Mohd. Riyaj S/o Abdul Latif v. State of Madhya Pradesh through the District Magistrate and Mohd. Ajeej S/o
2006-04-27
A.K.SHRIVASTAVA
body2006
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment ( 1. ) THIS revision petition has been directed against the judgment dated 5/9/1996 passed by 1st Additional Sessions Judge, Khandwa in Criminal Appeal No. 53/96 whereby the judgment dated 23/9/1996 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class Khandwa in Criminal Case No. 700/94 has been affirmed. ( 2. ) NO exhaustive statements of facts are necessary for disposal of this revision petition. Suffice it to state that the applicants, on the basis of the report lodged by respondent No. 2, were prosecuted under Section 448, IPC, (sic ). Since, the prosecution was not adducing evidence and did not examine the witnesses for a considerable long time, the trial Court closed the evidence of the prosecution and eventually the applicants were acquitted. ( 3. ) THEREAFTER the applicants submitted an application under Section 456, Cr. P. C. before the trial Court praying therein that possession of the house be delivered to them, since they have not been convicted and have been acquitted. The trial Court dismissed the application against which an appeal was preferred by the present applicants which has also been dismissed by the impugned judgment. Hence, this revision petition has been filed by the present applicants. ( 4. ) IT has been argued by Shri H. S. Dubey and Shri Abhinav Dubey, learned Counsel for the applicants that all the applicants were acquitted for the offence punishable under Section 448, IPC and if that is the position, the trial Court ought to have allowed the application filed by them under Section 456 Cr. P. C. In support of their contention learned Counsel have placed reliance on Subhan v. State 1974 CRI. L. J 731 ( 5. ) PER contra, Shri Samdarshi Tiwari, learned Govt. Advocate, by inviting my attention to Sub-section (1) of Section 456, Cr. P. C. , has submitted that the applicants have no right to ask for possession, According to learned Government Advocate this right is given to the person who was illegally dispossessed by the accused persons. Thus, according to learned Government Advocate, the two Courts below did not commit any error in passing the impugned judgment and, therefore, this revision petition be dismissed. ( 6. ) AFTER having heard learned Counsel for the parties, I am of the view that this petition deserves to be dismissed. ( 7.
Thus, according to learned Government Advocate, the two Courts below did not commit any error in passing the impugned judgment and, therefore, this revision petition be dismissed. ( 6. ) AFTER having heard learned Counsel for the parties, I am of the view that this petition deserves to be dismissed. ( 7. ) THE main contention of learned Counsel for the applicants is that since all the accused/applicants have been acquitted from the offence punishable under Section 448, IPC, therefore, the applicants are entitled to take back possession under Section 456 (1) Cr. P. C. On bare perusal of Section 456 (1) Cr. PC. , it is luminously clear that the possession may be restored to the persons who have been evicted by the persons who are convicted of an offence attended by criminal force or show of force or by criminal intimidation. This section cannot be stretched to the extent to benefit the accused persons if they are acquitted. If according to the accused persons, they have been illegally dispossessed during the pendency of the prosecution they are free to avail civil remedy. The decision of Subhan (supra) on which reliance placed by learned Counsel for the applicants is tangentially off the point. In that case the accused persons were convicted under Section 448, IPC and while hearing revision petition against their conviction, it was held by Allahabad High Court that the entry of the accused persons was bonafide and, therefore, the provisions of Section 448, IPC were not applicable. The facts of present case are totally different. ( 8. ) FOR the reasons stated herein above, I do not find any merit in this revision petition and the same is hereby dismissed.