JUDGMENT PRADIP MOHANTY, J. — This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 29.04.1991 passed by the learned J.M.F.C., Berhampur in 3(a) C.C. Case No.4 1990/T.R. No.138 of 1990, acquitting the respondent of the offence under Section 385-A of the Orissa Municipal Act (for short ‘the Act’). 2. The case of the appellant is that on 28.09.1989 and thereafter it was found that the accused-respondent had con¬structed a building in the main road, Gosaninuagam Street, abut¬ting to public road in Ward No.23 within Berhampur Municipality area without obtaining any permission. Thereby,he had contravened the provisions of Sections 264 and 266 of the Act. 3. The plea of the respondent was complete denial of the allegation. 4. Three witnesses were examined and five documents exhib¬ited on behalf of the appellant to prove its case. But, none was examined on behalf of the defence in order to substantiate its plea. Learned J.M.F.C., who tried the case, by his judgment dated 29.04.1991 acquitted the accused-respondent of the offence with the finding that the prosecution has miserably failed to prove the guilt of the accused-respondent under Section 385-A of the Act and also that the case being barred by limitation is not maintainable. 5. Mr. Choudhury appearing for the appellant submitted that the learned Magistrate grossly erred in law in holding that the case is barred by limitation since cognizance had been taken beyond the prescribed period of limitation. According to him, in case of violation of the provisions of the Act, the period of limitation for filing prosecution report is one year and the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure are subject to the provisions of the Special Act. He further submitted that no service of show cause notice is contemplated under Sections 264 and 266 of the Act and the trial Court has committed manifest error in acquitting the accused-respondent for non-service of such notice. 6. The point for determination is whether the period of limitation as prescribed by the Code of Criminal Procedure or that provided under the Act will apply to the instant case. Section 347 of the Act reads as under :- “347. 6. The point for determination is whether the period of limitation as prescribed by the Code of Criminal Procedure or that provided under the Act will apply to the instant case. Section 347 of the Act reads as under :- “347. Persons empowered to prosecute - Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, no person shall be tried for any offence against the provisions of this Act,or of any rule, regula¬tion or bye-law made under it, unless a complaint is made by the police or the Executive Officer of a Municipality or by a person expressly authorized in this behalf by the Municipality or its Executive Officer, within three months of the commission of the offence. But nothing herein shall affect the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Act 5 of 1898) in regard to power of certain Magistrate to take cognizance of offences upon information received or upon their own knowledge or suspicion: Provided that failure to take out a licence or obtain per¬mission under this Act shall, for the purposes of this section, be deemed a continuing offence until the expiration of the peri¬od, if any,for which the licence or permission is required, and if no period if specified, complaint may be made at any time within twelve months from the commencement of the offence.” From a bare reading of the above provision, it is crystal clear that the Police, or the Executive Office or any person authorised in this behalf by the Executive Officer, within three months of the commission of the offence shall file a complaint before the Magistrate.In the proviso, it is provided that for continuing offences, a complaint shall be filed within twelve months from the commencement of the offence. But with regard to taking cognizance of any offence, the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure will apply. Chapters- XIV and XV respectively provide for conditions requisite for initiation of proceedings and complaints to Magistrates.Chapter XXXVI thereof provides limitation for taking cognizance of certain offences. But with regard to taking cognizance of any offence, the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure will apply. Chapters- XIV and XV respectively provide for conditions requisite for initiation of proceedings and complaints to Magistrates.Chapter XXXVI thereof provides limitation for taking cognizance of certain offences. Section 468 occurring in the said Chapter, which envisages bar to taking cognizance after lapse of the period of limitation, runs as follows:- “468.Bar to taking cognizance after lapse of the period of limitation - (1) Except as otherwise provided elsewhere in this Code, no Court shall take cognizance of an offence of the cate¬gory specified in Sub-section (2) after the expiry of the period of limitation. (2) The period of limitation shall be - (a) six months, if the offence is punishable with fine only; (b) one year, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year; (c) three years, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding one year but not exceeding three years. (3) For the purposes of this section, the period of limita¬tion in relation to offences which may be tried together, shall be determined with reference to the offence which is punishable with the more severe punishment or, as the case may be, the most severe punishment.” 7. Section 385A of the Act provides for penalty, and the maximum penalty is fine of Rs.500/-. In other words, the offence alleged is punishable with fine only. The period of limitation for such an offence, as envisaged under Section 468(2)(a) Cr.P.C., is six months from the date of occurrence. In the in¬stant case, the unauthorized construction was allegedly noticed on 09.09.1989, prosecution report was filed on 28.03.1990 and the Court took cognizance on the same day. The offence alleged being punishable with fine only, the period of limitation for submis¬sion of prosecution report is six months from the date of occur¬rence, as envisaged under Section 468(2)(a) Cr.P.C. Though ac¬cording to the learned counsel for the appellant the period of limitation under section 347 of the Act is 12 months, perusal of the said Section shows that nothing therein shall affect the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 in regard to the power of certain Magistrate to take cognizance of offences. Therefore, there is no force in the said contention. Therefore, there is no force in the said contention. The prosecu¬tion report having been filed on 05.07.1991, it can safely be held that the same was beyond the period of limitation. There¬fore, the trial Court has rightly held that the prosecution report is barred by limitation. 8. As regards service of notice, Section 273-A of the Act provides that the Executive Officer shall serve a copy of the provisional order made under Sub-section (1) on the owner of the building or well together with a notice requiring him to show-cause within a reasonable time to be mentioned in such notice. In the instant case, there is no material before this Court that Ext.2 was duly served on the accused-respondent. The original Tapal Peon register has not been produced to show that the notice was received by the accused-respondent. 9. In view of the above, this Court is not inclined to interfere with the impugned judgment. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. Appeal dismissed.