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2006 DIGILAW 598 (PAT)

Vishwanath Choubey v. Bhuneshwar Choubey @ Oudul Choubey

2006-07-13

NAVANITI PRASAD SINGH

body2006
Judgment Navaniti Prasad Singh, J. 1. Heard. 2. The defendant filed an application before the trial court praying for framing and deciding preliminary issue as to the maintainability of the Suit. This having been rejected he has filed the present revision application urging that the Suit was not maintainable and the trial court failed to exercise its jurisdiction in framing and deciding the issue of maintainability as preliminary issue. 3. The plaintiff-opposite party upon notice has appeared. Heard both the sides 4. It appears that a Suit was filed in the year 1967 for partition. In course of the proceeding the parties entered into a compromise and basing on the said compromise a compromise decree was passed by the court ending the litigation. Now, another Suit has been filed in which the son of one of the signatories to the compromise alleges that the compromise was fraudulently entered and as such the court should set aside the compromise decree and hold that the family continued in iointness. In effect the Suit is challenging a compromise decree by a party claiming under person party to the compromise. The defendant upon notice appeared and filed an application that the Suit was not maintainable and prayed that maintainability question be decided as a preliminary issue. His contention was that a consent decree having been passed it, would operate as res judicata and no Suit would lie to challege the same. The Suit was thus not maintainable. The trial court rejected the same on the ground that the issue as raised was a mixed question of fact and law and could not be decided as a preliminary issue and the parties would have to undergo full fledged trial. It is this order that has been impugned before this Court. 5. The plaintiff-opposite party has appeared suo motu to defend the order of the trial court. It is urged on his behalf that at the time when the compromise was said to have been entered, his father was sick and infirm. He was not in a position to understand and wrongfully his signature was taken on the compromise and a wrong fraud vakalatnama was utilised to file the said compromise. It is urged on his behalf that at the time when the compromise was said to have been entered, his father was sick and infirm. He was not in a position to understand and wrongfully his signature was taken on the compromise and a wrong fraud vakalatnama was utilised to file the said compromise. He thus submitted that the said compromise decree was fraud and it is well established principle of law that a decree obtained by fraud is of no significance and the same can be set aside in any Suit as fraud vitiates all. 6. Heard the parties. 7. On behalf of the defendant-petitioner reliance has been placed that Order XXIII. Rule 3 and Rule 3(A) CPC which in terms prohibits filing of a suit challenging a compromise decree. He has submitted that there is a distinction between a decree in general obtained by fraud in a case which was contested and a decree passed on terms of compromise. Order XXIII Rule 3(A) CPC will apply only with a compromise decree and prohibits filing a Suit. challenging the said decree on ground of fraud. In support thereof he has placed reliance on a Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Guru Charan Singh and Ors. v. Mahatam Singh and Anr. in Civil Revision No. 1312 of 2002 decided on 18.10.2005. 8. I have examined the said unreported judgment. In that case the civil revision was originally placed before a Single Judge of this Court. The Hon ble Judge felt that a decree even a compromise decree obtained by fraud can be vitiated and a Suit would be maintainable but being confronted with an earlier judgment of this Court holding that a Suit would not lie to set aside a compromise decree. He referred the matter to a Division Bench. The Division Bench then held after considering the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Banwari Lal V/s. Smt. Chando Devi (through L.R.) and Anr. , reported in 1993(1) PLJR (SC) 21 that the question had been concluded by the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court and held that no fresh Suit is maintainable for challenging a decree passed on compromise in terms of Order XXIII. Rule 3(A) CPC. 9. , reported in 1993(1) PLJR (SC) 21 that the question had been concluded by the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court and held that no fresh Suit is maintainable for challenging a decree passed on compromise in terms of Order XXIII. Rule 3(A) CPC. 9. On the other hand, on behalf of plaintiff- opposite party reliance has been placed in the case of Ramchandra Singh V/s. Savitri Devi and Ors. reported in - wherein the Apex Court has held that a decree obtained by fraud cannot be used as a res judicata and the same can be challenged by a separate Suit. I am also conscious of this decision on the line that a decree obtained by fraud can even be challenged in a full proceeding but I find here the position is different. The law has enacted a statutory prohibition that so far as decree arising out of compromise is concerned no fresh Suit would lie. It is well settled that if law prescribes a procedure for an act to be done in a particular manner then all other modes are prohibited. 10. Here only a compromise decree is not obtained to challenge in a fresh Suit that does not amount that a compromise decree can never be set aside on ground of fraud. It is not the right to challege that has been taken away. What has been taken away is right to file fresh Suit the party or the affected party always have right to file an application in the Suit which was decreed on a compromise challenge the validity of the compromise and if such an application is filed and fraud is established then that court itself would cancel and recall the decree. 11. In view of my considered opinion the application of the defendant for deciding the question of maintainability as a preliminary issue was valid and the court failed to exercise its jurisdiction. I have accordingly, no option but to set aside the impugned order dated 3.9.2005 passed by learned Sub Judge. IV. Ara, in T.S. No. 446 of 2000 and direct the court below to proceed in accordance with the observation made above. 12. This civil revision application is allowed.