ORDER This is a petition filed under Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure ('Cr.P.C.') to quash the FIR No. 83 of 2005, dt. 21-6-2005 of Kovur Police Station of Neliore District registered against the petitioners-accused 1 to 4 and others for the offences punishable under Sections 196, 199, 120-B, 403, 406 and 418 of Indian Penal Code ('I.P.C.'). 2. Sri C. Padbhanabha Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that even the entire allegations in the First Information Report are taken in their entirety as true, none of the offences as alleged, have been made out against the petitioners and therefore, if the same is continued, it will lead to harassment to the petitioners as the investigating agency will frequently interfere with their rights on the ground of investigation. It is contended that in the absence of any allegations specific in nature to remotely connect the petitioners with the offence under Section 406 I.P.C. and in the absence of any allegation of entrustment of any property to any of the petitioners, they cannot be prosecuted for the alleged offences. In the absence of any false evidence given by the accused or any false declaration made by them, there cannot be any investigation for the offence under Section 196 or 199 I.P.C. Similarly, when the second respondent complainant was given only a job work and more than four crores have been paid to excavate and transport gravelly soil as per the measurements recorded, it is only a civil dispute. Eventually, it is contended that the registration of the crime is an abuse of process of law and was intended to arm twist and black-mail the petitioners for oblique and extraneous reasons and therefore, the proceedings are liable to be quashed. The learned counsel for the petitioners, in support of his contentions, placed reliance on U. Dhar and another v. State of Jharkhand 2003 SCC (Crl.) 490 and Anil Mahajan v. Bhor Industries Ltd. (2006) 1 SCC (Crl.) 746. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioners, in support of his contentions, placed reliance on U. Dhar and another v. State of Jharkhand 2003 SCC (Crl.) 490 and Anil Mahajan v. Bhor Industries Ltd. (2006) 1 SCC (Crl.) 746. 3. Sri S. Srinivas Reddy, learned counsel for the second respondent-complainant would contend that when the complainant specifically pleaded that to defraud and cheat the Raghava Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. ('RIPL'), to which, the complainant is the Managing Director, the petitioners hatched a criminal conspiracy with professors S.R. Gandhi and G.R. Dodagounder and thereby created a report to the effect that when fly-ash is mixed with gravel, the volume of the gravel increases as per the quantity of fly-ash added, the police are under obligation to investigate into the matter. It is contended that the said report has been brought into existence with an intention to deprive the complainant of the legitimate amounts due and therefore, the acts of the petitioners attract an offence, for which the complaint has been registered. Though it is a commercial transaction, there is always an element of cheating in the said transaction. Such transactions though gives rise to a civil dispute, if there is an element of cheating, the offending persons cannot be escaped from the criminal liability and inasmuch as cheating is specifically pleaded in the complaint, the petitioners have to be prosecuted accordingly. Since the police even after examining five witnesses could not file a report, a writ petition being W.P. No. 21594 of 2005 was filed on behalf of the complainant and this Court by order dated 7-10-2005 disposed of the said writ petition directing the police to file a final report pursuant to the registration of the crime. At that stage, the petitioners filed this petition and obtained stay of the proceedings with a view to protract the matter. 4. It is further contended that though the complainant received an amount of Rs. 4.5 crores for the gravel supply by him, the same is not at the agreed rate. The report jointly obtained by the petitioners and complainant from S. Narasimha Rao falsifies the stand taken by the petitioners. The complainant is entitled to the balance amount as per the report of said Narasimha Rao, but not as per the report obtained by the petitioners from S.R. Gandhi and another. The report jointly obtained by the petitioners and complainant from S. Narasimha Rao falsifies the stand taken by the petitioners. The complainant is entitled to the balance amount as per the report of said Narasimha Rao, but not as per the report obtained by the petitioners from S.R. Gandhi and another. Since it is alleged in the complaint that the petitioners entered into a criminal conspiracy with a view to cheat the RIPL and to deprive it the amounts due to it and brought into existence the report from the above two persons, the police are under obligation to investigate into the crime and file its report. Therefore, the impugned proceedings cannot be scuttled at the initial stage. 5. To buttress his submissions, the learned counsel for the second respondent-complainant placed reliance on the following decisions: Savita v. State of Rajasthan (2006) 1 SCC (Crl.) 571; M. Narayandas v. State of Karnataka (2003) 11 SCC 251 ; State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa (2002) Crl.L.J. 998; Lalmuni Devi v. State of Bihar 2001 (1) ALT (Crl.) 219 = 2001 (1) ALD (Crl.) 220 (SC); Gangaram Kandaram v. Sunder Chikha Amin 2000 (2) ALT 448 = 2000 (2) ALD 824 (F.B.); Mahavir Prashad Gupta v. State of National Capital Territory of Delhi 2000 Crl.L.J. 4665; and Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi 1999 Crl.L.J. 1833; and Ram Lal Yadav v. State of U.P. 1989 Crl.L.J. 1013. 6. In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal AIR 1992 SC 604 the Apex Court laid down the principles for quashing the First Information Report and cautioned that the extraordinary power should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in rarest of rare cases. The extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whim or caprice. The High Court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the F.I.R. or in the complaint. The extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whim or caprice. The High Court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the F.I.R. or in the complaint. At paragraph 33, it was further held that if any information disclosing a cognizable offence is laid before an officer in charge of a police station satisfying the requirements of Section 154 (1) of the Code, the said police officer has no other option except to enter the substance thereof in the prescribed form, that is to say, to register a case on the basis of such information. The inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. can be exercised by the High Court either to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. The Apex Court at paragraph 102 laid down the guidelines where the High Court can exercise such inherent jurisdiction to prevent the abuse of process of law, which read as under: "102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Sec. 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Sec. 156 (1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155 (2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceedings against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge." 7. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge." 7. Recently, the Apex Court in Anil Mahajan's case (2 supra) after taking note of the complaint filed against the accused for the offences under Sections 415, 418 and 420 I.P.C. and after following its earlier judgments in Alpic Finance Ltd. v. P. Sadasivan (2001) 3 SCC 513 and Nagawwa v. Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi (1976) 3 SCC 736 held that the substance of the complaint is to be seen and mere use of the expression "cheating" in the complaint is of no consequence and accordingly allowed the appeal filed by the accused setting aside the High Court order and upholding the order passed by the Additional Sessions Judge in setting aside the order of the Magistrate issuing process to the accused. At para 10, the Apex Court observed as under: "10. We have examined the complaint and it is clear from its substance that present is a simple case of civil disputes between the parties. Requisite averments so as to make out a case of cheating are absolutely absent. The principles laid down in Alpic Finance Ltd. case were rightly applied by learned Additional Sessions Judge and it cannot be said that the ratio of the said decision was wrongly applied. On due consideration, the learned Additional Sessions Judge had rightly set aside the order of the Magistrate issuing process to the appellant." 8. The facts in the case of U. Dhar and another (1 supra) are that Bokaro Steel Plant, a unit of Steel Authority of India Limited (for short "SAIL') awarded a contract to M/s. Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. (for short TISCO) growth shop for certain works. TISCO growth shop completed supply part of the work and erection part of the work was entrusted by it to M/s. Tata Construction & Project Ltd. (for short TCPL). TCPL in turn issued tender enquiry and awarded the work to M/s. Singh Construction Co., the complainant. According to the complainant, after completing the work it demanded payment of the balance amount under the contract from TCPL. The appellants before the Supreme Court are the Managing Director and Vice-President (Operations) of TCPL. TCPL in turn issued tender enquiry and awarded the work to M/s. Singh Construction Co., the complainant. According to the complainant, after completing the work it demanded payment of the balance amount under the contract from TCPL. The appellants before the Supreme Court are the Managing Director and Vice-President (Operations) of TCPL. When the complainant failed to receive the payment for the work done they filed a complaint on 11-12-2001 under Sections 403, 406, 420 and 120-B IPC at Bokaro. The Magistrate concerned took cognizance of the alleged offences and issued summons to the appellants-accused. On that, the accused moved the High Court for quashing the said proceedings and on dismissal of the said petition, they carried the matter in appeal before the Supreme Court. The Apex Court after taking into consideration of the contract between TCPL and the complainant with regard to the execution of certain works, held that even assuming the case of the complainant to be correct, at best, it is a matter of recovery of money on account of failure of TCPL to pay the amount said to be due under the contract. The complainant has alleged that TCPL has already received the money from SAIL for the work in question and it has misappropriated the same for its own use instead of paying it to the complainant and it is for this reason that the offences are alleged under Sections 403, 406 and 420 etc. At para 6, the Apex Court observed as under: "6. The Courts below have overlooked the fact that the contract between Bokaro Steel (a unit of SAIL) and TCPL is a separate and independent contract. The contract between the complainant and TCPL is altogether a different, contract. The contractual obligations under both the contracts are separate and independent of each other. The rights and obligations of the parties i.e., the complainant and TCPL are to be governed by the contract between them for which the contract between TCPL and Bokaro Steel (SAIL) has no relevance. Therefore, even if Bokaro Steel has made the payment to TCPL under its contract with the latter, it will not give rise to plea of misappropriation of money because that money is not money or movable property of the complainant." At para 7, the Apex Court observed as under: "7. Further, Section 403 uses the words "dishonestly" and "misappropriate". Therefore, even if Bokaro Steel has made the payment to TCPL under its contract with the latter, it will not give rise to plea of misappropriation of money because that money is not money or movable property of the complainant." At para 7, the Apex Court observed as under: "7. Further, Section 403 uses the words "dishonestly" and "misappropriate". These are necessary ingredients of an offence under Section 403 IPC. Neither of these ingredients is satisfied in the facts and circumstances of the case....." At para 8, it was held as under: "8. Thus, admittedly, the two contracts are independent of each other and payment under one has no relevance qua the other. It cannot be said that there is any dishonest intention on the part of the appellants nor can it be said that TCPL or the appellants have misappropriated or converted the moveable property of the complainant to their own use. Since the basic ingredients of the relevant section in the Indian Penal Code are not satisfied, the order taking cognizance of the offence as well as the issue of summons to the appellants is wholly uncalled for. Such an order brings about serious repercussions. So far as the appellants are concerned, when no case is made out for the alleged offences even as per the complaint filed by the complainant, there is no reason to permit the appellants to be subjected to trial for the alleged offences. Hence, the appeal is allowed. The impugned orders of the High Court as well as of the Chief Judicial Magistrate are hereby ordered to be quashed." 9. Then, I would like to briefly refer to the cases on which reliance is placed by the learned counsel for the second respondent complainant. In the case of Savita (3 supra) the Apex Court allowed the appeal filed by the complainant setting aside the order of the High Court in quashing the proceedings in a First Information Report registered for the offences under Section 498-A and 406 IPC basing upon certain statements made by the complainant in a divorce proceedings between her and the first respondent. It was held that it is too premature a stage for the High Court to give such a finding when even the investigation had not started and the said agency had no occasion to find out whether there was material to file a charge-sheet or not. It was held that it is too premature a stage for the High Court to give such a finding when even the investigation had not started and the said agency had no occasion to find out whether there was material to file a charge-sheet or not. It was held that though a finding given by the civil Court is binding on the criminal Court, such consideration of a finding of the Civil Court cannot be done by a Court entertaining a criminal petition for quashing an FIR wherein an investigation has not even started. 10. In the case of M. Narayandas (4 supra), the Apex Court after taking into consideration of the guidelines laid down in Bhajan Lal's case (11 supra) set aside the order passed by the High Court quashing the F.I.R. registered for the offences under Sections 468, 471, 470 and 120-B IPC, wherein the counsel appearing for the respondents-accused therein has not supported the reasons given by the High Court in quashing the complaint and fairly admitted that the reasons given by the High Court in quashing the complaint were unsustainable. 11. In M. Devendrappa's case (5 supra), the order passed by the High Court in exercise of powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. setting aside the proceedings initiated against the respondents-accused on the file of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Tumkur was the subject-matter of challenge before the Apex Court. The Apex Court after taking into consideration of the note of caution and the guidelines laid down in Bhajan Lal's case (11 supra) held that if it appears that on consideration of the allegations in the light of the statement made on oath of the complainant that the ingredients of the offence or offences are disclosed and there is no material to show that the complaint is mala fide, frivolous or vexatious, in that event there would be no justification for interference by the High Court and accordingly, allowed the appeal setting aside the order of the High Court. Similar view has been taken in the case of Lalmuni Devi (6 supra). 12. Against the order of a learned single Judge of this Court in allowing the writ petition filed under Article 226 of Constitution of India and quashing the F.I.R. registered for the offences under Sections 420 and 406 IPC, an appeal was filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. 12. Against the order of a learned single Judge of this Court in allowing the writ petition filed under Article 226 of Constitution of India and quashing the F.I.R. registered for the offences under Sections 420 and 406 IPC, an appeal was filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. On referring the matter by the Division Bench, a Full Bench of this Court in Gangaram Kandaram's case (7 supra) after considering the various issues, held that unless the investigation is completed, material evidence is gathered by examining different persons and authorities with regard to the collection of money, return of visas and the cheques issued by the petitioner and his brother, it cannot be said that the FIRs are without any basis and the petitioner has to be discharged for the accusation under Sections 420 and 406 of IPC. Unless the further investigation is made and charge-sheet submitted, it is difficult to come to a definite conclusion and in such cases, High Court should not exercise power under Article 226 of Constitution of India and accordingly set aside the judgment of the learned single Judge in quashing the proceedings. 13. In all the decisions referred to above, the principles laid down for quashing the First Information Report in Bhajan Lal's case (11 supra) was in full approval, but not been departed. In the light of the above and in view of the submissions made by the counsel for the parties, the point that arises for consideration in this petition is whether the complainant-allegations made in its entirety would constitute an offence where the police can make further investigation into it and, if not, the same is liable to be quashed. Further, in the light of the directions issued by this Court in W.P. No. 21594 of 2005, the investigating agency has to file a charge-sheet against the petitioners-accused. 14. Admittedly, RIPL, to which the second respondent-complainant is the Managing Director, is engaged in civil contract of excavation of earth and transportation of the same. M/s. Soma Enterprises Limited ('SEL') was awarded the contract work of executing the Nellore Bypass Road on National Highway No. 5, to which the first petitioner is the Director, second petitioner is Director, third petitioner is Project Director and fourth petitioner is the Project Manager. M/s. Soma Enterprises Limited ('SEL') was awarded the contract work of executing the Nellore Bypass Road on National Highway No. 5, to which the first petitioner is the Director, second petitioner is Director, third petitioner is Project Director and fourth petitioner is the Project Manager. SEL appointed the RIPL as its sub-contractor for excavation and transportation of gravel for the formation of embankment of Nellore bypass road on NH-5 from Km 172.840 to 178.200 from 1-6-2002 onwards. As per the averments in the complaint, the agreed rate was fixed at Rs. 27 per Cu. Mtr. For the first kilometre and Rs. 4 per Cu. Mtr. for every additional kilometre thereof and further there was an agreement between the parties that the SEL would pay the diesel amount and bonus amount whenever the complainant (RIPL) exceeds 25,000 Cu. Mtr. in a month. It is alleged that in the first two months (June and July, 2002) of execution, the complainant supplied gravel to the SEL to a tune of 1,00,000 Cu. Mtr. from the month of August, 2002 to December, 2002, SEL deviated from the original agreed pattern of execution by laying fly-ash in the form of layers in between the gravel layers of the embankment. The complainant objected to the said practice orally several times and finally gave it in writing through letter dated 21-1-2003 stating that the fly-ash laid by SEL is subjected to winds and is being carried away leaving very little in the embankment area. It was alleged that though the complainant asked the petitioners not to deduct any quantity from the bill for that fly-ash factor, neglecting the said request, the petitioners deducted around 3500 Cu. Mtr. by the end of January, 2003 from the complainant's bills amounting approximately to Rs. 3.50 lakhs. According to the complainant, SEL mixed a huge heaps of fly-ash along with the gravel as per the agreement entered into between SEL and the Government. As the fly-ash is cheaper than the gravel and it is available very near to the road that is being laid, to save the cost, SEL started dumping the fly-ash on the top of the gravel heaps and has started mixing the same and the same was again carried to the embankment to form the road. If fly-ash is mixed with gravel, most of the fly-ash would settle into the pores in the gravel. If fly-ash is mixed with gravel, most of the fly-ash would settle into the pores in the gravel. The complainant complained that the measurements of the material supplied by RIPL would have to be taken before mixing the fly-ash. The Managing Director of SEL (first petitioner) assured the complainant that the amounts would be paid by following suitable method for arriving at the quantity supplied by RIPL. The first petitioner, third and fourth petitioners also gave assurance that the matter would be settled amicably. It is alleged that from the month of February, 2003 onwards, the component of fly-ash as ascertained by the petitioners and without any basis was deducted from the bills payable to RIPL. In spite of the same, RIPL continued with the work and requested the petitioners not to withhold the amount towards fly-ash component, but, however, they continued with the same method of deducting certain part of amount towards fly-ash. When the complainant insisted the petitioners that the method adopted is not correct, they advised him to approach an expert in the field and get a report. Accordingly, the complainant approached Dr. C.V. Prasad and submitted a sample of the fly-ash mixed in the gravel. Dr. C.V. Prasad opined that the fly-ash mixed in the gravel would be about 4 to 6 per cent. When the complainant requested the petitioners to count the number of tippers of gravel being supplied and dumped by him in the stock yard for payment purpose, which they were doing for some items of work at that time, but the petitioners did not oblige to pay by counting the number of tippers supplied to them to cheat the complainant and misappropriate his bills of work executed. With faith on the petitioners and on their assurance that they disburse the withheld amounts by adopting the suitable method acceptable to both the parties, the complainant continued his work and in August, 2003 when pressurized to release the amount withheld by them, the petitioners changed their tune and asked the complainant to prove that the formula by which they are deducting the amount for fly-ash, as false so that they can release the withheld amounts. This attitude of the petitioners is to protract the matter and to misappropriate the proceeds to maximum extent possible by saying lame excuses from time to time. This attitude of the petitioners is to protract the matter and to misappropriate the proceeds to maximum extent possible by saying lame excuses from time to time. Even though the scope of the complainant is only to supply the gravel to the principal contractor, to get the money back, he approached the institute of IIT Madras and got tested at department of Ocean Engineering, IIT, Madras through Professor Dr. S. Narasimha Rao, who in his report dated 19-5-2004 opined that though 33.3.% of fly-ash is mixed with the gravel there will not be any bulkage in the volume of gravel soil. But, in spite of the said report, SEL did not respond to settle the payments due to the complainant and on the other hand, hatched a criminal conspiracy with the professors viz., S.R. Gandhi and Dr. G.R. Dodagoundar working at IIT, Chennai and created a fake report to cheat the complainant and to cause wrongful loss. Said S.R. Gandhi and Dr. G.R. Dodagoundar gave their report stating that there will be an increase in the volume of gravel after compaction due to addition of fly-ash. They further opined that the increase in the volume of gravel after compaction due to addition of fly-ash is nearly equal to the compacted volume of the fly-ash added and the maximum dry density of the sample collected from the field is nearly equal to the maximum dry density of 70% of gravel and 30% of fly-ash samples tested in their lab. Though the complainant has not received any amount since 9-4-2004, SEL is alleging that the complainant is due to a tune of Rs. 11 lakhs. Thus, the petitioners to obtain wrongful gain for themselves and to cause wrongful loss to the complainant, started cheating the complainant. The petitioners are trying to avoid the payment to the complainant on the basis of the report given by the above two professors. Finally, it is alleged that all the petitioners hatched a criminal conspiracy, cheated the complainant and misappropriated the amounts of the complainant for their own use by making illegal deduction in aggregate of 28% in all bills and committed breach of trust by willfully making the complainant to suffer irreparable loss. The other accused i.e., S.R. Gandhi and Dr. Finally, it is alleged that all the petitioners hatched a criminal conspiracy, cheated the complainant and misappropriated the amounts of the complainant for their own use by making illegal deduction in aggregate of 28% in all bills and committed breach of trust by willfully making the complainant to suffer irreparable loss. The other accused i.e., S.R. Gandhi and Dr. G.R. Dodagoundar have also joined their hands knowing fully well and gave a false report to support the false version of the petitioners to cause wrongful loss to the complainant. 15. Except stating that S.R. Gandhi and Dr. G.R. Dodagoundar created a fake report contrary to the report of Dr. Narasimha Rao, there is no allegation that the report is related to the fact of which it is obtained by law and was given knowing to be false or fabricated and the same would be used in evidence, to constitute the offences under Sections 196 and 199 IPC. Further, to constitute an offence under Section 403, dishonesty and misappropriation of property are the necessary ingredients for punishment under Section 406 IPC. Neither of the ingredients is satisfied with the allegations in the complaint. It is simply stated that to cheat the complainant and misappropriate the bills of work executed by him, the petitioners obtained the report from professors S.R. Gandhi and Dr. G.R. Dodagoundar. At the most, the report given by said professors is contrary to that of the opinion of Dr. S. Narasimha Rao. If a dispute arises with regard to the quantum of gravel supplied by the complainant, whether the said report is admissible in evidence or not is for the arbitrator, if provided under the agreement or for the civil Court. It is either for the arbitrator or the civil Court, as the case may be, to accept the said report or to reject the same. Mere use of the word 'cheat' does not attract the offence under Section 418 IPC since the entire reading of the complaint discloses that the fly-ash was mixed with the gravel by the petitioners company (SEL) as per the standards specified in the specification for Road and Bridge works issued by the Ministry of Road Transport & Highways as per the contract entered into by it with the Government. The amounts were withheld by the petitioners and as per the measurements of material, they deducted the amount towards fly-ash component from the bills payable to the complainant and the same was protested by the complainant as per his own averments. It is stated in the complaint that the first petitioner promised the complainant to disburse the withheld amount by adopting suitable method that is acceptable to both the parties. If the formula adopted by the petitioners for deduction of the amount towards fly-ash component is not agreeable to the complainant, at the most, it is a civil dispute, which can be resolved as per the terms and conditions of the agreement, but the same does not constitute an offence under Section 418 IPC since the withheld amount was not with a knowledge to cause wrongful loss to the complainant. 16. The Apex Court in Anil Mahajan's case (2 supra) categorically held that mere use of the expression "cheating" in the complaint is of no consequence. The substance of the complaint is to be seen. In the absence of any averment about the deceit, cheating or fraudulent intention of the accused at the time of entering into MOU wherefrom it can be inferred that the accused had the intention to deceive the complainant to pay, the same will not amount to cheating. 17. The entire reading of the complaint does not disclose any offence except a civil dispute between the parties. Hence, if the investigation is allowed to be continued, the petitioners would be called to the police station frequently for the purpose of investigation, which is nothing but an abuse of process of law and this is a case, which squarely falls within the exception carved out by the Apex Court for exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. Therefore, the impugned proceedings are unsustainable and they are accordingly quashed. 18. A feeble submission was made by the learned counsel for the second respondent-complainant that once this Court in W.P. No. 21594 of 2005 directed the police to file a report, they are under obligation to investigate into the matter and file the necessary report. It is to be seen that the petitioners-accused are not the parties to the Writ Petition No. 21594 of 2005. It is to be seen that the petitioners-accused are not the parties to the Writ Petition No. 21594 of 2005. This Court can exercise the inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. akin to that of Article 226 of Constitution of India and can pass suitable orders such as quashing the crime when a whole reading of complaint does not constitute any offence requiring investigation. Since this Court held that the dispute between the parties is a civil dispute, it is always open for the police to file a report as contemplated under Section 173 Cr.P.C. before the Magistrate concerned intimating that the proceedings have been quashed by this Court. 19. The Criminal Petition is accordingly allowed.