operation of this order be stayed for some time so as to enable his clients to approach before the higher forum. Considering the facts and circumstances, as four weeks time is already granted to file the undertaking and till then, in any case, no action is to be taken by the Corporation, such request is declined.

KALYANPRASAD DURGAPRASAD AGRAWAL v. BARODA MUNICIPAL CORPORATION