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2006 DIGILAW 605 (JHR)

Lakhan Tiria, Masi Tiria, Kanu Pingua And Chapi Kui v. State Of Jharkhand

2006-05-11

DHANANJAY PRASAD SINGH

body2006
JUDGMENT D.P. Singh, J. 1. This appeal is directed against the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 20.12.2000 passed in Sessions Trial No. 132 of 1994, whereby and whereunder the learned District and Sessions Judge, Singhbhum West at Chaibasa held the appellants guilty under Sections 326/34 and 379/34 IPC and sentenced them to undergo RI for three years and three months respectively. 2. The brief facts leading to this appeal are that in the afternoon of 10th October, 1993 the informant Dhibri Kui went to see her paddy cops planted in Mauja Bhawarpur, P.S. Manjhgaon, District Singhbhum West, Chaibasa alongwith her daughter, when she found all the appellants harvesting her ripe paddy from the field. It is further stated that when she objected why they were cutting paddy planted by her, the appellants asserted saying that the field belonged to them and they have got their share and on further protest by the informant, the appellants started assaulting the informant with sickle. It is further alleged that appellants caught hold of the informant and gave three blows with sickle on her head. When her daughter tried to intervene, she was also assaulted on her hands and back. Thereafter the appellants took away the harvested paddy worth of Rs. 250/-. The incident was seen by the villagers. She further asserted that there was a land dispute between the appellants and the informant for the same land and a case was pending in the District court. 3. On receiving information, the police arrived at the P.O. and recorded her statement in the afternoon at about 15.30 hours. On the basis of this statement, a case was registered against four appellants under Sections 324, 341, 379/34 IPC. The police investigated the case and finally submitted chargesheet against all the appellants under Sections 307/326 IPC. The case was committed for trial by the court of sessions. The trial court framed charges against all the appellants under Section 307/34 IPC and 379/34 IPC. Appellant Masi was further charged under Section 326 IPC. After examining the witnesses, the learned trial court acquitted appellants from the charge under Section 307/34 IPC but convicted them under Sections 326/34 IPC and 379/34 IPC and they were accordingly sentenced. 4. The present appeal has been preferred on the ground that the trial court has committed a mistake of fact and law. After examining the witnesses, the learned trial court acquitted appellants from the charge under Section 307/34 IPC but convicted them under Sections 326/34 IPC and 379/34 IPC and they were accordingly sentenced. 4. The present appeal has been preferred on the ground that the trial court has committed a mistake of fact and law. It is further asserted that the trial court has not considered the non-examination of the injured Jasmati, daughter of the informant as well as the I.O. of the case, which was fatal for the prosecution story. It is further asserted that the appellants have got bonafide claim and title over the disputed land and they have planted the paddy, for which this false case has been lodged against them. The memo of appeal further asserted that the eye witnesses contradict the fact asserted by the informant, as the informant has herself given different version before the police and the court. It is also asserted that in view of the admitted fact that the land was in dispute, the prosecution story should have been discarded. 5. All these points were stressed before me by the learned Counsel for the appellants. The learned App opposed this argument and asserted that the learned court has rightly convicted the appellants for the offences they have actually committed. 6. I have carefully gone through the evidences available in the lower court records and the points argued before me by the counsel for the appellants. In this case the genesis of the appellants are said to be dispute over the harvesting of paddy crops. The informant, PW 2, Dhibri Kui, her husband Suman lal Guiyan, PW 4 and PW 3, Jogendra Guiyan, Munda of the village, have admitted in cross examination that the land in question was the subject matter of civil dispute between the parties. PW 2 has further admitted that appellant Lakhan used to visit her mother-in-law and claims to be related with them. According to this witness, the P.O. was situated about 1 KM away from the village. She has further admitted that PW 3 Jogendra Guiyan was married with her sister-in-law. This Jogendra Guiyan asserted that he saw injuries on the person of PW 2. This witness has admitted that he has not seen the occurrence and when he reached at the P.O., everything was finished. She has further admitted that PW 3 Jogendra Guiyan was married with her sister-in-law. This Jogendra Guiyan asserted that he saw injuries on the person of PW 2. This witness has admitted that he has not seen the occurrence and when he reached at the P.O., everything was finished. He has also admitted that the land was in civil dispute between the parties. 7. PW 4, Suman Lal Guiyan himself asserted that he has seen the occurrence with his own eyes but he admitted that the FIR was lodged by his wife. He further admitted that he has not informed the village Sarpanch or Mukhia regarding the incident. 8. It is apparent from the materials on record that one of the injured, daughter of the informant Jasmati, though said to be injured, has not been examined by the prosecution without any apparent reason. PW 5 and 6 have formally proved the signature of the Officer-in-charge on the FIR and on the case diary, Exts.2, 3 and 4, PW 7, Dr. R.K. Ramesh examined the informant Dhibri Kui and her daughter Jasmati at about 2.30 PM on 10 October, 1993. He has found one sharp cut injury, one lacerated wound on the scalp of the informant and one cut wound on right index finger on her daughter. According to him, the injuries, on the informant, were simple in nature. The injury reports are marked as Exts. 5 and 5/1. 9. From perusal of the materials on record, it is apparent that the paddy was grown on a plot of land, which according to the prosecution and the defence, was disputed. The point, therefore, remains that the paddy was being harvested on a disputed plot, which is claimed by the appellants. In this context the informant has not produced any document in support of her possession over the land in question. It is further found that the witnesses have not consistently supported the manner, in which the assault was made. The injury reports brought on records, vide Ext. 5 and 5/1. also stand uncorroborated with the evidence of eye witnesses. However, if P.W. 4, the husband of the informant, was present at the P.O., no where it has come on record that he tried to intervene and protect his wife when the assault was being made. It shows that he was not present at the time of the alleged occurrence. also stand uncorroborated with the evidence of eye witnesses. However, if P.W. 4, the husband of the informant, was present at the P.O., no where it has come on record that he tried to intervene and protect his wife when the assault was being made. It shows that he was not present at the time of the alleged occurrence. All the witnesses, PWs 2, 3 and 4, are related and interested. The absence of injured Jasmati also creates a reasonable doubt in the prosecution story. 10. Having regard to the above mentioned facts and circumstances, I find and hold that the prosecution has failed to prove that the appellants have actually assaulted the informant in the manner alleged on 10th October, 1993 and failed to establish the prosecution story beyond all reasonable doubts. 11. In the facts and circumstances, I find and hold that the present appeal has got merit and deserves to be allowed. The appellants are acquitted of the chares leveled against them. 12. In the result, this appeal is allowed and the judgment and conviction and order of sentence dated 20.12.2000 is set aside. The appellants are on bail, they are discharged from the liability of their bail bonds.